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Abstract 
This study aims to determine the relationship between agency and freedom and it has 
developed a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that explains an agent’s decisions with a focus on 
freedom. Here, based on Berlin’s (1958) ideas we have conceptualised positive and negative 
sides of freedom with a focus on agency. Meanwhile, agency is defined and measured in three 
following modes: (A) the conative mode is developed based on Sen’s (2007) capability 
approach, (B) the cognitive mode is conceptualised based on Weber’s (1993) rationality types 
and Bakhtin’s (1935) dialogism, and (C) the affective mode is developed based on Weiner’s 
(2010) attribution theory of emotion. A Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is tested and developed in 
five empirical studies that include 21 in-depth interviews, two surveys on career choice of 1063 
employees and a university major selection of 4086 students in Iran, and finally the theory is 
applied to one case study that explains an entrepreneur’s agency-freedom relationship after a 
business failure. In summary, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency establishes that freedom matters 
but having agency to give up freedom in pursuit of one’s values ought to be the primary 
aspiration. This study can be exploited in the field of social psychology, appraisal psychology 
and organisational behaviour to understand an agent’s decisions in a social context with a focus 
on her freedom.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Introduction and Background 
This chapter provides an overview of the background to, and motivation for, the current 
study. First, it presents the rationale and boundaries of the research and then it outlines the 
significance, primary objectives, research questions, background and context. The chapter 
concludes with the contributions and outlines of the thesis. 
Agency is an important subject in human behaviour because human beings need to be 
the agents of their own life (Bandura, 2015; Snow et al., 2015; Gangas, 2015). In other words, 
individuals need to be in control of what they do/be (Rajala et al., 2016); to create change 
(Pesch, 2015); to be evaluated according to their own values (Dorrance Kennedy, 2015; 
Washburn and Nowak, 2015); and to be responsible for their own actions (Lepron et al., 2015) 
in order to feel happier (Vlase and Sieber, 2015) and to accomplish higher wellbeing (Bosmans 
et al., 2015). Agency is emphasised as the core construct of professionalism (Jääskelä et al., 
2016), creativity, collaboration and dynamism (Paloniemi and Collin, 2012). Thus a large 
amount of research has been conducted with the aim of understanding agency (Eisenhardt, 
1989; McCann et al., 2016). In this line, some researchers have studied agency with a focus on 
‘motivation’ in the field of psychology (Deci and Ryan, 2012, 2008, 2000, 1985), while others 
have concentrated on person-environment interactions, devoting their research particularly to 
the cultural (Conner et al., 2015; Sharp et al., 2015) and social aspects of environment 
(Bandura, 2015, 2012, 1977). Meanwhile, some psychologists have studied agency by 
investigating how obedient one can become in an authoritative environment (Milgram, 2015, 
1963), and how one’s voluntary actions are perceived by others (Jabbari and Kheiri, 2016). The 
problem is that agency has hardly been studied with a focus on freedom (as necessity). As 
evidence, recent reviews demonstrate that agency-oriented findings are narrowed to agency-
structure in the field of sociology of education (Brock et al., 2016), the agency-action link in the 
area of policymaking (McCann et al., 2016), the agency-environment association in computer 
science (Limerick et al., 2015), agency-diplomacy (Holmes, 2016) and agency-emotion (Steele, 
2016) relationships in International Relations (IR), the agency-anger connection with a focus on 
women in violent relationships (Ullman, 2016), the child-mother agency in the context of conflict 
(Ochen, 2015) and youth agency in education (Hart, 2014), with only a small number of 
empirical studies on an agent’s freedom in decision making (e.g. Baaren et al., 2015) as an 
agency outcome. 
To understand agency it is important to determine its relationship with freedom (Sen, 
1999), as the main challenge in understanding agency is that individuals have a tendency to get 
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involved in counterintuitive decisions (Arlegi and Teschl, 2015) and give up their freedom of 
choosing the available options that are judged as desirable options (Correia, 2016), either due 
to “weakness of will” (Davidson, 2014), emotion (Damasio et al., 2015), or when an agent is 
committed to certain values (Sen, 2011). The additional problem is that the majority of the 
studies on the agency-freedom literature are conducted mainly in the field of philosophy 
(Steward, 2015; Ludwig, 2016). Accordingly, the ground-breaking view on agency-freedom is 
Berlin's (1969) ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ that defines freedom from the two viewpoints of the 
positive (i.e. what/who is the source of action) and the negative (i.e. the space within which one 
is free to exercise her will). The positive freedom recognises the rational-affect duality of human 
beings (Simhony, 2014), while the negative side is about the importance of locating this person 
in an environment (Haugaard, 2016). Further, there are other philosophers that have not 
focused primarily on “agency” but their research is closely related, such as the studies on the 
voices that are subjugated in front of authorities (Bakhtin, 1935; Freedman and Ball, 2004); the 
studies in the field of sociology particularly in Weber's (1993) theory that argues a modern 
individual’s freedom is bounded by bureaucracy, because one standard way of living is forced 
on people and they rationalise their decisions according to those norms. Weber (1993) argues 
that in these modern societies individuals turn into bureaucrats, who have low freedom (Kalberg, 
1980). However, the problem is that Weber (1993) and many others are not covering the 
freedom-agency relationship. 
Today, one of the ground-breaking theories on the agency-freedom relationship is in the 
field of developmental economics, that is Sen's (2010, 2007, 1999, 1977, 1976, 1973) Capability 
Approach that emphasises the important role of agency in promoting freedom and wellbeing 
(Gammage et al., 2016), which also fosters national economic development (Gangas, 2015). 
Recent reviews (Gammage et al., 2016; Robertson, 2015) have repeated Sen's (1985) initial 
call for more agency-oriented studies on freedom. In this vein, this study draws attention to the 
problem that the freedom-agency relationship is not clear in a way that when one says ‘I chose 
to be/do something’, it is not clear how agentic the decision is made (Hampshire, 2016) and how 
her freedom is expanded/contracted by this decision. Figure 1 presents the scope of this 
research and our aim is to determine the relationship between agency and freedom. In this 
regard, we establish that this relationship can be clarified by evaluating an agent’s decision 
trajectories with focus on her values at the cognitive, conative and affective modes of the 
decision-making process. The following sections present the importance of conducting this 
study. 
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Figure 1: The scope of this research 
 
 
 
Rationale and the Boundaries of the Research 
The question is why it is important to clarify the agency-freedom relationship. It is shown 
that clarifying this relationship is important from social and personal perspectives (Hitlin and 
Kwon, 2016; Limerick et al., 2015). From the social view it is important to show how the 
environment coerces one to obey a set of norms (Brock et al., 2016). No doubt, the members of 
each social group need to obey certain standards in order for a society to exist and survive 
(Lubchenco, 1998; Rousseau, 1920). However, the problem is that in many social groups the 
individual members will lose their own personal agency (Ludwig, 2016). The manifestation of 
this view is the modern societies in which their individual members are not living according to 
their own personal values (Cockerham, 2015). However, the problem is that it is not clear what 
factors influence one to do/be what she has reason to value with respect to social boundaries 
(Mitchell et al., 2015).  
This ambiguity has challenged research to identify the reasons behind the so-called 
‘counterintuitive’ decisions that are made contrary to the rational judgment of external observers 
(Correia, 2016). In addition, research is struggling to understand the decisions that are made 
Research Background
Philosophy
‘freedom, 
agency,
& worldview’
Social Psychology 
‘freedom & agency’
Economy: 
‘decision, 
freedom, 
agency’
Appraisal 
psychology:
emotion & 
decision
Scope
of
Study 
Sociology:
‘rationality 
& freedom’
 18 
contrary to an agent’s own judgment, due to her “weakness of will” (Davidson, 2014), emotion 
(Damasio et al., 2015) and/or commitment to certain values (Sen, 1977). For example, why 
some young Westerners become interested in Radical Islamism and decide to join terrorist 
groups (Berger, 2016); why some Muslim women protest against the Hijab Ban in public spaces 
in France (Zempi, 2016; Chantler et al., 2009); why many young students choose to study 
subjects in which they have no personal interest (Gibbs and Dean, 2015; Rajala et al., 2016); 
why increasing numbers of employees decide to change their job although they receive 
generous financial rewards (Shirakawa, 2016; Schulte Steinberg et al., 2015); why employees 
voluntarily participate in work-related actions that contribute to organisational functions and 
career growth without the authority’s prescription or reward (Wang et al., 2014); and why 
entrepreneurs choose to undergo the heavy responsibility of starting a new business although 
they face financial instability and job insecurity (Adam and Fayolle, 2015). The aim of this study 
is to determine the agency-freedom relationship by developing a theory that can be applied to 
these scenarios and similar cases. Notwithstanding, the present study focuses on the string that 
connects all of these different examples, which is the link between agency and freedom (as 
necessary). In this line, the present research has developed a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and 
has applied it to one scenario in which an entrepreneur decides to continue with his start-up 
after a major business failure, even though this decision would limit his freedom to live a 
comfortable life, enjoying job security and short-term financial satisfaction (see Chapter 6, Case 
Study).  
Understanding the agency-freedom relationship is also important at the individual level. 
This is because this endeavour sheds light on the axiological constraints that individuals impose 
on their own decisions (Rainio and Hilppö, 2016). The best examples are modern bureaucrats 
who are following institutional norms, even when these norms are contradicting their own 
personal values (Cockerham, 2015). It seems as if modern human beings are blind to the 
bureaucratic strings on their freedom of choice (Milgram, 1963). In the 1980s, individuals who 
had lost their agency in modern societies left their comfortable life and travelled to the East in 
order to find a different cause for living (Bourgeois, 2015). Its best example is the hippie 
counterculture that is regarded as an important part of massive upheavals of the 1960s 
concerned with civil rights, Black Power, feminism, gay liberation, and environmentalism 
(Rorabaugh, 2015). Recently the same endeavour has had vital consequences as some 
individuals whose agency is contracted in Western societies have found the cause of their life in 
Radical Islamism (Berger, 2016). On the other hand, those who stay in the developed countries 
are not immune to the domino effects of living with low levels of agency. As evidence, there are 
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increasing number of individuals who lose their agency to create change (Rajala et al., 2016), to 
be creative and innovative (Sullivan, 2013), to be satisfied at work and at home (Cuyper and 
Witte, 2015), to work with commitment (McGeer, 2015), to stay loyal to their belongings, 
organisation and co-workers (Domingo, 2015). The employee whose agency is contracted can 
easily leave her job, even if the organisation has invested in training her and requires her 
productivity (Kaynak et al., 2015). More importantly, the individuals with low levels of agency do 
not perceive themselves as responsible for their own actions and they tend to relieve the 
pressure of commitment and discharge responsibilities to higher-ranked authorities (Lepron et 
al., 2015). Hence, it is important to study these challenges in organisations and larger social 
settings (McCann et al., 2016). Further, it is important to identify the agentic factors that 
associated with an individual’s freedom of choice, in order to understand why one makes a 
counterintuitive or incontinent decision, which are determined contrary to social and personal 
judgments (Gammage et al., 2016). In this line, the present research focuses on the agency-
freedom relationship and the boundaries of this research have been outlined according to this 
purpose.  
 
The Research Questions 
In order to narrow down the investigation and focus on the research aim and objectives, 
this study has developed the following research questions: 
• First Research Question: What factors influence one’s agency to do/be what she 
values? 
• Second Research Question: What is the implication of agency-oriented factors for 
the expansion/contraction of the agent’s freedom? 
 
 
Aims and Objectives 
In order to improve the judgment reliability that observers hold on others’ decisions, 
particularly the choices that are made contrary to external judgment (i.e. counterintuitive 
decisions) and those decisions that are made contrary to an agent’s personal judgment (i.e. 
incontinent decisions), this study has pursued the following aim and two objectives. In a non-
technical way, the present study aims to understand when one says “I chose to do/be 
something”, how internally driven this statement is and the extent to which this decision is 
bounded by the external factors or the factors that are not within her control due to weakness of 
will, emotion or environmental constraints. For example, when an employee decides to leave an 
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organisation and she says “I chose to leave this firm”, the extent to which her decision is 
emotional, rational, and limited by constraints such as financial limitations. In this vein, a 
technical way of investigating the internal aspects of the factors influencing one’s decisions is 
focusing on her agency. Further, a technical way of understanding person-environment 
interaction in decision making is focusing on freedom. For example, when an employee decides 
to leave the organisation, the role of values, authorities, and discourse between various 
standpoints matter in her decision. These elements are captured under the technical umbrella of 
freedom. Figure 2 presents research aim and objectives, which are presented in the technical 
terminology of agency and freedom studies:   
• Aim: Determine the relationship between personal agency and freedom 
• First Objective: Identify the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom. 
• Second Objective: Establish how freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-
oriented factors. 
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Figure 2. Research Aim and Objectives 
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Context 
To answer the above-mentioned research questions, we use a mixed methodology that 
includes 21 in-depth interviews, two large surveys (N:1063 and N:4086) and one case study. 
Due to accessibility issues the empirical data is collected from Iran. The host organisation is a 
private franchise educational organisation, which is comprised of 450 branches and covers the 
largest number of students among other private institutions (60%) at pre-university level 
(455,897 in 2015), with a large number of employees (15,858 in 2015) in 450 rural and urban 
cities in Iran. This organisation is a private entrepreneurial institution that offers three main 
educational services: (a) holding biweekly affirmative assessments at national level to test the 
students’ academic performance based on the school curriculum; (b) providing educational 
support and planning through a personal tutor; and (c) developing educational products 
including books, videos, and multimedia products.  
 
Outline of the Thesis 
This study is divided into nine chapters that are outlined as follows: 
Chapter 1: Introduction: this introduces the background of the study to identify the 
scope of research. It presents an introduction to the boundaries of research to explore what are 
the novel aspects of this research. The chapter also highlights the original aim, objectives, and 
research questions followed by the research context and outline. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review: this identifies the main gap in the literature regarding the 
agency-freedom relationship. In this regard, two gaps are identified and supported by the state 
of the art that leads us towards the research questions and objectives. 
Chapter 3: Research Methodology: this shows why and how we use Critical Realism 
as the philosophical foundation of our research approach to determine the agency-freedom 
relationship. It justifies why we use mixed methods to pursue our research enquiry. Further, it 
presents a detailed overview of the research-specific methodological concerns and ethical 
considerations regarding the notions of agency and freedom.  
Chapter 4: Theory Development: this presents the development process of the Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency that starts from a conceptual framework and a Capability-based 
Decision Model. It explains the limitations of the first model and our attempt to address these 
shortcomings in the cognitive, affective and conative modes of agency. 
Chapter 5: Data Collection, Analysis, and Findings: this chapter has four studies, 
which are designed to cover the enquiry of the two research questions. 
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• Study 1, Deductive-Inductive Development: includes seven in-depth interviews on career 
choice and results in 11 themes of agency-oriented factors according to which the first 
version of the Evaluation Instrument is developed to identify agency-oriented factors 
influencing freedom (1st RQ). 
• Study 2, Deductive-Inductive Development: an online survey is conducted on a sample of 
1063 employees on their career choice, using Explanatory Factor Analysis (EFA), the 1st 
version of the Evaluation Instrument is revised in eight themes that are measured by 10 
‘self’ and 11 ‘other’ factors from the two standpoints of the agents and others. 
• Study 3, Deductive-Inductive-Abductive Development and Amendment: another online 
survey is conducted on a sample of 4086 students on their university major selection, using 
EFA and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), the 2nd version of the Evaluation Instrument 
is developed with eight ‘self’ and nine ‘other’ factors that explain more than 60% of the 
variance in the data set. The factors are explained by Weber's (1993) rationality types, 
Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism and Weiner's (2010) emotions in the Attribution Theory of 
Motivation. 
• Study 4, Inductive-Abductive Amendment: 14 in-depth interviews are conducted using the 
final version of the Evaluation Instrument and all three modes of agency (affective, conative, 
and cognitive) are empirically developed according to the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The 
findings are explained by Sen's (1999) Capability Approach, Weber's (1993) rationality 
types, Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism and Weiner's (2010) emotions in the Attribution Theory of 
Motivation. 
Chapter 6: Case Study: this applies the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to one case study 
and determines the agency-freedom relationship of an entrepreneur after a failure when he 
decides to keep his start-up. 
Chapter 7: Theory Evaluation: this identifies the rival theories of the Tri-Modal Theory 
of Agency and compares it with: (a) Deci and Ryan's (2012, 2008, 2002, 2000) Self-
Determination Theory; (b) Douglas's (2007, 2004) Grid-Group Cultural Theory; (c) Milgram's 
(2015, 2009, 1963) Agency Theory; (d) Kruglanski's (1975) Exogenous-Indigenous Attribution 
Theory; and (e) Bandura's (2015, 2012, 1977) Human Agency Theory. This chapter concludes 
with the contributions of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to the area of agency and freedom. 
Chapter 8: Discussion: this discusses the findings according to the research aim and 
objectives. The chapter shows why the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is significant in measuring 
agency level with respect to freedom.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion: this concludes with mapping research findings onto research 
questions, showing that this research has been successful in identifying agency-oriented factors 
that expand/contract freedom. The limitations and contributions of this study are explained in six 
areas. This thesis ends by proposing several research questions and calling for future research 
on the consequential role of agency-outcome (i.e. decision) on agency-freedom linkage, 
comparing different agency-levels, expanding the empirical aspect of the affective mode of 
agency, and testing the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in different cultures. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
This chapter identifies the gaps in the agency-freedom literature that lead us towards our 
research questions, objectives and the overall aim of determining the agency-freedom 
relationship. Figure 3 shows the overall image of the logical argument that leads us towards the 
research question, the gaps, objectives and aim. Here, the research problem is that when one 
says ‘I chose to do/be something’, it is not clear how agency-oriented or internally-driven this 
decision is made. This problem is more complex in understanding incontinent decisions when a 
decision is made contrary to personal judgment (e.g. a bankrupt businessman decides to 
gamble, even though she is aware of the harmful consequences of this decision) (David et al., 
2015; Davidson, 2014), or counterintuitive decisions that are made contrary to other’s 
judgement (Sen, 1977) (e.g. when Darwin decided to reveal his theory of evolution contrary to 
the established belief about the origin of species at that time (Smith, 2015). These examples 
may seem too extreme in terms of the person-environment dilemma in the decision-making 
process, but in any decision an individual has to deal with what she wants and what society and 
environment as a whole require her to do/be (Correia, 2016). Our research problem in a simple 
way is that it is not clear how internally this statement is made ‘I chose to do/be something’.  
This is a crucial problem, as recent findings have shown that similar to the puzzle of 
internal-external influencers, an emotion-reason interaction is also a puzzle in understanding 
human decisions. It is found that an individual is not conscious about all of her decision motives 
(Clark, 2015), and in many decisions the affective and rational factors are opposing (e.g. one 
makes a rational choice to stop eating sugar, because she is suffering from obesity, but at the 
same time she is craving for a marshmallow) (Mischel, 2015). These examples about the puzzle 
of the emotion-reason interaction in decision making (Cian et al., 2015), weakness of will (David 
et al., 2015), and the person-environment dilemma in the decision process (i.e. the extent to 
which one is free to do what she personally wants in an environment that limits her actions) 
(Cockerham, 2015) can be conceptualised in the two notions of ‘agency’ and ‘freedom’ and their 
relationship (Berlin, 1958). In the present chapter we show that although ‘agency’ is being 
defined in relation to ‘freedom’ in the fields of economics (David et al., 2015) and philosophy 
(Stapleton and Froese, 2016), but the main gap in the literature is that agency and freedom are 
extensively being studied in isolation, and the problem is that their inter-relationship is poorly 
understood. This chapter reviews the literature to show how we have arrived at this gap and the 
research questions. Further, we review the literature on why it is important to address these 
questions.  
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Figure 3: Logical Argument 
 
Note: Rationale boxes summarise the studies whose findings imply the importance of conducting the present research. 
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Agency 
As mentioned above, a simple presentation of our research problem is analysing how 
internally driven is the statement ‘I chose to do/be something’. To address this problem, we 
review the literature on the main notions in this statement that are: (A) ‘I’ that is what/who makes 
the decision (i.e. the decision maker); (B) ‘choosing to do/be’ that is the process of decision 
making (i.e. decision making); and (C) ‘something’ that is what the decision maker has chosen 
to do/be (i.e. decision). Here, we review the literature on each of these three notions with 
respect to how agency-oriented or internally driven each of these notions are involved in the 
decision-making process.  
 
Decision Maker  
Regarding the ‘I’ or what/who makes the decision, there are two camps in the literature, 
considering that there is a spectrum of views between these two positions. At one end of this 
spectrum, we have rationalists whose views of the characteristics of decision makers have their 
roots in the ideas of Gary Becker (1993, 1976) and standard economics, assuming that a 
decision maker is a rational being (Thaler, 2016), and her decisions can be understood by her 
utility function, particularly her pecuniary motivations (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). This 
perspective neglects two important aspects of decision makers: (A) the psychological mode of 
human beings that is about emotion and the psychological complexities in human behaviour 
(Kahneman, 2014, 2012; Thaler, 2016; Thaler et al., 2010), and (B) the person-environment 
interaction that is about the role of norms, identity and social categories on the decision maker 
(Akerlof and Shiller, 2015; Akerlof, 2016).  
In front of this rationalist camp, a behavioural position has been developed that 
considers a human being’s judgmental biases (e.g. Kahneman, 2012; Kahneman and Tversky, 
2000), bounded rationality (Chrisman et al., 2014; Simon, 1991), mind-body division (Haidt, 
2006a), and emotion-rationality conflict (Damasio et al., 2015) to identify decision makers. This 
view has considered neuroscientific findings that the automatic side of the brain is in charge of 
most of the decisions that a human being makes in her life (Arvai, 2013; Deaves, 2012; Denham, 
2012). Within this camp, several decision models have been developed with a focus on the 
influence of different factors on human behaviour such as social identify (Akerlof, 2016a), 
psychology (Thaler, 2016), biases (Kahneman, 2012, 2003), altruism (Arlegi and Teschl, 2015; 
Davis, 2004; Sen, 1977), and one’s craving for happiness that is not just about pecuniary 
satisfaction (Layard, 2010, 2006). The behavioural camp considers both the affective and 
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cognitive sides of human beings, leading an individual to make a decision not only to maximise 
self-interest and for sympathy, but also for altruistic reasons and for the sake of others (Sen, 
1990). Within this perspective, both affective and cognitive modes of decision makers are 
regarded as the source of rational and planned decisions (Thaler, 2016). In other words, the 
affective state of being is not dismissed in rational behaviour in favour of the cognitive state 
(Cian et al., 2015; Kahneman, 2003b, 1991). This position has been supported by the recent 
findings in the field of neuroscience (see Damasio, 2012, 2004; Damasio et al., 2015).  
Hence, research into the question of how internally driven is the statement ‘I chose to 
do/be something’ must be clear about its position regarding the rationalist and behavioural 
standpoints. In this line, the rationalist camp identifies the ‘I’ in ‘I chose to do/be something’ as a 
rational being, who selects the optimum option through cognitive analysis of all of the 
possibilities and in order to maximise her self-interest (Akerlof, 2016a; Thaler, 2016). On the 
other hand, the behavioural camp says that the decision maker (i.e. ‘I’ in ‘I chose to do/be 
something’) has both affective and cognitive sides (Haidt, 2006a; Kahneman, 2012), and does 
not solely decide to maximise her selfishness (Chrisman et al., 2014; Sen, 1977a) and her 
rationality is bounded (Augier, 2001), hence she chooses the satisfying option (Simon, 1990) 
and sometimes her decisions seem irrational to the external observer (Davidson, 2014, 2001). 
As evidence, the latter camp is appropriate within the scope of our research problem to show 
why incontinent and counterintuitive decisions are made. Hence, by following the second camp 
we arrive at the question ‘what factors influence one to do/be something? This question has 
been the focal point of agency-oriented studies such as Bandura's (2015, 2012) theory of 
agency; Milgram's (2015, 2009) agency theory that focuses on obedience; and Deci and Ryans' 
(2012, 2008, 2002) self-determination theory that focuses on motivation. In this line, our initial 
question needs to be rephrased to ‘what agency-oriented factors influence one to do/be 
something?’ As evidence, here we have arrived at the notion of agency within the scope of our 
research problem. In this line, before taking the review of the literature further, it is worth 
mentioning the research understanding around the following two notions about agency. First, 
what agency is, with a focus on the definitions of this concept in different disciplines, highlighting 
the focus of the present study. Second, what the main and recent debates are around the 
concept of agency and what is the position of the present study regarding the elements that we 
are investigating in relation to agency.  
The review of literature regarding the first question around the definition of agency 
shows that the idea of agency that is about a human individual being in control, responsible and 
the master of her own actions is a child of the Enlightenment era (Jääskelä et al., 2016). At that 
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time one of the main agency-oriented ideas has been that through education one’s autonomy 
over her actions will be fostered (Biesta and Tedder, 2007). This idea has survived, particularly 
within the realm of education. Since the 1980s this view of the concept of agency has turned 
into the focal point of several studies, notwithstanding agency has rarely been mentioned in an 
explicit manner (Eteläpelto et al., 2013). Further, the concept of agency has been used to cover 
the notions of empowerment, emancipation, and activators of human growth (Mežirov, 1981), 
while others have linked the expansion of individual agency to community development, 
implying that empowering the individuals’ agency can be interpreted as some kind of cultural 
action for freedom (Freire, 1970). As evidence, the concept of agency has been defined in 
relation to freedom. Before going further, it is worth mentioning that this take on agency that 
defines it with respect to freedom in social setting is the main focus of the present study. We 
need to position the present study within the scope of agency-oriented studies, because the 
review of the literature shows that in the social sciences, the notion of agency has been widely 
used in different fields in relation to other concepts such as autonomy (Bonneville-Roussy et al., 
2013), self-efficacy (van Dinther et al., 2011), goals and interests (Mikkonen et al., 2013) and 
intrinsic motivation (Mackenbach and McKee, 2013). As evidence, the notion of agency has 
been defined and studied with respect to the concerns of different disciplines and their 
epistemological and ontological roots (Jääskelä et al., 2016).  
In this vein, the social sciences have studied agency with a focus on: (A) an individual’s 
opportunities for active participation in social context and her influence on the world around her 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1995); (B) agency is studied as a socially constructed theme in relation 
to social relationships and the source of power (one of the dominant scholars in this area is 
Foucault (1975)); (C) agency is studied with a focus on the intentional source of actions and its 
relationship with power and its impact on social events (a seminal work in this area is Modernity 
and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age by Anthony Giddens (1991); (D) 
agency is defined with respect to an embedded sense of self in interaction with one’s 
surroundings (see Archer, 2007); and (E) agency is being defined in the realm of philosophy in 
relation to freedom, democracy and human rights and as a manifestation of one’s being in 
relation to others and particularly the sources of power (Berlin, 1970). Overall, the review of the 
literature shows that the concept of agency is being defined in the social sciences as an 
“individual’s capacity to engage in intentional, self-defined, meaningful and autonomous action 
which is constrained by power relations and structural, contextual factors” (Jääskelä et al., 
2016).  
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However, the main shortcoming in this above-mentioned definition of agency that has 
roots in the apparent isolation of different fields (sociology, philosophy, neuroscience and 
psychology) from each other is that the recent findings in each field have rarely been 
incorporated into the other fields. For example, neuroscience has rarely included the 
philosophers’ definitions of agency in its studies and vice versa (Limerick et al., 2015). As 
evidence, agency is defined by philosophers as one’s ability to decide based on her own values, 
to create change, to be responsible for her own actions and to be evaluated based on her own 
decisions (Sen, 1999). On the other hand, neuroscientists define agency as the “subjective 
experience of controlling one’s actions, and, through them, external events” (Caspar et al., 
2016). Meanwhile, social-cognitive psychologists define agency with respect to the source of 
human action, i.e. an individual’s consciousness intentions, self-reflection, and self-regulation 
(Jääskelä et al., 2016), in which Bandura's (2015, 2012, 1989, 1977) theory of agency is one of 
the dominant theories in this field.  
As evidence, the isolation of agency-oriented studies in different fields leads us an 
emerging debate in the agency-oriented studies where neuroscientists and psychologists argue 
that the philosophical definitions of agency are overrated (Smith, 2015), as recent findings in the 
realm of neuroscience have shown that most of the human decisions are made unconcise and 
even the conscious decisions are not within her complete control (Caspar et al., 2016). On the 
same bases, psychologist have found that individual’s prefer to dismiss the burden of 
responsibility and free-will in favour of following orders, because it is difficult to be the source of 
order (Milgram, 2015, 1965). Hence, the review of the literature regarding the second question 
of what are the main debates in relation to agency reveals that one of the emerging debates in 
this area is the extent to which agency is overrated/underestimated in different fields (Smith, 
2015). In this regard, the present study believes that agency needs to be understood by careful 
understanding of the impact of societal structures on opportunities and their influence on destiny. 
This position is in line with Sen's (1999) position on agency, which consequently implies two 
things. First, in line with psychologist (e.g. Milgram, 2015; Bandura, 2015) and neuroscientists 
(e.g. Caspar et al., 2016) the present study says that the self-processing activities of the mind 
regarding the affective, cognitive and conative modes of human individuals need to be 
considered in the definition and study of agency. Second, the social context and self-
environment relationship of agency needs to be considered in its definition and study, where the 
latter is possible by defining agency with respect to freedom, as suggested by David et al. 
(2015). Therefore, we will define agency in the theory that is derived from the literature (see 
Chapter 4, Part 1) that highlights these two positions regarding the definition of agency, within 
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the scope of our research problem, aim and objectives. Further, at the end of this study the 
notion of agency is defined thoroughly in relation to the notion of freedom. 
 
Decision Making 
So far, to analyse how agency-oriented is the statement ‘I chose to do/be something’, we 
have reviewed the literature on the notion of ‘I’ (i.e. the decision maker). This has led us towards 
the notion of agency and the question ‘what agency-oriented factors influence one to do/be 
something’. Here, we review the literature on the second part of this statement that is about 
“choosing to do/be”, which is about the act and process of decision making that is about the 
motivations (Akerlof, 2016a; Deci and Ryan, 2012; Thaler, 2016), constraints (Alkire, 2007a; 
Sen, 2011), and mechanisms (Dovidio and Fiske, 2012; Kahneman, 1991) of the decision 
process. Similar to the previous section, we review different aspects of the decision process 
from the two camps that have been identified in the previous section (i.e. the rationalist and the 
behavioural standpoints).  
The main difference between these two camps regarding the decision process is about 
the individual’s motivations. Rationalists believe that pecuniary motivations and utility 
maximisation can explain human decisions (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010), while the other camp 
that includes several behavioural economists (e.g. Thaler, 2016), social psychologists (Haidt, 
2006; Kahneman, 2012), neuroscientists (Caspar et al., 2016) and some philosophers like Sen 
(1999) and Gray (2015) believe that pecuniary motivations and utility maximisation are not 
enough to explain the decision-making process. One of the leading studies in the second (i.e. 
behavioural) camp is Kahneman's (1991) study on human judgemental biases that sheds light 
on the great number of biases in judgments and decision making processes. This is linked to 
the previous argument about decision makers where most human decisions have roots in 
unconscious and automatic brain activities, thus, decision making process is hardly within the 
control of human consciousness (Kahneman, 2003, 2002; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984, 1979, 
1977).  
Building on the so called human side of the decision process, Kahneman (2012) has 
built a decision theory that explains decision process based on the individuals’ attempt to 
minimise loss and to maximise gain (Kahneman, 2012, 2003, 1991). Further, behavioural 
economists like Thaler (2016) have followed the legacy of Kahneman’s (2012) ideas about the 
human side of decision-making analysis and a new strand of behavioural economics has been 
established that has tried to address the same questions of standard economics, with a human-
oriented lens on the decision process. In this line, one of the leading studies in behavioural 
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economics is Identity Economics by Akerlof and Kranton (2010) that tries to add social identity 
to the explanation of the decision-making process, particularly in the field of economics. Further, 
some social psychologists have developed some decision theories that explain decision process 
based on reciprocity and revenge as the underlining rules of decision making in social settings 
(Haidt, 2006). The behavioural aspect of the decision process has also been one of the main 
concerns in the field of organisational and management studies (Jackson et al., 2013). In this 
regard, one of the leading studies is Simon’s (1976) administrative theory that focuses on 
employees’ decision making processes, in relation to the source of authority in the organisations, 
highlighting that an individual chooses a satisficing option instead of the optimum one, given her 
bounded rationality and the limitations of the decision context. This view is still relevant and 
there have been several studies on the bounded-rationality and satisficing aspects of the 
decision-making process (Chrisman et al., 2014).  
Although, the behavioural aspect of decision making has had several main 
advancements based on several seminal works (e.g. Akerlof and Kranton, 2010; Kahneman, 
2012; Simon, 1959; Thaler et al., 2014), the studies that have roots in standard economics (e.g. 
Moscone and Tosetti, 2010; Salehi et al., 2013) that focus on rational models of decision 
making are still providing relevant implications that can be used to understand human behaviour 
in social settings (Chetty, 2015). Hence, there is still a debate on how to explain the human 
decision-making process with respect to the findings of both camps. In this vein, Sen's "Rational 
Fool" (1990, 1977) is one of the seminal works on this debate that argues that individuals make 
many decisions to maximise their self-centred interests, but they also make altruistic and other-
centred decisions. In this regard, he has suggested three types of decisions that are self-
centred, sympathetic and committed actions. Both sympathetic and committed actions are 
considering the other-centred motivation rather than the selfish aspects of human behaviour, but 
the different between these two (i.e. sympathetic and committed actions) is that in sympathetic 
actions one considers others as long as it is not against her self-centred motives, whereas in 
committed actions one may make a decision that is against her self-centred goals for the sake 
of others (Sen, 1977).  
Although Sen’s distinction between different types of other-centred decisions has been 
received well by several scholars in the field of decision making (Houk et al., 2016), the problem 
is how to operationalise these ideas to explain decision-making processes (Chiappero-Martinetti 
et al., 2015). In this line, it is suggested to focus on the value-laden aspects of decision in 
relation to others and self in order to understand the decision process (Arrow, 2012; Nussbaum, 
2004). Accordingly, the position of the present study is that in analysing the statement ‘what 
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agency-oriented factors influence one to do/be something’, we need to focus primarily on the 
characteristics of that ‘something’ with a focus on values according to which the decision maker 
is choosing to/be. Here, the question that emerges is that if that “something” is not narrowed to 
the rationalist perspective of maximising utility and pecuniary satisfaction (e.g. getting more 
income), then what are its value-laden characteristics and how this will influence our research 
enquiry. 
 
Decision 
So far, to analyse how agency-oriented is the statement ‘I chose to do/be something’, we 
have reviewed the literature on the notions of ‘I’ (i.e. the decision maker), and the act and 
process of ‘choosing to do/be’ (i.e. decision making). This has led us towards the research 
enquiry of ‘what agency-oriented factors influence one to do/be something’, and identifying the 
characteristics of that ‘something’ beside utility maximisation, with respect to the behavioural 
camp of understanding human behaviour. In this regard, as mentioned above one of the leading 
scholars that have focused on this question is Sen (2007, 2004, 1999, 1985), who has argued 
that utility maximisation and pecuniary motives matter in human decisions, but they are not the 
only things that matter in understanding human decisions. Sen (1999) develops Capability 
Approach (CA) and emphasises the role of capabilities and freedom of choice, plurality of 
values, the importance of process as well as outcome in understanding human decisions. CA 
has turned into one of the seminal works in understanding decisions with respect to values and 
freedom (Alkire and Deneulin, 2009; Clark, 2005; Nussbaum, 1997; Swain, 2015).  
In CA, utility matters within the scope of one’s capability set (i.e. the potential state of 
being/doing that one can choose and pursue) to achieve what she values (Clark, 2005). This is 
where the concept of freedom to do/be what one has reason to values will become the focal 
attention of social scientists, economists and philosophers (Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015). 
There is a wide literature emphasising the importance of understanding capabilities (Alkire, 
2007a, 2005; Swain, 2015), and an agent’s freedom to turn a capability into a state of 
being/doing that she has reason to value (Andersson et al., 2012; Clark, 2005; Swain, 2015). In 
this line to see ‘what agency-oriented factors influence one to do/be something’, the position of 
the present study is conceptualising that ‘something’ as the ‘freedom to live the life one has 
reason to value’. Here, the concept of freedom comes to the attention, because freedom is 
being defined with respect to the notions that are equally important to study agency, which are 
values (Berlin, 2014), rational-irrational behaviours (Houk et al., 2016), and  self-environment 
interaction (Carter, 2004).  
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Before going forward, it is worth defining freedom, even though a full definition of this 
concept and the notions related to freedom are explained in detail in the following section that is 
allocated to this concept. In short, freedom is defined in two senses. One sense is about human 
individual ability to do/be what she wants, and this sense is known as the positive side of 
freedom (Berlin, 1958).  Positive freedom is about the internal aspect of a human being, which 
includes the rational-irrational modes of being (Houk et al., 2016), the conscious-unconscious 
aspect of mind, and her emotions.  Further, freedom has another side that is about an agent not 
being interfered with or coerced by others or environment in an intentional way and this side of 
freedom is known as negative freedom (Berlin, 1958) that includes social contractions and the 
interaction of an agent with her surroundings. The dilemma of the positive-negative balance of 
freedom, or the extent to which an individual can do what she values in a social setting, 
considering the affective-cognitive sources of ‘self’ and the requirements of living in interaction 
with other individuals is one of the established and important questions for liberal scholars 
(Berlin, 1958; Sen, 1999) and policy makers. In some respects, here, we are focusing on the 
same question too, but through the lenses of agency and freedom. Accordingly, the initial 
question of how internally driven is the statement ‘I chose to do/be something’ is rephrased into 
what agency-oriented factors associated with freedom. The following section shows that there is 
a gap in addressing this specific question, which makes this enquiry our first research question. 
 
Gap in Agency-Oriented Studies 
Table 1 shows the review of the literature on what we know about the question of what 
agency-oriented factors influence one to do/be what she values. According to the findings of the 
existing studies in Table 1, there are several factors that have found to have an effect on the 
decisions and consequently different ways of lives that each individual chooses to have. As 
outlined in the second column of Table 1, these factors include emotion (Kassam, 2015; Lau et 
al., 2015; Marissa S. Edwards et al., 2016; Zeng et al., 2015), reason (Binkley et al., 2016; Houk 
et al., 2016), the emotion-reason relationship (Phelps et al., 2014), the rational-irrational way of 
thinking (Hyland et al., 2015), the conscious-unconscious divide (Cant et al., 2012), constraints 
(Harstad and Selten, 2013a; MacCallum, 1967; Malawska and Topping, 2016), values (Mitchell 
and Carson, 2013; Harris et al., 1989), judgements (Heather and Segal, 2015; Pahman, 2016; 
Reach, 2015) and self-environment interactions (Bleidorn and Ködding, 2013). As evidence, 
there is a gap in the literature regarding a unified theory that captures all of these agency-
oriented factors that influence one’s way of life. The final row of Table 1 is about the Heffernan 
and Wards (2015) study that shows it is possible to develop a theory with respect to human 
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agency, in order to assess her agency level with respect to the factors influencing it. In this line 
and relying on the recent findings in the areas of agency, decision making and freedom the 
present study tries to shed light on the existing gap, by developing a unified theory that identifies 
the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom (i.e. to do/be what she values). So far, 
through a review of the literature on agency and decision making we have arrived at the first 
research question and a research gap. Therefore, from this gap we identify our first research 
objective that is “identifying agency-oriented factors associated with freedom”. In the next 
section, we show why it is important to achieve this objective, relying on recent findings in this 
area. Further, we review the literature on freedom in relation to agency. 
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Table 1: Existing Findings Regarding Agency 
Study 
 
Focus 
 
Methodology 
 
Findings 
 
Implications for Us 
(Kassam, 
2015) 
 
Emotion-
Decision 
 
Review of emotion 
and decision making 
(35 years) 
 
Decisions can be affected by potent, 
pervasive, predictable, sometimes harmful 
and sometimes beneficial emotional 
drivers. 
 
Emotion matters to understand 
an agent’s behaviour. 
 
(Zeng et al., 
2015) 
 
Emotion and 
behaviour 
 
Meta-analytic review 
of 24 empirical 
studies (N = 1759) 
 
The nature of emotion and individual 
differences influences the decision results. 
 
Emotion matters to compare 
individuals’ behaviour. 
(Marissa S. 
Edwards et 
al., 2016) 
 
Emotion-
environment 
 
Modified grounded 
theory approach 
 
Emotion influences behaviour and 
encourages one to be silent in social 
settings. 
 
Emotion matters to understand 
an agent’s behaviour in social 
settings. 
(Lau et al., 
2015) 
 
Emotion-
Freedom 
 
Six experiments 
 
Outcome matters even more than process 
from the subjective view; i.e. it is the 
outcome of choosing that affects the 
subjective feeling of freedom, rather than 
the process of choosing (e.g. participants 
feel freer when choosing among two 
equally good options than two equally bad 
options). 
 
Emotion matters to understand 
freedom, and one’s evaluation of 
her state of being/doing should 
be studied to investigate her 
perception of freedom. 
(Binkley et 
al., 2016) 
 
Reason-
Agency 
 
 
This book includes 
philosophical papers 
on agency, reason 
and action. 
 
 
Human actions involve different levels of 
agency-orientations. Some actions happen 
to us; some actions are reasoned for; some 
actions are not.  
To understand human behaviour, the 
nature of her actions must be studied in 
relation to her reasoning process. 
 
Reason matters in an agent’s 
actions.  
(Houk et al., 
 
Reason-
 
Multidisciplinary 
 
Withholding/withdrawing options influence 
 
Reason matters in freedom. 
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2016) freedom study in Bioethics one’s preferences; i.e. her decision; i.e. if 
one’s rationality is subverted then her 
freedom to choose is influenced. 
(Hyland et 
al., 2015) 
 
Rational-
Irrational 
 
 
Experiment (N = 
313) and structured 
equation modelling 
 
 
Rational or irrational beliefs influence an 
individual’s responses to external stimulus.  
 
Rationality matters in 
understanding human 
behaviours in response to the 
external environment. 
(Phelps et 
al., 2014) 
 
Emotion-
Reason 
 
 
Experiment in the 
field of neuroscience 
 
Emotional reaction to choice and value 
calculation matters to understand decision. 
If emotion changes then choice will change. 
Emotion and decision variables are related. 
Emotion influences choices through 
multiple modulatory neural circuits. 
 
The relationship between 
emotion and reason matters in 
human behaviour.   
 
(Cant et al., 
2012) 
 
Divided Self 
 
Review on ‘near 
death experience’ 
(NDE) with focus on 
the conscious-
unconscious divide. 
 
Neuro-chemical changes influence human 
experience. 
 
It is important to understand the 
divisions in self (e.g. conscious-
unconscious) to understand 
human behaviour. 
 
(Bleidorn 
and 
Ködding, 
2013) 
 
Self and 
environment 
 
 
Meta-analytical 
review of 50 years of 
research on self-
concept 
differentiation (N = 
54 samples) 
 
Self-concept is fragmented and depends on 
the contextual background. 
 
An individual’s behaviour must 
be studied with respect to 
context and external norms. 
 
(Heather 
and Segal, 
2015) 
 
Incontinent 
Actions 
 
 
Experiment, 20 
heroin users; 
questionnaire on 
drug-taking 
behaviour 
 
Akratic actions are not always involuntary 
behaviours (e.g. addiction is not a 
completely involuntary behaviour). 
People cannot give a reason for preferring 
incontinent over continent actions; that is 
why addicts say that they are compelled to 
behave contrary to their own better 
 
Some decisions are made 
contrary to the decision maker’s 
judgment. So it is important to 
study human decisions with 
respect to self and other 
evaluations. 
People cannot bring reason for 
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judgment. their intentional behaviour 
contrary to their better judgment. 
So, the soundness of reasons 
one provides for her behaviour 
must be studied in agency-
oriented factors. 
(Reach, 
2015) 
 
Weakness 
of Will or 
Medical 
Irrationality 
 
 
Book on philosophy 
of mind in medical 
prescriptions. 
 
An agent can intentionally perform an 
action that is contrary to her own judgment. 
This is tested in the case of obese patients. 
The principle of foresight is the key that 
helps people to choose remote reward 
rather than immediate pleasure.  
The dilemma of autonomy and choice can 
be addressed through understanding the 
ethical principles of decision making. 
 
Human behaviours must be 
studied with respect to the 
possibility of weakness of will or 
what is known as medical 
irrationality that A person is 
opposing herself. 
 
(Pahman, 
2016) 
 
Commitment 
Actions 
 
 
Philosophical 
argument 
 
Not all human decisions can be explained 
based on the generalised calculus of utility 
maximising behaviour, as suggested by 
George Stigler and Gary Becker. 
One has other-centred motives (altruistic) 
besides self-interests. 
Sometimes other-centred behaviours are 
the actions that are intended contrary to 
other judgment (e.g. risking one’s life in a 
battle for the sake of others). 
 
Self-centred motives are not the 
only drivers of human behaviour. 
People can make decisions 
contrary to the self-centred way 
of utility maximising, for the sake 
of others.  
 
(Strahle and 
Bonfield, 
2015) 
 
Decision 
Constraints 
 
Empirical test of 
eight structural 
factors for last-
minute Valentine’s 
Day gift purchases; 
U method to test the 
bias classification. 
 
Time serves as decision constraints and 
decisions made under time constraints are 
known as Panic Decision Making (PDM) 
 
Human behaviour must be 
understood with respect to 
constraints, like time. 
Temporal constraints must be 
studied in understanding human 
behaviour. 
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(Malawska 
and 
Topping, 
2016) 
 
Decision 
Constraints 
 
 
Apply bounded 
rationality theory; 
developing an 
agent-based model 
of farmers’ decision 
making on crop 
choice. 
 
Practical constraints and behavioural 
factors both affect decisions. 
 
Human behaviour must be 
understood with respect to 
constraints. These constraints 
can be universal or personal. 
(Harstad 
and Selten, 
2013b) 
 
Freedom of 
Choice 
 
Theoretic modelling 
and experiment 
 
An economic agent does not always 
optimise. 
The bounded rationality of an agent is one 
reason that optimisation does not occur in 
the decision process. 
 
Optimized decisions are hardly 
possible to occur due to agent’s 
bounded rationality. 
(Mitchell et 
al., 2015) 
 
Values  
 
Testing stockholder 
agency framework 
with respect to value 
and nature of 
decision objectives. 
 
Criticized single-objective theories for multi-
objective views towards understanding 
decision making in the multi-objective 
corporation.  
 
One’s values matter in how she 
behaves.  
The plurality of values and 
objectives must be considered to 
understand decisions. 
(Harris et 
al., 1989) 
 
Emotion and 
Belief 
 
Three experiments 
on 3- to 7-year-olds 
 
Emotional reactions of what is being 
observed depend on the observers’ 
(unconfirmed) beliefs and desires. 
 
Emotion and values are related. 
Emotion and values influence 
judgments. 
(Heffernan 
and Ward, 
2015) 
 
Modelling 
Decisions 
with respect 
to agency  
 
Integrating 
normative factors of 
decision and risk-
related factors within 
the action-based 
Agency Model of 
Risk (AMR) 
 
A focus on agency, motivation and values 
helps to understand decisions. 
Applying (AMR) help to identify the reasons 
behind behaviour. 
 
Agency-oriented factors can be 
conceptualised in a theory to 
explain human behaviour. So, 
agency-oriented factors can be 
identified that associated with 
freedom. 
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Why Agency-Oriented Factors Matter: Rationale  
Table 2 shows the review of the literature on why it is important to identify agency-
oriented factors associated with freedom (i.e. the first research objective). The second column 
of Table 2 points to the rationale of investigating our first research objective. In this line, recent 
studies have found that human judgments are prone to misattribution (Heller et al., 2015), and 
this has detrimental consequences for the lives of those who are affected by third-party 
observers’ misattributions (Heerdink et al., 2015).  Murphy (2016) has shown that sometimes 
people make irrational decisions, but attributing irrationality to all human decisions has 
detrimental policy implications. It is found that our judgments involve many biases (Joo and 
Durri, 2015), which influence policy-makers’ and managers’ judgments and everyone whose 
judgment will influence the lives of others. In this line, if one relies on lay observation (Heerdink 
et al., 2015), or a pure rationalist lens to understand human decisions, then her judgments are 
prone to several biases (Kahneman, 2012) and this can have detrimental impacts on the lives of 
the affected people (Heerdink et al., 2015). Hence, it is important to develop a reliable theory 
that captures the influence of agency-oriented factors on how people make a decision. In this 
line, Table 2 shows that recent reviews of attribution studies (Renzi et al., 2015), decision 
analysis (Puts et al., 2015) and agency (Binkley et al., 2016) have repeated this call that we 
need to improve our understanding of the way people choose to live with respect to the factors 
associated with their freedom of choice. Therefore, it is important to fill the gap that is about the 
lack of a unified theory that identifies agency-oriented factors associated with freedom. 
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Table 2: Literature on the Rationale behind the 1st Objective 
Study 
Focus Methodology Findings Implications for Us 
(Heller et al., 
2015) 
 
Misattribution 
 
Experiment (N = 
690); attribution 
regarding 
asthma. 
 
Pre-exposure beliefs predict 
misattributions about post-
exposure beliefs. 
 
Lay observers’ attributions about the world 
around them are prone to several biases. So 
we need to improve the existing 
understanding about human behaviours. 
 
(Murphy, 
2016) 
 
Irrational 
behaviours 
and policy 
implications 
 
 
Review 
 
Irrational decisions are 
possible as instances in 
consumer behaviour, failure to 
vaccinate children, etc. 
Irrational behaviours influence 
policy implications. 
 
Irrational behaviours have policy implications. 
So we need to identify a reliable set of 
agency-oriented factors associated with 
freedom to prevent or at least reduce 
negative policy implications. 
(Joo and 
Durri, 2015) 
 
Judgemental 
Biases 
 
 
Systematic 
Literature 
Review with a 
focus on rational 
behaviour 
 
Not every decision is rational. 
Most human decisions are not 
conscious.  
There is a gap in the literature 
to understand normal decision 
(i.e. the decisions that can be 
unconscious, unexpected or 
irrational).  
 
Everyone, even a professional observer, is 
prone to make judgmental biases about 
human behaviour. So we need a theory that 
tackles their observational shortcomings 
regarding human behaviour. 
 
(Mazar et al., 
2008) 
 
Rationalisation 
 
Six experiments 
in the field of 
behavioural 
economy 
 
 
People are prone to self-
deception. 
Self-deception and dishonesty 
happen for an agent to obtain 
benefit but up to the point that 
she can delude herself about 
her own integrity. 
 
To understand human behaviour, we need to 
be careful about their self-deception, and 
dishonesty. People’s “rationalisation” need to 
be detected. 
(Heerdink et 
 
Misattribution 
 
Six experiments; 
 
Emotional expressions 
 
Third-party observers’ misattributions have 
 42 
al., 2015) Consequences 
 
using the Affect 
Misattribution 
Paradigm; meta-
analysis 
influence attributions. 
Negative emotions result in 
negative social function. 
detrimental consequences for the lives of 
those who are affected by their unreliable 
attribution. So we need a theory that 
considers all aspects of human behaviour, in 
order to improve third-party attributions. 
(Renzi et al., 
2015) 
 
Review of 
Attribution 
 
 
Review of 1442 
papers 
published 
between (1990-
2014) 
 
False alarms can undermine 
the help seeking of potential 
cancer symptoms. 
Need for appropriate patient 
information when 
investigations rule out cancer. 
 
Attribution studies show misattributions that 
have a harmful effect on affected people’s 
wellbeing.  
Attribution literature lacks a theory that 
considers agency and freedom. So we need 
to improve our understanding about the 
attribution process with respect to agency 
and freedom. 
(Puts et al., 
2015) 
 
Review of 
Decision 
Analysis 
 
 
Systematic 
review of 17,343 
abstracts, 38 
studies were 
included. 
 
Lack of a theory that identifies 
factors influencing decisions 
like cancer treatments. 
Harmful consequences of 
shortcomings in the literature. 
Identifying fear of side-effects 
in decision analysis. 
 
Misjudgements about decisions harm human 
wellbeing. So we need to improve our 
understanding about decision, to be used in 
the health literacy area. 
(Binkley et 
al., 2016) 
 
Review of 
Agency 
 
 
Philosophical 
review of 
agency, action 
and reason 
 
Philosophers have failed to 
discover a simple grammatical 
litmus test for agency. 
 
Misjudgements about agency harm 
individuals’ wellbeing. So we need to improve 
our understanding of agency. 
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Freedom  
So far, from the problem of analysing how internally made is the statement ‘I chose to 
do/be something’, we have arrived at the first research question, that is what agency-oriented 
factors influence one to do/be what she values, which has led us to the first research objective 
that is identifying the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom. The question that 
emerges from the first research objective is that what we know about freedom with respect to 
agency. So far, freedom has been studied with a focus on the self and the environment. In the 
realm of philosophy, Berlin's (1969) Two Senses of Freedom is regarded as the most influential 
work that has focused on both the self and environment aspects of freedom (Gray, 2015). In this 
regard, Berlin (1969) has defined the ‘positive’ sense of freedom as who/what determines an 
action that is about the ‘self’ side of conceptualising freedom. The ‘positive’ sense of freedom 
has been developed with a focus on the puzzle of emotion-reason interaction as different 
sources of rational decision (Damasio et al., 2015; Kassam, 2015), the rational-irrational debate 
of human decisions (Hyland et al., 2015; Murphy, 2016), and human values (Arrow, 2012). 
Further Berlin (1969) has developed the ‘negative’ sense of freedom as the non-interfered 
‘space’ within which one is free to do/be what she values.  
One of the main contributions to the two senses of freedom, with particular attention to 
the negative sense of freedom is Sen's (1999) Capability Approach (CA) that conceptualises the 
non-interfered space as an individual’s capability set and the limitations within the process of 
transforming a capability into a functioning (i.e. achieved state of being/doing). Capabilities are 
defined as what an individual can do/be that captures the limitations of the environment on an 
agent’s decision making (Alkire, 2007; Nussbaum, 2003, 1987; Swain, 2015). Further, Sen 
(1999) identifies the notion of ‘functioning’ as the state of being/doing after achieving a capability. 
The emphasis on distinguishing capability from functioning will expand the notion of negative 
freedom by paying attention to available options (Clark, 2005), limitations (Casenhiser et al., 
2013), and the process of turning capabilities into functioning (Alkire and Deneulin, 2009; 
Andersson et al., 2012; Deneulin and Shahani, 2009). For example, to understand Berlin's 
(1969) ‘negative’ freedom through the lens of CA, we pay attention to having certain capabilities 
(e.g. a bicycle) and the ability to achieve them (e.g. knowing how to ride a bicycle) and the 
outcome (e.g. riding a bicycle). In this way, the impact of the environment on an agent’s 
freedom is captured with a lens that digs deep into the constraints imposed on an individual’s 
freedom of choice throughput the process of turning a ‘capability’ into a ‘functioning’. In addition, 
the role of one’s unique values and the plurality of different valuable states of being/doing is 
acknowledged in CA (Andersson et al., 2012). 
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Last but not least, one of the important contributions of CA to the definition of freedom is 
focusing on the importance of agency with respect to freedom. As mentioned earlier, Sen (1999) 
defines agency as one’s capability to choose the state of being/doing that she values, to be 
responsible for her decision and to be evaluated based on her own decisions. However, the 
question that needs further attention is how freedom (with a focus on both senses of positive 
and negative) and agency (with a focus on the rational-irrational and emotion-reason aspects of 
the decision maker) are related. The question is whether freedom and agency are directly 
related, which means if one has positive and negative freedom then she has agency; or whether 
freedom and agency are related in an inverse manner, which means that it is possible that one 
has freedom but lacks agency. To sum up, the question is how freedom is expanded/contracted 
based on agency-oriented factors, with respect to both the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ senses of 
freedom. Here, by asking the question with reference to agency-oriented factors we are 
capsulising all aspects of agency in our research enquiry (see the different aspects of agency as 
discussed in regard to the first research question). Hence, the question is what is the implication 
of agency-oriented factors for the expansion/contraction of the agent’s freedom? In this vein, the 
following section will review the freedom-oriented literature to see what we know about this 
question. If we identify a gap in this regard, then this question becomes our second research 
question, around which we design our second objective. 
 
Gap in Freedom-Oriented Studies 
Table 3 shows the review of the literature on what we know about the question of how 
freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors. The second column of 
Table 3 shows the areas where freedom has been studied. So far, freedom has been studied 
with respect to the positive and the negative senses of freedom (Berlin, 2014, 1969, 1958); 
obedience and agency (Bandura, 2015, 2012); the psychological need for authority (Deci and 
Ryan, 2012, 2008); the positive-negative notions of rational and irrational behaviours (Gray, 
2015); the social need for emotion and love (Krause, 2014; Nussbaum, 2004), and the means 
for nurture human development with a focus on personal and social needs (Swain, 2015). 
As evidence, Berlin’s 1958 two essays on freedom, which define this concept with 
respect to the sources of human action (positive) and the boundaries of action (negative) have 
not been used in the psychological take on freedom tha focuses on the mind process of an 
action (Bandura, 2015) and psychological needs and motivation (Deci and Ryan, 2012). One of 
the seminal agency-oriented works in the psychological field that has taken insights from the 
freedom-oriented studies in the field of philosophy is Milgram's (2009, 1963) theory of 
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obedience. However, as the label of Milgram's (1963) theory represents, the focus of this study 
is mainly on obedience rather than an explicit focus on agency and freedom (Milgram and Van 
den Haag, 1978). In this line, the problem is that the most coherent definition of freedom 
(according to Gray (2015), which is the positive-negative senses of freedom by Berlin (1969), 
has been adapted in a theory (namely Sen’s (1999) CA), but according to Chiappero-Martinetti 
et al. (2015) research can hardly operationalise CA. Further, as summarised in the second and 
the third rows of Table 3, the other agency-oriented studies on freedom have relied mainly on 
proxy variables of authority (e.g. Deci and Ryan, 2012) and obedience (e.g. Bandura, 2015) to 
study freedom. Hence, there is a gap in the literature in terms of how freedom is 
expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors, with a focus on the two senses of 
freedom and different modes of agency. The following section shows why it is important to 
address this gap, which is the foundation of our second research question. 
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Table 3: Existing Findings Regarding Freedom 
Study 
Focus Methodology Findings Implications for Us 
 (Berlin, 
1970, 1969, 
1958) 
 
Freedom 
from two 
senses that 
captures self-
space 
interaction 
 
Theorising human 
agency in 
philosophy 
 
Freedom is conceptualised 
from two senses: 
• the positive sense - its 
focus is on self 
(what/who determined an 
action) 
• the negative sense - its 
focus is on external 
factors that interfere with 
what the self wants (the 
space within which one is 
free to determine what 
she wants.) 
 
This comprehensive definition of freedom in 
the realm of philosophy (Gray, 2015), 
needs to be expanded with respect to 
agency (Sen, 1999b), particularly in a 
multidisciplinary manner that captures 
recent scientific findings on the three 
modes of agency.  
(Bandura, 
2015, 2012, 
1989, 1977) 
 
Freedom as 
Obedience 
 
 
Theorising human 
agency in social 
cognitive theory 
 
Freedom is conceptualised 
with respect to psychological 
mode of behaviour (see 
Chapter 7, Theory 
Evaluation). 
 
Freedom needs to be studied beyond a 
latent factor for obedience. 
(Deci and 
Ryan, 2012) 
 
Freedom as 
motivational 
need for 
authority. 
 
Theorising self-
determination with 
respect to 
motivation in the 
field of appraisal 
psychology. 
 
Freedom is studied as a 
motivational need for 
authority, to achieve well-
being, particularly within the 
realm of psychology (see 
Chapter 7, Theory 
Evaluation). 
 
Freedom needs to be studied beyond a 
latent factor for wellbeing. 
(Sen, 2011, 
2007, 1999b) 
 
Freedom as 
Capability 
 
 
Theorising 
development as 
freedom, and 
 
Freedom has turned into the 
focus of human 
development. 
 
• Freedom needs to be studied beyond 
capability and wellbeing. 
• Freedom needs to be studied with a 
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freedom as 
capabilities in the 
field of political 
economy. 
Freedom is studied with 
focus on its negative sense, 
within the concepts of 
capabilities and functioning. 
focus on agency. 
(Gray, 1980) 
 
Freedom and 
Rationality 
 
 
Philosophical 
argument on 
Berlin’s two senses 
of freedom. 
 
• Berlin’s account of 
freedom is a powerful 
argument, implying that 
freedom is about the 
non-restriction of options. 
• Although it is right to 
reject the positive 
conceptualisation of 
freedom that depends on 
rationalist doctrine, due 
to the shortcomings of 
this school of thought, 
positive freedom is 
necessarily involved in 
understanding human 
behaviour.  
 
• Berlin’s account of freedom is a solid 
ground to study freedom. 
• Rationality matters in the study of 
freedom. 
• Positive freedom should not be 
dismissed in favour of negative 
freedom, just because of irrationality in 
human behaviour. 
• To expand freedom, positive freedom 
must be studied by getting beyond the 
rationalist doctrine and including the 
affective mode of agency and the 
careful study of ‘rationalisation’, which 
Mazar et al. (2008) identify as a 
manifestation of irrational behaviour. 
(Krause, 
2014) 
 
Freedom and 
Emotion 
 
 
Review on the 
liberalism of love, 
with a focus on 
freedom 
 
Review and repeat the 
importance of Nussbaum's 
(2003) call for love (i.e. 
emotion) for liberal 
democracy. 
 
Emotions matter in the study of freedom. 
(Sen, 2013) 
 
Freedom in 
Society 
(focus on 
sustainability) 
 
 
Political review 
 
Social and biological needs 
matter but a human being is 
a reflective creature who can 
reason about and decides 
what is valuable for her. 
 
Social context matters in study of freedom, 
but it must be studied respect for the 
plurality of values and agency. 
(Sen, 1985) 
 
Freedom, 
Agency, 
 
Political review 
 
Both wellbeing and agency 
matter in moral lens towards 
 
Freedom should not be studied as a proxy 
for agency or wellbeing. These concepts 
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Wellbeing 
 
human being. need to be studied thoroughly and 
independently. 
(Swain, 
2015) 
 
Freedom, 
agency, 
capabilities, 
advantages 
 
 
Review of Sen's 
(1999) Capability 
Approach (CA) 
 
 
• The unique advantages 
of CA are its ability to 
give maximum autonomy 
to an individual, its focus 
on freedom, capabilities 
and transforming them 
into functioning. 
• CA is built upon the 
concepts of freedom 
• CA defines freedom 
based on Berlin’s two 
senses of freedom 
 
Freedom needs to be studied beyond the 
field of philosophy with a focus on agency 
and capabilities. 
(Chiappero-
Martinetti et 
al., 2015) 
 
Freedom, 
agency, 
capabilities, 
challenges 
 
Review of Sen's 
(1999) CA 
 
 
The main challenge of CA is 
how to operationalise it. 
 
Freedom needs to be studied in a way that 
the results can be operationalised in 
different areas. 
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Why Freedom Expansion/Contraction Matters: Rationale 
Table 4 shows why it is important to address the question of how freedom is 
expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors. There are several reasons including 
the important role of freedom on empowering wellbeing and the performance of individual 
members of social groups particularly in work settings (Wu et al., 2015), improving altruistic 
behaviours that are beneficial to individuals and society, particularly in organisational settings, 
such as the Employee Green Behaviour (EGB) (Norton et al., 2015), addressing the problem of 
invisible “free slavery” where in modern societies people supress their needs, emotions and 
expression of their values (Davidson, 2015), understanding the decisions that are made 
contrary to personal judgments (Davidson, 2014), developing an agency-freedom friendly 
environment where creativity and innovation is encouraged (Clark and Nye, 2015), reducing the 
elements of coercion in the environment that undermines individuals’ to become the agents of 
their own lives and to remain responsible for the impact of their actions (Caspar et al., 2016), 
and highlighting the existing debate on whether agency and free will are overrated with 
reference to recent neuroscientific breakthroughs about unconscious roots of behaviours (Smith, 
2011). So far, Jääskelä et al. (2016) have shown that it is possible and useful to investigate 
agency-oriented factors, but there is still a gap in terms of the link between agency level and 
freedom. Table 4 presents several reasons implying the importance of this research endeavour, 
which leads us towards our second research objective that is ‘establishing how freedom is 
expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors’.  
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Table 4: Literature on the Rationale behind the 2nd Research Objective 
Study 
 
Focus 
 
Methodology 
 
Findings 
 
Implications for Us 
(Wu et al., 
2016) 
 
Freedom 
matters at 
work 
 
 
Two surveys (N=215) of 
North American 
community college 
employees, and (N=148), 
and Chinese state-
owned enterprise 
employees 
 
It is found that having greater 
freedom within the role will improve 
the performance and wellbeing of 
overqualified workers 
 
It is important for the sake of wellbeing 
and performance of individuals to 
develop a theory that establishes the 
implication of agency-oriented factors 
for the expansion/contraction of the 
agent’s freedom. 
(Norton et 
al., 2015) 
 
Freedom 
matters for 
Employee 
Green 
Behaviour 
(EGB)  
 
 
Investigate the factors 
mediating and 
moderating EGB 
 
Required and voluntary EGB are 
different in terms of the contextual 
and personal factors. 
There is a need for multilevel 
research examining cross-level 
effects of the factors influencing 
EGB. 
Person-environment interaction 
needs to be studied with a focus on 
the required-voluntary nature of 
human actions. 
 
There is a need for a theory that 
investigates person-environment 
interactions with respect to agency and 
freedom, if we want both the person 
and the social group to benefit from 
their interaction. 
(Davidson, 
2015) 
 
Freedom, 
Agency 
and 
modern 
slavery 
 
 
Review of Eck's (2014) 
view on ‘modern slaves’ 
 
In modern times, we have ‘free 
slaves’. They are those who 
suppress their emotion; those 
whose slavery is hidden to them 
because they have always been 
slaves. Research needs to focus 
on the problem of coercion that 
may not be visible as medieval 
slavery but still exists in different 
forms. 
 
It is important to study freedom with 
respect to agency, if we need to 
understand incontinent actions. 
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(Davidson, 
1970) 
 
Agency-
freedom 
levels 
matter to 
understand 
incontinent 
actions. 
 
 
Logical argument around 
“how is weakness of will 
possible?” 
 
There are some actions that are 
performed with intention, contrary 
to the agent’s judgment. These are 
incontinent actions that have three 
characteristics, they are: (A) 
intentional, (B) the agent believes 
that an alternative option is open to 
her, (C) the agent judges that the 
alternative option is better. 
 
It is important to study agency with 
respect to freedom, which is a complex 
task as human decisions are complex 
and not always rationally predictable, 
and it is not possible to simulate them 
using cognitive models of behaviour. 
(Clark and 
Nye, 2015) 
 
Agency-
freedom 
levels 
matters for 
creativity 
 
Philosophical argument 
in educational philosophy 
 
Agency matters in creativity. 
 
It is important to conceptualise agency 
if creativity matters.  
(Caspar et 
al., 2016) 
 
Agency in a 
coercive 
environmen
t   
 
 
Neuroscience 
experiment 
 
Coercion changes the sense of 
agency in the human brain 
Being in a coercive environment, 
people feel a lower sense of 
agency. 
 
It is important to study agency with 
respect to the environment and its 
coercive element. In other words, if we 
need to diminish the coercive nature of 
the environment to enjoy the positive 
outcomes of agency, we need to study 
agency levels with respect to freedom 
levels. 
(Smith, 
2011) 
 
 
Is agency 
overrated? 
 
Review of experiments in 
neuroscience with a look 
at the philosophical take 
on agency 
 
Most of our decisions, even the 
conscious ones, are determined by 
chemical interactions in the brain. 
Experiments show that before one 
acts, her agency-outcome is 
predictable by tracing the chemical 
interactions in her mind.  
There is an ongoing debate about 
the extent to which free will exists.    
 
There is an emerging call for 
multidisciplinary research on agency 
and freedom, as the field of 
psychology, neuroscience and 
philosophy are drifting apart on this 
topic. 
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(Jääskelä 
et al., 
2016) 
 
Agency-
oriented 
theory 
 
 
Survey and Factor 
Analysis 
 
There is a gap in the literature for a 
research theory and an appropriate 
tool for assessing agency level. 
Describing a theoretical foundation 
and factor structure of a newly 
developed Theory of Agency of 
University Students, 
10 factors emerge with focus on 
students’ agency: (A) interest and 
motivation, (B) self-efficacy, (C) 
competence beliefs, and  (D) 
participation activity, (E) equal 
treatment, (F) teacher support, (G) 
peer support, (H) trust, (I) 
opportunities to influence, (J) an 
opportunity to make choices. 
 
There is a need for a generic theory 
that measures agency level, with a 
focus on freedom, as previous studies 
have shown that this endeavour is 
possible and it is useful for human 
wellbeing and performance. There is a 
gap in the literature for a theory that 
measures agency and freedom levels 
in relation to each other. 
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Conclusion  
We start from this problem that how internally made is the statement ‘I chose to do/be 
something’. We have shown that answering this question is complex and we have broken down 
this question into two research questions: (A) what agency-oriented factors influence one to 
do/be what she values, and (B) how is freedom expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented 
factors? To answer the first research question, we have shown that although recent studies 
have indicated that emotion (Kassam, 2015; Lau et al., 2015; Marissa S. Edwards et al., 2016; 
Phelps et al., 2014; Zeng et al., 2015), reason (Binkley et al., 2016; Houk et al., 2016; Hyland et 
al., 2015), person-environment (Bleidorn and Ködding, 2013; Heather and Segal, 2015), and 
constraints (Harstad and Selten, 2013a; Malawska and Topping, 2016; Strahle and Bonfield, 
2015) matter in understanding why a decision is made, some studies (Binkley et al., 2016; Puts 
et al., 2015; Renzi et al., 2015) have shown that there is lack of a single theory that captures the 
impact of all of these various agency-oriented factors on human behaviour. Further, the impact 
of these agency-oriented factors on an agent’s capability to live the life she has reason to value 
has not been captured in a unified theory that can be operationalised in different fields 
(Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015). Hence, there is a gap in the literature for a theory that 
identifies the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom. We have shown that it is 
important to address this gap, because studies (Heerdink et al., 2015; Heller et al., 2015) have 
shown that due to the lack of this theory, there are many misattributions that are made about the 
factors influencing an agent’s way of life, and these misjudgements have detrimental 
consequences, particularly on the wellbeing of those who are affected by the policy implications 
of these unreliable attributions (Murphy, 2015). To address this gap, we have concluded our first 
research objective that is identifying agency-oriented factors associated with freedom.  
Further, on the way of identifying agency-oriented factors associated with freedom, we 
have arrived at the question of what is freedom in relation to agency. This is a well-established 
question that has occupied the mind of several thinkers (e.g. Bakhtin, 1935; Berlin, 1969; 
Coffman, 2015; Weber, 1993); namely the extent to which one is free to do/be what she values. 
In this vein, we have arrived at the second important gap in the literature that although freedom 
has been studied with respect to ‘self’ and ‘space’ (Berlin, 1969, 1958), capabilities (Sen, 1999b; 
Swain, 2015), as a proxy for psychological need for authority (Deci and Ryan, 2012, 2008), as a 
latent variable for obedience (Bandura, 2015; Milgram, 2015), there is a shortcoming in this 
literature that we know little about freedom in relation to agency, as suggested by Sen (1999), 
and repeated in recent studies on the theory of the mind (Correia, 2016; Davidson, 2014, 2001; 
Smith, 2015). The problem is that this is a very important enquiry to clarify freedom and agency 
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levels in relation to each other, because recent studies have shown that freedom matters at 
work (Wu et al., 2015), freedom matters for volunteer behaviours that are useful for both 
individuals and society (Norton et al., 2015), freedom matters in today’s context where we are 
witnessing several examples of modern slavery (Davidson, 2015). In addition, agency matters 
for improving an individual’s sense of being (Clark and Nye, 2015) and wellbeing (Jääskelä et 
al., 2016). However, the problem is that different disciplines have studied agency in isolation, 
thus, some say that human agency is being overestimated by philosophers, while others believe 
that psychologists and neuroscientists underestimate human agency (Smith, 2015). This is an 
emerging debate in the field of agency and freedom because as we have reviewed the literature 
(see Table 1 and Table 3), there is also a gap in terms of conceptualising agency and freedom 
in relation to each other. Therefore, we have concluded our second research objective that is 
establishing freedom expansion/contraction with respect to agency-oriented factors.  
Overall, both of our research gaps point to agency and freedom and their relationship. In 
this vein, the main missing area in the agency-freedom literature is the lack of a clear 
understanding of these two notions in relation to each other and their relationship. As evidence, 
so far the freedom-oriented studies such as Sen's (1999) CA have pointed to this shortcoming 
and have called for more research on agency and freedom in relation to each other. However, 
agency-oriented reviews (Limerick et al., 2015; McCann et al., 2016), the freedom-oriented state 
of arts (Hedgecoe, 2015; Zeng et al., 2015), and decision-oriented reviews (Lehnert et al., 2015; 
Puts et al., 2015) are not offering a single and unified theory with a focus on the relationship 
between agency and freedom. Hence, the aim of this study is to fill this gap and to determine 
the agency-freedom relationship. Overall, these two gaps point to a single bigger gap that is the 
vague relationship between agency and freedom. Hence, we build our study on determining the 
agency-freedom relationship through achieving the above-mentioned two research objectives. 
Overall, the present chapter has shown what we know about the relationship between agency 
and freedom, and how we have arrived at our research questions, aim and objectives based on 
the gaps in the literature. In the following chapters we show how we have achieved the aim and 
objectives.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter starts with a clear statement of the research problem, and then it shows 
what is our plan, philosophical position, methods, ethical and measurement concerns to address 
this problem. In more detail, this chapter shows the logic of the research enquiry (i.e. inductive, 
deductive or abductive dimensions) of the present study based on our philosophical paradigm, 
which is Critical Realism, with a focus on the ontology, epistemology and axiology of our 
research enquiry. As a result, we present a research methodology that is designed according to 
these methodological pillars in this study. In sum, this chapter shows why the present study is a 
scientific enquiry that aims at determining the relationship between agency and freedom.  
 
Research Gap, Problem, and Questions 
So far we have shown that to understand how agentic is the statement ‘I chose to do/be 
something’, there is a gap in the literature regarding the relationship between agency and 
freedom and this study aims to fill this gap (see Chapter 2, Literature Review). The problem is 
how agency and freedom are related. Is agency expansion directly related to freedom 
expansion and vis-a-versa? For example, what is the agency-freedom level of a gambler who 
gambles (see Davidson (2014) on weakness of will); one who abstains from eating 
marshmallow while craving for it (see Mischel's (2015) experiment); one who decides to enter 
war zones to help civilians thus risking her own life (see Sen's (1990) rationale fool). To address 
the problem of the unclear relationship between agency and freedom, the present study tries to 
develop an agency-oriented theory with a focus on freedom. A theory that defines and 
conceptualises all aspects of agency and two senses of freedom (positive and negative) in 
relation to each other, and a theory that helps to expand our understanding of an individual’s 
decision behaviour both internal and external to her being. This chapter shows our methodology 
to fill this gap by developing a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency through a systematic approach of 
collecting, analysing and interpreting data, within the scope of answering the following 
questions: (A) what factors influence one’s agency to do/be what she values; and (B) what is the 
implication of agency-oriented factors for the expansion/contraction of the agent’s freedom?  
 
Research Paradigm 
Our research paradigm is based on Critical Realism (CR) that is a school of thought 
most recently defined by Bhaskar (1979, 2013, 1978). In this way, our ontological position is that 
reality exists independently of the human mind, but to a large extent the “real” things are not 
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readily observable (Tao, 2016). According to CR, within the independent reality there are three 
dimensions – the “real”, “actual” and “empirical”, and the things that are both “measurable” and 
“observable” are within the “empirical” domain (Sayer, 2010). This means that in principle there 
are some things in the “real” and “actual” domains that are not accessible to scientific tools and 
consequently the present research. CR identifies the ‘real’, ‘actual’ and ‘empirical’ domains of 
beings. The ‘empirical’ domain includes what a researcher can observe and measure, like the 
height of an individual that can be measured by an standard ruler; the ‘actual’ domain contains 
the events that are generated by some mechanisms in ‘real’ domains (e.g. time) (Mingers, 
2004); and the ‘real’ domain contains the mechanisms and structure that are not observable, 
such as the DNA molecules that carry most of the genetic instructors in the growth, 
development, functioning and reproduction of human beings (Bhaskar et al., 2015).  
In the present study, the link between agency and freedom is not observable and 
measurable by existing scientific tools, in a way that we can use a ruler to measure the height of 
an individual. Using existing research tools (e.g. questionnaire, interview and case study) we 
can only measure an individual’s perception of freedom, constraints, values, third-party 
evaluation, capabilities, time and chance. This is the same even in the field of neuroscience, 
when they (Damasio et al., 2015) are measuring the signals that are traveling among the neuron 
during the decision-making process to understand how a decision is made. Neuroscientists are 
not directly measuring the concepts of agency and freedom as they can measure rises and falls 
in blood pressure. However, the neuroscientific findings can be used to understand how the 
environment influences an individual’s affective and cognitive ability (in the form of neurons) to 
determine a choice (Christensen and Gomila, 2012). For example, they can design research in 
a way that an individual is asked to make a decision in a coercive situation where an external 
stimulus is pushing her to choose a certain option, and during the decision process they 
observe whether that external stimulus has changed the pattern signals in the decision-maker’s 
mind. For example, Caspar et al. (2016) have used the same methodology and they have found 
that a coercive environment will reduce the sense of agency. As evidence, the scientific findings 
that are obtained from observable things are used to draw a conclusion about unobservable 
concepts such as agency and freedom. This logical process to deduce the conclusion is 
induction and there are many scientific breakthroughs that are developed using inductive logic. 
For example, Darwin's (1872) theory of evolution in The Origin of Species and Isaac Newton's 
(1999) mathematical principles of natural philosophy were developed using inductive logic 
(Okasha, 2002). Darwin and Newton deduced their theories from a limited number of 
observations (about the origin of species and the movement of things, respectively) into a 
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general conclusion about the things that they have not observed and measured (i.e. the 
evolution of all species and the movement of everything on earth, respectively). Here, to 
develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, we have the same logic to explain how agency and 
freedom are related. Our first step is to develop the theory using deduction, when we test the 
existing theories (e.g. Berlin, 1958; Sen, 1999) about agency and freedom. The second step is 
induction, when we use the findings and the data that are obtained from the observations 
(through using interviews and questionnaires) and we draw some conclusion about the 
relationship between agency and freedom for the first time. The third step is abduction, when we 
use the existing theory (Bakhtin, 1935; Weber, 1993b; Weiner, 2010) to explain some 
conclusions that we have made during the induction phase of developing the Tri-Modal theory of 
Agency (see the next section that outlines the methods and techniques that we have used in 
these logical steps).  
 Another ontological question is if something is not observable by the available research 
tools (see Okasha (2002) for a discussion of different positions about observable features of 
reality), then whether these things exist. In this line, the present research based on the CR 
paradigm believes that there are some parts of freedom and agency that are not observable by 
scientific tools in the social sciences (i.e. they are within the ‘real’ domain, see Error! 
Reference source not found.), but it does not mean that they do not exist. This is our 
ontological position regarding the things that are not observable and measurable by scientific 
tools. Accordingly, our epistemological position is that we can use the existing scientific tools to 
observe and measure some parts of the ‘real’ domain that are within the ‘empirical’ domain. For 
example, one ontological question is whether emotions exist, given that we cannot see them 
(sadness, anger, happiness, etc.) in the same way as we can see a chair or a tree. In this 
regard, we say that emotions exist, but we have access to some parts of emotion that are within 
the empirical domain that can be observed and measured. In this regard, based on appraisal 
psychologists and particularly Weiner's (2010) attribution theory of motivation, we measure the 
motivating impact of emotion with decisions. For example, Weiner says that when one attributes 
her failure (e.g. a student fails an exam) to an external party (e.g. a bad teacher), then it is 
possible that this person experiences anger and decides to attack the source of failure (e.g. the 
student complains about the teacher to the school principals), because the attribution that she 
has assigned to her situation is external to her and not controllable by her. Hence, the emotion 
can be measured through analysing the characteristics (i.e. the locus, stability and 
controllability) of the attribution one assigns to her situation and the decision that is motivated by 
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that emotion (Rudolph et al., 2013; Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014) (see Chapter 4, 
Theory Development).  
Another example is about how to measure capabilities, as we cannot see one’s 
capabilities as they are limitless (Hodges and Creese, 2013), and the quality of an agent’s 
constraints and capabilities change in her lifetime in different contexts (Alkire, 2007; Nussbaum, 
2004). However, it is found that each individual has a perception about her list of decision 
options, even though due to her bounded rationality this list does not include all of the 
capabilities that are actually available to her (Avineri and Ben-Elia, 2015; Harstad and Selten, 
2013). Therefore, capability set can be observed and measured through one’s perception, 
acknowledging that this set has some members that are not observable and measurable by the 
researcher. This acknowledgement is one of the methodological concerns that guide the steps 
of the present research based on the ontological and epistemological position of CR. In other 
words, we believe that the present research is observing and measuring some parts of the 
agency-freedom relationship that are within the ‘empirical’ domain of CR (see Error! Reference 
source not found.), which are the parts of the ‘real’ that are measurable and observable by 
available research tools. In this regard, we break down the research questions to identify what 
type of knowledge we are seeking and how. 
 
Research Epistemology and Objectives 
This section presents what knowledge this study is developing and how. The first area of 
knowledge that we are developing is about the individuals’ decisions. Since, in the present study 
the essence of the relationship between agency and freedom is the decisions that the agent is 
making (i.e. agency-outcome). This is because our research problem has been developed 
around this idea that we have poor knowledge when we judge this statement “I chose to do/be 
something”, particularly as it is a puzzle how internally driven this decision is. Hence, even 
though the relationship between agency and freedom is not measurable and observable (i.e. not 
all of its aspects are within the ‘empirical’ domain of CR), we are determining this relationship by 
investigating how decisions are made with respect to internal and external reasons. Collecting 
and analysing data about the decisions are possible as there are many theories, studies, and 
research tools (e.g. questionnaire, interview) and methods on how to study decisions 
(Ashkanasy and Daus, 2016;), what factors (e.g. emotion, reason, constraints) influence the 
decisions (Roberts, 2015), and our judgements about decisions (Kahneman, 2014). The second 
area of knowledge that is developed in this study is about whether these decisions have 
conducive/conflicting impact on an agent being able to live according to her values. This is 
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because our definition of freedom is based on ‘values’, as we say that one is free to live 
according to her values, and her freedom is contracted if she makes a decision that is in conflict 
with her values (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). It is established that one’s ‘values’ are 
measurable through the individual’s perceptions about norms and imperatives by research tools 
(by way of introspection and self-reporting) (Arrow, 2012; Schultz and Zelezny, 1998). Therefore, 
to determine the relationship between agency and freedom, we develop knowledge about the 
reasons behind one’s decisions and the conflicting/conducive impact of these decisions on one 
being able to live according to her values.  
In this line, to determine the agency-freedom relationship, we need to gather the relevant 
knowledge from the existing theories on decisions and how these decisions influence one to live 
according to her values. Hence, our journey to determine the agency-freedom relationship starts 
from developing these concepts from the existing theories into an agency-oriented theory, 
namely the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). This first step is 
the theoretical development of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and it is accompanied by five 
steps that are empirical development and amendment of our theory (see Chapter 5, Data 
Collection, Findings and Analysis). During the process of empirical development of the Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency, whenever we test the existing theories on agency and freedom, our 
philosophical logic is deductive, when we go beyond the existing explanations then our logic is 
induction, and when we use the existing theories to explain our findings then we are using 
abduction. In each of the five empirical studies we are using all three logical approaches (see 
Error! Reference source not found.), because previously agency and freedom have been 
studied in isolation but their relationship has rarely been distinguished (see Chapter 2, Literature 
Review). 
Here, the first research question is “what factors influence one’s agency to do/be what 
she values.” In this question, we are dealing with three notions of ‘factors’, ‘agency’ and 
‘freedom’ (as the ability to live according to values). From the decision-oriented research 
(Avineri and Ben-Elia, 2015; Damasio et al., 2015), agency-oriented studies (Bandura, 2006; 
Jääskelä et al., 2016), and freedom-oriented studies (Berlin, 1958; Sen, 2011), we know that 
some aspects of these concepts are measurable and observable (i.e. within the ‘empirical’ 
domain) in an individual’s perceptions (by way of introspection and self-reporting). However, we 
acknowledge that there are some parts of reality that are not measurable and observable (such 
as the internal thought processes and inner feelings) regarding our first research question. 
Hence, our approach to address these questions is first deductive (when we use existing 
theories on decision, agency and freedom to test the factors influencing decision in relation to 
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values); then inductive (when we go beyond what existing theories know about how decisions 
are made with respect to affective, cognitive and conative modes of agency), and finally it is 
abductive (when we use existing theories (e.g. Bakhtin, 1935; Sen, 1992; Weber, 1993a; 
Weiner, 2010) to explain the findings that we have derived from the data.  
 Table 5 presents how the first research question is addressed to create the knowledge 
about ‘what factors influence one’s agency to do/be what she values’, based on our 
epistemological position within the CR paradigm regarding the source, scope, justification and 
criteria of knowledge. These criteria are set based on Scott's (2013) categorisation of 
epistemological positions within CR.  Table 5 shows that our first empirical research (Study 1) is 
designed to test the existing theories on agency and freedom by conducting interviews (see 
Chapter 5, Study 1). As mentioned above, at this point our research logic is deductive because 
we are testing the existing theories. Further, at the end of Study 1 we design a questionnaire 
based on the findings from the interviews and we go beyond the existing theories (see Chapter 
5, Study 1, Questionnaire Design). To design this questionnaire we use coding and thematic 
analysis to analyse the findings, which are the reliable and valid techniques to dig deeper into 
the data to identify new themes (Silverman, 2016). Therefore, the final phase of Study 1 is 
inductive, when we work from data to develop a generalisation from the observations.  
Further, in Study 2 and Study 3 we will conduct two surveys (N1=1063 and N2=4086) 
that are nationally representative (see the following section on research context). These two 
empirical studies are conducted for two reasons: (A) to concise the factors that we have found 
in Study 1, and (B) to find the agency-oriented factors that are generalisable (Groves et al., 
2013). In Study 2 and Study 3 when we test the findings of Study 1, we are using the deductive 
approach, and later when we go beyond the findings and explore a smaller number of agency-
oriented factors and design the final Evaluation Instrument then we are using the inductive 
approach. In this regard, to explore the survey data to identify agency-oriented factors we run 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) as a statistical technique suggested by Beavers et al. (2013) 
to be a reliable technique for reducing the factors to a set of distinguishing factors from the data. 
Further, at the end of Study 3, we run Confirmatory Factors Analysis (CFA) to see if our final 
factors fit the theory, which is a suggested technique by Brown (2015) for establishing the 
goodness of fit of the extracted factors (EFA and CFA are explained in detail in Chapter 5). At 
the end of Study 3, we use Weber's (2009) theory on ‘rationality types’ to explain the findings 
(i.e. agency-oriented factors that are designed in the Evaluation Instrument). Thus, at the end of 
Study 3 we are using the abduction to develop the Evaluation Instrument and Tri-Modal Theory 
of Agency.  
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Regarding our second research question, that is ‘What is the implication of agency-
oriented factors for the expansion/contraction of the agent’s freedom?’, the concepts of freedom, 
agency and their expansion/contraction have not been theorised before (see Chapter 2, 
Literature Review). Hence, to achieve our second objective we try to establish freedom 
expansion/contraction through measuring how one’s decision conflicts/conduces with her 
affective, cognitive and conative abilities to live according to her values (see Chapter 4, Theory 
Development).  Table 5 shows that two parts of Study 4 and Study 5 are focusing on this 
endeavour. In the first part of Study 4, we use the Evaluation Instrument that measures 
cognitive and conative parts of agency-oriented factors (developed in Studies 1, 2 and 3), and 
apply it to seven interviews to identify the affective mode of agency, as well as to explore how 
the agent deals with the opposing worldview. Here, first we use the deductive approach when 
we test the Evaluation Interment, then we use the inductive approach when we work from data 
to develop a generalisation from the observations about the affective mode of agency and 
worldviews (see Chapter 5, Study 4, Part 1). Finally, when we use Weber’s (2009) rationality 
theory, Weiner's (2010) emotion theory and Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism to explain the findings 
we are using the abductive approach.  
Finally, Part 2 of Study 4 has the same approach and methods as the first part of study 4, 
but in addition, here we conduct interviews on four different types of decision in order to expand 
the generic aspect of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that determines the agency-freedom 
relationship based on agency-oriented factors (see Chapter 5, Study 4, Part 2). In the second 
part of Study 4 we start by testing agency-oriented factors that have been developed in the 
previous studies (i.e. using deduction), then we go beyond by working from data to develop a 
generalisation from the observations about what is known about the levels of agency and 
freedom in relation to each other (i.e. using induction), and finally we use Weber (2009), Weiner 
(2010), Bakhtin (1935), Berlin (1969), and Sen (1993) to explain the findings (i.e. using 
abduction). At the end of Study 4, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is being developed both 
empirically and theoretically, through four studies that each have a deduction, induction and 
abduction phase. Finally, in the fifth study we use the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency on one case 
study to test all aspects of the theory and to determine the agency-freedom relationship. 
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 Table 5: Research epistemology of the agency-freedom relationship 
Study 
 
Question 
 
Focus 
 
Logical 
Approach 
 
Source of 
Knowledge 
Theory Development*  
 
RQ1 
 
Agency-Freedom 
 
Deduction 
 
Literature 
1. Theory Development (Study 1) 
 
RQ1 
 
Factors (Affective, Cognitive and 
Conative); Values 
 
1st Deduction  
2nd Induction 
 
Individuals (interview) 
2. Theory Development (Study 2) 
 
RQ1 
 
Factors (Cognitive and Conative); 
Values 
 
1st Deduction  
2nd Induction 
 
Individuals (survey) 
3. Theory Amendment (Study 3) 
 
RQ1 
 
Factors (Cognitive and Conative); 
Values 
 
1st Deduction  
2nd Induction 
3rd Abduction 
 
Individuals (survey) 
4.1. Theory Development (Study 4, 
Part 1) 
 
RQ2 
 
Factors (Affective); Values; 
Worldview 
 
1st Deduction  
2nd Induction 
3rd Abduction 
 
Evaluation Instrument; 
Individuals (interview) 
4.2. Theory Amendment (Study 4, 
Part 2) 
 
RQ2 
 
Link between decision; Value 
 
1st Deduction  
2nd Induction 
3rd Abduction 
 
Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency; Individuals 
(interview) 
5. Testing Theory (Case Study) 
 
RQ1 
RQ2 
 
Agency-Freedom Relationship 
 
1st Deduction  
2nd Induction 
3rd Abduction 
 
Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency; Individuals 
(interview) 
Note: RQ1: What factors influence one’s agency to do/be what she values? RQ2: How to determine the Agency-freedom link with the 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency?; (*) Theory Development is in Chapter 4.
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Why Critical Realism and its implications 
For two main reasons we use Critical Realism (CR) to determine the agency-freedom 
relationship. First, CR does not have the simplistic view of other paradigms like positivism that 
only relies on identifying the correlated empirical variables, assuming that ‘causal analysis’ is 
similar to ‘regression analysis’ (Sayer, 2010). Initially, CR has been developed as a 
philosophical critique against the positivist assumption that knowledge of reality can be gained 
only through empirical means (Tao, 2013). Further, CR also stands against the idealists’ 
ontology, claiming that there is no independent reality to human perceptions (Okasha, 2002). As 
a result, CR is a philosophical position that endorses the idea of an independent reality, but for 
CR “there is always an interpretive or hermeneutic element in making sense of this reality, 
particularly in social setting” (Tao, 2013). That is why CR is a philosophical ground that justifies 
the use of the mixed-method approach. In this line, CR says that “quantitative methods enable 
us to develop reliable descriptions; to provide accurate comparisons; and to identify patterns 
and associations” (McEvoy and Richards, 2006, p. 71). For example, here we use survey and 
factor analysis to work on data in order to identify the patterns of agency-oriented factors and 
concise them in a generalizable way. Further, in in-depth interviews we identify the affective 
mode of agency-oriented factors. At the end of the first part of Study 4, all three modes of 
agency (affective, cognitive and conative) are identified in agency-oriented factors (see Chapter 
5, Study 4, Part 1), using both qualitative and quantitative methods. Second, using CR as the 
philosophical ground to determine the agency-freedom relationship is consistent with the other 
theories used in the present study. In this line, according to Zheng and Stahl (2011) both Sen's 
(1999) Capability Approach and Critical Realism are normative theories; they both believe in 
democracy and pursuit of the “good life”. More importantly, CR focuses on freedom similar to 
the other theories that we use in this study, namely Berlin's (1969) liberal approach to freedom 
and values, Weber's (1993) Rationality Types, and Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism. All of these 
theories have a common point that is consistent with CR, as they all can be seen as a critical 
lens on human behaviour in social settings. The axiological domain of our research enquiry is 
that the researcher’s values (i.e. lens) are used to interpret the observations (see Chapter 5, 
Data Collection, Findings and Analysis). In the statistical approach our axiological lens to 
interpret the result becomes more objective (see Chapter 5, Study 3, Result Interpretation). 
Further, we develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency within a research methodology that is 
designed around CR through five empirical studies that have deduction (initially we test what we 
know in theory and the existing literature on agency and freedom), induction (we work with the 
data to develop generalisable explanations for our findings, here, we go beyond the existing 
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explanations for agency-freedom relationships), and abduction parts (when we use existing 
theories to explain our findings) (see  Table 5). Figure 4 shows the input, process and output of 
this research and the research aim and objectives that are mapped onto the concepts of agency 
and freedom. 
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Figure 4: Research aim and objectives 
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Research Plan 
This study is a basic research as it is a fundamental scientific enquiry to develop the 
agency-freedom relationship. So far, we have outlined that our research methodology includes 
an initial state of theory development, and then four empirical studies that cover mixed-method 
approaches based on the CR philosophical paradigm to develop the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency, and finally one case study to test the theory (Figure 5). The detailed explanation of 
each empirical study, the justification of the use of methods and techniques are in Chapter 5, 
where we outline data collection, findings and analysis. As presented in Figure 5, we are using 
both qualitative and quantitative methods due to the scope of our research questions. We use 
surveys to (A) identify a generalisable set of agency-oriented factors that are associated with 
freedom of choice, and (B) compare the impact of agency-oriented factors from two standpoints 
of ‘self’ and ‘other’. Hence, to analyse the survey findings, we use EFA to explore the factors in 
the data, and then we run CFA to test the goodness of fit of these factors to theory, as 
suggested by (Brown, 2015). It is worth mentioning here, however, that the surveys identify 
cognitive and conative modes of agency-oriented factors, and the affective mode is being 
explored using the interview data. 
Further, we use qualitative methods to accompany the quantitative findings in order to: 
(A) identify ‘emotions’ that is the affective mode of agency; (B) identify how an individual deals 
with the opposing worldview by comparing their scores in ‘self’ and ‘other’ standpoints of the 
questionnaire (see Chapter 4, Theory Development for more detail); (C) identify the agent’s 
values; (D) distinguish the agent’s rationality types particularly in the cases that two rationality 
types have similar types of reasoning (see the problem of identifying M.G.’s rationality type in 
Chapter 6, Case Study); (D) detect ‘rationalisation’, when an individual is offering an unsound 
reason for her decision; (E) to study the link between emotion, reason and decision (see 
Chapter 4, Theory Development and Chapter 5, Data Collection, Findings, and Analysis). Figure 
5 shows that the result of the first three studies is an Evaluation Instrument that identifies 
agency-oriented factors associated with freedom, and the result of the final two empirical 
studies map this Evaluation Instrument and the agency-oriented factors onto the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency. Finally, we apply our theory to a case study that establishes how freedom 
expands or contracts based on agency-oriented factors.  
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Figure 5: Research Methods, Tools and Techniques 
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Research Methods and Data Analysis Techniques 
In Chapter 5 we explain data analysis, reduction, conclusion justification, ethical issues 
and obstacles that we have encountered when collecting data for each of the four studies 
presented in Figure 5. Further, the full justification of the methods being used is provided in 
Chapter 5. Here, we present a short overview of all of the methods and techniques, applied to 
develop and test the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to the determine agency-freedom relationship. 
First, we develop the theoretical foundation of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in Chapter 4. 
Here, we use logical reasoning to develop this conceptual ground from the existing theories on 
agency and freedom. Second, in Chapter 5 we present four studies that empirically develop the 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.  
The first study will conduct systematic in-depth interviews with seven employees, with a 
focus on the factors that have influenced their career choice. The interview questions are 
designed based on the elements of the core decision model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
(see Chapter 5, Study 1, Interview Questionnaire Design). To analyse the data, we use coding 
and thematic analysis, based on the Braun and Clarke (2006) steps to analyse interview data. 
Finally, we design the first version of the Evaluation Instrument based on the 11 themes that are 
developed in the interviews and using theories (see Chapter 5, Study 1, Result Interpretation).  
The second study is a survey, using the 1st Evaluation Instrument used in the first study, 
with a focus on the cognitive and conative factors associated with the “career choice” of a 
sample (N=1063; distributed in 450 cities around Iran) that is representative at the national level 
of the employees of the host organisation. The survey was conducted through SurveyMonkey 
(see Chapter 5, Study 2). We run EFA on the data as the data are found appropriate for this 
technique (see Chapter 5, Study 2, Data Analysis), and in order to concise the factors. As a 
result of EFA, the 1st Evaluation Instrument is revised into the 2nd version (Chapter 5, Study 2, 
Result Interpretation).  
The third study is another survey, using the 2nd Evaluation Instrument with a focus on the 
cognitive and conative factors associated with the “university major selection” of a sample 
(N=4086; distributed in 450 cities around Iran) that is representative at the national level from 
the students of the host organisation. The survey was conducted through SurveyMonkey (see 
Chapter 5, Study 3). We run EFA to concise the factors and then we run CFA to test the fitness 
of the factors to theory (see Chapter 5, Study 3, Data Analysis). As a result, the final version of 
the Evaluation Instrument is developed into a reliable and valid instrument that measures the 
cognitive and conative modes of agency-oriented factors. The factors are explained by Weber's 
(1993) rationality types. 
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The fourth study has two parts. In the first part, we use the Evaluation Instrument and we 
conduct ten interviews with some of the students that have participated in Study 2 and we 
explore the affective mode of agency-oriented factors. The interview questions to identify 
emotions are designed based on Weiner's (2010) attribution theory of emotion (see Chapter 5, 
Study 4, Part 1). Further, we test how they deal with the opposing worldview, based on the 
questions that are designed based on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism. In the second part of Study 4, 
we will conduct four other in-depth interviews, with a focus on different decision subjects (i.e. 
migration, devoting wealth, surviving business failure). In both studies we use thematic analysis 
to analyse the data, and we get help from theories to explain the findings in order to determine 
the agency-freedom relationship in these four cases (see Chapter 5, Study 4). At the end, the 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is developed and we apply all its aspects to one case study to 
determine the agency-freedom relationship, using the individual’s score in the Evaluation 
Instrument, conducting an interview to identify emotions and worldviews and the link between 
these concepts. Each of the above-mentioned studies, data analysis, techniques and samplings 
are explained in detail in Chapter 5 in the sections on data collection, findings and analysis. 
 
Context at Country and Industry Levels 
The context of this study is Iran’s private education sector. This is a special context for 
studying the agency-freedom relationship because several historical events have limited 
Iranians’ freedom of choice compared with the other parts of the world, particularly the west 
(Waites, 2008; Ansari, 2015). Following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the country was 
dragged into one of the longest internal conflicts that ruined most of its infrastructure (Alvandi, 
2014; Wilber, 2014). Since the end of the war in 1988 the country has made several advances 
in health, education and income (Salehi-Isfahani, 2010; Rad, Naderi, & Soltani, 2011). Due to 
these macro improvements, the country has witnessed advancements in relation to human 
development (Palesh et al., 2010). Although these developments have been disrupted by the 
international sanctions on Iran from 2010 to 2016, the educational sector has dealt with this 
isolation better than other sectors, mostly because the country relies on its own national 
curriculum (Savage and O’Connor, 2015) and the main job requirement is to be an expert in a 
particular academic subject (Park and Lee, 2015). Hence, an increasing number of Iranian 
university graduates meet such requirements unlike other service industries that require 
international professional training such as finance and banking (Abtahi & Saadi, 2012; 
Dehghanpour Farashah Ali, 2013). Also, the private educational sector has provided the most 
employment opportunities for university graduates (Teferra, 2015) and women in particular 
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(Esfahani and Shajari, 2012) over the past decade. Hence, the decision of ‘career choice’ and 
‘university major selection’ are two important agency-outcomes in Iran (Salehi-Isfahani, 2009), 
and the private educational sector provides a representative sample to test the factors 
influencing these decisions. The present study has had the privilege of using the sample of 
1063 young employees (male and female, aged between 19 and 25 years old) as well as the 
sample of 4086 students (male and female; aged 18 or 19; before going to university) that are 
distributed in 450 urban and rural cities of Iran. This is because due to some political concerns 
collecting data at the national level in Iran is difficult for researchers in the field of humanities 
(Teferra, 2015).      
In this line, it is worth mentioning that in Iran an individual’s agentic ability to live the life 
they value is influenced by Islamic ideology that is dictated by the government (Ali, 2010). Two 
competing streams of thought have influenced Iranians’ way of living over the years. A group of 
thinkers and policy makers believes that Islam must govern all aspects of life and work (e.g. Ali, 
2010; Khan, Farooq, & Hussain, 2010; Branine & Pollard, 2010), while others favour an Islamic 
society governed by western-style democratic values (Javidan and Dastmalchian, 2003). 
Whereas the first group of thinkers has tried to produce Islamic guidelines for living and their 
framework has been widely applied in governmental institutions (Zangoueinezhad & Moshabaki, 
2011), the second group has tried to apply Western practices to Iranian institutions mostly in 
private industry. For example, according to the Islamic school of thought individuals’ practices 
need to be framed within the Islamic treaties and the Quran, and thus an ‘ideological test’ of an 
individual’s values is one of the applications of Islamic assessment in governmental institutions 
(Namazie & Tayeb, 2006). The Islamic ideology does not directly block the diffusion of different 
values in society as is evidenced by the studies conducted in other countries such as Turkey 
(Şahin et al., 2013), Egypt (Bakhoda et al., 2012) and Saudi Arabia (Anderson et al., 2012; 
Bahurmoz et al., 2015). However, it may make the diffusion of non-Islamic values more difficult. 
Hence, within this coercive ideological context, it is relevant to ask how an agent is free to live 
according to her own values.  
 
Context at Organisational and Individual levels 
This research consists of four studies of which three are conducted in a private 
educational institution consisting of 450 branches operating as franchises in Iran. This institution 
has the largest number of students (80%) among private institutions at pre-university level 
(374,998 in 2013, and 455,897 in 2016) and publications (1360 titles and five million copies in 
2016), with an increasing number of employees (11767 in 2013, and 15858 in 2016) in 450 rural 
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and urban cities in Iran. This private institution is organised in different autonomous franchises 
across the country that offer three main educational services: (a) holding biweekly affirmative 
assessments at the national level to test the students’ academic performance based on the 
school curriculum; (b) providing educational support and planning through a personal tutor; (c) 
developing educational products including books, videos, and multimedia products. The 
background and the context of each study are explained in detail in the following sections; 
however, it is worth mentioning that the first four studies are conducted in this organisation. The 
focal decisions that are analysed in these four empirical studies are the “career choice” of 
personal tutors of this organisation and the “university major selection” of its students. These 
two decisions were chosen as the focus of these empirical studies, because the data at the 
national level were accessible to the researcher.  
Before moving forward, it is important to clarify the role of personal tutors, as they 
comprise the highest percentage of employees in this organisation (85% in 2011, and 84% in 
2015). This job, which is the entry level to private educational organisations, covers various 
roles of teaching, consulting and administrative tasks. University graduates and students 
constitute the primary applicant pool for this job. This makes our sample on “career choice” 
representative of person-environment conflict in the agency-freedom relationship, due to the 
high-stake employment situation of young educated Iranian jobseekers (Salehi-Isfahani, 2013). 
Further, the other focal decision (i.e. university major selection) of Study 3 represents another 
agent-environment conflict with a focus on the agency-freedom relationship due to several 
reasons: (A) the university entrance exam is highly competitive in Iran (Arani et al., 2015); (B) 
the career trajectory of Iranian youngsters highly depends on their university major at 
undergraduate level (Salehi-Isfahani, 2011); (C) there is a normative social status attached to 
one’s identity based on her university major (Hussain, 2015). In other words, “university major 
selection” and “career choice” are the two decisions whose impact remains with the agent in 
different domains of her life. The sampling for each study is explained in detail in the next 
chapter (see Chapter 5), where the data collection, analysis and findings are presented.  
 
Ethical Concerns  
The concepts of agency and freedom have a normative nature and their measurement 
involves some important ethical concerns (Buzzelli, 2015; Roberts, 2015). One of the famous 
research examples on agency that has neglected these ethical concerns is Milgram's (1965) 
study that involved participants in an experiment without properly informing them about the 
actual purpose of research. Milgram (1965) has found that 70% of participants followed the 
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authority’s order to harm another person without questioning the eligibility of the source of the 
order. The detrimental side effects of Milgram's (1965) study on its participants have obliged 
researchers to refocus on the importance of ethical concerns particularly when they study 
normative constructs (Baumrind, 2015), such as agency and freedom. Hence, in order to 
prevent similar detrimental impacts, the present study has carefully followed ethical points in all 
four studies and the case study: (A) the topic and focus of the study is explained in detail to all 
participants; (B) the data were collected with the permission of the participants; (C) the findings 
are reported with the participants’ consensus; and (C) the participants are kept anonymous (see 
Appendix 2 for Ethical Forms). 
The code of research ethics of Brunel University (“Research Ethics | Brunel University 
London”, 2014), a set of generic ethical requirements of this university, has been acknowledged 
in research design, conduct, recording and reporting the present research that involves human 
participants, within the following steps: (A) anonymous participation in the survey and interviews 
is not assessed as risky for the participants (Mertens, 2014); (B) voluntary participation and 
informed consent are considered based on the ethical codes of Brunel University and we have 
made sure that each participant is adequately informed of the aims, methods, source of funding, 
any possible conflicts of interest, institutional affiliation of the researcher, the anticipated risks of 
the study and any discomfort it may entail, as suggested by Evans (2016); (C) the publication of 
results is done by considering every safeguard of the privacy of the participant, and in a way to 
minimise the effect of the study on the participants’ mental integrity and personality, as outlined 
by Silverman (2016). 
 
Truthfulness Measurement  
The present study is aware of and carefully considers the measurement truthfulness (i.e. 
reliability, validity, credibility, dependability) of agency and freedom. This is important because 
every individual has a subjective definition of her freedom (Sen, 1999), and the way she sees 
the causes of the events and states around her could be different from our technical definition 
(Heller et al., 2015). Hence, in designing the measurement scales for all the agency-oriented 
constructs, we consider the two dimensions of ‘existential’ (i.e. the degree to which the construct 
pervades through the context) and ‘cognisant’ (i.e. the degree to which an individual is aware of 
the presence of that construct) (see Chapter 5, Data Collection, Findings and Analysis). Table 6 
shows our particular measurement concerns in designing the Evaluation Instrument, data 
analysis and interpretation of agency-oriented factors with a focus on freedom: 
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Table 6: Measurement Rules 
 
 
Criteria    
Measurement 
Scale 
(Survey) 
 
Five-point Likert Scale: The Evaluation Instrument is an aptitude questionnaire and it asks:  
“On the bases of your direct experience, please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements 
regarding the reasons behind your decision of (subject of decision): Scale from (Highly likely = 1) to (Not relevant 
= 5). 
Five-point Likert Scale Justification: We use a five-point Likert scale because it captures the variation in values 
and pro-environmental behaviours (Schultz and Zelezny, 1998), which is an appropriate scale to determine 
individuals’ levels of agreement-disagreement with the statements about agency and freedom in this study.    
A priori 
assumptions 
 
 
Participants are assumed to be truthful, reasonable, rational beings that have emotions and sometimes they 
perform incontinent actions (see Davidson, 2014) or counterintuitive actions that are intentional actions contrary to 
external evaluation and judgement. 
Emotion and reason have different levels of influence on agents (Kahneman, 2014), but this study is focused on 
identifying the influences, not their comparative level of importance. 
Freedom: to measure freedom, we acknowledge that we are not measuring the construct directly; instead we are 
measuring a subjective understanding of freedom and one’s perception. This shows that there are some parts of 
freedom in the ‘real’ domain of reality that are not measured in the present study. This refers to our research 
assumption based on CR that underpins our research findings (see Chapter 3, Methodology).  
Attribution: To measure attribution, we have the following two measurement considerations: 
1. First, attribution is studied as reason not cause, while the latter has been the main focus of attribution 
theories (see Heider, 1944). This means that we measure attribution as a reason, without assuming the 
mechanical cause-effect relationship. In this study, reason is defined within an agent’s apperception which 
refers to the conscious process of connecting two or more pieces of knowledge, i.e. the subject of 
attribution with the Reason and Temporal aspects through the Causative Connective.  
2. Second, in this study, we highlight and distinguish between the knowingness and existence aspects of 
attribution. In this regard, we say that an attribution exists in both the objective and socially constructed 
(and so subjective) senses. It is important to consider whether attribution is assumed as a part of the 
objective reality of the world, or as a socially constructed entity (and so subjective, which is an object in 
one’s subjective perceptions of the world). For instance, a theoretical explanation that connects 
cause/reason and effect could be produced using an appropriate model of the world that is known to 
somebody but not necessarily the agent. Alternatively, cause/reason and effect are non-independent, and 
effect must follow its co-related cause/reason over time. Whether anyone in the world knows of this 
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connection or can even explain it, is quite a different matter. This last interpretation follows realism, 
whereas the former is anti-realism (i.e. proof is needed in order to deem a proposition sound). Here, we 
acknowledge that each individual may have either of the above realism/anti-realist interpretations of the 
world, but this study’s position is based on critical realism (as explained above in detail). In this regard, we 
limit apperception and existence of attribution to awareness in the sense that it can be reasoned about 
consciously in one’s mental models of the world. The attribution therefore becomes amenable to 
introspection. Thus, regarding the attribution measurement we consider two aspects of Existence and 
Apperception. In this line, we identify the following four situations:  
1. Not Chance: an attribution exists and it is known. 
2. Unaware Agent: An attribution exists but it is unknown. 
3. Luck: An attribution does not exist and it is unknown (by definition, one cannot know what does not 
exist) 
4. Rationalisation: An attribution does not exist but it is known (It may be the case that the sense in 
which something exists and is known is to be determined by the agent’s specific rationality type 
(Weber, 1993). In this case, an attribution exists if it is entailed within one of the four rationality 
types of (Weber, 1993) – if it cannot, then it does not exist to the agent! Clearly, this is an anti-
realism position. Here we must differentiate between realism/anti-realism positions. How can one 
know something that does not exist? (see above) This only makes sense if we explain the term 
exist in the sense of anti-realism and know in the sense of a flawed mental model of the world. 
Alternatively, we could have a realism position on exist (so the attribution is not real), yet an agent 
can know it empirically (i.e. a posteriori) through a flawed process of perception and apperception 
(see above). 
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Methodological Limitations 
This study has faced some methodological limitations. One limitation has been 
contacting participants living in the rural cities of Iran through Skype in order to conduct an 
interview. This is because the government has reduced the internet bandwidth in the country for 
political purposes (Morozov, 2012). As a result, the poor internet connection has forced us to 
exclude more than 10 interviews conducted by the researcher. Another methodological 
limitation has been about the specific topic of this research (i.e. freedom and agency), which is a 
sensitive subject particularly in a religious country like Iran (Waites, 2008). In this vein, we did 
not investigate some interesting case studies on agency and freedom such as freedom of 
speech or women’s freedom to not wear the Hijab in public spaces in the country. These are 
well known, interesting and emerging examples in Iran (Ansari, 2015) where the relationship 
between agency and freedom is complex and needs to be studied further.  
 
Chapter Summary 
In summary, this chapter shows that to address the problem of the unclear relationship 
between agency and freedom, we have designed a mixed-method research enquiry in four 
studies based on the Critical Realism (CR) philosophical paradigm. We have shown the logical 
philosophy (deduction, induction and abduction) behind each study and the methods and 
techniques that have been used. Further, we have mentioned the ethical issues and 
measurement considerations on our way to develop and test the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, 
which determined the agency-freedom link. In the following chapter, the data collection, 
research tools, data analysis, findings, and interpretation of results of the four studies are 
presented.  
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Chapter 4: Theory Development 
Introduction 
This chapter has two parts. First, we developed a conceptual framework around the 
research objectives in the first part of this chapter. This conceptual framework is built upon the 
existing literature, relying on the researcher’s special lens that identifies the hidden links among 
the studies on agency and freedom in different disciplines. In the second part of this chapter, we 
develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency based on the early conceptual framework. The result is 
a theory to determine the agency-freedom relationship by identifying the factors and 
mechanisms that are involved in the agency-freedom relationship. The core of the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency is the associating concept between agency and freedom that is the agency 
outcome (decision).  
Regarding the first research question that is “what factors influence one’s agency to 
do/be what she values”, this chapter develops the core model of the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency that identifies three sets of factors: (A) personal and universal constraints; (B) emotion; 
and (C) reason. This chapter develops these factors in the model using logical reasoning and 
insights from the previous theories on freedom-decision (Sen, 2004, 1999, 1990), freedom-
rationality (Weber, 1993a), freedom-worldview (Bakhtin, 1935) and emotion-decision (Weiner, 
2010). As the core model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is developed, it identifies three 
mechanisms that relate agency outcome (decision) to freedom expansion/contraction that are: 
(A) the Evaluation process that determines the emotion and reason that are generated after 
making a decision at t1 from the ‘self’ and ‘other’ standpoints; (B) a Feed Backward-Forward 
Loop that connects emotion and reason at t1 to the next decision at t2; and (C) Capability 
Realisation that determines how the agent categorises her opportunities based on desirability 
and realisable criteria and how this process continues over time with respect to the unintentional 
consequences (side-effects) of her decisions. 
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Part 1: Conceptual Framework of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
This part develops the early conceptual framework of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
according to the research aim and objectives. This section presents the researcher’s 
understanding of the literature regarding agency and freedom. Here, we present the conceptual 
links that enable us to achieve the aim and to develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. This is 
the researcher’s lens on the literature of agency and freedom that later on will be actualised in 
the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. Figure 6 presents a summary of the concepts that are 
developed by the researcher in the first part of this chapter, which include what we know and 
what we don’t know about freedom and agency. We know freedom as it is defined based on two 
senses of freedom by Berlin (1969); the role of authority and rationality types in freedom as 
defined by Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism, and Weber's (1993) rationality types respectively; 
constraints that can be logically derived from Sen's (1999) Capability Approach; the affective 
mode of agency that can be derived from Weiner's (2010) attribution emotions; the cognitive 
mode of agency that can be defined based on Weber's (1993) four rationality types; and values 
as defined based on Berlin's (1969) view on freedom. Figure 6 summarises our existing 
knowledge around the research gap, which at the moment is fragmented and it is unclear that 
how these two concepts of agency and freedom are related. These concepts are developed in 
the first part of this chapter and they will become the foundation of the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency that will be developed in the second part of this chapter that determines the agency-
freedom relationship. 
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Figure 6: Research Gap from the Researcher’s Lens 
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Objective 1: Conceptual link  
Table 7 shows the review of the literature, highlighting the conceptual links developed by 
the researcher between the existing studies and the notions about the first research objective 
that is identifying agency-oriented factors associated with freedom. These notions are the 
affective mode of agency developed based on Weiner's (2010) attribution emotions; the 
cognitive mode of agency that is developed based on Weber's (1993) types of rationalities and 
Bakhtin's (1935) worldviews and discourse among different worldviews; and the conative mode 
of agency that is developed based on Berlin's (1969) and Sen's (1999) definitions of freedom 
and volitional behaviour. The fourth row of Table 7 shows that we have identified decision as 
agency-outcome based on the findings about the manifestation of agency in human behaviour, 
as suggested by neuroscience studies (e.g. Damasio et al., 2015; Damasio and LeDoux, 2012; 
Damasio, 1999). The fifth row of Table 7 shows that in order to identify agency-oriented factors 
we focus on the evaluation of both self and environment, particularly institutions, as suggested 
by phenomenological institutionalism (Meyer, 2008). The sixth row of Table 7 shows that based 
on Sen's (1999) CA and in order to identify agency-oriented factors we consider the role of 
capabilities (the potential state of being/doing), functioning (the achieved state of being/doing), 
the process of realising and desiring a capability, and assessing the capabilities with respect to 
constraints involved and their desirability according to an agent’s values. The eighth row of 
Table 7 shows that we build upon the findings of behavioural economics (Mazar et al., 2008) 
and we get the insight that people may be self-deceptive about the agency-oriented factors that 
are associated with their freedom, thus, we develop the notion of ‘rationalisation’ to detect the 
cases where the agent offers unsound reasons for her agency-outcome. Overall, Table 7 
presents our early conceptual framework around the first research objective. The following 
sections show how these concepts are developed in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in order to 
identify agency-oriented factors associated with freedom.  
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Table 7: Literature-Based Conceptual Framework around the 1st Research Objective 
Study 
Focus Findings Our Conceptual Link Implications for Us 
(Weiner, 2010) 
 
Emotion  
 
Emotions influence decisions. 
 
 
Affective Mode of Agency 
 
 
Agent’s emotions 
(affective mode) 
influence her decisions 
(Bakhtin, 1935; 
Weber, 2009) 
 
Person-
environment 
 
Way of reasoning (i.e. rationality 
type), and how the agent deals with 
the other’s influence on her 
freedom. 
 
Cognitive Mode of Agency 
 
 
Agent’s reasons 
(cognitive mode) 
influence her decisions. 
(Berlin, 1969; 
Sen, 1999b) 
 
Freedom and 
Agency 
 
Decisions are performed by two 
forces of emotion and reason within 
a non-interfered space. What/who 
performed the decision and the 
size of non-interfered space both 
matter in understanding freedom. 
 
Conative Mode of Agency 
 
 
Agent’s freedom 
(conative mode) 
influences her 
decisions. 
(Damasio, 
2005; Damasio 
et al., 2015) 
 
Decision and 
agency 
 
Her decisions are a manifestation 
of human intentions, wants, 
emotions and reasons. 
 
Agency-outcome is decision 
 
Agency can be studied 
through decisions. 
 
(Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977) 
 
Phenomenol
ogical 
Institutional 
Theory 
 
 
Decisions are influenced by the 
environment and particularly the 
institutions around us. 
 
Evaluation 
 
 
Agency must be 
studied in an 
environment through 
‘self’ and ‘other’ 
evaluations of the 
agent’s state of 
being/doing. 
(Sen, 1999b) 
 
Capabilities 
and 
Functioning 
 
To understand human decisions, 
the quality and quantity of their 
capabilities (i.e. potential state of 
 
Capabilities: potential state of 
being/doing 
Functioning: A capability that is 
 
Agent’s capabilities, 
and how they are 
turned into a state of 
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being/doing) and functioning (i.e. 
achieved capability) need to be 
analysed. 
achieved by volition and desire. 
Commanding: A capability that is 
assigned to agent by coercion. 
Beneficial: A state of being/doing 
that is evaluated as desirable. 
Adverse: A state of being/doing 
that is evaluated as non-desirable. 
Desirability: value-laden criterion 
of assessing capabilities and state 
of being/doing. 
Realisability: constraint-oriented 
criterion of assessing capabilities 
and state of being/doing. 
being/doing, must be 
studied. 
 
(Sen, 1999b) 
 
Resource 
Limitation 
 
Freedom of choice is limited by the 
person and the environment. 
  
Personal Constraints: The 
limitations imposed by self on 
agency-outcome. 
Universal Constraints: The 
limitations imposed by the 
environment on agency-outcome.   
 
Agent’s constraints 
must be studied. 
(Mazar et al., 
2008) 
 
Dishonesty 
and self-
deception 
 
 
People use self-deception and they 
are dishonest to give a taste of 
profit without spoiling their positive 
self-view. 
 
Rationalisation is defined as a 
situation when one offers unsound 
reasons for her course of action. 
 
“Rationalisation” in an 
agent’s self-report 
about her decision 
behaviour needs to be 
detected. 
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Objective 1: Rationale of the Conceptual Link 
Table 10 shows the review of literature on why it is important to address the first 
objective with respect to the conceptual linkage highlighted in the previous section. In summary, 
Table 10 points to the main reasons behind our conceptual framework of the first objective (i.e. 
identifying agency-oriented factors associated with freedom). The first row of Table 10 shows 
that we develop the three modes of agency (i.e. affective, cognitive and conative) in the Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency in order to consider the existing debate on whether agency and free 
will are overrated. This is in line with Smith's (2015) argument that recent neuroscientific 
findings regarding human decisions are undermining the concepts of agency and free will as 
articulated by philosophers and liberal thinkers. Hence, we have conceptualised three modes of 
agency to be considerate about the different sides of the debate on agency. The second row of 
Table 10 shows that to prevent misjudgement about agency and freedom, we focus on agency-
outcome and its manifestation on decision as suggested by neuroscientists (e.g. Damasio et al., 
2015). Hence, the core of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency will be a decision model, which is 
going to be explained in detail in the second part of the present chapter. This will also consider 
the role of the environment and how decisions are constructed by institutions as suggested by 
Meyer and Rowan (1977). Hence, our decision model must have an evaluation part that 
considers the role of both self and other on agency-outcome (see the fourth row of Table 10). 
Following, in line with Sen (1999) we believe that both process and end-points matter in agency-
outcome, hence, we use capabilities and functioning notions in the decision model that is the 
core of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. Finally, we are careful about ‘rationalisation’ in the way 
people explain their decision as Kahneman (2012, 2003, 1991) emphasised in his theory of 
human biases. Hence, we develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with respect to the 
possibility of ‘rationalisation’ in peoples’ reasoning for their decision behaviours. The following 
section presents our conceptual framework around the second research objective, and why this 
conceptual framework helps to develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in order to establish 
freedom expansion/contraction with respect to agency-oriented factors.  
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Table 8: Rationale behind the Conceptual Framework of the 1st Research Objective 
 
(Why)  This 
Conceptual Link 
 
 
Advantages derived from the literature 
 
 
 
Implications for Us 
 
Why three modes of 
agency? 
 
 
In order to be able to consider the inter-disciplinary debate among 
neuroscientists and philosophers regarding the relevance of agency 
and free will, when most of human decisions are made 
unconsciously, as emphasised by Smith (2015). 
 
 
Developing the Tri-Modal Theory 
of Agency that has all three 
modes of agency, with a 
foundation in freedom literature. 
 
Why focus on 
decision as agency-
outcome ? 
 
In order to prevent us from making loose judgements about freedom 
that are rampant in agency studies in the field of social psychology 
(see Bandura, 2015) and appraisal psychology (see Deci and Ryan, 
2012). In line with Damasio et al. (2015), the focus on decision will 
help to increase the reliability of findings about agency and freedom.  
 
Developing a decision model as 
the core of the Tri-Modal Theory 
of Agency. 
Why evaluation from 
person-environment 
standpoints? 
 
In order to refocus on the role of institutions and their hidden 
mechanism in constructing agency-outcome, as Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) show that it is important to consider how decisions are 
constructed in social contexts. 
 
Developing an evaluation sections 
for the core decision model of the 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. 
Why capability-
functioning? 
 
In order to emphasise process while considering the end point in 
decision making and human life trajectory, as Sen (2011) says it 
matters. 
 
Building the core decision model 
of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
on capability and functioning.  
Why focus on 
constraints? 
 
In order to highlight the role of constraints such as time that have 
widely been overlooked in agency-oriented and freedom-based 
studies, as Heffernan and Ward (2015) have shown. 
 
Considering two levels for the 
capability decision model, the core 
of the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency. The inner level is the 
Logical Core that includes the 
constraints that are external to 
agency, thus, out of her control. 
The outer shell, that is the 
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Affective Shell, is about the 
constraints related to the agent, 
like emotion, reason, judgment, 
and the interaction among them. 
Why focus on 
rationalisation? 
 
Addressing the unreliability involved in self-report research tools as 
Kahneman (2014, 2012, 2002) has shown several  biases and 
unreliability in the way individuals perceive and explain their 
behaviours. 
 
Developing a mechanism to 
identify and detect 
“rationalisations” in the way 
people explain their decisions. 
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Objective 2: Conceptual Link  
Table 9 shows the concepts that are developed in the present research, based on the 
literature on agency and freedom, that help us to develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in 
order to achieve the second research objective that is establishing how freedom is 
expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors. As shown in Table 9, we study decision 
(agency-outcome) as the link between agency and freedom, based on Berlin's (1969) and Sen's 
(1999) definitions of freedom. They both have built their definitions of freedom on the decisions 
that agents make. Here, we highlight the role of decisions as the conceptual link between 
agency and freedom and the core of understanding of the agency-freedom relationship is a 
decision model (see Table 7). The other concepts that we have developed to establish freedom 
expansion/contraction based on agency-oriented factors are: (A) evaluation from the ‘self’ and 
‘other’ standpoints, based on Davidson's (2014) and Sen's (1977) emphasis on the differences 
between the judgements made by ‘self’ and ‘other’ and their complex influence on decisions; (B) 
emotions that are generated from the attributions that are made as a result of the agent’s 
evaluating her state of being/doing and the attributions she makes that influence her 
subsequent decision, based on Weiner's (2010) Attribution Theory of Motivation; (C) the 
rationality type of the agent that is the way she reasons her decisions and, according to Weber 
(1993), this will influence her freedom of choice; (D) worldview and the way the agent deals with 
the opposing worldview, as Bakhtin (1935) says that these mechanisms will also are associated 
with freedom; and finally (E) values and establishing freedom expansion/contraction based on 
the conflictive/conducive influence of decisions on the agent to live according to her values, 
which Sen (1999), Berlin (1969) and Weber (1993) have all acknowledged and emphasised the 
role of morality and values in an agent’s freedom. At the end, our definition of agency is 
presented in the final row of Table 9, which is a value-laden concept built upon the existing 
views on agency and freedom. The next section shows why these concepts fit our enquiry to 
develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in order to achieve the second research objective. 
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Table 9: Literature-based Conceptual Framework around the 2nd Research Objective 
Study 
 
Focus 
 
Findings 
 
Our Conceptual Link 
 
Implications for Us 
(Berlin, 
1969; 
Sen, 
1999b) 
 
Decision 
(Link) 
 
Freedom is to be studied 
with a focus on decisions 
in terms of ‘self’ and 
‘space’. Positive freedom 
is about who/what 
determines decisions.  
Negative freedom is about 
the space of decision 
making.  
 
Decision as the link 
between agency and 
freedom. 
 
 
The core of the agency-freedom relationship is 
a decision model. 
Decision is agency outcome. 
Freedom is necessary for agency. 
To study positive freedom, divided self, 
emotion, rationality, values, and constraints 
must be studied at the personal level. 
To study negative freedom, capabilities, 
functioning, process, values from the other’s 
perspective and person-environment 
interaction must be considered. 
(Davidso
n, 2014, 
2001, 
1970) 
 
Judgment 
(self) 
 
Incontinent actions are 
possible when an agent 
makes an intentional 
choice, while she has 
another alternatives, while 
the agent judges that the 
other alternative is better. 
 
Evaluation from the ‘self’ 
standpoint: to help 
understand incontinent 
actions that are made 
contrary to self-judgment. 
 
Evaluation from the two standpoints of self and 
other. 
Determining impact of agency-oriented factors 
from the two standpoints of ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
Emotions are studied in two categories of 
direct (self-reflected) and indirect (perceived).  
Rationality is studied with respect to self and 
other. 
Freedom is studied from the two senses of 
positive and negative (see Table 3) 
(Sen, 
1990, 
1977) 
 
Judgment 
(other) 
 
Committed actions are 
possible when an agent 
decides against her self-
centred goals for the sake 
of others. 
 
Evaluation from the ‘other’ 
standpoint: to help 
understand counterintuitive 
actions that are made 
contrary to common sense 
(or other judgment)  
 
Evaluation from the two standpoints of self and 
other. 
Evaluating a state of being/doing based on 
‘self’ values in relation with norms or ‘other’ 
values 
 
 
Emotion 
 
Emotions act as decision 
 
Emotions: emotions are 
 
Affective mode of agency is studied based on 
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(Weiner, 
2010) 
(attribution) motives. Evaluation of 
current behaviour and 
attributions assigned to 
that behaviour generate 
emotions, related to 
stability, controllability and 
locus of that attribution. 
generated from the 
attribution made in the 
evaluation of the self about 
the self, and self about the 
other about self. 
Feed Backward-Forward 
Look: evaluation of the 
state of being/doing and its 
influence on subsequent 
decision. 
the Weiner’s (2010) attribution theory of 
motivation. 
Emotions are generated from attribution, 
dervied from evaluation. 
Locus, stability and controlability of attributions 
determine emotion. 
Emotion plays as motivator and  trigger of 
subsequent decision.  
(Weber, 
2009, 
1993a) 
 
Rationality 
type  
(person-
environme
nt 
interaction) 
 
The way people reason for 
their actions (i.e. rationality 
types) associates with their 
freedom. There are four 
rationality types: 
substantive (value laden), 
practical (goal driven), 
formal (order driven), 
theoretical (abstract and 
external to the agent). 
Substantive rationality is a 
way of reasoning that 
allows agent to flourish 
freedom. In formal 
rationality the agent is 
bounded to standard 
norms. 
 
Rationality Type: the way 
an agent reasons for her 
decisions that is mapped 
onto her values and 
associates with her 
freedom of choice. 
 
Agency-oriented factors need to be mapped 
onto rationality types to reveal how 
environment influences freedom. 
Rationality types influence agency-outcome, 
thus it is a mode of agency that is associated 
with freedom.  
(Bakhtin, 
1935) 
 
Worldview 
(person-
environme
nt 
interaction) 
 
A coercion of freedom is 
discourse between 
sources of authority and 
those who are under 
authority. The only way of 
having discourse that 
enables people to have 
 
Worldviews: way of 
reasoning, reason, 
emotion, values, needs of 
an agent. 
Reconciling Approaches: 
the way worldviews 
encounter and integrate. 
 
Worldviews and reconciling approaches must 
be studied to see how one makes a decisions 
in relation to others. 
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freedom is dialogue. In 
dialogism everyone is 
heard; everyone has her 
own version of reality; 
people are being informed 
and their worldview may 
be altered in face of each 
other. 
(Sen, 
1999b) 
Berlin 
(1969) 
Weber 
(1993) 
 
Value and 
freedom 
 
One must be free to live 
the life she has reason to 
value. 
 
‘Values’ are the 
benchmarks of measuring 
agency and freedom levels 
and their relationship. 
If a decision conflicts with 
an agent’s ability to live 
according to her values, 
then her freedom is 
contracted. 
If a decision is conducive 
with an agent’s ability to 
live according to her 
values, then her freedom is 
expanded. 
 
Defining freedom with respect to values as 
“one is free to live the life she has reason to 
value”. 
Defining agency as an individual’s affective, 
cognitive and conative abilities to decide 
according to her own values, to remain 
responsible for the result of her decision, to 
create change in line with her values, and to 
be judged based on her agency-outcome and 
her values. 
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Objective 2: Rationale of the Conceptual Link 
Table 10 shows the review of the literature on why it is important to address the second 
objective based on the concepts highlighted in the previous section (see Table 9). The second 
and the third columns of Table 10 cover the reasons behind, and the implications of the 
conceptual framework that we have built to establish around the second objective (i.e. 
establishing how freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors.) within the 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The first row of Table 10 shows that focusing on decision as the 
link between agency and freedom is appropriate, because decision is a tangible concept and 
manifestation of agency and freedom, as other freedom-oriented scholars (e.g. Sen, 1999) have 
also focused on decision to develop their freedom-oriented theory of human behaviour. Recent 
reviews show that to study decision, we have access to valid and reliable methodologies that 
have already been established and tested in many studies (Puts et al., 2015), thus, investigating 
the agency-freedom relationship through the notion of decision helps us to conduct a 
multidisciplinary study among the isolated fields of psychology, philosophy and neuroscience 
(Kahraman et al., 2015). The second row of Table 10 shows that by conceptualising evaluation 
from ‘self’ and ‘other’ standpoints, we are able to address the crucial and open questions of 
understanding the decisions that are intended contrary to personal judgment (see incontinent 
actions by Davidson, 2014), and the actions that are intended against self-centred goals and for 
the sake of others (see commitment actions by Sen, 1977). This is because the dilemma of 
explaining counterintuitive and incontinent decisions is about the mismatch between self and 
other judgments. Further, conceptualising emotion based on Weiner's (2010) theory on 
attribution-emotion-motivation has been suggested by the studies (Reisenzein, 2014; Reisman, 
2015) that have focused on the emotional and moral aspect of decisions. Table 10 shows that 
Conceptualising rationality types based on Weber's (1993) sociology theory has been 
suggested by the studies (Cockerham, 2015; Kalberg, 1980a) that have focused on person-
environment interaction and freedom. Conceptualising worldview based on Bakhtin's (1935) 
dialogism has been suggested by the studies (Holquist, 2002; Robinson, 2011; White, 2009) 
that have focused on hidden coercions on the freedom of individuals in the agent-authority 
relationship. Finally, conceptualising freedom expansion/contraction and agency-oriented 
factors based on values is because what distinguishes the characteristics of human decisions 
from the decisions made by other species is human values and morality (Arrow, 2012), as value 
is the cornerstone of the concepts of freedom and agency (Nussbaum, 2004). So far we have 
developed the early phases on the theoretical development of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. 
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In the next part, we start building the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency based on this early conceptual 
framework.  
  91 
Table 10: Rationale behind the Conceptual Framework of the 2nd Research Objective 
 
(Why) this 
conceptual link? 
 
 
Advantages derived from the literature 
 
 
Implications for Us 
Why decision as the 
agency-freedom 
link? 
 
Because: 
Decision is a tangible manifestation of the abstract 
concepts of agency and freedom (Sen, 1999b). 
There are available valid methodologies to investigate 
decisions in various disciplines (Puts et al., 2015). 
Decision is a well-known and well-established notion 
in different sciences (Kahraman et al., 2015). 
 
Determining the agency-freedom relationship 
becomes the main novelty and implication of the 
present study. 
Why consider 
evaluation from the 
‘self’ standpoint? 
 
Because recent studies on incontinent actions 
(Correia, 2016)  show that the question of why an 
agent makes an intentional decision contrary to her 
own judgment is still open to further research. 
 
Determining the agency-freedom relationship with 
respect to ‘self’ judgment will contribute to the 
studies in the areas of theory of the mind 
(Davidson, 2014), and free will (e.g. Correia, 
2016). 
Why consider 
evaluation from the 
‘other’ standpoint? 
 
Because recent studies on committed actions 
(Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015) show that the 
question of why an agent makes an intentional 
decision contrary to norms, common sense, and 
against her self-centred goals is still open to further 
research. 
 
Determining the agency-freedom relationship with 
respect to ‘other’ judgment will contribute to the 
studies in the areas of behavioural economics 
(e.g. Mazar et al., 2008), and Sen's (1977) idea of 
rational fool. 
Why focus on 
attribution-emotion 
in the agency-
freedom link? 
 
Because recent studies on attribution emotions 
(Heerdink et al., 2015) show that the affective mode 
of agency has rarely been studied with a focus on 
attributions about the current state of being/doing and 
its motivational impact on subsequent decisions. 
Weiner's (2010) theory to investigate emotions 
through attributions as decision motivator is recently 
used and acknowledged as an appropriate approach 
 
Determining the agency-freedom relationship with 
respect to attribution emotions will contribute to 
the studies in the areas of appraisal psychology 
(e.g. Rohr et al., 2015). 
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to understand moral aspects of decision in some 
studies (Reisenzein, 2014; Reisman, 2015). 
Why focus on 
rationality types in 
the agency-freedom 
link? 
 
Because recent studies on rationality types 
(Cockerham, 2015) show that the cognitive mode of 
agency has rarely been studied with a focus on 
rationality types. Further, Weber's (1993) types of 
rationality are acknowledged and used by several 
scholars (Cockerham, 2015; Kalberg, 1980a) to 
understand human behaviour with respect to person-
environment interaction and freedom. 
 
Determining the agency-freedom relationship with 
respect to rationality types will contribute to the 
studies in the areas of the sociology of agency 
(e.g. Cockerham, 2015; Kalberg, 1980). 
Why focus on 
worldview in agency-
freedom link? 
 
Because recent studies on worldview (Robinson, 
2011) show that cognitive and conative modes of 
agency have rarely been studied with a focus on 
worldviews and reconciling mechanisms, while 
pointing to Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism as an 
appropriate philosophical ground for this purpose. 
 
Determining the agency-freedom relationship with 
respect to worldviews and dialogism will 
contribute to the studies in the areas of philosophy 
of the person-environment interaction (e.g. 
Holquist, 2002; White, 2009). 
Why conceptualise 
freedom based on 
values in the agency-
freedom link? 
 
Because values are one of the main distinguishing 
factors of human beings that is the corner stone of the 
concepts like free will and agency (Arrow, 2012).  
 
Determining the agency-freedom relationship with 
respect to values will contribute to the studies in 
the areas of freedom (e.g. Berlin, 1970) and 
agency (e.g. Smith, 2015). 
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The Early Conceptual Framework 
This thesis aims to determine the agency-freedom relationship. So far we have shown 
that to achieve this aim we need to develop an agency theory that: (a) explains cognitive, 
conative and affective modes of agency with respect to freedom; (b) measures agency with 
respect to both the positive and negative sides of freedom; and (c) determines how agency and 
freedom are related. However, the main challenge in bringing together all of these broad and 
mostly isolated concepts in a single theory is determining a way to link them together (Gangas, 
2015; Okkolin, 2016; Pelenc et al., 2015). In this regard, we have developed a conceptual 
framework that sheds light on the agency-freedom relationship with a focus on decision as our 
basic building block. Figure 7 shows how our early conceptual framework is mapped onto the 
research aim and objectives as well as the relationship between the focal concepts in this study.  
As presented in Figure 7, we have identified three modes of affective, cognitive and 
conative for agency, in order to be realistic about the role of free will in human behaviour. This is 
because whether agency and free will are overrated in philosophical stands is an ongoing 
debate (Smith 2015), since the recent findings in the field of neuroscience show that most 
human decisions are made automatically (Damasio et al., 2015), and the agency level is highly 
correlated with the level of coercion of the environment (Caspar et al., 2016; Correia, 2016; 
Damasio and LeDoux, 2012). Hence, we have identified three modes for agency to welcome the 
recent findings about emotion (Ashkanasy, 2015; Heerdink et al., 2015; Reisenzein, 2014), 
reason (Cockerham, 2015; Kalberg, 1980a), and the volitional aspect of agency (Chiappero-
Martinetti et al., 2015a), with respect to freedom. 
Figure 7 also shows that we have conceptualised decision as agency-outcome to use it 
as a link between agency and freedom, because decision is well established in various 
disciplines (Lehnert et al., 2015; Puts et al., 2015), there are valid methodologies to study 
decision (Arlegi and Teschl, 2015), and freedom. Further, agency studies have already focused 
on decisions (see Sen, 2011, 1977). Focusing on decision enables us to use the insights from a 
broader range of knowledge and the result becomes familiar in a wider academic context 
(Buckareff et al., 2015). Further, being able to make a decision is the necessity of both positive 
and negative freedom (Berlin, 1969). Finally, the link between decision and freedom is 
emphasised in Sen's (1999) Capability Approach (CA) where freedom is defined as the 
necessity of human development that won him the Noble Prize for Economics. In CA, Sen 
(1999) suggests studying freedom by measuring the “effectiveness” of individuals in their own 
life and society. In the other words, to study freedom Sen (1999) emphasises the need to 
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examine an individual’s agency regarding her ability to make decisions, to create change, to live 
the life she has reason to value, and to be evaluated based on her decisions.  
So far, CA has been expanded in the field of human development (Alkire, 2015; Swain, 
2015) with particular focus on the “evaluation” aspect of freedom that is about measuring and 
comparing individuals’ substantive freedom in different societies (Basta, 2016; Chiappero-
Martinetti et al., 2015b). In Chapter 2 (Literature Review) we have shown that in spite of Sen's 
(1999) emphasis on the importance of understanding the agency aspect of freedom (i.e. 
“effectiveness” in his terminology), this area has remained underdeveloped. Accordingly, we put 
a capability-based decision model as the core of our conceptual framework and the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency, because a capability-based understanding of decisions has already been 
attempted in Sen's (1999) Capability Approach to understand agency and freedom, and this 
concept is well known in freedom studies (Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015), and agency studies 
(Asah, 2015). The following sections show how the capability-based decision model is built to 
be the core of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. 
However, even if we focus on decisions as the link between agency and freedom, we 
have shown that there is still a gap in the literature in terms of determining the agency-freedom 
relationship with a focus on the cognitive, affective and conative modes of the agent in her 
decisions (see Chapter 2, Literature Review). This is a complex relationship because decisions 
are sometimes determined contrary to self-judgment (i.e. incontinent actions in Davidson's 
(2014) terminology) and other’s judgment (i.e. counter-intuitive decisions). For example, the 
literature lacks a theory that determines the agency-freedom relationship of a gambler when she 
decides to continue gambling contrary to her own judgment; or a peace activist when she 
decides to enter a protest contrary to common sense, implying that her involvement may 
threaten her life. The challenging question is what the cognitive, conative and affective levels of 
the agency of the gambler and the peace activist are and how their positive and negative 
freedom expands/contracts after exercising their agency (i.e. making the decision). Gambling 
and entering a peace protest may seem too extreme examples regarding the balance between 
self and other judgments and the agency outcome (i.e. decision), but it (Correia, 2016) has been 
shown that in any decision there is a trade-off between self and other judgments. In this line, in 
many life-changing decisions an agent is evaluating between the internal (i.e. agency-oriented 
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factors) and external (i.e. constraints or motivators) factors to choose a career, university major, 
partner, place of living, etc. 
In this line, in the early conceptual framework we have identified three modes for agency 
(affective, cognitive and conative) and we have defined freedom contraction/expansion based 
on values (see Figure 7). In this line we say that freedom is contracted if the agent makes a 
decision that is in conflict with her values, and freedom is expanded if a decision is conducive to 
the agent’s values. The reason that value is the cornerstone of our theory is because value is 
tyhe distinguishing concept of human decisions from animals’ actions (Arrow, 2012), which is 
the reason behind having the concepts of agency and freedom in understanding human 
behaviour (Nussbaum, 2004). At the end, as the relationship between agency and freedom is 
vague, thus our research enquiry to develop the Tri-Modal Theory of is to shed light on this 
matter and to determine the agency-freedom relationship. Building on this early conceptual 
framework, in the following sections we develop the central model of the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency, where every element of the early conceptual framework (Figure 7) is explained in detail 
and expanded.
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Figure 7: Early Conceptual Framework 
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Part 2: The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
Background  
To develop a theory that explains the agency-freedom relationship and their associating 
concept that is decision, this study starts from Sen's (1999) Capability Approach (CA) that 
focuses on freedom, agency and the decision process (Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015b; 
Lorgelly et al., 2015). CA emphasises individuals’ values, opportunities and the decision 
process. Here, we explain why each of these notions matter in the agency-freedom relationship 
and how we capture them in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.  
 
Process and Values 
Process and values matter in the agency-freedom relationship, because they can 
contract/expand an agent’s freedom as they affect the number and quality of capabilities (i.e. 
the potential state of being/doing) and the way these options are turned into a state of 
being/doing (Goldberg, 2016). For example, the state of freedom of Person A, who wants to win 
an election by any means, is different from the freedom level of Person B, who wants to win the 
same election fairly, because the process that they have chosen to achieve that end is different. 
In this line, the present study puts emphasis on the decision process and an agent’s values 
because we define agency as an individual’s cognitive, conative and affective ability to decide 
according to her values, to create change, to be responsible for her actions, and to be evaluated 
based on her decisions. This is our expansion on Sen's (1999, 1985) idea of freedom with a 
focus on agency. For example, Person A has higher freedom regarding the number of options 
that are available to her to win the election compared with Person B, but this study measures 
their agency level too. Here, we argue that although Person A has higher freedom than Person 
B, the agency level of Person B is higher than Person A, because Person B is more in control of 
her decision process and more responsible for the consequences of her choice according to her 
own values compared with Person A.  
The example of a presidential election shows the importance of focusing on an agent’s 
values and decision process in understanding her agency-freedom relationship. In today politics, 
there are some candidates that are accused of accepting financial support from certain lobbies 
to win the election (Richards, 2015; Simien and Carr, 2015), while other candidates have a 
different decision process that limits their capabilities to win the election because they have 
preferred to reject the financial support based on their own personal values (Johnson, 2016). In 
the end, the candidate who rejects the financial support and decides to proceed according to 
her values has made a decision that contracted her negative freedom regarding the number and 
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quality of capabilities she has compared with the other candidate but the agency of the former is 
higher than the latter, because the latter has to obey the source of financial support even if her 
values conflict with what they want her to decide. Hence, it is necessary to determine the 
decision process and the agent’s values to shed light on understanding the agency-freedom 
relationship.   
 
Capabilities 
Capabilities (or the potential state of being/doing, or opportunities that are defined based 
on Sen's (2004) CA matter in the freedom-agency relationship as emphasised in Sen CA. For 
example, having different capabilities distinguishes the freedom of Person A, who has to select 
from Set A that includes three options of ‘being hanged to death’, ‘being shot to death’ and 
‘being electrified to death’ from the freedom of Person B, who chooses from Set B that includes 
three opportunities of ‘being awarded’, ‘being given a house’, and ‘being given a car’. Although 
this is an extreme example, it has been shown (Arrow and Renwick, 2015) that the quantity and 
quality of capabilities influence the decision-making process with respect to freedom.  
In decision making, the concept of capabilities is tied with the notion of preferences as 
the quality and quantity of capabilities are affected by an agent’s preferences (Arrow, 2012, 
1962). However, one of the main challenges in the field of decision making is determining an 
individual’s preferences (Hausman, 2005) in a way that captures the multiple sides of motivation 
(Grewal et al., 2006), and the complexities of cognitive, affective and conative modes of the 
decision-making process (Binder, 2014; Okkolin, 2016). For example, if Person B prefers Set A 
to Set B she has made a counterintuitive decision (i.e. a decision contrary to other’s judgement) 
(Correia, 2016). This could be because this person is committed to certain values (Sen, 1990) if 
she offers reasons that have stability and robustness then her decision is completely rational 
and planned (Sen, 2007). For example, imagine that Person B is a political activist who prefers 
the ‘worst’ option according to common sense (i.e. to be hanged to death) instead of deciding to 
be released from jail by betraying her friends to the authorities. Here, Person B has made a 
counterintuitive decision, but her decision is made according to her value, she has created 
change in the environment, and she has been responsible for her actions (i.e. her decision is 
agency oriented). If we analyse her decision based only on common sense, then an external 
observer may regard this decision as irrational.  
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Due to the same challenges, Sen (1990) in his ‘Rationale Fool’ acknowledges that 
understanding one’s preferences in counterintuitive decisions is complex. He argues further that 
besides self-centred decisions, people make decisions to satisfy sympathetic reasons (Graham, 
1984) and other-centred preferences (Hausman, 2005). This type of decision that is other 
centred is designated “committed actions” in Sen's (1990) terminology. The examples of 
committed actions are deciding to be involved in sustainable activities, or humanitarian aid that 
may threat the agent’s life. Sen expands his view up to the point that “one may decide to get 
involved in a committed action because she/he internalized others’ goals” (Sen, 1990). However, 
some (Hatzis and Mercuro, 2015; Sendjaya, 2015) have questioned the reliability of Sen’s 
explanation for counterintuitive decisions (“committed action”). Further, understating 
counterintuitive decision becomes more complex because people may determine an action 
contrary to their own personal judgment (i.e. incontinent actions suggested by Davidson, 2001), 
due to “weakness of will” (Correia, 2016). As articulated in Chapter 2 (Literature Review), the 
endeavour (Asah, 2015; Corral, 2015; Pülschen and Pülschen, 2015; Arlegi and Teschl, 2015; 
Dhiman et al., 2015) to understand the reasons behind counterintuitive and incontinent 
decisions has hardly focused on the agent’s freedom. Hence, the important question here is 
how to determine preferences to understand counterintuitive and incontinent decisions with 
respect to the agency-freedom relationship. 
In this regard, we conceptualise preferences based on the core idea of freedom in this 
study that one is free to choose to live the life she has reason to value that is in line with Sen's 
(1999) CA. In this line, we need a value-laden notion of preferences that captures three modes 
of agency (i.e. affective, cognitive and conative). Further, this notion needs to capture personal 
and environmental levels of evaluation. Hence, we expand the concept of preferences to the 
notion of “desirability” that is value laden, multilevel and includes an agent’s volition and 
capabilities in her decision-making process. In this regard, in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
desirable capabilities are commensurate with an agent’s values. So far, it is established that an 
agent’s capabilities, values, decision process and desirability are the main pillars of the Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency that is developed to determine the agency-freedom relationship. 
Accordingly, the following sections build the central model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency on 
Yorulmaz and Khans' (2008a; 2008b) ‘capability-based decision model’ that has been the first 
attempt to explain decision with respect to capabilities with a focus on freedom.  
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The Early Decision Model 
Sen’s capability theory was first operationalised to a decision model developed by 
Yorulmaz and Khan (2008a/b) in order to explain decision with respect to capabilities. This early 
work acknowledges the rational and affective domains of decision making, trying to tie them to 
Sen’s theoretical ideas on volition, decision making and capabilities, but this enquiry has 
remained underdeveloped. In this line, Yorulmaz and Khan identified the importance of rational 
and affective reasons on the decision process, but these areas were underdeveloped and 
remained immature in the theoretical development of the model. The work presented here 
builds upon the Yorulmaz and Khan model by using their decision analysis for determining the 
agency-freedom relationship. We begin by describing the fundamentals of the Yorulmaz and 
Khan model and then proceed to discuss where their limitations are and where this current work 
seeks to contribute. Figure 8 presents the original model of Yorulmaz and Khan (2008a/b). 
Yorulmaz and Khan’s model represents the two principles of volition and benefit in 
decision making. It recognises that people sometimes make free will decisions but other times 
external forces can influence their decisions and so a resulting decision should not be 
considered to be entirely based on the freedom to choose (i.e. volition). The issue of benefit 
arises when determining the outcomes of a decision. Some decisions are beneficial while others 
have more of an adverse consequence for the decision-maker’s well-being. The basis of the 
model is the Capability Set, which is comprised of the totality of capabilities available to an 
agent at a moment in time. This set is dynamic and so can change as a result of decisions 
made. Capabilities are acted on by two types of factors (internal and external) to render some 
realisable while others remain unrealisable. It is the set of realisable capabilities that offer the 
decision maker the choices. When a decision is made entirely at will, the resulting state of being 
is considered functioning; conversely, where an element of coercion is involved, the state of 
being that results is known as commanding. Certain states arise as a direct consequence of 
other states and the elimination of certain capabilities. These states are called 
consequential/side-effects because they are not chosen consciously by the agent. 
Combinations of the level of volition and the benefit of the resulting state lead to the four 
resulting end states in Figure 8. 
  101 
Figure 8: Decision-making model based on the Capability Approach 
 
 
 
Note: adapted from "Yorulmaz, N. and Khan, T.U.M. (2008a), A Capabilities Approach to Patient Safety Assessment In Proceedings 
of 2nd International Patient Safety Congress Antalya, Turkey 25 – 29 March 2008". 
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The First Model’s Features and Limitations 
The decision-making model presented in Figure 8 is tailored to our research focus 
because it can be used to determine both the factors and mechanisms that influence the 
agency-freedom relationship. In this line, the Yorulmaz and Khan (2008a/b) decision model 
acknowledges all factors influencing the capability set and categorises them in the ‘Logical Core’ 
(rational domain) and ‘Affective Shell’ (affective domain) of the model. However, the main 
limitation of this early decision model is its shortcoming regarding a valid set of theoretical and 
empirical support for the factors of the Affective Shell. Further, the concept of ‘agency’ is not 
defined and measured anywhere in this model. Meanwhile, this decision model has 
conceptualised the factors of the Logical Core, but it lacks any empirical support to explain how 
these factors are related to the affective elements. The present study builds upon these 
limitations and develops the early decision model to become the centre of the Tri-Modal Theory 
of Agency. In this line, the Logical Core of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is adapted from the 
rational factors suggested by Yorulmaz and Khan (2008a) in the early decision model. The 
Logical Core includes the following domains of constraints that act on the possible agency-
outcomes available to an agent: 
a) Logical constraints: Often two functionings are mutually exclusive such that both 
cannot be true or both false at the same time. An obvious example maintains that 
one cannot do something while simultaneously not doing it. Also, one cannot be 
considered alive while also being dead. Thus contradictions are prohibited in the 
rational consideration of decision making (Bremer, 2015). Where one capability is 
realised its complement becomes an unrealisable capability by application of this 
constraint. Similarly, contrary relationships between functionings impose constraints, 
where two functionings may not be true simultaneously (but may both be false). For 
instance, one may choose to ride a bus to work, or take a train, but both are not 
possible at the same time, though it is possible that neither is chosen and one opts 
to walk instead. Constraints derived from a consideration of logical validity serve to 
define which choices are reasonable (in its strong sense). Note that the issue of 
soundness is not considered here. 
b) Physical constraints: The laws that govern natural phenomena impose constraints 
on one’s decisions through permitting and inhibiting particular actions and states. It 
is a basic principle of the model that an agent is unable to evade the influence of 
nature and the laws that describe possibility when arriving at a possible choice. So 
for instance, one may not choose to flap one’s arms and fly, become invisible, 
  
 
 
 
103 
abstain totally from sustenance and expect to survive, swim unaided under water for 
an extended time, and any other feat that would normally entail overcoming a basic 
law of nature and existence. The rational principle does not allow delusional thinking 
where one believes in the ability to overcome the limitations inherent in normal life. 
c) Resource constraints: In order to attain one’s goals it is usual to expend energy, 
money, time and other resources without which success would be unachievable. 
Where a goal is both physically and logically attainable in principle, the limiting factor 
is the availability of the required materials (e.g. economic, emotional) to facilitate 
achievement. Therefore, where the necessary resources are absent, one’s choices 
are not considered to be realisable, which is consistent with the Resource 
dependence theory (Hillman et al., 2009). As an example, consider the student who 
wishes to attain a degree without paying tuition fees, without attending classes and 
without studying. One would not expect this student to succeed in graduating with 
their chosen degree, even though physics and logic permit success. 
d) Axiological (self-imposed) constraints: Where there are no externally imposed 
constraints from physics, logic and resources, still decision makers introduce their 
own constraints based on personal value systems, which serve to define the 
allowable choices. Often moral, ethical and religious considerations enter the 
decision-making process and dictate which options become ineligible for a particular 
decision maker. This type of constraints is highlighted in phenomenological 
institutional theory (Tolbert and Zucker, 1999) and Weber's (1993) theory on how an 
individual’s way of thinking bounds her course of action (Kalberg, 1980b). Strict 
adherence to religious law, for example, would exclude marriage for some priests 
(i.e. Catholic). 
 
The Rational Core just described rests on four domains of constraints: two that are 
universal (logic and physics) and two that are personal (resources and axiological). Collectively 
these constraints determine the scope of functionings that are possible, reasonable, realisable 
and allowable for the agent. Beyond what one knows to be possible, reasonable, realisable and 
allowable, there is the added consideration of what is desirable that is the value-laden, 
multilevel criteria of actualising capabilities. Desirability determines the interaction of three 
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modes of agency (affective, rational and conative) and it is located at the affective level of the 
model. Understanding the desirability aspect of decision is necessary to explain incontinent and 
counterintuitive decisions. For example, imagine a policeman in a corrupt police station where it 
is possible, reasonable and realisable to accept bribes and this police officer’s son is very sick 
and needs to undergo expensive surgery that costs way above the father’s savings. How to 
determine his agency-freedom relationship if he decides to refuse/accept the bribe? In the Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency we shed light on this problem by analysing the desirability aspect of 
the decision. The early decision model (i.e. Yorulmaz and Khan (2008a) is immature in this 
respect and does not adequately detail the desirability aspect of decision making with a focus 
on agency and freedom. This aspect is located in the Affective Shell that includes the following 
three domains:  
a) Evaluation: This part anticipates how self and others perceive an agent’s behaviour - 
whether it is approved and encouraged; and how these reactions influence the 
agency outcome. 
b) Feed Backward-Forward Loop: shows how the evaluation result will influence the 
agent’s capability set next time around. 
c) Capability Realisation: depicts how the subsequent impact of a decision affects the 
availability of choices in the next step. 
 
Three Phases of Theory Development 
Figure 9 shows three phases of developing the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency based on 
Yorulmaz and Khan’s (2008a/b) early decision model. This is the first version of the extended 
decision model developed in our research to determine the agency-freedom relationship. This 
version is published by the authors (Khan and Ghalamchi, 2015) in the British Academy of 
Management conference.  
Phase 1: Capability Realisation: As presented in Figure 9, the first developmental phase 
of the affective shell is about Capability Realisation that explains how decision makers realise, 
evaluate, choose and pursue an option from the set of capabilities. As mentioned earlier 
process, values, opportunities, and desirability are important to understand the agency-freedom 
relationship, which is our extension of Sen's (2004) freedom-decision view and Sen's (1990) 
theory of the “Rational Fool”. For example, when a university graduate in art is looking for a job, 
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she starts from analysing options in the job markets (i.e. capability set), then based on her 
personal and universal constraints (i.e. Logical Core) and values (i.e. desirability) she 
categorises some jobs as her realisable and desirable capabilities (e.g. internship in a museum), 
and if she applies for this job then she moves towards one of the four boxes in the Evaluation 
area of the model, which shows the volition and benefit aspects of her state of being/doing after 
the decision. In this area, the ‘side effects’ and ‘capability sets’ need further development.   
Phase 2: Evaluation: The second phase of the model is Evaluation that shows how an 
agent’s state of being/doing before and/or after making a significant and conscious decision is 
evaluated from the self and other standpoints. For example, in the previous example about the 
art graduate who was looking for a job, in the Evaluation Phase we need to explain how her 
state of being/doing was evaluated from her point of view and the others. Here, the model 
requires to be developed with respect to freedom.  
Phase 3: The Feed Backward-Forward Loop: The third phase of the model is the Feed 
Backward-Forward Loop that shows how the emotion and reason that are generated at the 
Evaluation phase subsequently influence the next decision. For example, imagine a female job 
seeker, recently graduated from university and looking for a job in a society that is suffering from 
gender discrimination. In this situation, she may experience ‘anger’ towards the employers who 
reject her application because of her gender, and she experiences hopelessness and she 
becomes coerced to work in a position that provides her with a lower salary compared with her 
male counterparts. Further, the negative emotion that she experiences after evaluating her 
situation may lead her towards being passive, irresponsible and a team-averse employee in the 
work setting (Ashkanasy, 2015). To explain how all of these emotional and rational factors 
influence an agent’s subsequent decisions, the current version of the model is immature. It 
particularly needs to explain how emotion and reason interact and influence agency outcome. 
The developmental process of these three phases of the model is explained in detail in the 
following sections. The model that is developed at the end of this chapter is the centre of the Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency and it will be empirically tested and developed in the following chapter.
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Figure 9: Extending the Capability-Based Decision Model (1st Version) 
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Phase 1: Capability Realisation 
The first phase of developing the central model of the Tri-Modal of Theory Agency is 
explaining agency outcome (decision) with respect to freedom. As mentioned earlier, to achieve 
this aim we focus on an agent’s desirability, values, decision process and capabilities. The 
following sections present how these aspects are developed in the Capability Realisation phase 
of the model. 
 
Phase 1. Desirability and Values 
Desirability: This criterion distinguishes capabilities that are commensurate with the 
agent’s values (i.e. value-driven options) at the two levels of individual and others (i.e. multi-
level), with particular focus on the agent’s freedom (i.e. volitional). Desirability is a multi-level 
notion because in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency an agent’s decision is evaluated in a social 
context, thus her decision is evaluated at least at two levels of “individual” and “social”. 
Desirability consists of an agent’s values, because in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency freedom 
is defined as an agent’s capability to live the life she has to value, thus it is important to test if a 
capability is commensurate with her values. In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, desirability 
assessment occurs before checking how realisable a capability is, because human beings have 
“bounded rationality” (Simon, 1990) and they are not able to process all of their available 
options (i.e. realisable capabilities). Accordingly, several studies in the field of social psychology 
(Kahneman, 2014; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 2014, 1973) have 
shown that human mind uses ‘heuristic’ mechanisms to minimise the number of available 
options, based on a simple rule of ‘maximising gain and minimising loss’. Hence, the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency is designed in a way that initially assesses the desirability of the agent’s 
capabilities and then considers how realisable they are.  
 
Values: In the early version of the ‘capability-based decision model’ by Yorulmaz and 
Khan (2008), there is no trace of value in their decision model. Here we add this criterion to the 
model, because it is the critical notion of understanding the agency-freedom relationship, as we 
say an agent’s freedom is contracted if she makes a decision that prevents her from living the 
life she has reason to value. In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency values are not factual 
statements (Berlin, 1970; Hume, 1902; Kant, 1998); they are not observable facts that can be 
deduced empirically, neither are they artificial conventions like mathematics; values are not 
universal, external to human beings and unchanged by history; they are not accessible to the 
minds of any rational being (Berlin, 1970; Kant, 1998). Values are orders, commands, 
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“imperatives” (Kant, 1998). Values are not objective, but it does not mean that they are 
subjective, and they are not “reducible to psychology” as Hume (1902) believes (Berlin, 1970). 
In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, we believe that to understand an individual’s behaviour and 
in communication with other human beings, there must be existed a common value set, as it is 
in custom, manner, law, tradition and religion (Berlin, 1970). In this line, there is an element of 
objectivity in values (Berlin, 1958). Here, understanding the foundation of values is not within 
the scope of the present study, but in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we highlight the role of 
agency in choosing a value set to make decisions in order for the agent’s freedom to be 
evaluated according to those values. 
Here, consistent with Berlin (1958) and Sen (1999) we believe in the diversity of 
personal interests and plurality of values. It is worth mentioning, however, that our evaluation 
criteria to assess capability set is not limited to Sen’s (1999) view in Capability Approach. This is 
because in his work people only desire the things that are both personally valued and valuable 
in the broader context of the community. For Sen (1999), one ‘ought’ to value what is valuable in 
society. This is because what one ought to do/be has impersonal validity that refers to stable 
standards of what should be done or experienced from the normative point of view (Heider, 
1944; Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014). Here, consistent with Weber (1993) and Bakhtin 
(1935), we believe that social values may conflict with personal values and increasingly contract 
one’s freedom. Sen’s (1999) category identifies individuals in only one outcome box of 
beneficial-functioning in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (see Figure 9), which does not explain 
the decisions that are made contrary to the ‘self’ and ‘other’ judgements. To address this 
shortcoming, we encompass both personal and social views and accordingly expand Sen’s 
(1999) criteria of ‘valuable’. In this regard, we evaluate an agent’s capabilities and her realised 
capabilities (i.e. functioning and commanding) from both the intrapersonal (i.e. the way the 
agent thinks and feels) and the interpersonal (i.e. the way an agent thinks, feels and behaves in 
relation to others) (Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014). To determine the agency-freedom 
relationship we evaluate an agent’s capabilities from the three perspectives of (a) personal, (b) 
social, and (c) source of authority as presented in Figure 10. The following examples show how 
one may value something that has no social value and/or vice versa: 
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• Adverse-Functioning (AF): For example, agents might want to smoke/gamble, but society 
evaluates these decisions with negative value. In this case, if the agent volitionally 
smokes/gambles, then she ends up at the Adverse-Functioning (AF) state in the model.  
• Beneficial-Functioning (BF): If both personal and social values coincide and the source of 
authorities do not force the agent to choose something (i.e. the agent volitionally chooses 
the option commensurate with her values), then this decision leads her towards the 
Beneficial-Functioning (BF) state. For example, a common value in developed society 
advocates pro-environmental activities like recycling household waste. In this situation if an 
agent volitionally decides to recycle her household waste, then this decision leads her 
towards the BF state of being/doing.    
• Beneficial-Commanding (BC): This is when a decision option lacks the values that are 
personally attached to it, but society values it and sources of authority coerce the agent to 
choose it, such as the smoking ban in public spaces. A social smoker who wants to smoke 
but refrains from smoking due to the smoking ban will end up at BC.   
• Adverse-Commanding (AC): This is when something is valueless from both the personal 
and social perspectives, but one is forced to select that. An example of (AC) is to be 
conscripted into the armed forces and being required to fight in an illegal war for political 
reasons, like the young Syrian civilians, whose home town is occupied and are forced to 
fight for ISIS (Jasser, 2014). A soldier can refuse and will not be forced, but there are 
consequences to refusing an order. Hence, a soldier that participates in that war despite the 
conflict between her values and illegality of that war will end up at the AC state of 
being/doing.  
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Figure 10: Value-Volition Evaluation Criteria 
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Figure 11 adds the desirability aspect to the first phase of the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency that is Capability Realisation, which explains how an agent realises, evaluates, chooses 
and pursuits an option from her capability set. For example, when a university graduate is 
looking for a job, she starts from analysing options in the job markets (i.e. capability set, Node 
A), then based on her personal and social values she categorises some jobs as her desired 
capabilities (Node B1), and if she has the required skills and abilities to apply for her desired 
options then at Node D1, she applies for the desirable options and if she will be accepted in her 
desired and realisable job, then she ends up at Beneficial Functioning box in the model. At this 
stage the Capability Realisation phase of the model needs to clearly determine the decision 
process (i.e. decision cycles), and consequences (i.e. Side Effects) over time (i.e. Decision 
Trajectory), before and after the focal decision. These domains are explained in the following 
sections. 
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Figure 11: The Capability Realisation Phase developed focusing on Desirability and Values 
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Phase 1: Process, Time and Scope  
The decision process matters in understanding both agency and freedom (Vegesana 
and McKenzie, 2015; Wright et al., 2016), particularly due to the values attached to certain 
capabilities and the role of time in an agent’s life trajectory. For example, judgment about the 
war refugees’ decision to leave their country differs if the analysis starts from observing their 
state of being/doing from before to after the war (Anagnostopoulos et al., 2016; Orchard and 
Miller, 2014). In this line, some (Ajzen, 2015; Armitage, 2015) emphasise the analysis of 
decision with a focus on its temporal aspect. The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency adds a temporal 
aspect to the earlier decision model, which implies why we need to understand the Evaluation 
and Feed Backward-Forward Loop of a decision to determine the agency-freedom relationship. 
Time passes and the reason and emotion that are generated after evaluating a decision (at t) 
feed forward/backward, influencing the agent’s subsequent decisions (at t+1) as presented in 
Figure 12. It is worth mentioning here, however, that setting the scope of the impact of an 
agent’s decisions on each other over time is important. Here, it must be acknowledged that 
decision making is a broad area, extended in metacognition by psychologists (e.g. Kahneman, 
2003, 2002), neuroscientists (e.g. Damasio, 2012; Damasio et al., 2015), behavioural 
economists (e.g. Becker, 1993; Taylor and Brown, 1988) and philosophers (e.g. Gächter and 
Thöni, 2007). We acknowledge the breadth and depth of this area and the focus of this study is 
narrowed to the impact of emotion and reason on the object, subject and process of decision, as 
long as it associates with freedom. Hence, the scope of our analysis is narrowed to freedom, 
which means we study the decision object, subject and process once an agent makes a 
decision that conflicts with her values, as presented in Figure 12.    
1. Object of decision: The agent’s capabilities that constitute the decision space (i.e. Berlin's 
(1969) negative freedom) within which a choice is to be made. 
2. Subject of decision: The decision itself (e.g. decision to migrate; decision on a career 
change) 
3. Decision Process: General problem-solving mechanisms, which are applicable in any 
situation. The decision processes include an agent’s mental process that results in choosing 
a certain capability from capability set (i.e. Berlin's (1969) positive freedom). Decision 
processes can be: 
a. The innate ability to perform abstraction and use heuristics. 
b. The use of emotional, rational, and random decision-making mechanisms.
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Figure 12: Temporal Emergence of the Evaluation and Feed Backward-Forward Phases 
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Phase 1: Process, Side Effect  
One particular notion in analysing human decision with respect to time is about the 
unintentional consequences of decision (Huang et al., 2016; Stoutenborough et al., 2015). Here, 
the role of chance and luck in an agent’s freedom also comes to attention (Coffman, 2015). The 
early decision model has acknowledged side-effects (see Figure 8), but this aspect has 
remained underdeveloped. Side-effects can have contemporaneous and consequential effects. 
Thus, in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency three types of reasoning are analysed to see whether 
an agent assigns the reason of her decision to an attribution at the time of decision making (i.e. 
correlational reasoning) (Kelley et al., 2013), to something in the future (i.e. teleological 
reasoning) (Collins, 1978) or to a reason in the past (i.e. causal reasoning) (Bargh, 1989).  
Figure 13 presents the progression of states and capabilities and how they change from 
the focal decision (at t), its influence as a side-effect decision (at t) and the subsequent focal 
decision (at t+1). The side-effect decision is linked to the focal decision by a branch ending in 
the commanding state in the side-effect decision (at t). The side-effect decision is not an 
intended consequence, thus, the agent cannot avoid it. Both the focal and side-effect decisions 
(at t) impact on the agent’s freedom (at t+1) through reason and emotion (at t) that influence her 
decision (at t+1). The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency says that if a decision (at t+1) coerces the 
agent to dismiss her values then her freedom is contracted.  
Figure 13 presents the temporal progression of states that starts with an agent making 
an important and conscious decision at (t). For example, a young girl decides to migrate to 
another country to study when she is 18 years old. Migration at the age of 18 is her focal 
decision. Once she actually decides to migrate, the decision to migrate generates unintended 
consequences (i.e. the side-effect). As a result, she has to make an unintended decision; for 
example, she has to leave her family. These side-effects are coerced on the agent. That is why 
the arrow from the side-effect of the Focal Decision at (t) enters into the commanding states at 
the Side-Effect Decision at (t). After making the decision to migrate, the agent is entering a 
different state of being/doing, where she has to make her focal decision at (t+1). At this stage, 
both her Focal Decision at (t) (i.e. migration) and the Side-effect Decision at (t) (i.e. leaving 
family) will influence her capability set at (t+1). For example, if her focal decision at (t+1) is 
about choosing a place to live, her capability set has been influenced by her Side-effect 
Decision at (t1) and she lacks the option of living with her family. Figure 13 shows one cycle of 
decision making in time. However, in reality there are infinite cycles of side-effect decisions that 
are imposed on the agent as a result of making one focal decision, and some of these may 
remain unknown to the agent, due to her bounded rationality. 
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Figure 13: Side-Effect in the Decision Process 
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Side-effect decisions emerge AFTER the initiating decision, but may co-occur with the 
primary functioning that results from the focal decision. However, both the primary and 
consequential decisions influence an agent’s capabilities through the feedback cycle. Figure 14 
shows that although the side-effect decision does not directly influence the primary decision, the 
agent may correctly identify and predict side-effects of the primary decision and take account of 
the consequences in choosing to act (consider a master chess player thinking 10 moves ahead) 
both primary and consequential decisions influence the person’s subsequent capabilities 
through feedback. Figure 14 shows that in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we have expanded 
Sen’s (1999) functioning set to the primary state of being/doing plus the consequential state of 
being/doing. The primary ones are the self-determined capabilities of focal decisions, and the 
consequential ones are the ending state of being/doing that one arrives at from the side-effects 
of her focal decision.
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Figure 14: Primary and Consequential Decisions  
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Developing the temporal mode of the decision model is a crucial step in identifying 
agentic factors associated with freedom. In this line, Figure 15 shows the dynamic and temporal 
aspect of the model. At this stage, by using the model we can analyse multiple side-effect 
decisions, because the focal decision can create multiple unintended consequences. As 
presented in Figure 15, each focal decision can create multiple side-effect decisions, but the 
question is how many of them are analysed in each agency analysis. For practical reasons, we 
analyse one side-effect decision. Explaining side-effects furthermore is not within the scope of 
the present study, but if a participant in interviews points to an important consequence of her 
decision, we explain it and map it onto the side-effect part of the model (see Chapter 5, Study 4).  
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Figure 15: Temporal Dimension of the Decision Model 
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Phase 1: Process, Reasoning Direction  
Due to the temporal mode, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is dynamic and enables us 
to traces an agent’s decision trajectories over time. Hence, it is important to establish what we 
mean by before and after a decision, decision cycles, and traveling backward/forward in an 
agent’s life trajectory (see Figure 15). The direction of agency analysis matters because people 
use the following temporal based types of reasoning (i.e. teleological, casual and correlational).  
A. Teleological Reasoning. If one uses teleological reasoning, this means that this person 
assigns the ‘reason’ of his/her decision to a state/event in the future (Gelman et al., 
2015). By imagining a future desired state of being/doing, the agent interjects by 
adopting the capability that aligns with that desired future situation. Hence, we explore 
for empirical factors and map them onto the future if they have a similar nature to 
teleological reasoning. Consequently, if an agent uses teleological reasoning, then we 
should travel forward in the model towards the state/event that is identified as a reason 
behind her decision. Teleological reasoning is the basic building block of the Feed 
Forward Loop in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. For example, if a social smoker 
decides to refrain from smoking in public spaces, and her reason for this decision is to 
prevent incurring a fine, then she is using teleological reasoning and assigns her 
decision to a reason in the future. 
B. Causal Reasoning. If agent uses causal reasoning, then she is assigning the reason for 
her decision to a state/event in the past (Hastie, 2015). For a reasoning to be regarded 
as ‘causal’, there must be an influence between the attributed prior state/event and its 
effect on the decision (Michotte, 1963). If agent uses causal reasoning, then we travel 
backward in the model towards the state that is identified as the reason behind the 
decision. Causal Reasoning is mapped onto the Feed Backward Loop in the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency. For example, if an employee decides to leave her job and her reason 
for this decision is her manager’s behaviour, then she is using causal reasoning. 
C. Correlational Reasoning. If agent uses correlational reasoning, then she is referring to 
a reason that occurs parallel to the decision, with no identification of any causal link 
between that event and its result (Bukowski et al., 2016). If agent uses a 
cotemporaneous reason, in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we are careful not to 
misunderstand correlational and causal reasoning. However, if evidence supports 
correlational reasoning in the agent’s explanation, it can potentially be causal and further 
evidence is required to be sure about the type of reasoning (Kelley et al., 2013). If an 
agent is using correlational reasoning, then we do not travel back/forward in the model.  
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Figure 16 presents a linear interpretation of temporal reasoning of the decision-making 
process. Accordingly, to explain agency outcome (decision), the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
analyses an agent’s types of reasoning to indicate how far forward or backward from S1 (i.e. the 
state of being/doing at time of decision making) should be travelled in the model. This approach 
is imaginary time travel to set the boundaries of influence in terms of history and prescience. 
Reflections on one’s history and the emergent emotions are interjected into the focus of 
decision through feedback channels; whereas, the anticipation of possible future states is 
correspondingly interjected into the decision process through feed forward conduits. This part of 
the model requires further empirical development and once we find the agency-oriented factors 
associated with freedom we map them onto this temporal reasoning, in order to identify the 
direction and distance of decision analysis over time (see Chapter 5, Result Interpretation of 
Study 3 and Study 4). 
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Figure 16:  Imaginary Time Travel 
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Phase 1: Capabilities and Capability Set 
To understand the agency-freedom relationship, this study focuses on agency outcome 
(decision) and capabilities, based on Sen's (2007) CA. Capabilities matter in determining an 
agent’s negative freedom (i.e. the space within which one is free to do/be what she values). For 
example, Person A is ‘fasting’ and Person B is ‘starving’; they both are at the state of being 
hungry, but Person A has more expanded negative freedom as she has the capability of eating, 
whereas Person B lacks the capability of eating. As evidence, the freedom space (i.e. Berlin's 
(1969) negative freedom) of Person A and Person B can be compared by comparing their 
capability sets. Hence, it is important to identify the quantity and quality of an agent’s 
capabilities in order to determine the agency-freedom relationship. In this regard, according to 
the desirability and realisable criteria and based on logical set theory, we identify 12 ‘Family 
Groups’ of capabilities and end states (i.e. commanding and functioning) in the model.  
Table 11 shows the membership criteria of these 12 sets as presented in Figure 17. It is 
important to note that the strength of this study is its particular focus on both Node A and Node 
B to evaluate capability sets. At Node A, the agent’s capabilities are classified based on the 
desirability criterion, which is a multilevel notion, evaluated at the personal and social 
standpoints and includes values and volition. At Nodes B1 and B2 capabilities are categorised 
based on a realisable criterion that includes universal (i.e. physical and logical) and personal (i.e. 
resource-dependent and axiological) constraints. It must be mentioned that “Axiological 
Constraints” have a special position with respect to agency, in which agent herself imposes 
limitations on her decision. Self-imposed constraints are similar to Max Weber’s substantive 
rationality (Kalberg, 1980b), and Sen's (1990) ‘commitment’ actions, as all of these notions try to 
explain the decisions that are value laden, they are made due to long-term goals, and they can 
be other-centred (i.e. counterintuitive decisions). For example, one may decide not to tell a lie 
because of her ethical beliefs, although revealing the truth may violate her self-interest.  
Further, as presented in Table 11 at Node B1 and B2 the split of realisable/unrealisable 
capabilities is not within the agency of the person to determine. At Nodes D1 and D2 the agent 
finally chooses one of the realisable capabilities, willingly (i.e. ends up at functioning) or due to 
compulsion by a source of authority (i.e. ends up at commanding). Distinguishing desired, 
realisable and freely selectable capabilities at Node A, B1-B2 and Nodes D1-D2 enables us to 
indicate an agent’s freedom level, from a negative perspective. This is one of the 
methodological advantages of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in explaining the agency-
freedom relationship that is captured in the model. This is because most of the previous studies 
on decision-freedom (e.g. Corrigan et al., 2012) mainly focus on what happens at Node D1 and 
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D2. Therefore, to present a rigorous analysis of each agency outcome (decision) we trace these 
nodes to show the level of freedom of agents passing these nodes and outcome states. 
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Table 11: Membership Criteria of Capability Sets 
 
Label Set Departure Node Arrival Node Membership Criteria  
 
Capability Set C Node F-G Node A All possible options 
 
Desired Capability Set D Node A Node B1 Personally Valuable& Socially 
Valuable& Volitional 
 
Undesired Capability Set U Node A Node B2 Personally Valueless& Socially 
Valueless& Coerced 
 
Desired-Realisable Capability Set DR Node B1 Node D1 Desired & Not Limited 
 
Desired-Unrealisable Capability Set DU Node B2 Node D2 Desired & Limited 
 
Undesired-Realisable Capability Set UR Node B2 Node D2 Undesired & Not limited 
 
Undesired-Unrealisable Capability Set UU Node B2 Node D2 Undesired & Limited 
 
Beneficial Functioning Set BF Node D1 Evaluation Both Personally & Socially Desired & 
Volitionally Chosen 
 
Adverse Functioning Set AF Node D2 Evaluation Personally desired & Socially Undesired 
& Volitionally Chosen 
 
Beneficial Commanding Set BC Node D2 Evaluation Personally Undesired & Socially Desired 
& Coerced to be Obtained 
 
Adverse Commanding Set AC Node D2 Evaluation Undesired & Coerced to be Obtained 
 
Side Effects Set SE Node D1, D2 Node A Accidental Consequences of Desiring a 
Capability 
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Figure 17: The Capability Set Trajectory in the Model 
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Phase 2: Evaluation 
The second phase of the core decision model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is 
Evaluation that encompasses the way that an agent evaluates her state of being/doing at t1 and 
its impact on her decision at t2. According to appraisal psychologists (Rudolph et al., 2013; 
Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014) the link between evaluation and decision is through the 
emotions that emerge when an individual self-reflects on her state of being/doing and/or reflects 
on other’s evaluation about her state of being/doing. This study is founded upon this idea that 
whatever one’s values are she is free to pursuit. If one lacks any value, she acts based on her 
instinct, and whatever emotion she feels she is free. This implies that in addition to emotion, a 
human individual is regarded as a rational being equipped with an intellectual mind that enables 
her to reason her decisions (Cornish and Clarke, 2014). Hence, to the identify agency-freedom 
relationship, it is important to consider both the affective and rational (i.e. emotion and reason) 
factors that motivate a decision. These two consists of the two modes of agency (i.e. affective 
and cognitive) in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. 
Considering both cognitive and affective modes of agency is particularly important to 
understand freedom from a positive perspective, which according to Berlin (1969) is about 
who/what is the source of determining an action. For example, one of the reasons that some 
governments put boundaries on citizens’ freedom is that they argue that people make irrational 
decisions that harm themselves and society (Gray, 2015). For example, the restrictive law of the 
smoking ban in public spaces is justified according to the same argument that not all human 
decisions are based on intellectual reasoning (Carroll et al., 2013), in which one calculates a 
cost-benefit analysis, uses all required information and chooses the best option that maximises 
her self-interest (Kahneman, 2003). These examples show the importance of identifying the 
impact of both affective and cognitive factors that influence an agent to be/do what she has 
reason to value. Here, Davidson's (2001) concept of the “weakness of will” also comes to 
account that is about incontinent decisions that are made contrary to personal judgement. 
These examples point to the complexity of reason-emotion interaction as a decision motive. 
Accordingly, in the following sections we develop the affective and cognitive factors behind 
agency outcome in the Evaluation and Feed Backward-Forward Loop of the model. 
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Phase 2: Emotion 
Emotion is the main drive behind most human decisions (Jin et al., 2014; Steele, 2016). 
Psychologists regard the affective part as the automatic side of behaviour that is hard-wired into 
the brain through many years of human evolution (Haidt, 2006). However, the role of emotion in 
our conscious and planned decisions (e.g. university major selection, career choice, marriage, 
having children, investment, migration etc.) is being underestimated and sometimes distorted by 
several thinkers (Damasio et al., 2015), including liberal philosophers like Berlin (1969). Since it 
is complex to determine how emotion operates and guides an agent’s behaviour, the role of 
emotion in the freedom of choice is an underdeveloped area (Nussbaum, 2007). However, 
psychologists and neuroscientists have made significant progress in terms of identifying the role 
of emotion in an agent’s life (Ashkanasy and Daus, 2016; Damasio et al., 2015; Rudolph and 
Tscharaktschiew, 2014). The present study emphasises the role of emotion in the agency-
freedom relationship and uses appraisal psychology and particularly Weiner's (2010) attribution 
theory of motivation (Figure 18) to determine the impact of an agent’s decision at t1 through 
‘emotion’ on her decision at t2. Figure 18 is Weiner's (2010) model that shows how one’s 
decisions will generate certain behavioural consequences that influence her subsequent 
decisions through emotion (e.g. pride, self-esteem, hope, hopelessness, shame, guilt, sadness 
and happiness).
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Figure 18: Weiner‘s (2010) Attribution-based Theory of Interpersonal Motivation 
 
Note: Taken from “The Development of Attribution-Based Theory of Motivation: A History of Ideas” by Weiner (2010; p:34). 
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Getting insight from Weiner's (2010) attribution theory of motivation (Figure 18), we 
develop the Evaluation Phase of the model by adding the agent’s self-reflection process to the 
decision model. The Evaluation Phase consists of the agent’s reflection on her decision from the 
‘self’ and ‘other’ stand-points. Weiner (2010) shows that when one evaluated the outcome of her 
behaviour (e.g. success/failure), she experiences certain emotions (e.g. pride/hopelessness). 
The emotion that is generated through this attribution mechanism is related to the stability, 
controllability and locus of the attribution that she assigns to her behaviour. For example, if one 
fails in her exam and attributes low ability (i.e. uncontrollable, stable and internal attribution) to 
this outcome, then she feels hopelessness. On the other hand, if she assigns low effort (i.e. 
controllable, unstable or internal) to her failure, then she feels shame and/or regret. As evidence, 
the characteristics of the attribution (i.e. locus, stability or controllability) that one assigns to her 
behaviour are related to the emotions she feels afterwards (Kelley et al., 2013; Rudolph and 
Tscharaktschiew, 2014). 
Weiner's (2010) attribution theory of motivation shows how these emotions that are 
generated within the evaluation process can either motivate or demotivate one’s subsequent 
decision. In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, our focus is on analysing an agent’s decisions, 
thus, Weiner's (2010) work is an appropriate theory to be used in order to develop the affective 
mode of agency in our theory. Here, we use Weiner's (2010) theory and expand it in our model 
by detecting the agent’s emotions from two perspectives. We ask the agent to evaluate her 
decision from her own standpoint (self) as well as the standpoint of others as presented in 
Diagram 12. Although, some studies (Dimaggio et al., 2008; Damasio et al., 2015) have shown 
that reflecting on a decision from the other’s worldview is cognitively demanding, research 
(Grysman et al., 2013) shows that people are aware of the other’s worldview and with 
professional support they may be able to reflect on their own behaviour.  
For example, imagine a divorced woman in a religious society like Saudi Arabia or Iran. 
She may not be sure about the social stigma about her state of being, but she is aware of it and 
with professional assistance she may be able to reflect on her situation (Travers et al., 2015). 
Self-reflection from two standpoints in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency can help to improve self-
report data collection methods, as research (Härtel et al., 2011) shows that this method of data 
collection is prone to methodological limitations. In addition, research (Podsakoff et al., 2016) 
shows a small correlation between self-report and objective measures of behaviour. Therefore, 
reflecting from ‘self’ and ‘other’ worldviews can also improve self-report methods that collect 
emotion data using within-person variations in behaviour, like daily diary methods (Ashkanasy, 
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2015). In agency analysis our model helps the agent to reflect on the other’s worldview and 
emotion influences one’s behaviour in two ways: 
1) Subconscious: the agent experiences some emotion but she is not conscious of it (e.g. 
when one faces a bear and runs away frightfully). The emotion experienced by the agent 
has a subconscious impact (see the upper part of Figure 19, showing the emotions 
generated from the ‘self’ standpoint). 
2)  Rational: the emotions that the agent perceives by reflecting on how others feel when 
evaluating her state of being/doing. This emotion is not subconscious and it is at the 
cognitive level because the agent is using cognitive processes to reflect on the other’s 
worldview (see the lower part of Figure 19, showing the emptions generated from the 
‘other’ standpoint). 
 
Figure 19 shows the emotions that are generated from self and other evaluation as 
subconscious and rational types of emotions. As presented in Figure 19, we have two black 
boxes of emotion and rationality in the model. These black boxes present the complex mental 
process that generates emotion and reason (Damasio et al., 2015). We show emotion-reason 
integration in back box, because the mental process behind their generation is not within the 
scope of the present study. These two black boxes include some parts of the ‘real’ domain that 
are not observable and measurable by scientific tools (see Chapter 3, Methodology). The 
affects and rationales we use in this study are the outcome of these black boxes that are within 
the ‘empirical’ domain, based on our research philosophy (i.e. Critical Realism). The arrows 
leading from the black boxes are the predictions of what the emotions and rational could be. In 
the model we use the emotions presented in Table 12 and Table 13 that are the extension 
version of Weiner’s (2010) list of emotions in his Attribution Theory of Motivation (see Figure 18). 
These emotions interject when one evaluates her state of being/doing and assigns the cause of 
beneficial/adverse or commanding/functioning state to a reason.  
Building upon Weiner's (2010) attribution theory, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency shows 
that if the locus of control is important then the emotion is Class C. If the stability of that cause is 
important then Class S emotions are interjected. If locus matters, then Class L emotions are 
generated. For example, if the divorced woman in a traditional society attributes the reason of 
her divorce to an internal reason (e.g. poor personality), then she experiences locus-oriented 
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emotions that are represented in Class L (e.g. humiliation), consequently she may reject the 
other marriage proposals (i.e. Latency in decision), which shows that she has been demotivated 
by the emotion generated by evaluating her previous decision.  
On the other hand, if the same woman attributes the reason of her divorce to society 
and/or to her ex-husband’s characteristics, reasons that are not within her control, then 
controllability-oriented emotions emerge and she would experience Class C affects (e.g. anger), 
which motivates her to go against the cause of her situation. There are many examples that 
after divorce, ex-partners make a decision and try to harm each other, due to the anger they 
have experienced after evaluating their previous decision (i.e. divorce) (Berk et al., 2014; 
Petrican et al., 2015). Finally, if the same woman attributes the cause of her divorce to stable 
reasons (e.g. not being attractive), then it is possible that she feels Class S emotions (e.g. 
Hopelessness) and becomes demotivated in her future romantic-oriented decisions. The 
emotional result of agency-analysis will be empirically tested and developed in the Evaluation 
and Feed Backward-Forward Loop of the model in the following chapters. 
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Table 12: Emotion Classes Based on Weiner’s Attribution Theory of Motivation 
Emotion Class 
Emotion Consequence Motivational Result 
Class C 
  
 
Shame Go away- Latency Demotivate 
 
Guilt Go toward- Persistency Motivate 
 
Regret Go toward-Persistency Motivate 
 
Anger Go against- Intensity Motivate 
 
Pity Choice- Help Motivate 
 
Gratitude Choice- Persistency Motivate 
Class L 
  
 
Pride Latency/Persistency Motivate 
 
Self-Esteem Latency/Persistency Motivate 
 
Humiliation Latency/Persistency Demotivate  
Class S 
  
 
Hope High expectancy- Persistency Motivate 
 
Hopelessness Low expectancy- Latency Demotivate 
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The role of direct (i.e. generated from the ‘self’ evaluation) and perceived (generated 
from reflecting on the ‘other’ evaluation) emotions on freedom is presented in Figure 19 and 
Table 13. This table enables us to distinguish between ‘self’ and ‘other’ evaluator wolrdviews, 
and the functional impact of emotion (i.e. red/green signal) on regulating behaviour, which we 
adapt and logiclly extend from moral emotion studies (Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014) that 
are built upon Weiner’s (2010) theory. In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we have customised 
these emotion lists to the agency-freedom relationship. Figure 19 shows the agent (i.e. self) and 
the observer (i.e. other) perspectives about the agent’s situation. For example, a divorced 
woman in a religious society may evaluate her state of being/doing as Beneficial Functioning, 
but it is possible that her relatives and colleagues evaluate her state of being as Adverse 
Commanding. We expect that the ‘self’ and ‘other’ worldviews are divergent due to the distinct 
rationalities and emotions each party has when evaluating a similar state of being/doing 
(Gasper, 2010). For example, in case of the divorced woman in a religious society, if she 
evaluates her state of being as Beneficial Functioning from her personal standpoint then 
according to Table 13, it is possible that she experiences pride that has a good hedonic side, 
which motivates her to continue and make a similar decision in her life. However, if she 
perceives that others in the society evaluate her situation as Adverse Commanding, then 
according to Table 13 she may experience contempt, disgust, and/or scorn that all are emotions 
with a bad hedonic characteristic, which may motivate her to decide to change her behaviour 
and/or ask for help. As evidence, ‘self’ and ‘other’ worldviews towards a single decision can 
generate completely different emotions that lead to divergent decisions. In the following section 
we explain these disparities by developing the reason side of the Evaluation and Feed 
Backward-Forward Loop of the model. In addition, the following chapters will test and develop 
the emotions that are generated from the agent’s ‘self’ and ‘other’ reflection about the decision 
under analysis. Our approach to develop the emotion-reason aspect of the model is logical 
deduction between Weiner’s (2010) list of emotion and the notions of agency and freedom in the 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. 
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Table 13: Mapping Emotion onto the Model 
Worldview 
State Emotio  Functio
n 
Hedonic  Signal for Behavioural Change 
Self 
    
 
Beneficial Functioning    
 
 Pride Start Good “to go on like that” 
 
 Pride Stop  “to change behavior” 
 
 Alpha Pride Start Good “to go on the same due to ability” 
 
 Beta Pride Start Good “to go on the same due to effort” 
 
Adverse Functioning    
 
 Guilt Stop Bad “I should have done otherwise” 
 
 Regret Start Bad “to change my behaviour” 
 
Beneficial Commanding    
 
 Pride Start Good “to be the same” 
 
Adverse Commanding    
 
 Shame Start Bad “to go away” 
 
 Embaresme
nt 
Start Bad “to go away” 
Other 
    
 
Benficial Functioning    
 
 Admiration Start Good “Go towards and support” 
 
 Gratitude Start Good “Do it again” 
 
Adverse Finctionig    
 
 Anger Stop Bad “Better not to do that” 
 
 Indignation Start Bad “Agitate against authority” 
 
 Schadenfreu
de 
Stop Bad “Better not to do that” 
 
Beneficial Commanidng    
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 Envy Start Bad “to compare” 
 
Adverse Commanding    
 
 Contempt Stop Bad “to change behaviour” 
 
 Scorn Stop Bad “to change behaviour” 
 
 Disgust Stop Bad “to change behaviour” 
 
 Sympathy Start Bad “to accept help” 
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Figure 19: The Agency-Freedom Relationship from the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ Standpoints 
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Phase 2: Reason and Rationality 
Reasons according to which an agent makes a decision play a significant role in her 
freedom (Hindess, 2014). The agent’s cognitive mode (Bandura, 2015) and her way of 
reasoning (i.e. “rationality type”) (Kalberg, 1980b) are particularly important to understand her 
freedom in the modern era in which according to Max Weber “the essence or unique 
characteristics of the time in which we are living is rationalisation - of tradition, religion, politics, 
money, sexuality, and the state of the human body” (Turner, 2002). Before going further, it is 
important to clarify that “rationalisation” in Weber’s terminology refers to how an individual 
brings reasons for her behaviour, that is, which “rationality type” one uses to explain her actions. 
The present study defines “Rationalisation” differently that is presented at the end of this 
chapter. Further, the present study gets insight from Weber’s rationality types, and accordingly 
here we believe that the agent’s rationality type is particularly important in defining her freedom 
in relationship with other people and in the social environment.  
For example, the way a Muslim man rationalises his decisions leads him to practice 
certain actions (e.g. asks his wife to wear the Hijab, fasts on certain days of the year, marries 
more than one woman, prays six times a day, etc.). These rituals may seem irrational in 
Western society to an atheist or someone else, who believes in a different set of values. Some 
may defend specific “rationalities” or ways of reasoning and try to reduce the diversity in order to 
reach to an identical way of life (i.e. rationality types) in society. Having similar values and a 
single way of life (i.e. “rationality types”) may help people to live in social groups, but it can 
contract each individual’s freedom to live the life they personally have reason to value (Bakhtin, 
1935; Berlin, 1969; Weber, 1993b). Sen (1999) shows that considering the plurality of values 
and diversity of ways of life is important for an agent to do/be what she has reason to value. 
Hence, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency determines the agency-freedom relationship based on 
the plurality of values and diversity of ways of life, as we believe that if an individual accepts the 
responsibility for her actions then she can live the life she has reason to value to be free and the 
agent of her life (Sen, 1999). This view has roots in liberal doctrine (Berlin, 1969; Gray, 2015). In 
this line, we try to identify reasons that are manifested by each agent in her unique way of life. 
Here, we use “rationality types” that is Weber's (1993) definition for the way an agent brings 
reasons for her decisions or her way of life.  
Accordingly, to develop the reason side of the Evaluation Phase in the core model of the 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, we use Weber's (1993) “four types of rationality” that are adapted 
from Kalberg's (1980) expansion on the original idea. These four rationality types are the ideal 
types that are tailored to our research enquiry for several reasons. First, Weber defines 
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rationality with a focus on freedom (Cockerham, 2015). Rationality is a disputable concept as 
some define it as mean-end type of social action, while others like Weber (1993) define it as 
‘bureaucratisation’ and an ‘increasing lack of freedom’ (Kalberg, 1980b). Weber considers the 
following four types of rationalities, among which ‘substantive rationality’ is the only way that 
directly leads to action based on an agent’s personal values rather than mean-end justification. 
On the other hand, the other three types (i.e. practical, formal and theoretical) are mean-end 
social actions that somehow bound the agent’s freedom at the cognitive and/or affective levels 
to social norms that are established and justified in modern societies (Cockerham, 2015). The 
following are four types of rationalities that we have also mapped onto Weiner’s (2010) 
attribution emotions and add them to the model for identifying the reason side of decision in 
relation to emotion. Table 14 presents the result of mapping Weber's (1993) rationality types 
and Weiner’s (2010) attribution emotions through logical reasoning, which is one of the unique 
achievements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The following chapters test and develop this 
logical mapping with empirical data (see Chapter 5, Study 4).  
a) Substantive Rationality. Using substantive rationality, an agent relies mostly on her 
values and beliefs that lead her to achieve a long-term goal (Kalberg, 1980). The agent’s 
decision is not necessarily bounded to her own self-interest and may fulfil the interest of 
a larger number of people. This type of rationality can explain Sen's (1990) committed 
action that the agent makes a counterintuitive decision contrary to ‘other’ judgement (e.g. 
behaving ethically although this manner may have detrimental consequences). Since the 
agent’s values hardly change, the stability aspect of using substantive rationality 
dominates other causal dimensions. Hence, the agent who uses substantive rationality 
possibly experiences Class S emotions (e.g. hope or hopelessness in Weiner's (2010) 
list). The length of continuity of this hopefulness/hopelessness is as long as the values 
exist, which may never end.  
b) Formal Rationality. Using formal rationality the agent relies mostly on bureaucratic 
norms, authority’s orders and external reasons (Kalberg, 1980). The main motives of this 
individual are defined by bureaucratic authorities, thus, it is possible that the agent 
experiences Class C emotions that are controllability-related emotions (e.g. a  decrease 
in pride and self-esteem in Weiner's (2010) list). Using formal rationality, it is conjectured 
that the agent experiences fear class emotions (e.g. anxiety, despair, doubt, dread, 
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panic, suspicion and angst), and her values change according to the source of authority 
and through the emotions generated in ruler-ruled conflicts. 
c) Practical Rationality. Using practical rationality, the agent relies on the mean-end way 
of thinking and her decisions are made to lead her towards a pleasant end (Kalberg, 
1980). An individual with practical rationality behaves similar to the “rational man” in 
rational choice theories used in standard economics (Hindess, 2014). The agent’s 
motives are self-centred. It can be conjectured that the agent experiences Class S 
Emotions that are stability-oriented (e.g. hope/hopelessness in Weiner's (2010) list). 
Here, the length of continuity of hope is shorter than what is experienced at substantive 
rationality, because hope is as short as reaching for a personal goal (e.g. financial 
satisfaction). For Sen substantive and practical rationality are aligned, because he is 
interested in situations where one’s personal values and social norms are in line. But for 
Weber the scope is different. Practical in Weber’s term is not sufficient for functioning (i.e. 
free choice), unless it is in line with the agent’s personal values. Our position is that 
practical and substantive rationality must be distinguished based on the length of the 
agent’s belief in certain values over time (see identifying rationality type in Chapter 6, 
Case Study). 
d) Theoretical Rationality. Using theoretical rationality, the agent relies on the abstract 
realisation of her decision (Kalberg, 1980), on external principles that are not necessarily 
value based. One of its manifestations is choosing a commuter route to go to work 
based on the reported traffic, received from a news bulletin (i.e. external to the agent). 
Using these types of reasoning, the occurrence and impact of events are external to the 
agent, but she has control to decide which set of principles to use. Therefore, the locus 
and controllability aspect of situations become important for the agent. Hence, it is 
conjectured that the agent that uses theoretical rationality can experience Class C and 
Class L emotions (Weiner, 2010), but her decision may easily change depending on 
external worldviews. 
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Table 14: Rational Indicators of Causal Dimensions  
 
Rationality Type Controllability Stability Locus Emotion Class Emotion Longevity 
 
Substantive Rationality Controllable Stable Internal Class S & L Hope Hardly 
Change 
 
Formal Rationality Uncontrollable Stable External Class L & C Fear Change 
 
Practical Rationality Controllable Stable* Internal Class S & L Hope Change 
 
Theoretical Rationality Controllable 
 
Stable External* Class L & C Pride/Humiliation Easily 
Change 
Note: * shows the comparative stability of practical and substantive rationalities as values (substantive rationality) are more stable 
than goals (practical rationality); Chapter 6, Case study, analyses their difference). 
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Phase 2: Reason and Worldview 
In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, understanding an agent’s ability to have and raise 
her “voice” (i.e. a personal worldview that is shaped according to her values and rationality type) 
is important in determining the agency-freedom relationship. Here, ‘worldview’ refers to the 
technical notion of ‘voice’ in Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism that emphasises freedom and power 
relationships in discourses between authorities and minorities in a given society. We say that 
how agent deals with others’ worldviews matter in her agency-freedom relationship, because 
research (Bandura, 2015; Clark, 2015; Gangas, 2015) shows that agency must be studied in 
relationship with environment, and the other’s worldview is a manifestation of environment (or 
external factors) influencing agency.  
As evidence, recent neuroscientific findings (Caspar et al., 2016) have shown that in a 
coercive environment the sense of agency is diminishing. For example, imagine Person A is an 
employee, who rejects bribes due to her ethical values, although she lives in a society that is 
corrupted and bribery is known as a possible, realisable and reasonable act. Here, Person A 
has a high level of agency that she decides to live according to her values, particularly because 
it (Foerster, 2013) is shown that self and the environment interact with each other within the 
concept of agency. Now compare the agency of Person A with Person B, who is another 
employee in the same corrupted environment, believing that accepting bribes is morally wrong, 
but she decides to accept bribes because others are doing the same, justifying her action by 
referring to the invisible contracts in the society. This study argues that Person A has a more 
expanded level of agency with respect to freedom than Person B, because Person A is living 
the life that she has reason to value, whereas Person B’s freedom to live the life she has reason 
to value is contracted by external factors. Encountering the opposing worldview of the ‘other’ 
applies to any decisions in any society, because there are different ways of life and sets of 
values that are unique for each individual (Buckareff et al., 2015). Hence, the question is how an 
agent encounters with the ‘other’s’ worldview when making a decision.  
To answer this question, we get insight from Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism, which defines 
freedom with respect to the discourse between individuals’ worldviews. According to Bakhtin 
(1935) it is a necessity for freedom that all worldviews will be raised, to be listened to be 
informed and possibly to be altered through this dialogic discourse that never ends. In other 
words, for Bakhtin having dialogue with the other’s worldview particularly with the worldview of 
authority is a building block of having freedom in society. For example, in the above examples 
about the two employee’s decisions in terms of bribery, if Person B had dialogue between her 
own worldview (i.e. rejecting bribes), and the other’s worldview (i.e. accepting bribes), then she 
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would be able to raise her own worldview and she may have not decided to behave contrary to 
her own values. In dialogue, there is no single reality and every individual sees the world 
through her own lens (Burke, 1988; Robinson, 2011; White, 2009). Bakhtin's (1935) dialogic is 
consistent with Sen's (2007) emphasis on the plurality of values and ways of life as the 
necessity of freedom.  
In order to identify how an agent reconciles her own worldview with the others, the 
conative mode of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is informed from Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism. 
Here, we are particularly focusing on the situation that worldviews are opposing and an agent 
needs to deal with them to make an important decision. For example, how a teenager reconciles 
her worldview that she wants to study art in university, with her parent’s worldview that want her 
to study medicine; how an employee reconciles her worldview of running the project according 
to her own understanding of the company’s mission with her boss’s worldview that wants her to 
operate in a different way. To show how two worldviews are reconciled with respect to freedom, 
the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has developed the following three ways of reconciling 
worldviews namely monologue, dialogue and dialectic based on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism.   
a) Monologue and Dismissing the ‘Other’ Worldview. Using monologue and dismissing the 
opposing worldview of the ‘other’ implies that the agent is not accepting the opposing 
worldview. It is conjectured that the agent who uses monologue will experience the fear 
class of emotions (e.g. anxiety, despair, doubt, dread, panic, suspicion, angst) as a result of 
dismissing the opposing worldview (Table 15). Here, the agent has control over her decision. 
Thus, she may experience controllability-oriented emotions (i.e. Class C), such as gratitude, 
shame, regret and pity. 
b) Monologue and Dismissing the ‘Self’ Worldview. Using monologue and dismissing the 
‘self’ voice shows that the agent subjugates her worldview in front of others. Hence, it is 
conjectured that agent is not in control of the situation and she experiences negative 
controllability-based emotions (i.e. class C) against the ‘other’ such as the fear class of 
emotions. 
c) Dialectic. Using dialectic, the ‘self’ worldview and ‘other’ worldview both remain in the 
decision process and are being integrated and turned into another worldview that is 
consistent with the first worldviews. Hence, it is conjectured that the agent experiences both: 
(a) the emotion related to her type of rationality, and (b) controllability-based emotions, 
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because this person is not fully in control of reconciling the opposite worldviews to create 
the third voice.  
d) Dialogue. Using dialogue means that agent keeps both her own worldview and the 
opposing worldview and is being informed by the other’s worldview and is being altered. 
Using dialogue, both the ‘self’ and ‘other’ opposing worldviews remain in the agent’s mind, 
but they are informed by each other and may change over time. Hence, it is conjectured that 
using dialogue this person experiences the emotions that are generated from her rationality 
type. For example, if one is feeling pride, after involving in dialogue with the opposing 
worldview her affective state will not change as long as she holds the same rationality type. 
 
In addition, we have mapped the mentioned reconciling approaches onto Weiner’s 
(2010) attribution emotions, in order to see how the worldview aspect of reason is related with 
emotion, and how they both motivate/demotivate a decision. Here, to determine the opposing 
worldview we ask agents to reflect on their decision from the two standpoints of ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
and then we compare these self-reflections. This method of data collection will be 
accommodated in our questionnaire design in the next chapter, in order to consider person-
environment interaction through Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism. Table 15 presents how dialogue, 
monologue and dialectic ignite certain emotions through the aggravating controllability of person 
over his/her destiny. In the following chapters we will find empirical support for these elements 
of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (see Chapter 5, Study 4). 
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Table 15: Emotion Generated from Reconciling Approaches 
 
Reconciling 
Approach 
Mechanism Causal Dimension Emotion  
 
Monologue Dismiss ‘Self’ worldview Controllability Class C & Fear  
 
Monologue Dismiss ‘Other’ worldview Controllability Class C & Fear  
 
Dialogue Keep both ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ worldviews, while 
they are informed by each other and are altered 
over time 
Controllability Emotion class of ‘self’* 
 
Dialectic Integrated ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ worldviews into a 
new worldview that is consistent with both prior 
worldviews 
Controllability Class C & Emotion class of ‘self’ * 
 
Note: Class C emotions are: Anger, Shame, Fear, Pity, Regret and Gratitude. * means that this emotion class may change when the 
rationality of ‘self’ changes in dialogue and dialectic 
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Phase 3: Feed Backward-Forward Loop 
To understand the agency-freedom relationship in the model, so far we have developed 
the theoretcial foundation and logical structrue, showing what and how affective and cognitive 
modes of agency operate in the model, with respect to freedom. Now the question is how these 
factors that are generated at t1 influence the agent’s subsequent decision at t2. According to 
planned behaviour studies (Ajzen, 2015) the relation between reason-emotion and decision is 
both backward and forward, because the emotion-reason that are generated in the past and are 
anticipated to occur in the future both influence agency outcome (decision) at t1. Hence, we call 
this relationship the Feed Backward-Forward Loop. 
We develop the Feed Backward-Forward Loop in a way that our theory is able to explain 
what emotions and reasons have been involved in the agency outome decision, and whether 
this decision conflicts with the agent’s values, because our main argument is that such a 
decision is contracting her freedom. In this regard, the three sets of information need to be 
mapped together, which are: (a) the agent’s rationality type that reveals the strength of her 
values and long-term goals; (b) the agent’s reconciling approach when facing opposing 
worldview that reveals which of the ‘self’ or ‘other’ worldviews is stronger in her decision making; 
and (c) agent’s direct and percieved emotions that are generated based on the controlability, 
stability, and locus of the attribution she assigns to her decision.  
In order to map these three sets of information, we deduce 32 possible permutations of 
the evaluation, standpoints, emotion and their impact on one’s decision based on logical 
reasoning (Table 17 and Table 18). In this line, Table 17 has all of the permutations in which the 
‘self’ worldview is the dominating worldview in discourse between the agent and her 
enviornment; and Table 18 covers all possible logical permutations where the ‘other’ worldview 
is the dominating standpoint in the agent’s discourse with her enviornment. To determine the 
agency-freedom relationship, the first three columns of Table 17 and Table 18 will be filled in by 
empirical data that agent provides through explaining her decision. The two final columns of 
Table 17 and Table 18 are filled in based on logical deduction (see Chapter 6, Case Study).  
For example, the first row of Table 17 shows that the ‘self’ worldview is subjugating the 
‘other’ worldview; the agent evaluates her state of being/doing as Beneficial Functioning; as a 
result the agent experiences pride; she may percieve that others evaluating her situation can 
experience pride, anger, envy or contempt towards her. This is because, her ‘self’ worldview 
subjugated the other’s worldview, her values have not been conflicted by her decision, and 
consequently her freedom is not contradicted by her decision. For example, an employee who 
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decides to reject bribes in a corrupt enviornment is a possible candidate where her agency-
freedom relationship regarding her decision to reject a bribe can match this row of Table 17. 
As an another example we explain the first row of Table 18 that implies the situations 
where the ‘other’ worldview is subjugating the ‘self’ worldview. In this situation, if she evaluates 
her state of being as Beneficial Functioning, this means that she has evaluated her situation as 
beneficial from the other’s perspective but not internally; her agency outcome can conflict with 
her values, as she anticipates that others can feel anger towards her in the future. Here, we 
acknowledge the difference between internal-external situations. In this case, as her ‘self’ 
worldview is being subjugated by the ‘other’ opposing worldview, her agency outcome can 
conflict with her values and her freedom would be contracted. The example of this row could be 
the employee who decides to accept bribes in a corrupt society, even though being involved in 
bribery is against her personal moral values. Here, she has subjugated her worldview because 
she feels unconfortable in society. 
However, to arrive at these conclusions about the agent’s level of freedom in Table 17 
and Table 18, at first we need to indicate which of the ‘self’ and/or ‘other’ worldviews can 
potentially dominate the other one in cases of opposition. In this regard, to analyse each 
agency-outcome (decision) we need to collect information about these concepts from both the 
‘self’ and ‘other’ perspectives, in order to identify the type of rationality and reconciling approach 
that agent is using. Further, from this information, we deduce what emotion is generated and 
which standpoint (i.e. ‘self’ or ‘other’) is stronger in her decision process. We summarise all the 
possible permutations of rationality types and reconciling approaches that determine the agent’s 
dominating standpoint (i.e. ‘self’ or ‘other’) in  Table 16.  
As evidence, from the rationality type and reconciling approach we deduce 16 possible 
permutations that imply the importance of the ‘self’ or ‘other’ worldview in the final collumn of 
Table 16. For example, the second row of  Table 16 shows that one has substnative rationality 
and uses monologue and dismisses the ‘other’ worldview, in this situation although she 
experiences the fear class of emotion (e.g. doubt), the strong standpoint in her decision process 
is the ‘self’. For example, if an employee in a corrupt enviornment uses monologue and 
dismisses the worldview of others (i.e. involvement in bribery), then she lives according to her 
values, but it is possible that she experiences the fear type of emotions (e.g. doubt and anxiaty). 
After identifying which standpoint is stronger in the agent’s way of explaining her decision in  
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Table 16, then the result helps to decide whether we should use use Table 17 and Table 18 to 
see whether the agent’s freedom is contracted as a result of exercising her agency (i.e. 
decision).  
Here, there is a subtle point regarding the agency-freedom relationship. if the agent 
makes a decision that contradicts her values, then her positive freedom is definitely contracted, 
even though her negative freedom may be expanded is some ways. For example, comparing 
the decisions of Person A and Person B regarding bribery, Person B that accepts bribes is 
contradicting her values, her positive freedom is contracted, while her negative freedom may be 
expanded (e.g. the bribe expands her capability set). On the other hand, Person A that rejects 
bribes in line with her values, her positive freedom is expanded, while her negative freedom 
may be contradicted (e.g. she lacks the bribe and the capabilities it brings to her capability set). 
The following chapters try to determine the agency-freedom relationship on this basis that is 
established in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. In the empirical studies (Chapter 5) we try to find 
empirical support for these rationality types, reconciling approaches and emotions. Finally, the 
model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency will be used to explain a case study that includes all 
aspects of this theory in Chapter 6.
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 Table 16: Identifying the Dominating Worldview  
 
Rationality Reconciling 
Approach 
Result of 
Reconciliation 
Attribution Related 
Emotion 
Dominating 
Worldview 
 
Substantive Monologue Dismiss ‘Self’ Fear Emotion Class Other* 
 
Substantive Monologue Dismiss ‘Other’  Fear Emotion Class Self 
 
Substantive Dialogue Evolving Hope  Self  
 
Substantive Dialectic Integrate worldviews Hope Self 
 
Practical Monologue Dismiss ‘Self’ Fear Emotion Class Other 
 
Practical Monologue Dismiss ‘Other’ Fear Emotion Class Self 
 
Practical Dialogue Evolving  Hope Self 
 
Practical Dialectic Integrate Worldviews Hope Self 
 
Formal Monologue Dismiss ‘Self’ Fear Emotion Class Other 
 
Formal Monologue Dismiss ‘Other’ Fear Emotion Class Self 
 
Formal Dialogue Evolving Rationality-Driven 
Emotion 
Other 
 
Formal Dialectic Integrate Worldviews Rationality-Driven 
Emotion 
Other 
 
Theoretical Monologue Dismiss ‘Self’ Fear Emotion Class Other 
 
Theoretical Monologue Dismiss ‘Other’ Fear Emotion Class Self 
 
Theoretical Dialogue Evolving Rationality-Driven 
Emotion 
Self 
 
Theoretical Dialectic Integrate Worldviews Rationality-Driven 
Emotion 
Self 
Note: * means that it may change in the long term depending on the strength of values.  
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Table 17 and Table 18 have the following characteristics to cover all permutations of the 
relations of the Affective-Cognitive-Conetive modes of agency in the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency:  
ü Table 17 shows the emotion-reason and decision relationship in situations where the ‘self’ 
worldview is strong, which means the agent is using substantive and/or practical rationality 
and facing an opposing worldview she uses dialogue and dialectic.  
ü Table 18 shows the emotion-reason and decision relationship in situations where the ‘other’ 
worldview is strong, which means the agent is using formal and/or theoretical rationality and 
facing an opposing worldview she uses monolgue. 
ü In both Table 17 and Table 18, instead of analysing success/failure, which are the focus of 
attribution studies, we analyse the state of being/doing based on two criteria: (a) whether the 
state of being is evaluated as valuable by personal and social parties (i.e. 
beneficial/adverse), and (b) whether one arrives at that state volitionally (i.e. 
functioning/commanding). These caveats result in four states of being/doing that are 
Beneficial-Functioning (BF), Adverse-Functioning (AF), Beneficial-Commanding (BC), and 
Adverse-Commanding (AC).  
ü In both Table 17 and Table 18, the minimum impact of decision on agency is identified. In 
other words, if at least one mode is contracted by the decision then we identify it as ‘one 
mode is contracted’.  
ü In both Table 17 and Table 18, the impact of decision on both positive and negative modes 
of freedom is mentioned. If at least one sense (positive or negative) is expanded, then it is 
identified that freedom is expanded. If at least one sense is contracted, then it is identified 
that freedom is contracted. 
ü In both Table 17 and Table 18, delusional situations are excluded (e.g. someone cannot kill 
someone else and feel free). 
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ü An example in Table 17: Imagine when Bill Gates decided to establish his charitable 
foundation, presumably he was volitionally making this decision, which puts him in the first 
row of Table 17, because he was following his values, experiencing pride because both he 
and others evaluated his state of being/doing as beneficial-functioning. Some people 
admired him and some envy him. The contempt and/or anger of some people did not force 
him to make a decision that conflicts with his values, and he had substantive rationality that 
is based on his values that hardly change.  
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Table 17: Relationship of Affective-Cognitive-Conative Modes of Agency with strong ‘self’ 
Self 
Direct 
Emotion 
Other Percieved 
Emotion 
Value  Freedom  Agency 
BF 
 
Pride 
    
 
 BF Pride-
Admiration-
Gratitude 
Conduced  Expanded  All Modes Expanded 
 
 AF Anger-
Indignation-
Schadenfreude 
Conduced  Expanded One Mode Contracted 
 
 BC Envey Conduced Expanded One Mode Contracted 
 
 AC Contempt-
Scorn-Disgust- 
Sympathy 
Conduced Expanded All Modes Contracted 
AF 
 
Guilt-Regret 
    
 
 BF Pride-
Admiration-
Gratitude 
Confliced Contracted One Mode Contracted 
 
 AF Anger-
Indignation-
Schadenfreude 
Confliced  Contracted One Mode Contracted 
 
 BC Envey Confliced Contracted One Mode Contracted 
 
 AC Contempt-
Scorn-Disgust- 
Sympathy 
Confliced  Contracted One Mode Contracted 
BC 
 
Pride 
    
 
 BF Pride-
Admiration-
Gratitude 
Conduced Expanded One Mode Contracted 
 
 AF Anger-
Indignation-
Schadenfreude 
Conduced  Expanded One Mode Contracted 
 
 BC Envey Conduced Expanded One Mode Contracted 
 
 AC Contempt-
Scorn-Disgust- 
Sympathy 
Conduced Expanded One Mode Contracted 
AC 
 
Shame-
Embarassment 
    
 
 BF Pride-
Admiration-
Conflicted Contracted One Mode Contracted 
  
 
 
 
154 
Gratitude 
 
 AF Anger-
Indignation-
Schadenfreude 
Conflicted Contracted One Mode Contracted 
 
 BC Envey Conflicted Contracted One Mode Contracted 
 
 AC Contempt-
Scorn-Disgust- 
Sympathy 
Conflicted Contracted All Modes Contracted 
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Table 18: Relationship of Affective-Cognitive-Conative Modes of Agency with strong ‘Other’ 
Self 
Direct 
Emotion 
Other Percieved 
Emotion 
Value  Freedom  Agency 
BF 
 
Pride 
    
 
 BF Pride-
Admiration-
Gratitude 
Conduced Expanded All Modes Expanded 
 
 AF Anger-
Indignation-
Schadenfreude 
Conflicted Contracted  One Mode is Contracted 
 
 BC Enve Conduced Expanded One Mode is Contracted 
 
 AC Contempt-
Scorn-Disgust- 
Sympathy 
Conflicted Contracted One Mode is Contracted 
AF 
 
Guilt-Regret 
    
 
 BF Pride-
Admiration-
Gratitude 
Conduced  Contracted One Mode is Contracted 
 
 AF Anger-
Indignation-
Schadenfreude 
Conflicted Contracted One Mode is Contracted 
 
 BC Envey Conduced Expanded One Mode is Contracted 
 
 AC Contempt-
Scorn-Disgust- 
Sympathy 
Conflicted Contracted  One Mode is Contracted 
BC 
 
Pride 
    
 
 BF Pride-
Admiration-
Gratitude 
Conduced  Expanded One Mode is Contracted 
 
 AF Anger-
Indignation-
Schadenfreude 
Conflicted Contracted One Mode is Contracted 
 
 BC Envy Conduced  Expanded One Mode is Contracted 
 
 AC Contempt-
Scorn-Disgust- 
Sympathy 
Confliced Contracted One Mode is Contracted 
AC 
 
Shame-
Embarassment 
    
 
 BF Pride-
Admiration-
Gratitude 
Conduced Contracted One Mode is Contracted 
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 AF Anger-
Indignation-
Schadenfreude 
Confliced Contracted One Model Contracted 
 
 BC Envey Unviolated Contracted One Mode is Contracted 
 
 AC Contempt-
Scorn-Disgust- 
Sympathy 
Confliced Contracted All Modes are 
Contracted 
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The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency: The Complete Model  
Figure 20 presents the final version of the model that is developed in this chapter, which 
is the centre of determining the agency-freedom relationship in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. 
It presents all of the developmental aspects of this chapter in three phases of (1) Capability 
Realisation, (2) Evaluation, and (3) the Feed Back-Forward Loop. So far, we have explained 
how Capability Realisation operates in the model. Here the affective and rational sides of 
agency are visualised in the Evaluation and Feed Backward-Forward parts of the model (Figure 
20). The elements of the model that are emotional based, are in the feedback loop where one’s 
evaluation of her current state (Nodes E1, E2, E3) influence her subsequent decision (Node A, 
B1, B2, D1, D2), through the direct and perceived emotion generated from her evaluation (Node 
E3). The association between the “rationality type” part of reason and emotion is presented at 
Node F. The relation between the “worldview” part of reason and emotion is presented at Node 
G.  
It is worth mentioning, however, E3a is proximal but E3b is distal from the agent due to 
the relative detachment from the agent. E3a is proximal to E1 and E2 because it represents the 
direct emotions (the emotions the agent feels are in her affective domain). E3b is distal to the 
agent so it is located far from E1, E2, because it presents the emotions that the agent perceives 
and they are in her cognitive domain. The four types of reconciling worldview and rationality 
types are presented in the Feed Backward-Forward Loop of the model, and the arrows leading 
from them feed into both the rational and emotion box. This is according to the logical link 
between reason and emotion that has been established in the previous section (see Table 16, 
Table 17 and Table 18). The reason and emotion that are generated from the Evaluation Phase 
feeds in two black boxes and their analysis is beyond the scope of this research. However, the 
outcome of the emotion and rational boxes feeds into the agency-outcome (i.e. decision), which 
is in line with our philosophical position (see ‘empirical’ domain in Chapter 3, Methodology).  
The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency traces the impact of these emotions and reasons on the 
decision object (i.e. capability set) at Node J. The arrow from the decision object to the 
Capability Realisation phase is dotted, in order to show the passage of time and the temporal 
aspect of analysis at Node A. In addition to Figure 20, Table 19 presents the genotype (i.e. a 
group of elements having similar constructs) and phenotype (i.e. the observable construction of 
the elements) of the model. Further, Figure 21 presents the time sequence of the model’s 
elements. In the following chapters we try to find empirical support for both the reason and 
emotion side of the theory. We use surveys and interviews to empirically develop the Tri-Modal 
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Theory of Agency, and then we apply this theory to a case study to determine the relationship 
between agency and freedom. 
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Figure 20: The Tri-Model Theory of Agency (Complete Core Model) 
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Table 19: Genotype-Phenotype of the Model 
Element 
 
Genotype of Cell 
 
Phenotype of Agent 
Node A 
 
Influenced by affect and rational, 
personal cost-benefit analysis of 
capabilities based on:  
The senses of value and volition 
decision maker’s emotions and 
values 
 
Agent categorises Capabilities in two sets: 
Desired: Capabilities that are both valuable 
and volitional 
Un-Desired: Capabilities that are either non-
valuable or non-volitional 
 
Node B1 
 
Limited desired capabilities 
based on the rational core 
constraints of the model:  
Logical  
Physical  
Axiological  
 
Agent is coerced to categorise Desired 
Capabilities in two sets: 
Realisable Desired: desired capabilities that 
are achievable  
Un-realisable Desired: Desired capabilities that 
are not achievable due to constraints. 
Node B2 
 
Limited non-desired capabilities 
based on the rational core 
constraints of the model:  
Logical  
Physical  
Axiological  
 
Agent is coerced to categorise non-desired 
capabilities in two sets: 
Realisable Un-Desired: Un-desired capabilities 
that are achievable  
Un-realisable Un-Desired: Undesired 
capabilities that are not achievable due to 
constraints. 
Node C 
 
Accidental properties of realising 
a capability. 
Flow unintentionally 
Unintended consequences of 
desiring something 
Not the purpose and focus of 
the decision 
 
Agent aims to reach a desired state and in 
parallel unintended consequences occur as the 
accidentals of desiring something.  
Node D1 
 
Choosing a desired and 
realisable capability, and in this 
decision:  
• Sense of value is evaluated 
from two sides of personal 
and social 
• Sense of commanding is 
evaluated from two sides of 
personal and source of 
authority 
• Volitional choice is possible 
• Decision maker is conscious  
• Side-effects are generated 
 
Agent is free from any force or source of 
authority and volitionally chooses a capability 
that has both personal and social value. This 
leads her to the “Beneficial Functioning” state. 
Node D2 
 
Choosing an undesired and 
 
Agent chooses: 
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realisable capability. This 
decision has following 
genotypes:  
• Sense of value is evaluated 
from two sides of personal 
and social 
• Sense of commanding is 
evaluated from two side of 
personal and source of 
authority 
• This is not a volitional choice 
• Decision maker is not 
conscious 
• Side-effects are generated 
• A capability with personal value, without 
social value, without being coerced. This 
leads her to “Adverse Functioning” State. 
• A capability without personal and social 
value, but being coerced. This leads her to 
“Adverse Commanding” state. 
• A capability without personal value, with 
social value, with being coerced. This leads 
her to “Beneficial Commanding”. 
 
Node E1 
 
At S1, evaluating state of 
being/doing, using certain 
“rationality type” based on her 
values, goal and principles. 
 
Making a decision, the agent evaluates her 
then state of being/doing, using substantive, 
practical, formal and/or theoretical rationalities.  
 
Node E2 
 
At S1, evaluating state of 
being/doing, encountering the 
opposite worldview of ‘others’, 
makes the decision maker deal 
with the opposite worldview and 
the strength of her own 
worldview is being tested. 
 
 
Making a decision, the agent evaluates her 
state of being/doing, but if she encounters an 
opposite worldview, she must use a reconciling 
approach of dialogue, monologue, or dialectic 
to integrate her own (i.e. ‘self’) and the other’s 
worldviews. This situation shows the strength 
of her worldview in front of the other’s 
worldview. 
Node E3 
(a & b) 
 
At S1, evaluating state of 
being/doing, from dual 
worldviews of ‘self’ (E3a) and 
‘other’ (E3b), attribution 
emotions are generated that 
influence the subsequent 
decision (i.e. Des1). 
 
Making a decision, the agent evaluates her 
state of being/doing from dual worldviews of 
‘self’ and ‘other’. This generates self-directed 
and perceived emotions that are combined (in 
the emotion black box) and result in influential 
emotion on decision making.  
 
Node F 
 
At S1, using a certain rationality 
type shows the strength, locus 
and stability of decision maker’s 
values, goals and principals.  
 
 
The type of rationality the agent uses to make 
a decision shows the quality and strength of 
her rationale. If the agent uses: 
• ‘Substantive Rationality’, then her values 
and long-term goals are internal, stable and 
controllable.  
• ‘Formal Rationality’, then her values and 
goals are external, unstable, and 
uncontrollable. 
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• ‘Practical Rationality’, then her values and 
goals are internal, unstable and 
controllable. 
• ‘Theoretical Rationality’, then her values 
and goals are external, controllable and 
unstable. 
Node G 
 
At S1, facing the opposite 
worldview tests the strength of 
the ‘self’ worldview in decision 
making. 
 
 
The way one deals with the opposite worldview 
shows the strength of her view.  
• If one uses monologue and dismisses the 
agent’s own worldview, then her ‘self’ 
worldview is weaker than the other’s. 
• If one uses dialogue and dismisses the 
other’s worldview, then her ‘self’ worldview 
is not strong enough to deal with the 
opposition. uses dialogue and being 
informed and keeps the opposite 
worldview, then her ‘self’ worldview is 
strong enough to accept the existence of 
multiple worldviews. 
• If one uses dialectic and takes into account 
the opposite worldview in her decision, then 
her ‘self’ worldview is strong enough to deal 
with the opposition. 
Node H 
 
The self-directed emotions, the 
other’s perceived emotions, 
rationality-oriented emotions, 
worldview-oriented emotions are 
combined and result in an 
emotion that influences decision. 
 
The agent feels certain emotion after 
evaluating her decision. 
Node I 
 
Type of rationality and 
reconciling  
opposite worldviews set the 
rationale of the decision maker. 
 
The agent makes a decision based on her 
rationale that is combined of her values, goals 
and principles that are developed after facing 
opposite worldviews.  
Node J 
 
The agent’s rationale and affect 
face each other and the strong 
one wins the decision. If the 
result decision contradicts 
agent’s values then her freedom 
is contracted to the same extent. 
 
The agent evaluates her state of being/doing at 
S1, from the ‘self’ and ‘other; worldviews. This 
results in certain emotions. Meanwhile, she is 
using her values and dealing with an opposite 
worldview (if one exists) and this result in her 
rationale.  
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Figure 21: Time Sequence of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in the model 
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Detecting Rationalisation 
To determine the agency-freedom relationship, this study is measuring agentic-factors 
from the two standpoints of ‘self’ and ‘other’ as presented in Figure 22. In this way, we can 
detect whether an agent is exercising ‘rationalisation’. The present study defines ‘rationalisation’ 
as substituting the real reason of a decision with a comfortable and unsound reason in two 
conditions. One condition of ‘rationalisation’ is when the agent has made a decision due to 
emotional intentions and she is substituting the actual motive with a rational reason when self-
reflecting on her decision behaviour. For example, imagine Person A has chosen to study art at 
a particular university even though she is not interested in art and the actual reason behind her 
decision is that her friends are going to the same university doing art. In this case, it is possible 
that Person A substitutes the real reason that is emotional with a rational reason when she 
explains why she has made that decision. In this line, several studies (Mazar et al., 2008; Rohr 
et al., 2015) have shown that people are prone to attribute a comfortable reason instead of 
reporting their emotional motives to protect their self-esteem. To address this issue, in the Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency the reasons behind a decision are measured with the same set of 
scales two times from the two perspectives of ‘self’ and ‘other’. Studies show that helping 
people to self-reflect on their behaviour contributes to the internal validity of self-report data 
collection methods (Duke et al., 2015). Further, having two worldviews on one issue helps to 
facilitate self-distancing in self-reflection (White et al., 2015). This helps to measure the within-
person variation to which research (Ashkanasy, 2013) shows studies on emotion need to pay 
further attention. Hence, through analysing the mismatches between the agent’s ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
worldviews on a similar construct we can identify unsound reasons (i.e. ‘rationalisation’). For 
example, if Person A answers the same question about her university major selection once from 
her ‘self’ and another time from the other’s (e.g. her parent’s) worldview, then it is possible that 
she reports two contradictory reasons. For instance, in this case ‘self’ worldview could be that “I 
chose it because I liked this major”, whereas the ‘other’s’ worldview could be “my parents think 
that I chose it only because my friends are doing this major”. The mentioned opposing ‘self’ and 
‘other’ worldviews can help us to indicate whether there is any emotional reason involved in her 
decision through further qualitative analysis of the agency outcome.  
In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, the second condition for ‘rationalisation’ is when an 
agent does not truly understand the intention behind her behaviour and she offers a comfortable 
reason to make sense of her course of action. This type of ‘rationalisation’ has been 
emphasised in various fields of ‘sociology’ (Weber, 1993), psychology (Baynes, 2015) and 
neuroscience (Solms and Leuzinger-Bohleber, 2016). Supporting this statement, neuroscientists 
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(Clark, 2015) have shown that there is a large body of human behaviour that is not within her 
control and one is not conscious and aware of. Meanwhile, psychologists (Baynes, 2015) refer 
to human unconsciousness to explain such behaviours. In this line, Weber (1993) in his ‘Basic 
Concepts in Sociology’ underlines that any ‘meaningful’ course of behaviour has emotional 
and/or rational intention, whether or not the people involved understand the meaning of it. 
Weber further argues that although the line between ‘meaningful’ and ‘responsive’ behaviours is 
blurred, the aim of social enquiry must be to stay objectively detached from the research subject 
while shedding light on the true intentions behind social behaviours. For example, although it 
may not be possible to determine the actual agency-freedom relationship of an agent who 
determines a counterintuitive or incontinent decision, research can find some reliable reasons 
that are true for their relationship in different contexts.  Weber says that this aim is possible by 
gaining knowledge of the whole social situation around that behaviour to determine the 
intentions behind meaningful behaviours.  
In this vein, this study aims to determine the agency-freedom relationship by analysing a 
meaningful behaviour, i.e., important decisions an individual makes in her life (e.g. career 
choice, university major selection, etc.) with respect to all three modes of agency (i.e. affective, 
cognitive and conative). Hence, in order to gain a comprehensive knowledge about these three 
modes, in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we have collected data on affective and rational 
reasons behind one’s decision from the two standpoints of ‘self’ and ‘other’. As presented in 
Figure 22, these affective and cognitive modes of agency can acquire different values as 
different individuals experience countervailing emotions and believe in different values 
(Bukowski et al., 2016). In the following chapters that we develop the empirical side of the 
theory, we consider this dual worldview (i.e. ‘self’ and ‘other’) to determine the agency-freedom 
relationship with careful attention to detecting ‘rationalisation’ in an agent’s self-reflections on 
her decision. 
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Figure 22: Dual Worldviews of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
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Chapter Summary  
This chapter has developed a model that is the core of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
upon a capability-based decision model initially proposed by Yorulmaz and Khan (2008a). The 
early decision model has two parts of the Logical Core that is about logical constraints, and an 
Affective Shell that is about what factors influence decision and how. This chapter develops and 
expands that early decision model towards the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in a way that (a) 
explains cognitive, conative and affective modes of agency with respect to freedom, (b) 
measures agency with respect to both the positive and negative sides of freedom, and (c) 
determines how agency and freedom are related. 
In order to determine the agentic factors, the present chapter has developed the early 
model’s Affective Shell in three following phases. The first phase is Capability Realisation that 
identifies how an agent chooses a capability from her opportunity set. In this line, we have 
identified how an opportunity is selected based using the principles of logical set theory; how an 
opportunity is assessed by the agent based on Desirability and Realisable criteria; and how an 
agent’s decision process continues over time with a focus on the unintentional consequences of 
her decision. In the second phase this chapter has developed the Evaluation part of the model 
that identifies how emotion and reason are generated and how they influence an agent’s next 
decision. Finally, in the third phase this chapter has identified how emotion and reason feed 
backward and/or forward into the agent’s decision trajectories (i.e. established the relationship 
of affective, cognitive, and conative modes of agency). The cognitive mode is developed based 
on Weber's (1993) rationality types; the conative mode based on Sen's (1999) capability 
approach and Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism and their relationship is established with the affective 
mode of agency through Weiner's (2010) theory of attribution emotion. These phases provide a 
theoretical foundation to address the research questions by determining the factors and 
mechanisms that determine the agency-freedom relationship based on logical deduction and 
the knowledge accumulated in other theory. In the following chapters we test and develop these 
elements empirically. 
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Chapter 5: Data Collection, Findings, and Analysis 
Introduction 
The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has been developed theoretically in the previous 
chapter and this chapter presents its empirical development and amendment. Table 20 presents 
an overview of this chapter in four studies that altogether: (A) explain cognitive, conative and 
affective modes of agency with respect to freedom; (B) measures agency with respect to both 
positive and negative sides of freedom; and (C) determines how agency and freedom are 
related. In summary, this chapter presents the following four studies:  
I. The first study is a “qualitative development” that is administered through conducting seven 
extensive in-depth interviews based on the main elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency. As a result, the first version of the Evaluation Instrument is developed, that is a 
research instrument for addressing the first research question that is determining the 
agency-oriented factors associated with freedom. The philosophical logic to develop the first 
version of the Evaluation Instrument has been firstly deductive, when we test the elements 
of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in interviews (see interview results in Study 1), and 
secondly inductive when we work with data to find generalisable themes about agency-
oriented factors (see thematic analysis and design of the Evaluation Instrument in Study 1). 
II. The second study is a “quantitative development” of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
through conducting an online survey via SurveyMonkey, analysing the “career choice” of 
personal tutors. Of 12,160 personal tutors in 450 rural and urban areas in Iran, 1,260 
respondents have filled in the 1st version of the Evaluation Instrument online; 1063 valid 
responses were obtained. As a result of factor analysis the 1st version is revised into the 2nd 
version of the Evaluation Instrument. The philosophical logic to develop the 2nd Evaluation 
Instrument has firstly been deductive when we test the first version, and then inductive when 
we run EFA to extract a concise number of factors that particularly represent the cognitive 
and conative modes of agency-oriented factors. 
III. The third study is a “quantitative amendment” of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency through 
conducting another survey with a focus on the “university major selection” of students. This 
survey was also administered online through SurveyMonkey. The 2nd version of the 
Evaluation Instrument is used. Data were collected from the 455,897 cohort of students in 
450 rural and urban areas in Iran. We have managed to collect 4,260 responses, among 
which 4,086 valid responses were obtained. As a result of factor analysis, the questionnaire 
is revised in to the 3rd version of the Evaluation Instrument. This research instrument is 
developed to accomplish the first research objective that is determining the agency-oriented 
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factors associated with freedom. The logical philosophy in Study 3 is similar to Study 2 with 
one difference that at the end of Study 3, we use Weber's (1993) theory of rationality types 
to explain the findings. Hence, the final round of analysis in this study is abductive. 
IV. The fourth study: identifies the affective mode of agency, reconciling approach and 
rationality type as well as the link between three modes of agency (cognitive, conative and 
affective) in order to address the second research objective, which is establishing the 
implication of agency-oriented factors for the expansion/contraction of the agent’s freedom. 
The 4th study has two following parts: 
a. (Part 1) is the second round of the “qualitative development” of the Tri-Modal Theory 
of Agency through conducting extensive in-depth interviews with 10 students, who 
had participated in the second survey. As a result, empirical evidence for the 
affective side of agency, reconciling approaches, and rationality types are collected 
and the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is developed by empirical data. Here, we use 
deduction when we test the agency-oriented factors of the Evaluation Instrument, 
then we use induction when we work in the data to identify the affective mode of 
agency oriented factors, and worldviews, and finally we use abduction when we use 
Weiner's (2010) attribution theory of motivation to explain the affective mode and 
Bakhtin's (2010) dialogic theory to explain the worldviews. 
b. (Part 2) is a “qualitative amendment” of the Tri-Modal Theory of agency through 
conducting extensive in-depth interviews with four individuals about four different life-
changing decisions (i.e. migration, devoting wealth, not migrating, and keeping up a 
start-up business after failure). Due to the generic aspect of the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency, the participants in this study were not necessarily from the host organisation 
of the first four studies. Part 2 of Study 4 has two main results. First, it is established 
how freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors. (i.e., second 
objectives achieved). Second, its results help to develop a case study methodology 
to apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency on different agency-outcomes. The next 
chapter uses this case study methodology and develops M. G’s case study as a 
complete application of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The philosophical logic that 
we have used in this study is the same as that of the first part of Study 4. 
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Table 20: Data Collection and Analysis, and Finding Chapter Overview 
S 
 
Method  RQ  
 
N Participants Focal 
Decision 
Mode  Before 
Analysis 
Analysis 
Technique 
Analysis Outcome 
1 
 
 
Interview 
(2013) 
 
RQ.
1  
 
7 
 
Personal 
Tutors 
 
Career 
Choice 
 
Skype 
 
Elements of 
Tri-Modal 
Theory of 
Agency 
 
Thematic 
Analysis 
Coding 
 
 
11 Themes of Agentic 
Factors (1st Evaluation 
Instrument) 
2 
 
 
 
Survey  
(2014) 
 
RQ.
1 
 
1063 
 
Personal 
Tutors 
 
Career 
Choice 
 
Online 
(Survey 
Monkey) 
 
11 Themes 
(1stFramewor
k) 
 
EFA, CFA  
 
8 Themes of includes 
10 ‘Self’ & 11 ‘Other’ Agentic 
Factors 
(2nd Evaluation Instrument) 
3 
 
 
 
Survey 
(2015) 
 
RQ.
1 
 
 
4086 
 
Students 
 
University 
Major 
Selection 
 
Online 
(Survey 
Monkey) 
 
8 Themes 
(2nd 
Framework) 
 
EFA, CFA  
 
8‘Self’ Factor & 9‘Other’ 
Agentic Factors; Mapped to 
Weber’s Rationality Types 
(3rd Evaluation Instrument) 
4. 
p1 
 
 
 
Interview 
(2015) 
 
RQ.
1&2 
 
10 
 
Students 
 
University 
Major 
Selection 
 
Telephone 
 
8-‘Self’ and 9-
‘Other’ 
Evaluation 
Instrument 
 
Thematic 
Analysis, 
Coding 
 
 
Map 3rd Evaluation 
Instrument to Reconciling 
Approaches, Rationality 
Types and Emotions. 
Link freedom to agency. 4. 
p2 
 
 
 
Interview 
(2016) 
 
RQ.
1&2 
 
4 
 
Musician, 
entrepreneur, 
IT specialist, 
manager. 
 
Migration; 
Starting 
business; 
Wealth 
devotion. 
 
Face to 
Face 
 
8-‘Self’ and 9-
‘Other’ 
Evaluation 
Instrument 
 
Thematic 
Analysis, 
Coding 
Note: Research Question1 (RQ1) is “What factors influence one’s agency to do/be what she values?”; RQ2 is “What is the 
implication of agency-oriented factors for the expansion/contraction of the agent’s freedom?”; Focal Decision is the decision under 
study in that research; EFA Explanatory Factor Analysis that is calculated using SPSS; Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is 
analysed using Lisrel.8 on Dell Latitude E747. S stands for Study. 
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Study 1: Qualitative Development (1st Round) 
Study 1 is the first step to empirically develop the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, 
conducted in August 2013, focusing on the first research objective that is to identify the agency-
oriented factors associated with freedom. This study focuses on “career choice” as the focal 
decision. Via Skype we have conducted extensive in-depth interviews with seven personal 
tutors. Before conducting interviews, the questions were sent to the participants and the 
interviews were conducted based on the answers that participants had already provided to the 
questions. According to Baggio et al. (2014) this method helps respondents to engage in the 
interview. To consider ethical issues (Slade and Prinsloo, 2013), we made sure about the 
voluntary participation, informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality of the result. With 
respect to the above-mentioned ethical issues, we recorded the interviews. In order to analyse 
the data, the researcher carefully listened to the recorded interviews twice; during the first time 
the repeated themes were identified, and in the second time the participant’s answers to each 
question were transcribed word by word, in order to make sure that everything was collected 
thoroughly. According to Bartlett (2012) this method improves the measurement accuracy of 
qualitative analysis. The interviews are conducted in Farsi. The data were initially transcribed in 
Farsi then translated into English. To confirm accurate translation, data were translated back 
from English to Farsi. The following sections present our sampling approach, measurement 
scales, data analysis technique, results and the result interpretation of the first study.  
 
Study 1: Sample 
All seven participants were personal tutors for more than one year in the host 
organisation. To recruit volunteer participants, the research aim and rationale were announced 
on the organisation’s official website and they were asked to send us their information if they 
were interested in participating in the interviews (see Appendix 2). After one week, 10 personal 
tutors sent us emails, showing interest in being interviewed about their “career choice”. Among 
these 10 personal tutors we managed to conduct interviews with seven, particularly due to 
technical difficulties in connecting with rural areas in Iran through Skype. This is because the 
government restricts internet bandwidth (Morozov, 2012). As presented in Table 2, three 
participants are from Tehran and the rest are living in other cities around the country. The 
sample is diverse regarding the age, gender, university major and participant’s evaluation 
regarding the “desirable” and “realisable” aspects of their “career choice”. The participants’ self’ 
evaluation of their “career choice” after making the decision is indicated in the last two columns 
of Table 21. 
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Table 21: Participants in Study 1 
 
ID Age Gender From Tenure University major Desirable  Realizable 
 
B.K 40 M Tehran 5 Education Beneficial Functioning 
 
M.B 26 M Dehdasht 6 Electronic Engineering  Beneficial Functioning 
 
M.F 29 F Orumiye 3 Physics Beneficial Commanding 
 
N.M 21 F Tehran 4 Industrial Engineering Adverse Functioning 
 
N.L 20 F Sarab 2 Nursery Beneficial  Functioning 
 
S.S 33 F Tabriz 3 Accounting Adverse Commanding 
 
S.R 27 F Arak 4 Agricultural Engineering Adverse Commanding 
Note: the Desirable and Realizable aspects are assessing the participants’ state of being/doing after their career choice, based on  
the assessment criteria mentioned in Chapter 4, Theory Development.
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Study 1: Measurements (Interview Questions) 
As the first empirical step to determine what factors influence one’s agency to do/be 
what she values (RQ1), seven extensive in-depth interviews were conducted on the main 
aspects of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, which are desirability, realisability, side-effect, 
environment, capabilities, state of being/doing, and emotion aspects of the agency-freedom 
relationship (Figure 23). Accordingly, Table 22 shows 52 questions designed based on the 
theoretical foundation of these seven elements. These questions were sent to the participants 
prior to the interviews. Following is a summary of their theoretical background (see Chapter 4, 
Theory Development, for more detail): 
I. Desirability is freedom aspect of agency that is a value-laden and multilevel criterion of 
capability realisation that includes the volitional aspect of decision making. The items of 
this construct are developed based on Berlin's (1958) view on value and volition. 
II. Realisability is a constraint-laden criterion of capability realisation that includes 
universal and personal constraints that are located in the Logical Core of the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency. The items of this construct are developed based on decision 
constraints in Sen's (1999) Capability Approach (CA), as well as the basics of logical and 
physical possibility.  
III. Environment refers to the external aspect of limitations on agency with a focus on the 
role of institutions and opposing worldviews. The items of this construct are designed 
based on Weber's (1993) rationality types and Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism. 
IV. State of Being and Doing focuses on the process-outcome notion of the agency-
freedom relationship that is built upon the capability-functioning distinction in Sen's 
(1999) CA that says both endpoint and process matter when investigating freedom and 
agency.  
V. Emotion is the affective aspect of agency and its items are developed based on 
Weiner's (2010) attribution theory of motivation. 
VI. Side Effect is about the temporal nature of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that 
considers the consequential of decisions on one’s life trajectory in terms of freedom and 
agency. 
VII. Capability is the options an agent potentially has and how they can flourish into the 
state of being/doing. 
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Figure 23: Interview Questions based on the Elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
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Table 22: Interview Questions 
Interview Questions on six elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
Desirability (Volition) 
 
Did you choose to be a personal tutor as your first preference?  
What were your other alternatives and why did you not choose them? 
Did you feel any limitation when you were deciding to work as a personal tutor? 
Desirability (Value) 
 
Do you think being a personal tutor in this organisation is beneficial to your career life? 
Do you think being a personal tutor in this organisation is beneficial to your personal life? 
Do you think being a personal tutor in this organisation will help you achieve your life ambitions? 
Realisability  
 
Did you have any other preferable job alternatives but becoming a personal tutor prevented you from actualising that 
choice? 
Were you limited in any way by any longstanding illness, disability, infirmity, or mental health problem to choose to 
become a personal tutor rather than your other more preferred job? 
Did you face any environmental difficulty (e.g. another preferable job was far from you and you could not travel there on 
a regular basis) when you were deciding to become a personal tutor? 
Could you say that you have chosen to become a personal tutor, because you had physical constraints that did not 
allow you to choose what you like the most? 
Did you choose to become a personal tutor because of financial reasons? 
Did you have any preferable job alternative that you could not choose it because you lacked the required skills and 
experience? 
Did you have all of the requirements to choose the job that you preferred the most? 
Could you say that one of the reasons that you have chosen to become a personal tutor is because you could not 
choose your most preferred jobs, as you did not have enough requirements? 
Did you have any preferable job alternative that you could not choose because it was against your beliefs? 
Did you have any preferable job alternative that you did not choose because it was against your religious beliefs? 
Did you have any preferable job alternative that you did not choose but your explanation is not convincing for others 
who have different personal beliefs about religious, tradition or ethical issues? 
Could you say that one of the reasons that you have become a personal tutor is the rules and beliefs that you set for 
yourself? 
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Side Effects 
 
While making decisions, did any accident happen that prevented you from choosing another job that you had preferred 
more than the job of personal tutor? 
Did the consequence of your previous decisions prevent you from choosing another job (decisions such as choosing 
your university major, or decision to move to another city? 
Environment  
 
Which of the following institutions always had a great influence on your decisions, and particularly your choice of 
becoming a personal tutor (e.g. legal, religious, cultural, political, economic, social, organisational, professional, or 
other)? 
How did this institution affect you to choose to become a personal tutor? 
In this institution, with which social group do you identify with? 
What common factors can you see between yourself and other members of this group that allows you to align with this 
social group? 
How does your decision to become a personal tutor contribute to your relative position within this social group that you 
are influenced by? 
How important was your social group in your decision to become a personal tutor? 
Is there any social group in your life that would disapprove of your decision to become a personal tutor? 
How did their evaluation influence your decision to become a personal tutor? 
State of being/doing 
 
What other alternatives did you have, when you were choosing to become a personal tutor? 
Would you feel differently, if you had chosen your second most preferable alternative that you had when you decided to 
become a personal tutor? 
How differently would the social group that you identify with have responded if you had chosen your second most 
preferable alterative? 
Emotion 
 
What did you feel when this organisation accepted you as a personal tutor and you were to choose to work in this role? 
(rank the highest 5 and the lowest 1) (Anger, Happiness, Hope, Hopelessness, Gratitude, Shame, Regret, Surprise, 
Happiness, Sadness, other) 
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Why did you choose to become a personal tutor? (Rank the lowest 1, and the highest 5, and explain)  
Do you say that “I become a personal tutor because…?  
of my family. 
of my friends. 
of my social group. 
of my university. 
other employers rejected me. 
I put effort into it. 
I have studied hard in the past. 
have not tried enough to find another job. 
I have not studied enough in the past. 
I was not persistent enough for other jobs. 
I was not able enough for other jobs. 
my abilities and talents. 
I could not do another job. 
my abilities matched the job requirements. 
this job’s tasks match with my IQ level. 
I was not lucky enough to find another job. 
I was lucky. 
other luckier people choose this job. 
accident. 
I found about it out of luck. 
Please rank the following reasons based on their influence on your decision to become a personal tutor: 
 Ability, Effort, Others, Luck. 
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Study 1: Analysis (Thematic Analysis and Coding) 
The qualitative content analysis used in Study 1 is presented in Table 23. This is based 
on Zhang and Wildemuths' (2010) guidelines for analysing qualitative content and Braun and 
Clarke (2006) following six phases of thematic analysis: (A) familiarising with data, (B) 
generating initial codes, (C) searching for themes among codes, (D) reviewing themes, (E) 
defining and naming themes, (F) producing a final report that maps themes to research aims 
and objectives. As a result, the following 11 Themes are generated that present cognitive, 
conative and affective modes of agency with respect to freedom.  
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Table 23: Qualitative Content Analysis Criteria of Study 1 
Qualitative Analysis  
 
Content 
Procedure 
 
Interview  
Data preparation  
 
Designing interview questions based on the five constructs of the 
agency-freedom relationship in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. 
Transcribing data word by word in Farsi then into English. The data 
is translated back to confirm accurate translation. 
Collecting similar parts in categories. 
Define unit of 
analysis  
 
Searching for the expressions of an idea. 
Searching for similar ideas. 
Develop categories / 
coding schema  
 
Developing new coding generated based on the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency. 
Coding of ‘Freedom Awareness’ for the conative mode of agency 
based on Berlin's (1969) definition of freedom.  
Coding of ‘Impact of Commodities’ for the conative mode of agency 
based on  Sen's (1999) CA. 
Coding of ‘Teleological Reasoning’, ‘Causal Reasoning’, 
‘Correlational Reasoning’, ‘Logical Reasoning’, ‘Impact of Third-party 
Evaluation’, ‘Impact of First Party Evaluation’, and ‘Ontology of 
Attribution’ for the cognitive mode of agency based on Weber's 
(1993) practical and substantive rationality. 
Coding of ‘Impact of Affective State’ and ‘Awareness of Affective 
State’ for the affective mode of agency based on Weiner's (2010) 
Attribution Theory of Motivation. 
Test coding schema  
 
Checking the text for coding. 
Revising coding and checking the coding consistency. 
Identifying pair themes. 
Coding all the text 
 
Adding new themes to coding. 
Combining similar codes. 
Assess the coding 
consistency  
 
Rechecking the coding 15 times by researcher and colleagues. 
Checking the reliability of coding. 
Linking related literature to each theme. 
Draw conclusion  
 
Identifying relationships within categories. 
Generating Themes from the coding result. 
Measuring each theme from ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ perspectives. 
‘Self’ standpoint: Agent’s self-reflection on her own decision. 
Other standpoint: Agent’s self-reflection on other’s evaluation of her 
decision. 
Designing the 1st version of the Evaluation Instrument based on 
Themes. 
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Study 1: Result (11 Themes) 
The result of the thematic analysis is 11 themes (coding detail is available in Appendix 1). 
The cognitive mode of agency is coded by seven themes of ‘Logical Reasoning’, ‘Teleological 
Reasoning’, ‘Casual Reasoning’, ‘Correlational Reasoning’, ‘First Party Evaluation’, ‘Third Party 
Evaluation’, and ‘Ontology of Attribution’. The conative mode of agency is coded by two themes 
of ‘Freedom Awareness’ and ‘Impact of Commodities’. Finally, the affective mode of agency is 
coded by two themes of ‘Impact of Affective State’ and ‘Awareness of Affective State’. Table 24 
presents the coding result with reference to the evidence from the interviews. These findings 
accomplish the first three phases of the Braun and Clarke (2006) thematic analysis (i.e. (A) 
familiarising with data, (B) generating initial codes, and (C) searching for themes among codes). 
The following sections will present the results of the remaining two steps that are: (D) reviewing 
themes, (E) defining and naming themes. At the end of Study 1, we present the final step of 
thematic analysis (i.e. (F) producing a final report that maps themes to research aims and 
objectives) in the Result interpretation section.
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Table 24: Reviewing, Defining and Naming Themes 
Theme 
 
Definition   
 
Direct Evidence 
Freedom 
Awareness 
 
 
 
Agent over/under 
estimates her 
freedom, implying 
that sometimes the 
two concepts of 
‘agency’ and 
‘freedom’ are 
misused for each 
other. 
 
M.F: 
“I had freedom of choice between my options, I didn’t have many options. There was no 
force on me from my family to choose between the options I had.” 
S.R: 
“This organisation provided a job opportunity that may not be the best option, but it is good 
for many. They feel satisfied, as they think that at least they have somewhere to go as an 
office. The thing is that they are educated but they could not find a job in their own major.” 
N.M: 
“I was thinking that it is better not to migrate at that time, as I was funded to my family and I 
liked Iran. I could not leave my belongings. External things put shadow on my first two 
choices and forced me to go for the third or fourth option; but this choice is still my priority.” 
 “The greatest limitation after becoming personal tutor was that I could not study for a PhD, 
which was my best alternative.” 
M.B: 
“It is true that my ideal was to become a professor at Stanford University, but the situation 
would not let me to do that. I cannot fight with all of the things around me, so I am pushed to 
make this decision. Saying that I am forced, well, it is not a right word; I want to say that 
because of the situation I made another decision, but still I freely made this decision.” 
Ontology of 
Attribution 
 
 
 
Agent provides 
contradictory 
reasons for her 
decisions. 
 
  
 
M.F: 
“They interviewed me for this job. So it could be because of effort that I became a personal 
tutor. But, actually none of these things such as luck, family or effort was the reason behind 
my decision. I found this job by accident, because I was looking for a job. It could be 
because of my city and lack of sufficient job opportunities.” 
N.M: 
“Ability and wisdom are more important than effort for this job. “To be hired I did not make 
any effort. After the interview I was easily accepted as a personal tutor.” 
“As Islam says, ‘one minute’s thinking is much better than years of praying’. It means that 
you must first think then try. This is true about my decision as well. First I thought about 
what I wanted, then I put in the effort. I do not say luck; I say God’s will. 
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Teleological 
Reasoning 
 
 
Agent assigns the 
reason of her 
decision to a 
state/event in 
future. 
S.S:  
“I was not thinking about the future at the beginning and I wanted to do my job in the best 
way, but from the second year I decided to progress in my job.” 
S.R: 
“Honestly speaking, I could not achieve what I wanted financially and professionally in this 
job.” 
N.M: 
“I always wanted to prepare myself for a big managerial role.” 
“I was thinking that I would have job security in this organisation.” 
N.L: 
“When I was accepted into university, I was thinking that it is the time to practice what I was 
thinking about in the past and to become a personal tutor.” 
M.B: 
“I was feeling that this job did not have a good future.” 
“I had this dream, something like a fairy tale wish of establishing my own educational 
institution one day.” 
Causal 
Reasoning 
 
 
 
Agent assigns the 
reason of her 
decision to a 
state/event in past. 
 
S.S: 
“If I took this organisation’s exams when I was a student, I might have chosen a major in 
university that I have liked and I would have worked in it.” 
“About four years ago I was an accountant in our family firm. At that time, I wanted to start a 
job that has innovation in it, because accountancy is a routine job and you do some 
repetitive tasks every day.” 
M.G: 
“I have some belongings that I could not leave them and leave for another country.” 
“When I was doing my undergrads, I was thinking about working in the scholarship section 
of this organisation in my city, because I used to use this organisation’s scholarship when I 
was a student myself.” 
Logical 
Reasoning 
 
 
These themes refer 
to the line of 
reasoning that is 
 
M.F: 
“I tried to find a job to earn some money while having some free time to study. I tried to 
achieve it. I was not making a decision.” 
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 not logically sound, 
or refer to anti-
realist thinking, or a 
flawed reasoning 
(see Chapter 3, 
Methodology).  
S.R: 
 “I didn’t make a good decision, because when I was making this decision, I was too young, 
only 19 years old and I was thinking that I was making a right choice.” “I never thought that I 
was making a wrong choice.” 
M.B: 
“At that time, I freely made this decision to stay and not leave my belongings. Now I can 
change myself into another person and forget about my family and leave the country.” 
Third-Party 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
Agent assigns the 
reason of her 
decision to a third 
party; a source 
external to the 
agent.  
 
S.R: 
“I was never thinking that I would become unemployed and doing a job that no one regards 
as a real job.” 
M.F: 
“In my friends’ jobs like teaching in a private university in our city, you do not have so much 
freedom. In that job I had to do favours to some special students’ in scoring their exam. I left 
the job because I did not see this as a good thing to do. So I did resign and did not go there 
any more, while my friends stayed there. They had no problem with such a thing!” 
S.S: 
“When I was in high school, I did not participate in this organisation’s exams, despite my 
family’s pressure to attend at least two exams. Unfortunately, I was lazy at that time and I 
did not go.” 
S.R: 
“At the beginning, my father did not like me to study an agricultural major in university, but 
he had no objection to me choosing the role of a personal tutor in this organisation. After my 
father, it is my husband who has no objection against me working in this organisation and 
he supports me financially”. 
“When I say that I have a degree in agriculture engineering, they look at me in a way that it 
seems I have done nothing important. In Iran, agricultural jobs are not easy to find.” 
“The educational system in Iran does not look at agricultural majors as an academic 
choice.” 
N.M: 
“There are many people who told me that I made a wrong choice, but I laughed at them all, 
because I know what I am doing.” 
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N.L: 
“I sometimes have different religious beliefs, but I must not show them, because they may 
think differently about me.” 
M.B: 
“I felt that their perception about me had changed. It seemed that they were saying that 
“M.B did not make a very correct decision”. 
First Party 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
Agent brings 
reasons for her 
decision that are 
rooted in how 
she/he evaluates 
her situation from 
her own standpoint. 
 
N.M: 
“I think my mother’s and my families’ influence is positive and I accept them. I believe in 
their words.  
“I made the decision, but my mother had a great role.” 
“I have consulted with one of the Sharif University’s best professors, who is an expert in 
entrepreneurship. He told me that you would make a mistake if you start your business. The 
females' age of entrepreneurship is not your age and you know nothing at the moment. At 
the end, I think that I made the right choice.” 
N.L: 
“Mainly, the concerns that we have in our family influence me. I do not accept many people 
and I only believe in my family; as my brother says that I don’t listen to anyone outside the 
family.” 
M.B: 
“Although they had different views about me, I did what I liked. I did not pay attention to 
what others say.” 
Correlational 
Reasoning 
 
 
Agent assigns the 
reason of her 
decision to 
state/event that 
occurs in time of 
decision making. 
 
 
N.M: 
“At that time, I did not have the required experience, I was too young for it, and my 
character was not developed.” 
M.B: 
“At the same time, I was feeling a prospect for myself and I liked to assess my teaching 
ability when I entered into the role of personal tutor.” 
“At the same time, there was a pharmaceutical firm and I was supposed to do its electronic 
jobs, but I was feeling that this job did not have a good future.” 
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Impact of 
Commodities 
 
 
Agent points to 
influence of 
commodities on her 
decision. 
 
M.B: 
“The world was somehow against me making this decision. I chose it because of interest 
and ability that I felt from within.” 
“Impact of 
Affective 
State” 
AND 
“Awareness 
of Affective 
State” 
 
 
 
Agent points to 
influence of 
emotion on her 
decision. 
 
 
 
M.B: 
“At that time my main feeling was hope, but sometimes you may feel hopelessness.” 
“I felt gratitude towards this organisation and I liked to return its favour. 
“Being connected with students and helping them satisfy me and that is why I liked to do 
this job.” 
N.M: 
“When I was doing my masters’ dissertation I started a project with great enthusiasm and 
worked hard, but because of my personality I could not continue, because after some 
defeats I become hopeless.” 
“Because of my personality, I had left all my previous jobs when I became hopeless.” 
S.R: 
“At the beginning my father’s negative signals disturbed me. Other also reacted in an 
unpleasant way, when they found out that I was studying agriculture. At that difficult time, 
being in this organisation and working with students was energising.” 
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Study 1: Result Interpretation 
Here, the result of Study 1 is interpreted by mapping the themes onto the research aims 
and objectives. The first study’s findings indicate 11 themes. To determine agency-oriented 
factors associated with freedom, we try to consolidate these 11 themes into a smaller but still 
representative set of latent factors associated with freedom. According to Creswell (2014) factor 
analysis can provide a suitable solution to reduce the number of items while keeping the 
meaning, but this technique is appropriate for quantitative data. Hence, we have considered 
running a round of quantitative data collection on the themes. In this regard, we have designed 
an appropriate research instrument (i.e. questionnaire) to apply a survey and to establish the 
extent to which each of the 11 themes is genuinely associated with the agent’s freedom. This 
questionnaire becomes the Evaluation Instrument of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that 
identifies agency-oriented factors associated with freedom (i.e. the first research objective). 
Hence, collecting data using the Evaluation Instrument and running Explanatory Factor Analysis 
(EFA), the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom will be identified. The following 
sections will show how this research instrument is designed based on the 11 themes. 
 
Study 1: The Evaluation Instrument (1st Version) 
To design the Evaluation Instrument, we rely on the findings of the first study and the 
theoretical foundation of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The findings support the idea that 
each theme has an ‘existential’ and ‘cognisant’ aspect, because the participants’ understanding 
and definition of the notions of freedom, attribution and agency are not similar to our technical 
definitions (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation). The ‘existential’ aspect refers to the 
extent to which each theme exists when an agent makes a conscious, deliberate and important 
decision. The ‘cognisance’ aspect points to two conditions of ‘rationalisation’ that is the extent to 
which the agent is providing a sound reason for her choice. The ‘cognisant’ aspect of each 
theme shows that the agent may lack the knowledge/awareness about that theme. Hence, in 
the Evaluation Instrument we identify two constructs of ‘existential’ and ‘cognisant’ to measure 
each theme. The ‘existential’ aspect can be measured by asking the agent about the influence 
of certain factors on her decision, but the ‘cognisant’ aspect requires a detection method for 
‘rationalisation’, as explained in the previous chapter (see Chapter 4, Theory Development).  
According to the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, the ‘cognisant’ aspect of themes is 
measured from two standpoints of ‘self’ and ‘other’ and the findings are interpreted as following. 
The agent can control the ‘self’ aspect but she cannot control the ‘other’ aspect of the themes, 
i.e. this aspect roots in the Logical Core of our theory (see Chapter 4). Meanwhile, the ‘self’ 
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aspect is mapped onto the Affective Shell of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that is developed 
empirically and includes influencers that are milder form of constraints that the decision maker is 
prepared to violate in favour of other constraints. Given a capability set available to a decision 
maker, the constraints influence the agent at the ‘Logical Core’ of the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency; this produces a capability set that is realisable; then the influencers are imposed on the 
agent at the ‘Affective Level’ of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and it produces the final 
‘realisable’ and ‘desirable’ capabilities. 
Accordingly, to design the Evaluation Instrument, first, we ask a series of questions 
derived from each theme’s constructs and dimensions that indicate the ‘existential’ aspect of 
each theme. This part is labelled the ‘self’ agency-oriented factors. Second, to indicate the 
‘cognisant’ aspect of themes, we ask a set of similar questions, but this time the participant is 
required to answer them from the standpoint of others. The respondent’s answers to these 
series of questions are collected as the ‘other’ agency-oriented factors. Finally, to indicate 
whether a respondent is ‘rationalising’, we compare her ‘self’ and ‘other’ answers. Table 25 
presents the rules according to which the Evaluation Instrument is designed. 
Table 25 is developed based on the findings of Study 1 (i.e. thematic assumptions) and 
these are mapped onto theoretical insights in the literature. We consider these assumptions in 
data collection and when determining the agency-freedom relationship, using the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency. In addition to the a priori assumptions presented in Table 25, the findings of 
Study 1 also show that sometimes participants say that nothing has influenced their decision 
(see the Ontology of Attribution in Table 24). This implies that we need to detect whether the 
decision is because of “luck” or whether this person is ‘rationalising’. To address this challenge, 
we correlate the ‘ontological’ dimension of attribution (derived from our thematic analysis) with 
Weiner's (2010) causal dimensions of attribution (Stability, Locus, Controllability) in order to 
identify the sound reason. As explained in the methodology chapter, Chapter 3, we 
acknowledge the participants’ way of thinking that could be realism or anti-realism. Hence, both 
‘existence’ and ‘apperception’ aspects of attribution are considered. This means that any 
attribution can be identified as “not chance” (existed and known), or Unaware Agent (existed but 
unknown), or Luck (not existed and unknown), or Rationalisation (not existed but known) (see 
Chapter 3, Methodology).  
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Table 25: Design Rules of the Evaluation Instrument 
 
Measurement Rule 
 
Pair Themes have ‘self’ and ‘other’ Measures. 
Measurement Scales shows that each theme has three constructs and several dimensions based on 
its definition.  
Questions are designed inductively from the interview material. We choose an example of the 
characteristics of each construct’s dimension, because: (A) these examples are frequently repeated in 
interviews, and (B) they are at the level of lay person thinking. 
Order in the questionnaire is that first the ‘self’ and then the ‘other’ questions are asked.   
Measurement Scale 
 
Score Measurement: the participant’s total score of each factor, which is measured by summing up the 
score of each item, divided by the total score possible for that factor (i.e. a percentage). 
Number of questions for paired themes: we try to keep the equivalent number of items for ‘self’ and 
‘other’ questions (preferably five item for each view), in order to keep the consistency among the 
themes. However, this harmony may change as a result of factor analysis in quantitative studies. 
A priori Assumption 
about Decision 
 
 
‘Self’ and ‘Other’ Judgment and type of decision: here, we have two assumptions about the decision 
type based on Davidson's (2014) incontinent actions and Sen's (2004) commitment actions:  
If an intentional action is contrary to ‘self’ judgement, then it is an incontinent action (that is based on 
Davidson's (2014) incontinent action).  
If an intentional action is contrary to ‘other’ judgment, then it is a counterintuitive action (that is based 
on Sen's (2004) commitment action) 
A priori Assumption 
about Rationalisation 
 
 
Rationalisation: sometimes people make subconscious or emotional decision through heuristic 
mechanisms, but they try to formulate a rational explanation, believing that a rational explanation is a 
true explanation (Kahneman, 2012). Further, the findings of study 1 show that sometimes people know 
that they are rationalising but they only accept it after the fact. 
A priori Assumption 
about Self-Reflection 
 
 
Self-reflection: sometimes people cannot accurately reflect well on their behaviour, as self-reflection 
requires high cognitive endeavour (Travers et al., 2015). Hence, we measure the items from the two 
perspectives of ‘self’ and ‘other’, as it helps respondents to put themselves in a position of ‘other’ and 
this helps them to evaluate their decision through self-distancing and it is found that “self-distancing 
facilitates adaptive self-reflection” (White et al., 2015). 
Measuring  
 
Logical Reasoning: The theme of logical Reasoning that measures the soundness of the agent’s logical 
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“Logical Reasoning” 
theme 
 
argument is being measured through comparing ‘self’ and ‘other’ scores that measure similar 
constructs. In other words, Logical Reasoning is measured through detecting rationalisation, because 
unsound logical reasoning is an example of “Rationalisation” that is defined in this study as the 
incidences when an attribution does not exist but the agent refers to something as an attribution (see 
Chapter 3, Methodology).   
Measuring  
Affective related 
themes 
 
 
Affective Related Themes: Here, the themes that are related to an affective state (i.e. “Affective State” 
and “Awareness of Affective State”) are measured through the link between attribution, reason and 
their logical link with emotion. This is because in this study emotion is investigated based on Weiner's 
(2010) attribution theory of motivation, which implies that certain emotions are generated when one 
(agent) evaluates her situation (decision) (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). Hence, in the 
Evaluation Instrument we have the measurement scales of attribution and reason and we try to find a 
reliable pattern that further based on Weiner's (2010) theory we link to the emotion list. Finally, we test 
these links and Weiner's emotion using in-depth interviews and a case study (qualitative methods; see 
Study 3 and Study 4), which are highlighted (Chase et al., 2015) as more appropriate tools to detect 
emotion than quantitative methods. Further, this mixed method is in line with our philosophical 
paradigm (i.e. Critical Realism), saying that there are some parts of the “real” in social behaviour (Luke 
and Bates, 2015), such as emotion (McKee et al., 2015) that are not observable but some of their 
aspects are in the empirical domain that can be measured, like the attributions that initiate emotions. 
Thus, we use qualitative methods to find some aspect of the ‘real’ domain regarding emotion. 
Measuring Freedom-
related themes 
 
Freedom: To measure freedom-related themes we consider three following a priori: 
First, the ‘existential’ dimension of freedom is articulated in the way that freedom is possessed 
regardless of conscious awareness, so it may be possible to find oneself in a free state, but due to 
apathy (not lack of capabilities) feel no desire for any option. Otherwise, if we constrain freedom to 
depend ‘sufficiently’ on the conative aspect, then freedom becomes very much determined exclusively 
at a psychological level. Hence, in this study “apathy” does not preclude freedom and this construct 
has two dimensions of psychological and ontological.  
Second, in this study the ontological aspect of freedom covers negative aspect, thus, the number and 
quality of capabilities are measured, which is in line with Sen's (1999) definition of negative freedom. 
(see Chapter 2, Literature Review).  
Third, to measure the ontological aspect of freedom, we consider the meaning of “equivalence” of 
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capabilities based on an agent’s values that are indicated based on her rationality type. This is 
because in this study the agency-freedom link is conceptualised based on an agent’s values consist 
with liberal thinkers (Berlin, 1958; Sen, 1999) as we say that one must be free to live the life she has 
reason to value. Hence, in the present study a priori assumption is that two entities have equivalent 
impact, as long as they equally satisfy the agent’s pursuit to live the life she has reason to value. 
Pilot Study  
 
The 1st version of the Evaluation Instrument is applied in a pilot study of (N=20) and as a result the 
wording of the questions is revised based on the feedback received from the participants. 
First Step: We sent the questionnaire that indicated the impact of each of themes on their decisions. 
Second Step: We interviewed the same participants and qualitatively indicate the misunderstanding 
due to the wording and design of the questionnaire. 
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The findings of Study 1 and the theoretical concerns as mentioned in Table 25 have 
been summarised in Table 26 that presents the eight themes of agency-oriented factors as well 
as their definitions, dimensions, and constructs that are designed in the Evaluation Instruments 
to identify agency-oriented factors associated with freedom (the 1st research objective). 
Following, Table 27 is the 1st version of the Evaluation Instrument that includes 84 question 
items to measure these eight themes from the two standpoints of ‘self’ and ‘other’. Each 
standpoint accounts for 42 items to measure the eight themes. The next section is Study 2 that 
uses the 1st version of the Evaluation Instrument and applies it in a survey that analyses the 
‘career choice’ of 1063 personal tutors. 
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Table 26: 1st Evaluation Instrument, Theme, Dimensions, Constructs 
Theme 
 
Definition  
 
Dimensions and Sub-Dimensions 
 
1) Freedom 
Awareness 
 
Construct 1: Freedom 
Freedom Awareness is about the conative mode of agency. 
Here, freedom is defined based on Berlin's (1969) positive 
and negative definitions of freedom as following: 
I. Positive freedom is about what/who is the source 
of determining an action. Here, we identify the 
psychological dimension to measure positive 
freedom that includes the volition and connotation 
aspect of agency.  
II. Negative freedom is about the space within which 
agent is free to do/be what she values, without 
external interference. Here, we identify the 
ontological dimension that includes number, 
equivalence and independence of options to 
measure negative freedom. 
Construct 2: Cognisance Aspect 
§ The degree to which agent is aware of the presence 
of freedom.  
Construct 3: Existential Aspect 
§ The degree to which freedom pervades through the 
context. Considering the fact that people do not 
necessarily define freedom in our technical sense 
“as there are many kinds of freedom (some 
valuable, some detrimental, and some trivial) and 
‘freedom’ means very different things to different 
people” (Sen, 1999). 
 
I. Psychological: 
a. Volition: If there is only one capability 
available whether this person has the 
volition to choose it. 
b. Connotation: Whether or not an agent 
has the motivation and drive to 
choose an option. For a person to be 
free, they must experience a 
momentary stimulation directed 
towards the prospective action (see 
Chapter 3, Methodology). 
II. Ontological: 
a. Number of Capabilities: At least one 
capability exists that an agent can 
volitionally transform it to functioning. 
b. Equivalence of Capabilities: Whether 
the available options are equivalent 
(see Table 6 for equivalence criteria), 
in terms of their future emotional 
impact, their side effect, and the 
evaluation third-party (see Chapter 3, 
Methodological concern of freedom 
measurement). 
c. Independence of Capabilities: Are 
these options independent from each 
other, meaning that there is no 
constraint from choosing one on 
pursuing another? 
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2) Ontology of 
Attribution 
 
Construct 1: Attribution 
This theme includes cognitive mode of agency and it is 
defined in a mechanistic view, according to the purpose of 
attribution that is to identify a ‘reason’ for an occurred 
circumstance. For a reason to be accepted as an 
attribution, it must correspond to following formal semantic: 
(Subject of Attribution ~ Causative Connective ~ Reason). 
In this study, we builds upon attribution theories (e.g. 
Graham, 1991; Kelley et al., 2013) and we only accept the 
presence of attribution that through analysis we can identify 
a link between these three parts. Otherwise there is no 
attribution for behaviour under analysis (see Chapter 3, 
Methodology for more detail on existence of attribution). 
Hence, attribution has following four dimensions: 
I. Subject of Attribution: State of being/doing to which 
an individual is attributing a reason. For example, 
being a teacher is a subject of attribution. 
II. Causative connective: The semantic connection 
between reason and subject of attribution, such as: 
for, because, as, etc. 
III. Reason: This is a motivator and it can have two 
forms of State and Event. 
IV. Temporal: If the reason is past oriented, then it is a 
causal reasoning. If the reason is future oriented, 
then it is teleological reasoning. If the reason is 
present oriented, then person is using Correlational 
Reasoning (see Chapter 3 for more explanation). 
Construct 2: Existential Aspect 
§ The degree to which attribution exists for decision.  
Construct 3: Cognisance Aspect 
§ The degree to which agent is aware of an attribution 
for her decision (see Chapter 3 for detail 
 
I. Subject of Attribution: (In Study 1, study 2 it 
is career choice; in Study 3 it is university 
major selection) 
II. Causative connective 
III. Reason/Equivalent to cause:  
a. State: to which a person is assigning 
her subject of attribution. Here, it is 
functioning/commanding. 
b. Event: to which a person is assigning 
her subject of attribution. Here, it is 
either side effect, feedback or 
evaluation. 
IV. Temporal:  
a. Future Oriented 
b. Past Oriented 
c. Present Oriented 
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explanation).  
 
3) Third Part 
Evaluation 
 
Construct 1: Third Party 
This theme is about all three modes of agency (cognitive, 
conative and affective) and it is defined because “third party 
observers do not have direct access to agent’s thoughts, so 
their cognitive biases, preferences, emotional and well-
being concerns influence their attributions” (Foster, 2013; 
Xiaoping, 2013). Here, we explore three questions to 
explain third party evaluation: 
I. Who is evaluating? Third parties can be implicit (like 
institutions), or explicit (like a tangible observer). 
The characteristics (such as trustworthiness and 
credibility) of the third party are important. 
II. How is the evaluation done? 
a. Expedience Rules: Legally sanctioned rules. 
When institutional norms are perceived as 
appropriate and useful to the agent. 
b. Social Obligation: Morally governed rules. 
c. Taken for Granted Rules: Culturally 
supported and conceptually correct rules.  
III. What is the evaluation? Type of Evaluation is 
important. Graham and Barker (1990) show that if 
one is praised for success and not blamed for 
failure, then it is inferred that he/she is lower in 
ability than those who received natural feedback. 
Hence, we measure the valance of evaluation 
(positive, negative, neutral), and whether it is 
motivational/not. 
Construct 2: Existential Aspect 
§ The degree to which agent’s way of decision 
making (i.e. rationality type) is influenced by 
 
I. Who evaluates: 
a. Implicit/Explicit: Whether third party is 
tangible (e.g. specific person), or it is 
intangible and implicit (e.g. an 
institution). 
b. Characteristics: Whether third party is 
regarded as trustworthy, credible and 
influential. 
II. How evaluates: 
a. Expedience Rules: This related to 
institutional logic, implying legally 
sanctioned rules. When institutional 
norms are perceived as appropriate 
and useful to the agent. 
b. Social Obligation: Morally governed 
rules. 
c. Taken for Granted Rules: This related 
to institutional logic, implying culturally 
supported and socially accepted rules.  
III. What evaluates: 
a. Valence: Positive, Negative, or neutral 
quality of evaluation of others about 
decision. 
b. Motivator/not: whether the evaluation 
is encouraging or discouraging. 
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environment through social groups and institutions 
(i.e. the extent to which the agent has Weber's 
(1993) theoretical, practical or formal rationalities). 
Construct 3: Cognisance Aspect 
§ The degree to which the agent is aware of the 
impact of her social group (that includes the 
institutions to which the agent belongs) and self-
identity. This is regarded as a construct, because 
based on Sociological institutionalism 
(phenomenological type), most of an individual’s 
choices are occurred by non-decision actions rather 
than rationalised, fully informed and purposive 
actors’ choices (Meyer, 2010). Actors may explain 
their decisions as rational and purposive, but it is a 
non-decision action constructed by institutions. 
4) First Party 
Evaluation 
 
 
Construct 1: First part evaluation 
This theme includes conative and affective modes of 
agency and it is about the agent’s reflection on her own 
decisions. Here, we answer two questions to define First 
Party Evaluation: 
I. How one reflects on her decision? According to 
social identity theory (Tajfel and Billic, 1974) three 
following mechanisms are possible. 
a. Social Categorisation: “People categorise 
themselves in different categories based on 
colour, income, belongings, beliefs, religion, 
occupation, education” (Tajfel and Billic, 
1974). 
b. Self-Identification: “People adopt the identity 
of the group they have categorized 
themselves as belonging to” (Tajfel and 
Billic, 1974). 
 
I. How: 
a. Social Categorising Factors 
b. Social Adapting Norms  
c. Social Comparing Norms 
II. What: 
a. Valence: Positive, Negative, or neutral 
quality of assessment of behaviour. 
b. Motivator/not: Level of importance of 
self-reflection on subsequent 
behaviours. 
  
 
 
 
196 
c. Social Comparison: “People in explaining 
their behaviour overestimate the influence of 
internal factors and underestimate the 
circumstantial ones” (van Heerden, 1999). 
“People tend to attribute their success to 
internal factors and their failure to external 
forces” (Jones and Nisbett, 1971). 
II. What is the personal evaluation? A person’s 
evaluation of her decision. Here, the valence of 
evaluation is identified to show if one has 
negative/positive assessment and the degree to 
which an agent values her own judgment. 
Construct 2: Existential Aspect 
§ The degree to which social group and self-reflection 
exists when agent makes a decision. 
Construct 3: Cognisance Aspect 
§ The degree to which agent is aware of her social 
group and self-reflection. 
5) Teleological 
Reasoning 
 
 
Construct 1: Teleological Reasoning 
This theme is the cognitive mode of agency and it is 
defined as a future oriented reasoning (i.e., the state/event 
to which people attribute their decision is in the future). 
Being the agent of your life means that you have ‘values’ 
and ‘goals’. Here, we say agent’s self-interests can be 
integral or incidental. If it is incidental, then they are non-
consequential to your life. If they are integral, then they 
form the basis of your goals. Here, we use Sen's (1990) 
goal-driven motivation in ‘Rational Fools’ that explains 
decision behaviour as motivated by: 1) Self Interest, 2) Self 
Welfare Goal, and 3) Self-Choice goal. Accordingly, the 
behaviour motivated by these three is called: 1) Self-
Centred, 2) Sympathy, 3) Commitment. Here, counter-
 
I. Decision Motivators: 
a. Ethical Preference: Moral and ethical 
concerns.  
b. Subjective Preference: Needs and 
desires of the self-motivate agent.  
II. Decision Type: 
a. Self-Centred Choice: Decision 
motivator is agent’s self-interest. 
b. Sympathy: Decision motivator is self-
welfare goal. When concern for others 
directly affects one's own welfare. 
(E.g. If the knowledge of torture of 
others makes you sick) 
c. Commitment: choosing to do 
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intuitive decisions cover commitment actions (see Chapter 
3, Methodology). 
Construct 2: Existence Aspect 
§ The degree to which Teleological Reasoning exists. 
Construct 3: Cognisance Aspect 
§ The degree to which agent is aware of Teleological 
Reasoning. 
something that leads to an outcome 
that the agent does not subjectively 
prefer. (If the knowledge of torture of 
others makes you think it is wrong and 
you are ready to do something to stop 
it, although this action may conflict 
with your personal interest; it is a case 
of commitment.) 
6) Causal 
Reasoning 
 
 
Construct 1: Causal Reasoning 
This theme is about the cognitive mode of agency and it is 
defined as a past oriented reasoning that means that the 
state/event to which people attribute their decision has 
occurred in past. Here, we define it according to Automata 
Theory (Hopcroft, 2016), causal reasoning consists of 
states (the state of being/doing in time of making decision, 
and current state of being/doing), and transitions. As the 
agent sees a trigger (Cause), she/he makes a transition (or 
Decision) to another state. According to its transition she is 
arrived at her current state. 
Construct 2: Existential Aspect 
§ We only accept causal reasoning when can identify 
link between previous state and transition to next 
state.  
Construct 3: Cognisance Aspect 
§ If a person mentions causal reasoning in her 
statements, we say she is cognisant of it.  
 
I. Current State: The mental and physical state 
of decision maker in time making the choice. 
II. Result State: The mental and physical state 
of a decision maker after making a decision. 
III. Impulse/trigger (Cause): Whether an 
impulse initiates state change (i.e. decision). 
IV. Transition: whether the agent undergoes 
state transition by making a decision. 
 
7) Correlational 
Reasoning 
 
Construct 1: Correlational Reasoning 
This theme is about the cognitive mode of agency and it is 
a contemporaneous reasoning. This means that the 
state/event to which people attribute their decision is in the 
 
I. Correlation 
a. Person:  
b. Stimulus:  
c. Time:  
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present. According to Kelley (1973) people assign the 
reason for an action to the factors that co-varies most 
closely with that action. The reason of an event must be 
present when the event occurs and absent when the event 
fails to occur. To make correlational reasoning, people 
need to have access to ‘Consensus’, ‘Distinctive’ and 
‘Consistency’ information resources, then they attribute 
causality on the basis of correlation. According to the Kelley 
et al. (2013) co-variant model, people take into account 
three types of evidence to make an attribution: 
I. Person: Consensus Information; the extent to which 
other people behave in the same way in a similar 
situation. All people have the same behaviour if it 
has high consensus. If no one does so it has low 
consensus.  
II. Stimulus: Distinctive Information, the extent to which 
an agent behaves in the same way in similar 
situations. 
III. Time: Consistency Information: the extent to which 
an agent behaves similarly every time that the 
situation occurs.  
Construct 2: Existential Aspect 
§ The degree to which agent is using correlational 
reasoning.  
Construct 3: Cognisance Aspect 
§ The degree to which an agent has access to 
consensuses, distinctiveness, and consistency 
information to make a correlational reasoning. 
II. Subject of Attribution: 
a. State: people’s state of being/doing to 
which they assign their decision. 
b. Event: the incident happens when the 
agent is making the decision. 
 
 
8) Impact of 
Commodities 
 
Construct 1: Commodities 
This theme is about the conative mode of agency. It is 
defined based on resources that enable an agent to 
achieve her valuable life. Sen (1999) says that commodities 
 
Commodities: 
I. Tangible Resources 
a. Individual Physiology: like health, 
personal abilities, talent, IQ, gender, 
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(such as a bicycle) are considered as an input, but their 
value depends upon an individual’s ability to convert them 
into valuable functioning (such as riding a bicycle). Hence, 
we define following dimensions to measure commodities: 
I. Tangible Resources  
II. Intangible Resources  
Construct 2: Existential Aspect 
§ The degree to which commodities exists for an 
agent. 
Construct 3: Cognisance Aspect 
§ The degree to which an agent is aware of the 
commodities. 
age, etc. 
b. Local Environment Diversity: like 
geographical, demographic, 
economic, cultural, social assets.  
II. Intangible Resources 
a. Variation in Social Condition: like 
one’s access to education, security, 
community relation. Also one’s class, 
ethnic, race, etc. 
b. Differences in relational perspective: 
Commodities in relation to agent’s 
culture, religious, norms, 
c. Distribution within the family: The way 
commodities are distributed in family. 
Note: For more detail in the definition of the constructs (e.g. freedom, attribution, constraints) see Chapter 4, Theory Development.
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Table 27: The Evaluation Instrument (1st version) 
Theme 
 
‘Self’ Questions 
 
‘Other’ Questions 
Freedom 
Awarenes
s 
 
 
 
  
When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, 
 
I. Psychological: 
a. Volition: 
Q1. I genuinely wanted it. 
b. Connotation: 
Q2. I had the drive. 
II. Ontological: 
a. Number of Capabilities: 
Q3. I could have chosen a different job. 
b. Equivalence of Capabilities: 
Q4. All of the jobs available were equally 
acceptable to me. 
c. Independence of Capabilities: 
Q5. Becoming a Personal Tutor did not 
prevent me from doing another job. 
 
When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, I believe 
that others thought that: 
I. Psychological: 
a. Volition: 
Q1. I genuinely wanted it. 
b. Connotation: 
Q2. I had the drive. 
II. Ontological: 
a. Number of Capabilities: 
Q3. I could have chosen a different job. 
b. Equivalence of Capabilities: 
Q4. All of the jobs available were equally 
acceptable to me. 
c. Independence of Capabilities: 
Q5. Becoming a Personal Tutor did not 
prevent me from doing another job. 
Ontology 
of 
Attribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, 
 
I. State/Temporal: 
a. Q1. Because of my previous state. 
b. Q2. Because of my state, when making the 
decision. 
c. Q3. Because of the state I aimed to reach. 
II. Event/Temporal: 
a. Q4. Because of a circumstance that 
happened before I made the decision. 
b. Q5. Because of a circumstance that 
happened just when I was making decision. 
c. Q6. Because of a circumstance that I 
expected to happen after my decision. 
 
When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, I believe 
that others thought that: 
I. State/Temporal: 
a. Q1. Because I was unemployed before 
that. 
b. Q2. Because I was looking for a job. 
c. Q3. Because I aimed to have career 
progress. 
II. Event/Temporal: 
a. Q4. Because before that I could not find 
another job. 
b. Q5. Because when I was looking for a 
job I found this organisation is looking for 
a Personal Tutor. 
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c. Q6. Because I expected to be promoted 
in future. 
Impact of 
Third 
Party 
Evaluation 
 
 
When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, 
 
I. Who evaluates: 
a. Implicit/Explicit:  
Q1. Because of the evaluations of others I 
know. 
b. Characteristics:  
Q2. Because others’ evaluation was 
important for me and I believed that it was 
to my benefit. 
II. How evaluate: 
a. Expedience Rules:  
Q3. Because the way this organization is 
operating is appropriate for its workers. 
b. Social Obligation:  
Q4. Because working in this organisation is 
in line with my morals and ethics. 
c. Taken for Granted Rules:  
Q5. Becoming a Personal Tutor was not a 
result of serious decision-making process, 
but it was an expectation from me as a 
university student in Iran. 
III. What evaluate: 
a. Valence:  
Q6. Because others had a positive 
evaluation. 
b. Motivator/not:  
Q7. Because others encouraged me. 
 
When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, I believe 
that others thought that: 
 
I. Who evaluates: 
a. Implicit/Explicit:  
Q1. Because someone advise me. 
b. Characteristics:  
Q2. Because someone whom I believe 
advise me. 
II. How evaluate: 
a. Expedience Rules:  
Q3. this organisation is Waqf and I can 
have indirect influence on life of poor 
students. 
b. Social Obligation:  
Q4. I do have some rules for myself that 
prevent me from doing some jobs that 
others do. 
c. Taken for Granted Rules:  
Q5. It was obvious for me to choose this 
job.  
III. What evaluate: 
a. Valence:  
Q6. Because people around me said it is 
a good decision. 
b. Motivator/not:  
Q7. Because others pushed me to do so. 
 
Impact of 
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First Party 
Evaluation 
 
When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, 
 
I. How one self-reflect: 
a. Social Categorising Factor. 
Q1. Because, people that are similar to me 
in terms of level of education, family 
background, ethnic group, values and 
concerns are working here. 
b. Social Adapting Norms.  
Q2. Because, I could adapt the way people 
work in this organisation to become similar 
to them. 
c. Social Comparing Norms. 
Q3. Because, we are more successful than 
others who are not working in this 
organisation.  
II. Personal Evaluation: 
a. Valence: 
Q4. I made a true decision to become a 
Personal Tutor in this organisation. 
b. Motivator/not: 
Q5. My own evaluation on my decision is 
very important for my subsequent choices. 
When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, I believe 
that others thought that: 
 
I. How one self-reflect: 
a. Social Categorising Factor. 
Q1. Because some people that I know 
and are similar to me are working in this 
organisation. 
b. Social Adapting Norms.  
Q2. Sometimes I do not behave based 
on my personal beliefs, because others 
around me may misjudge my act. 
c. Social Comparing Norms. 
3. My gender was not important in 
becoming a Personal Tutor, but it would 
be for promotion to higher-level jobs. 
II. Personal Evaluation: 
a. Valence: 
Q4. I can see that people Around me do 
not look at Personal Tutorship as a 
proper job. 
b. Motivator/not: 
Q5. I consulted with others, and I chose 
what was appropriate for me. 
Teleologic
al 
Reasoning 
 
 
When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, 
 
I. Motivators: 
a. Ethical Preference:  
Q1. Moral and ethical concerns are 
important on my exercise of decision. 
b. Subjective Preference:  
Q2. Maximising my self-interest and 
 
When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, I believe 
that others thought that: 
 
I. Motivators: 
a. Ethical Preference:  
Q1. Because, it allows me to influence 
the education of poor students. 
b. Subjective Preference:  
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satisfying my needs are important. 
II. Decision Type: 
a. Self-Cantered Choice: 
Q3. It is very important that my decision 
helps me to achieve my personal goals. 
b. Sympathy:  
Q4. It is important that my decision helps 
me to achieve my goal while it has positive 
influence on the lives of others. 
c. Commitment:  
Q5. Sometimes I decide against my 
personal interest, to achieve a moral and 
ethical satisfaction. 
 
Q2. Because, I like this role, consulting, 
teaching, and working with students. 
II. Decision Type: 
a. Self-Cantered Choice:  
Q3. Because, I learn job experience to 
promote to better jobs, earn more money 
and satisfaction. 
b. Sympathy:  
Q4. Because, I can transfer my 
knowledge to more students, while 
strengthening my teaching skills. 
c. Commitment:  
Q5. Because, for me my career prospect 
is not as important as the influence I 
make in society. 
Causal 
Reasoning 
 
 
When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, 
 
I. State:  
Q. My geographical, physical and emotional state, 
in the time of decision making is important. 
II. Impulse (Cause):  
Q. It is like an impulse pushes me to make 
decision. 
III. Transition:  
Q. After making the decision, my physical and 
mental state will change. 
IV. Causal Process: 
a. Enabling State:  
Q. My specific physical and mental state 
must enable me to choose what I want. 
b. State Change: 
Q. The outcome of the decision must satisfy 
 
When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, I believe 
that others thought that: 
I. State:  
Q. Because, I was a young university student 
looking for a part-time job to earn some money. 
II. Impulse (Cause):  
Q. Because, I found the job of Personal 
Tutorship. 
III. Transition:  
Q. After becoming a Personal Tutor, my 
situation has changed. 
IV. Causal Process: 
a. Enabling State:  
Q. My state of being a young student, 
having this organisation’s requirements 
enabled me to choose this job.  
b. State Change:  
  
 
 
 
204 
the reason that pushes me to make that 
choice. 
Q. Because, I was looking for a job and I 
could be employed as a Personal Tutor. 
Correlatio
nal 
Reasoning 
  
 
 
 
 
 
When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, 
 
I. Person:  
Q1. There were many others applying for this job. 
II. Stimulus:  
Q2. Because I just wanted to become a Personal 
Tutor. 
III. Time:  
Q3. I always wanted to become a Personal Tutor. 
 
When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, I believe 
that others thought that: 
 
I. Person:  
Q1. I think it was a popular thing to do. 
II. Stimulus:  
Q2. I liked to be a Personal Tutor. 
III. Time:  
Q3. I was always thinking about being a 
Personal Tutor. 
Impact of 
Commoditi
es 
 
 
 
When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, 
 
I. Tangible: 
a. Individual Physiology: illness, disability, 
age, gender. 
Q1. I had personal physiological limitations.  
b. Local Environment Diversities:  
Q2. The environment constrained me. 
II. Intangible: 
a. Variation in social condition:  
Q3. I had social limitations. 
b. Differences in relational perspective:  
Q4. Conventions and customs limited my 
choices. 
c. Distribution within the family:  
Q5. I was discriminated among my family. 
 
When I decided to become a Personal Tutor, I believe 
that others thought that: 
I. Tangible: 
a. Individual Physiology: illness, disability, 
age, gender. 
Q1. I had no shortcomings such as 
illness, disability, age limitation, or 
gender limitation. 
b. Local Environment Diversities:  
Q2. My choices were limited in the city I 
was living.  
II. Intangible: 
a. Variation in social condition:  
Q3. None of these applies to me: Lack of 
access to education, security, being 
ethnic minority. 
b. Differences in relational perspective:  
Q4. My family situation never limited my 
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choices. 
c. Distribution within the family:  
Q5. I had similar opportunities as my 
siblings. 
Note: ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ items for similar themes are measured with similar theoretical foundation and items; the wording of some 
questions is different in the ‘self’ side with the ‘other’ standpoint based on the participants’ expressions in Study 1. Here, in line with 
Willis (2004) we use interview data as a way to improve questionnaire design. “Waqf is an endowment made by a Muslim to a religious, 
educational, or charitable cause” (Blackburn, 2008).
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Study 2: Quantitative Development  
To identify agency-oriented factors associated with freedom (i.e. the first research 
objective), the present study applies the 1st version of the Evaluation Instrument on a survey 
and runs Explanatory Factor Analysis (EFA) to consolidate the eight themes (Teleological 
Reasoning, Casual Reasoning, Correlational Reasoning, Freedom Awareness, Impact of 
Commodities, Ontology of Attribution, First Party Evaluation, Third Party Evaluation) in to a 
smaller but still representative number of factors. The 1st Evaluation Instrument is translated into 
Farsi and the wording of the questions is revised according to the pilot study (see Table 27). As 
a result of the pilot study, the researchers decided to present the questions both in Farsi and 
English. Data were collected from a cohort of 1,260 personal tutors in 450 rural and urban cities 
in Iran. Of 1,260 respondents, 1,063 are used in the analysis as valid data. Participants 
evaluated the factors influencing their career choice in the host organisation. The size and 
nationwide distribution of the sample make it representative of career choice of young adults in 
Iran; the decision that is found in several studies (Hussain, 2015; Salehi-Isfahani, 2011; Salehi 
et al., 2013) to be a crucial agency outcome in personal and social life of these young adults. 
Finally, we use the findings of this study to revise the 1st Evaluation Instrument and in the 
following study we apply the 2nd version of the Evaluation Instrument in another survey as the 
“quantitative amendment” of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. 
 
Study 2: Analysis (EFA) 
We run Explanatory Factor Analysis (EFA), which is an appropriate statistical technique 
with respect to our objective that is to identify agency-oriented factors associated with freedom. 
Here, we try to consolidate our eight themes that are measured by 84 items in the 1st version of 
the Evaluation Instrument into a reliable research instrument with a smaller number of 
measurements that have no redundancy and repeated measurement. For this purpose, we run 
EFA to identify the underlying dimensions that explain the correlations between the set of 
variables. According to Kim and Mueller (1978) “EFA is an interdependence technique in that an 
entire set of interdependent relationships is examined without making the distinction between 
dependent and independent variables”. Mathematically, each item is expressed as a linear 
combination of underlying factors. The co-variation among the variables is described in terms of 
a small number of common factors.  
Using SPSS, we follow these steps to conduct EFA. First, the correlation matrix is 
calculated and reports the factor loadings (which are simple correlations) between each variable 
and the factors. Second, it rotates factors and determines the number of factors. We use a 
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Varimax procedure to rotate the factor matrix into a simpler matrix for interpreting the result. In 
this way, according to Kim and Mueller (1978), each variable has non-zero or significant 
loadings with only a few factors, if possible with only one. By construction, as a result of using a 
Varimax rotation procedure our factor scores are uncorrelated and therefore there is absolutely 
no chance of multicollinearity if these served as independent variables. Finally, we interpret 
factors by calculating factor scores and mapping them to theoretical constructs in the 1st 
Evaluation Instrument. In this line, we identify the items that are not loaded to the components 
and decide whether to keep them in a revised Evaluation Instrument with respect to theory.  
Finally, the 1st Evaluation Instrument is revised to be used in another survey to which the same 
statistical technique (i.e. EFA) as well as Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) will be applied and 
the results will identify agency-oriented factors associated with freedom. 
It is worth mentioning here that EFA is applied on 42 items of ‘self’ and 42 items of 
‘other’, separately. This is because theoretically these two standpoints are identified as 
independent in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (see Chapter 4, Theoretical Development). 
Statistically, we can run EFA on ‘self’ and ‘other’ items, because their correlation matrix Kaiser–
Meyer–Olkin statistic are near one (.881 and .856, equivalently) and their Chi-Square in 
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity (12632 and 14532, equivalently) are found significant with p-value 
(.000) (Beavers et al., 2013). These findings show that EFA is an appropriate technique for this 
data. 
 
Study 2: Result (‘Self’ Standpoint) 
Table 28 presents eigenvalues, loadings and variance of ‘self’ factors. The factors with 
eigenvalues greater than one are used (Beavers et al., 2013); so here we can extract 10 
common factors. Secondly, we seek common factors, which cumulatively account for a large 
percentage of the total variance (typically at least 60%). As evidence, the first 10 factors 
combined account for a cumulative total of 57.59% of the total variance. The variance is lower 
than 60% and we also use a scree plot to decide the right number of factors. Figure 24 is the 
scree plot of the eigenvalues against the number of factors in the order of extraction. The point 
just before the scree indicates the ‘right’ number of factors so, again, 10 factors seem 
reasonable. Hence, we use the first 10 ‘self’ factors.  
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Table 28: Eigenvalues, total loadings and variance of ‘self’ factors 
Component 
 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
 
1 
 
7.61 
 
18.13 
 
18.13 
2 
 
5.27 
 
12.55 
 
30.67 
3 
 
1.90 
 
4.52 
 
35.19 
4 
 
1.75 
 
4.17 
 
39.37 
5 
 
1.67 
 
3.97 
 
43.34 
6 
 
1.51 
 
3.59 
 
46.92 
7 
 
1.25 
 
2.98 
 
49.90 
8 
 
1.15 
 
2.74 
 
52.64 
9 
 
1.07 
 
2.55 
 
55.20 
10 
 
1.00 
 
2.39 
 
57.59 
11 
 
.98 
 
2.33 
 
59.92 
12 
 
.91 
 
2.17 
 
62.09 
13 
 
.89 
 
2.12 
 
64.21 
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Figure 24: Scree Plot of ‘self’ factors 
 
 
Table 29 presents the component matrix of the first 10 ‘self’ factors and maps them onto 
the theoretical constructs. The first column in this table presents the new labels of each factor 
that is assigned based on the theoretical themes. For example, the first factor is labelled ‘Goal 
Orientation’ because the items of Sen's (2004) goal-oriented motivation (sympathetic, self-
centred, and committed actions) are correlated with the first factor (.81, .78, and .74, 
equivalently), with (! >	.6). The first row of Table 29 shows that this factor has the greatest 
eigenvalue (7.61) and explains the highest variance (18.13) in the dataset among all 10 ‘self’ 
factors. This finding indicates that the main agentic factor that distinguishes respondents, in 
terms of their freedom is value-laden and goal oriented, which are the characteristics of Weber's 
(1993) substantive rationality. Our threshold for factor loading to extract the items is (.03), and 
there are five factors that are found significant but they have only moderate to low correlation 
that we keep them in the revised Evaluation Instrument, which are (e.g. .44, .45, .45, .34, .32) 
for the items of (psychological dimension of freedom awareness, first party evaluation, 
attribution to previous state, correlational reasoning (people), and teleological reasoning). 
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Table 29: ‘Self’ Component Matrix, Themes, New Labels 
Factor 
 
New 
Label 
 
Eigen 
Value 
 
Var.% 
 
Theme 
 
Items 
 
Factor 
Loading 
1 
 
Goal Orientation 
 
 7.61 18.13    
 
   Teleological Reasoning, 
Sympathetic Goal 
I can give my knowledge to students. .81 
 
   Teleological Reasoning 
Sympathetic Goal 
This job allows me to help poor students. .78 
 
   Teleological reasoning 
Committed Action 
Through personal tutorship I positively impact in society and 
that is more important than satisfying my personal interests. 
.74 
 
   Teleological Reasoning 
Motive 
I like teaching and consulting students. .72 
 
   Teleological Reasoning Self-
centred Goal 
Personal Tutorship drives me to reach my goals. .62 
 
   First Person Evaluation I believe that I made a right choice. .58 
 
   Teleological Reasoning I find career experience that is useful for y future. .58 
 
   Teleological Reasoning I can influence the poor students’ education because this 
organisation is Waqf. 
.55 
 
   Freedom Awareness 
(Psychological Dimension) 
I believe that I freely chose this job. .44 
 
   First Party Evaluation We Personal Tutors help students more than the others. .45 
2 
 
Causal State and Trigger 
 
 5.28 12.56    
 
   Ontology of attribution 
(present state) 
I think due to the state of job market when I was looking for 
a job. 
.76 
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   Ontology of Attribution 
(previous state) 
I think because before Personal Tutorship, my other choices 
were limited. 
.71 
 
   Ontology of Attribution 
(Present event) 
I think because something happened when I was looking for 
a job that I decided to become Personal Tutor. 
.64 
 
   Ontology of attribution 
(previous event) 
I think because I did not have personal relations to be 
employed in other jobs. 
.61 
3 
 
Causal Transition 
 
 1.90 4.52    
 
   Causal Reasoning Transition After becoming a Personal Tutor my state has changed. .67 
 
   Causal Reasoning Transition I had the job requirements, I applied for Personal Tutorship 
and after being hired my state has changed. 
.62 
 
   Causal Reasoning Because my state and abilities were in line with this 
organisation’s requirements and for this job. 
.59 
4 
 
Impact of Commodities  
 
 1.75 4.18    
 
   Environmental Limitation I was under negative discrimination and resources were not 
evenly distributed among us. 
.82 
 
   Family Limitation My family situation was against me and limited my options. .79 
 
   Physiological Limitation I had a shortcoming such as illness, disability, and age or 
gender limitation. 
.61 
5 
 
Social Identifier 
 
 1.67 3.98    
 
   Social Identification I think it is a usual job for university students. .78 
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   Social Identification Because I was a student, who was looking for a job and 
earning income. 
.76 
6 
 
Third Party Evaluation  
 
 1.51 3.59    
 
   Third party Evaluation (who) Environment/others were influential on my decision. .74 
 
   Third party Evaluation (who) Someone specific recommended this job to me. .69 
 
   Third Party Evaluation 
(motivator) 
Others encouraged me. .67 
 
   Third Party Evaluation 
(Valence) 
Others had positive idea about me becoming a Personal 
Tutor. 
.60 
7 
 
Ontology of Capabilities 
 
 1.25 2.98    
 
   Equivalence of Capabilities I believe that my other alternatives were as good as 
Personal Tutorship. 
.77 
 
   Number of Capabilities I believe that I had other alternatives. .72 
 
   Independence of Capabilities I believe that I could have chosen another job at the same 
time. 
.70 
8 
 
Third Party Evaluation (who) 
 
 1.15 2.73    
 
    I think the environment influenced me to become a Personal 
Tutor, not a specific personal or institution. 
 
.65 
9 
 
Attribution to Future State 
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 1.07 2.55    
 
   Attribution to Future State I think due to the state that I expected to reach through this 
job. 
 
.69 
 
   Attribution to Previous state I think due to my state of employment before this decision.  .45 
 
   Correlational Reasoning 
(people) 
I think because those who are similar to me choose this job. .34 
 
   Teleological reasoning I find career experience that is useful for my future. .32 
10 
 
Ethical Rules 
 
 1.00 2.39    
 
   Ethical Rules I have my own rules that prevent me from doing some jobs. .86 
Note: the results are round up to two decimal points for clear presentation. 
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Study 2: Result (‘Other’ Standpoint) 
Table 30 presents eigenvalue loadings and variance of ‘other’ factors. As explained 
above only the factors with eigenvalues greater than one are used. So, we have extracted 11 
common factors. The second reason that these 11 factors are extracted is that we seek for 
common factors that cumulatively account for a large percentage of the total variance (typically 
at least 60%). As evidence, the first 11 factors combined account for a cumulative total of 
63.86% of the total variance. Figure 25 is the scree plot of the eigenvalues against the number 
of factors in the order of extraction, according to which, again, 11 factors seem reasonable.  
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Table 30: Eigenvalues, total loadings, variance of ‘other’ factors 
Component 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 
 
7.56 
 
18.02 
 
18.02 
2 
 
5.23 
 
12.45 
 
30.47 
3 
 
2.40 
 
5.72 
 
36.19 
4 
 
2.01 
 
4.80 
 
40.99 
5 
 
1.74 
 
4.15 
 
45.13 
6 
 
1.68 
 
4.01 
 
49.13 
7 
 
1.50 
 
3.57 
 
52.70 
8 
 
1.30 
 
3.09 
 
55.80 
9 
 
1.19 
 
2.83 
 
58.63 
10 
 
1.16 
 
2.75 
 
61.38 
11 
 
1.04 
 
2.48 
 
63.86 
12 
 
.97 
 
2.30 
 
66.17 
 
Figure 25: Scree Plot of ‘other’ factors 
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Table 31 presents the component matrix of the first 11 ‘other’ factors and maps them 
onto the theoretical themes. Similar to ‘self’ factors, here, the first column in Table 31 presents a 
new label for each component that is assigned based on the theoretical definition of the items 
that are loaded to that factor. Similar to ‘self’ factor the first factor that is labelled ‘Goal 
Orientation’ is value laden and goal oriented, which are the characteristics of Weber's (1993) 
substantive rationality. This finding is another insight showing that the first agentic factor that 
can explain 18.01% of variance among individuals in terms of freedom is the extent to which 
they decide based on their values. Similar to ‘self’ factors, here our threshold for factor loading 
to extract the ‘other’ items loaded to each factor is (.03). Here, there are three items that are 
significant but they have moderately low correlation with the components (i.e., .45, .46, .32), 
which are (First Party Evaluation, Teleological Reasoning, and Causal Reasoning (State)).  
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Table 31: ‘Other’ Component Matrix, Themes, New Labels 
Factor 
 
New 
Label 
 
Eigen 
Value 
 
Var.% 
 
Theme 
 
Items 
 
Factor 
Loading 
1 
 
Goal Orientation 
 
 7.56 18.01    
 
   First Party Evaluation I made a right choice when I became a Personal Tutor. .77 
 
   Volition I had the drive. .74 
 
   Third Party Evaluation Moral and ethical concerns motivated my decision. .72 
 
   Third Party Evaluation Because working in this organisation is in line with my ethical 
beliefs. 
.70 
 
   Connotation I genuinely wanted this job. .70 
 
   First Party Evaluation My personal evaluations largely influence my future decisions. .66 
 
   First Party Evaluation We Personal Tutors help students more than the others .45 
 
   Teleological Reasoning I tried to make a decision that satisfies both my preferences 
and those of others. 
.46 
2 
 
Impact of Commodities 
 
 5.23 12.45    
 
   Social Limitation I had social limitations. .86 
 
   Conventional Limitation Conventions and customs limited my choice. .85 
 
   Environmental 
Limitations 
The environment limited my career choice. .82 
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   Family Limitations My family limited my career choice. .77 
3 
 
Causal State and Event 
 
 2.40 5.71    
 
   Ontology of Attribution 
present state 
Because of my state when I was making this decision. .81 
 
   Ontology of Attribution 
previous state 
Because of my previous state before this decision. .80 
 
   Ontology of Attribution 
present event 
Because of what happened just when I was choosing this job. .70 
 
   Ontology of Attribution 
previous event 
Because of what happened before this decision. .69 
4 
 
Third Party Evaluation  
 
 2.01 4.80    
 
   Third Party Evaluation 
(who) 
Certain people's evaluations influence my decisions. .78 
 
   Third Party Evaluation 
(who) 
Because I trusted others' evaluation of my decision. .76 
 
   Third Party Evaluation 
(what) 
Because others encouraged me. .73 
 
   Third Party Evaluation 
(what) 
Because others had positive judgment. .70 
5 
 
Causal Transition 
 
 1.74 4.14    
 
   Causal Reasoning 
Transition 
After making this decision, my state would change. .84 
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   Causal Reasoning 
Enabling State 
My state when I was making the decision enabled me to 
transform into a new state. 
.81 
 
   Causal Reasoning 
Intriguer 
Something intrigued me, I made this decision and my state had 
changed. 
.80 
6 
 
Self-Centred Motivation  
 
 1.69 4.00    
 
   Teleological Reasoning 
Self-centred goal 
Maximising my self-interest motivated me to make this 
decision. 
.84 
 
   Teleological Reasoning 
Self-centred decision 
In my decision I tried to satisfy my self-interest. .86 
7 
 
Correlational Reasoning 
 
 1.45 3.58    
 
   Correlational 
Reasoning (people)  
There were many others applying for this job. 
 
.83 
 
   Correlational 
Reasoning (Time) 
This job always has applicants. .78 
8 
 
Social Identifier 
 
 1.23 3.09    
 
   Social Identification Typically, people similar to me choose this job. .75 
 
   Social Identification I have many common points with my colleagues. .77 
9 
Attribution to Future State 
 
 1.19 2.83    
  
 
 
 
220 
 
   Attribution to future 
state 
Because of what I expected to happen after my decision. .74 
 
   Attribution to future 
state 
Because of the state that I aimed to reach through this 
decision. 
.65 
 
   Causal Reasoning, 
State 
My geographical, physical and emotional states at the time of 
decision making were important. 
.32 
10 
 
Quality of Capabilities 
 
 1.16 2.75    
 
   Equivalence of 
Capabilities 
All of my job opportunities were equally valuable to me. .62 
 
   Independence of 
Capabilities 
This job did not prevent me from doing other jobs. .61 
 
   Third Party Evaluation Because this organisation’s management is to the benefit of 
Personal Tutors. 
.46 
11 
 
Number of Capabilities 
 
 1.04 2.48    
 
   Number of Capabilities I could have chosen a different job. .64 
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Study 2: Result Interpretation 
So far, we have identified 10 ‘self’ and 11 ’other’ agency-oriented factors that are 
associated with freedom. The interesting finding is that the value-laden agentic factor can 
explain the highest variation from both ‘self’ and ‘other’ standpoints (18.13 and 18.01 
equivalently) in people’s decision making in terms of freedom. In other words, having Weber's 
(1993) substantive rationality is the most distinguishing agentic-factor in terms of freedom. 
However, at this stage we will not map the factors onto different parts of the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency, because we are going to revise the Evaluation Instrument based on the findings of this 
study in order to conduct another survey as the Quantitative Amendment phase that finalises 
the agentic factors.  
To revise the Evaluation Instrument according to the findings of Study 2 there are three 
main challenges. First, as presented in Table 32, there are 21 items that are found significant 
but they have moderately low correlation with the extracted factor. The question is whether to 
lose them or keep them in revised version of Evaluation Instrument. Second, there are two 
factors (i.e., Ethical Rules, and Third Party Evaluation “who”) that are only extracted at the ‘self’ 
standpoint, and three factors (i.e., Correlational Reasoning, Self-Centred Motivation, and 
Number of Capabilities) that are only extracted at the ‘other’ stand point. Keeping them in the 
Evaluation Instrument will disturb the harmony of having similar measurement scales at the ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ sides. Third, among the factors that are extracted at both ‘self’ and ‘other’ sides, 
some have different numbers of items loaded to them. For example, the factor of Goal 
Orientation has 10 items at the ‘self’ stand point, whereas it has eight items at the ‘other’ side. 
Overall, the latter two challenges are about this question of how to keep the harmony of factors 
at the ‘self’ and ‘other’ standpoints in the revised Evaluation Instrument.  
In line with Brown (2015), our approach to overcome these challenges is primarily being 
loyal to theory and then trying to keep the harmony of factorial models; here, for ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
measurement scales. This means that we keep the items as long as all of the theoretical 
constructs and dimensions are kept in the Evaluation Instrument. In this line, Table 13 shows 
why we keep seven items that are significant but they have moderately low correlation in the 
revised Evaluation Instrument. The third column in this table shows if the item is the only 
representative of its theoretical dimension. If the items represent a theoretical dimension in 
isolation, then we keep it in the revised Evaluation Instrument. For example, we keep Qo36 (i.e. 
question 36 of the ‘Other’ side) as it is the only item that represents the “Stimulus”, that is the 
sub-dimension of “Correlational Reasoning”, but we lose Qo14 (i.e. question 14 of the ‘other’ 
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side) as it is not the only item that measures “Who” that is the sub-dimension of “Impact of Third 
Party Evaluation”.
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Table 32: Insignificant Items from EFA (Study 2) 
Item 
Theme, Dimension, Sub-Dimension 
 
Isolated/not  Lose/ Keep 
(other) Q3. I could have chosen a different job. 
 
 
Freedom Awareness;  
Ontology of Capabilities; 
Number of Capabilities 
 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: Yes 
 
Keep   
(self) Qs2. I believe that I worked hard to become a Personal Tutor. 
 
 
Freedom Awareness; 
Psychological; 
Connotation 
 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: No 
 
Keep 
(self) Q16. I have some rules for myself that prevent me from doing some jobs that others do. 
 
 
Impact of Third Party Evaluation; 
How; 
Social Obligation 
 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: Yes 
 
Keep  
(self) Q17. It was obvious for me to choose this job. 
 
 
Impact of Third Party Evaluation; 
How; 
Taken for Granted; 
 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: Yes 
 
Keep 
(other) Q26. Maximising my self-interest is important in my decision. 
 
 
Teleological Reasoning; 
Motivator; 
Subjective Preference; 
 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: Yes 
 
Keep 
(other) Q27. In my decisions I try to maximise my self-interest.  
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Teleological Reasoning; 
Motivator; 
Subjective Preference; 
 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: Yes 
 
Keep 
(other) Q35. There were many other students applying for this job. 
 
 
Correlational Reasoning; 
Person; 
 
Dimension: Yes 
Sub-Dimension: Yes 
 
Keep 
(other) Qo36.I became a Personal Tutor because I have exceptional characteristics. 
 
 
Correlational Reasoning; 
Stimulus; 
 
Dimension: Yes 
Sub-Dimension: Yes 
 
Keep 
(other) Q37. This job always has applicants. 
 
 
Correlational Reasoning; 
Time; 
 
Dimension: Yes 
Sub-Dimension: Yes 
 
Keep 
(other) Q38. I had personal physiological limitations. 
 
 
Impact of Commodities; 
Tangible; 
Individual Physiological limitation; 
 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: No 
 
Lose 
 
(other) Q15. Because the way this organisation operates is appropriate for its workers.  
 
 
Third Party Evaluation; 
How; 
Expedite Rules 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: No 
Lose 
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(other) Q17. Becoming a Personal Tutor was not a result of serious decision-making process, but it was an expectation 
of me.  
 
 
Third Party Evaluation; 
How; 
Taken for Granted; 
 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: No 
Lose 
 
(self) Q23. I think that I made a right choice.   
 
 
Impact of First Party Evaluation; 
Personal Evaluation; 
Type; 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: No 
Lose 
 
(self) Q40. I did not have access to educational facilities or resources in society to choose my favourite job. 
 
 
Impact of Commodity; 
Intangible Resources; 
Social Limitation; 
 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: No 
Lose 
 
(self) Q20. I think this is a usual job for university students. 
 
 
Impact of First Party Evaluation; 
How; 
Social Categorization Factors; 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: No 
Lose 
 
(self) Q11. Because I expected to be promoted in future.  
 
 
Ontology of Attribution; 
Event Temporal; 
Event, Past 
 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: No 
 
Lose 
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(self) Q14. Because someone whom I believe advised me. 
 
 
Impact of Third Party Evaluation; 
Who; 
Characteristics; 
 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: No 
 
Lose 
(self) Q21. Because sometimes I do not decide based on my beliefs to prevent wrong judgments. 
 
 
Impact of Third Party Evaluation; 
How; 
Social Adapting Norm; 
 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: No 
 
Lose 
 
(other) Q29. Sometimes I decide against my personal interests to achieve moral and ethical satisfaction. 
 
 
Teleological Reasoning; 
Decision Type; 
Self-centred Choice; 
 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: No 
 
Lose 
(other) Qo31. Something like an impulse pushed me to make this decision. 
 
 
Causal Reasoning; 
Impulse 
 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: Yes 
 
Lose 
(self) Q31. I think because I found the job of Personal Tutorship. 
 
 
Causal Reasoning; 
Impulse 
 
Dimension: No 
Sub-Dimension: Yes 
 
Lose 
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Study 2: The Evaluation Instrument (2nd Version) 
Finally, Table 33 presents the revised Evaluation Instrument in which we have: (A) kept 
at least one item for all of the theoretical dimensions of the first Evaluation Instrument, and (B) 
kept the harmony of items at the ‘self’ and ‘other’ standpoints. Table 33 is the revised Evaluation 
Instrument based on the findings of Study 2, according to which the number of items at the ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ standpoints has reduced from 42 to 36. This version of the Evaluation Instrument will 
be revised for a second time in Study 3, which is a survey on ‘university major selection’. In this 
regard, we revise the wording of the questions according to its focal decision. In this line, the 
‘other’ is indicated as “parents”, because the respondents are students at the age of 18 and 19 
and Padilla-Walker et al. (2013) have shown that at this age for these young adults the main 
other, whose evaluation influences their decisions, is their family and particularly their parents. 
However, in this version of the Evaluation Instrument (Table 13) we have tried to revise the 
wording of the items to be generic rather than decision specific. This helps us to use the final 
Evaluation Instrument for identifying agency-oriented factors associated with freedom for any 
type of decision.  
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Table 33: Evaluation Instrument (2nd Version) 
Other 
 
Self 
Other Factor 1: Goal Orientation  
 
Self Factor 1: Goal Orientation   
I. Theme: Freedom Awareness 
a. Psychological Freedom 
i. Volition:  
Qo1. He/she genuinely wants this 
opportunity.  
ii. Connotation: 
Qo2. He/she has the drive.  
II. Theme: Impact of Third Party Evaluation 
a. How 
i. Social Obligation 
Qo3. Because this choice is in line with 
his/her ethical beliefs.  
III. Theme: Impact of First Party Evaluation 
a. What 
i. Valence 
Qo4. He/she is making the right choice.  
Qo5. His/her personal evaluations largely 
influence his/her future decisions.  
IV. Theme: Teleological Reasoning 
a. Motivators 
i. Ethical Preference 
Qo6. Moral and ethical concerns motivate 
his/her decision.  
b. Decision Type 
i. Sympathetic Action 
Qo7. He/she tries to make a decision that 
satisfies both his/her and our 
preferences. 
 
 
I. Theme: Freedom Awareness 
a. Psychological Freedom 
i. Volition:  
Qs1. I believe that I freely choose my 
major. 
ii. Connotation: 
Qs2. I believe that I worked hard to be 
able to choose this major.  
II. Theme: Impact of Third Party Evaluation 
a. How 
i. Expedience Rules 
Qs3. I can influence others by choosing 
this major.  
III. Theme: Impact of First Party Evaluation 
a. What: 
i. Qs4. This major drives me to reach my 
goals. 
IV. Theme: Teleological Reasoning 
a. Motivators 
i. Ethical Preference 
Qs5. Because this major allows me to 
help others. 
ii. Subjective Preference 
Qs6. I like this major.  
b. Decision Type 
i. Self-centred Choice  
Qs7. I will be educated and that is 
useful for my future.  
ii. Sympathetic Action  
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Qs8. Because my decision is good for 
me and others. 
iii. Committed Action  
Qs9. Through this major I can positively 
impact in society and that is more 
important than my personal interests.  
V. Theme: Correlational Reasoning 
a. Time 
Qs10. I was always thinking about studying this 
major. 
Other Factor 2:  
Impact of Commodities 
 
 
Self Factor 4:  
Impact of Commodities 
Theme: Impact of Commodities 
I. Tangible Resources 
Qo8. The environment limited his/her choices.  
II. Intangible Resources 
Qo9. He/she has social limitations. 
Qo10. Conventions and customs limited his/her choice. 
Qo11. His/her family limited my opportunities. 
 
Theme: Impact of Commodities 
I. Tangible Resources 
Qs11. I have a shortcoming, such as illness, disability, 
age or gender limitation. 
Qs12. My opportunities are limited because of my 
result in Concour. 
II. Intangible Resources 
Qs13. My family situation was against me and limited 
my options. 
Qs14. In my family, I faced negative discrimination and 
resources were not evenly distributed among us. 
Other Factor 3:  
Causal State and Trigger 
 
Self Factor 2:  
Causal State and Trigger 
Theme: Ontology of Attribution: 
I. State-Temporal: 
a. Past: 
 
Theme: Ontology of Attribution: 
I. State-Temporal: 
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Qo12. Because of his/her previous state, before 
this decision (.796). 
b. Present: 
Qo13. Because of his/her current state when 
she/he is making this decision. (.811) 
II. Event Temporal 
a. Past: 
Qo14. Because of what happened before this 
decision (.696). 
b. Present: 
Qo15. Because of what happened just when 
he/she is making this decision (.700). 
 
a. Past: 
Qs15. I think because before this decision, my 
other choices were limited. 
b. Present: 
Qs16. I chose it due to its current popularity. 
II. Event Temporal 
a. Past: 
Qs17. Because before this decision something 
happened that I could not achieve the result 
that I wanted in Concour. 
b. Present: 
Qs18. I think because something is happening 
now that I am choosing this major. 
III. Theme: Impact of First Party Evaluation: 
I. How 
a. Social Comparing Norms: 
Qs19. I think because of my family status and 
situation I am choosing this major. 
Other Factor 5:  
Causal Reasoning 
 
Self Factor 3:  
Causal Reasoning 
Theme: Causal Reasoning: 
I. State: 
Qo16. His/her geographical, emotional and physical 
state is important when he/she is making this decision. 
II. Transition: 
Qo17. After making this decision, his/her state will 
change. 
III. Enabling State: 
Qo18. His/her state, when he/she is making this 
decision, enables him/her to transform into a new state. 
IV. State Change: 
 
Theme: Causal Reasoning: 
I. Transition: 
Qs20. After being accepted for this major in university, 
my state will change. 
II. Enabling State: 
Qs21. Because my state and abilities are in line with 
this university major’s requirement. 
III. State Change: 
Qs22. I have the required score in Concour, I apply for 
this major, and after being accepted in this major my 
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Qo19. Something triggered him/her, he/she will make 
this decision, and his/her state would change. 
 
state will change. 
Other Factor 4:  
Third Party Evaluation 
 
Self Factor 4:  
Third Party Evaluation 
Theme: Impact of Third Party Evaluation 
I. Who 
Qo20. Certain people’s evaluation influences his/her 
decision. 
Qo21. Because he/she trusts others’ evaluation of 
his/her decision. 
II. What 
a. Valence 
Qo22. Because others have positive judgment. 
b. Motivator 
Qo23. Because others encourage him/her.  
 
 
Theme: Impact of Third Party Evaluation 
I. Who 
Qs23. The environment is influential on my decision. 
Qs24. My parents recommend this major to me (.689). 
II. What 
a. Valence 
Qs25. Others have positive ideas about me 
choosing this major. 
b. Motivator 
Qs26. Others encourage me. 
 
Other Factor 8:  
Social Identifier 
 
Self Factor 5:  
Social Identifier 
I. Theme: Impact of First Party Evaluation 
II. How: 
Qo24. Typically, people similar to him/her choose the 
same way. 
Qo25. He/she has many common points with those who 
choose the same major. 
Qo26. He/she and those who choose the same major 
are more successful. 
 
 
 
I. Theme: Causal Reasoning 
a. State: 
Qs27. Because I am a student, who has 
studied and passed Concour for this major. 
b. Theme: Correlational Reasoning 
i. Person: 
Qs28. I think this is a popular major for 
students. 
ii. Stimuli: 
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Qs29. My specific situation makes me 
choose this major. 
 
Other Factor 9:  
Attribution to Future 
 
Self Factor 9:  
Attribution to Future 
I. Theme: Ontology of Attribution: 
a. State/Temporal 
Future State: 
Qo27. Because of the state that he/she aims to 
reach after this decision. 
b. Event/Temporal 
Future Event: 
Qo28. Because of what he/she expects to 
happen after his/her decision. 
 
 
 
I. Theme: Ontology of Attribution: 
a. State/Temporal 
Future State: 
Qs30. I think due to the state that I expect to 
reach through this major. 
b. Event/Temporal 
Future Event: 
Qs31. Because I expect to progress in future. 
Other Factor 11: 
Ontology of Capabilities 
 
Self Factor 7:  
Ontology of Capabilities 
I. Theme: Freedom Awareness 
a. Ontology of Capabilities 
i. Number: 
Qo29. He/she can choose a different way. 
ii. Equivalence: 
Qo30. All of his/her opportunities are 
equally valuable to him/her. 
iii. Independence: 
Qo31. This choice does not prevent 
him/her from perusing his/her other 
options. 
 
I. Theme: Freedom Awareness 
a. Ontology of Capabilities 
i. Number: 
Qs32. I believe that I have other 
alternatives. 
ii. Equivalence: 
Qs33. I believe that my other 
alternatives are as good as this major. 
iii. Independence: 
Qs34. I believe that I can choose to do 
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 another major at the same time. 
Extension: Components that are found only on Subjective or Objective Side 
 
Other Factor 6: 
Self-Centred Motivation 
I. Teleological Reasoning 
a. Motivator: 
Qo32: Maximising his/her self-interest is important when he/she is making this decision. 
b. Decision Type: 
Qo33. In his/her decisions he/she tries to maximise his/her self-interest.  
Other Factor 7: 
Correlational Reasoning 
I. Correlational Reasoning: 
a. Person: 
Qo34. There are many others applying for this major. 
b. Stimulus: 
Qo35. He/she chooses this option because he/she has exceptional abilities. 
c. Time: 
Qo36. This option always has applicants. 
Self Factor 10: 
Ethical Reasoning 
I. Impact of Third Party Evaluation 
a. How: 
i. Social Obligation: 
Qs35. I have some rules for myself that prevent me from choosing other majors that others do. 
ii. Taken for Granted: 
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Qs36. It is obvious for me to choose this major. 
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Study 3: Quantitative Amendment 
Study 3 is the Quantitative Amendment phase of our research methodology to determine 
agency-oriented factors associated with freedom, which is the final step towards achieving the 
first research objective. Study 3 is a survey and its measurement scale is the Evaluation 
Instrument that has been revised in the previous survey (i.e. Study 2). Participants are young 
male and female adults at the ages of 18 and 19, randomly selected from 455,897 students of 
the host organisation that are distributed in 450 rural and urban areas in Iran. The online 
questionnaire is distributed through SurveyMonkey via the host organisation’s official website for 
two weeks from the 5th of June 2015. As a result of the pilot study, the questionnaire is 
presented in both Farsi and English. We have managed to collect 4,200 responses, among 
which 4,086 valid responses were obtained that is representative sample for determining 
agency-oriented factors associated with freedom, with a focus on the agency outcome of 
‘university major selection’ that is regarded as one of the most important decisions young adults 
make in their life (Salehi-Isfahani, 2011).  
Study 3 aims to statistically concise the agency-oriented factors for the final round. In 
this regard initially we run EFA to concise the ‘self’ and ‘other’ factors. The rotation method used 
in the analysis is Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. It is worth mentioning here that EFA is 
applied on 36 items of ‘self’ and 36 items of ‘other’, separately. As explained in the previous 
study, this is because theoretically these two standpoints are independent in the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency in order to identify ‘rationalisation’ (see Chapter 4, Theoretical Development). 
Statistically, we can run EFA on ‘self’ and ‘other’ items, because their correlation matrix Kaiser–
Meyer–Olkin statistic is large (.895 and .874, equivalently) and their Chi-Square in Bartlett’s test 
of Sphericity (37474.48 and 38773.66, equivalently) are found significant with p-value (.000). 
These findings show that EFA is an appropriate technique for this data set. 
Secondly, we run Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to evaluate the fitness of final 
models of ‘self’ and ‘other’. Finally, to interpret the findings, we map the ‘self’ and ‘other’ factors 
in the final version of the Evaluation Instrument and map them onto other elements of the Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency (i.e. rationality type, reconciling approach, and emotion). In the next 
study, we use the final Evaluation Instrument in the second round of qualitative development of 
the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to establish how freedom is expanded/contracted based on 
agency-oriented factors, which is our second research objective. 
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Study 3: Result (‘Self’ Standpoint) 
Table 34 presents the result of EFA on ‘self’ factors that includes the eigenvalue, total 
loadings and variance of ‘self’ factors. As explained above only the factors with eigenvalues 
greater than one are used. So, we have extracted 8 common factors at the ‘self’ standpoint. The 
second reason that these 8 factors are extracted is that we seek common factors that 
cumulatively account for a large percentage of the total variance (typically at least 60%). Here, 
the first 8 factors combined account for a cumulative percentage of 57.48% of the total variance. 
Figure 26 is the scree plot of the eigenvalues against the number of factors in the order of 
extraction, according to which, again, 8 factors seem reasonable at the ‘self’ stand point.  
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Table 34: Eigenvalues, total loadings, variance of ‘self’ factors (Study 3) 
Component 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 
 
6.47 
 
18.00 
 
18.00 
2 
 
5.08 
 
14.11 
 
32.09 
3 
 
2.30 
 
6.38 
 
38.47 
4 
 
1.92 
 
5.34 
 
43.81 
5 
 
1.54 
 
4.27 
 
48.09 
6 
 
1.31 
 
3.64 
 
51.73 
7 
 
1.04 
 
2.89 
 
54.62 
8 
 
1.03 
 
2.86 
 
57.49 
9 
 
.95 
 
2.65 
 
60.14 
10 
 
.86 
 
2.39 
 
62.53 
11 
 
.81 
 
2.26 
 
64.79 
 
Figure 26: Scree Plot of ‘self’ factors (Study 2) 
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Table 35 presents the component matrix of the 8 ‘self’ factors and maps them to the 
theoretical constructs in the early Evaluation Instrument. Similar to the previous study, the first 
column in this table presents the new labels of each factor that is assigned based on the 
theoretical themes. Inconsistent with the findings of the previous study, here, the first factor is 
value laden and goals oriented as the items of Sen's (2004) goal-oriented motivation (self-
centred, sympathetic, and committed action) are correlated with the first factor (.76, .79, and .65, 
equivalently), with (! >	.65). The first column of Table 34 presents the new labels of each factor 
that are assigned to them according to the theoretical foundation. The findings indicate that the 
final 8 ‘self’ factors are: (1) Motivation, (2) Social Status, (3) Third Party Evaluation, (4) 
Capabilities, (5) Expectations, (6) Intangible Resources, (7) Effort and Ability, and (8) Desire 
Intensity. The items loaded to these factors are marked by their question number in the 
Evaluation Instrument, in order to show how the order of the previous Evaluation Instrument is 
revised in this study. For example, the questions of 3rd to 9th in the Evaluation Instrument are 
loaded to the first factor labelled as Motivation and the 1st item is loaded to the 6th factors, and 
the 2nd item is loaded to the 7th factor in the revised Evaluation Instrument. These findings help 
us to finalise the Evaluation Instrument based on the statistical evidence.  
The findings in the first row of Table 35 indicate that a value laden and goal oriented 
factor of Motivation has the greatest eigenvalue (6.47) and explains the highest variance 
(17.98%) in the data set among all 8 ‘self’ factors. This finding is another insight showing that 
the main agentic factor that distinguishes respondents, in terms of their freedom is value laden 
and goal oriented, which are the characteristics of (Weber, 1993) substantive rationality. Further, 
our cut-off point for factor loading to extract the items loaded to each factor is (.30). Here, there 
are seven items that are significant but they have moderately low correlation 
(i.e., .50, .36, .54, .50, 50, 54, and .44), which are the items of (s35, s16, s15, s12, s27, s10, 
and s36 equivalently). Note that here, ‘s’ means ‘self’ factor. The only item that is excluded from 
the ‘self’ model in the final Evaluation Instrument is s23 that has measured Third Party 
Evaluation (How), which is being measured with s24 and s25. 
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Table 35: ‘Self’ Component Matrix (Study3) 
Factor 
 
Label 
 
Eigen  
 
Var.% 
 
Theme, Dimension 
 
Item 
 ! 
1 
 
Motivation 
 
 6.47 17.98    
 
   Goal Orientation, Impact of Third Party 
Evaluation, How 
s3. I can be an influential person through choosing 
this major. 
.76 
 
   Goal Orientation, Impact of First Party 
Evaluation, What 
s4. This major drives me to reach my goals. 
 
.71 
 
   Goal Orientation, Teleological 
Reasoning, Motivator, Ethical 
Preferences 
s5. This major allows me to help others. 
 
.79 
 
   Goal Orientation, Teleological 
Reasoning, Motivator, Subjective 
Preferences 
s6. I like this major. 
 
.65 
 
   Goal Orientation, Teleological 
Reasoning, Decision Type, Self-
Centred Choice 
s7. I will be educated and this is useful for my future. 
 
.70 
 
   Goal Orientation, Teleological 
Reasoning, Decision Type, 
sympathetic Action 
s8. This decision is good for me and others. .65 
 
   Goal Orientation, Teleological 
Reasoning, Decision Type, Committed 
Action 
s9. Through this major I can create an impact on 
society that is more important than my personal 
interests. 
.78 
2 
 
Social Status 
 
 5.08 14.11    
 
   Impact of Commodities, Tangible 
Resources 
s11. I have a shortcoming, such as illness, disability, 
age, or gender limitation. 
.60 
 
   Causal State and Trigger, Ontology of 
Attribution, Event-Temporal, Past 
s17. Because before this decision something 
happened that I could not achieve the result that I 
wanted in Concour. 
.69 
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   Causal State and Trigger, Ontology of 
Attribution, Event-Temporal, Present 
s18. I think because something is happening now that 
I am choosing this major. 
.67 
 
   Causal State and Trigger, Impact of 
First Party Evaluation, How 
s19. I think because of my family status and situation I 
am choosing this major. 
.53 
 
   Social Identifier, Correlational 
Reasoning, Stimulus 
s29. My specific situation makes me choose this 
major. 
.65 
 
   Ethical Reasoning, Impact of Third 
Party Evaluation, How 
s35. I have some rules for myself that prevents me 
from choosing other majors that others do. 
.50* 
3 
 
Third Party Evaluation 
 
 2.30 6.38    
 
   Casual State and Trigger, Ontology of 
Attribution, Present State 
s16. I choose it due to its current popularity. .36* 
 
   Impact of Third Party Evaluation, Who s24. My parents recommend this major to me. .73 
 
   Impact of Third Party Evaluation, What, 
Valence 
s25. Others have positive ideas about me choosing 
this major. 
.80 
 
   Impact of Third Party Evaluation, What, 
Motivator 
s26. Others encourage me. .84 
 
   Social Identifier, Correlational 
Reasoning, Person 
s28. I think this is a popular major for students. .61 
4 
 
Capabilities  
 
 1.92 5.34    
 
   Freedom Awareness, Ontology of 
Capability, Number 
s32. I believe that I have other alternatives. .87 
 
   Freedom Awareness, Ontology of 
Capabilities, Equivalence 
s33. I believe that my other alternatives are as good 
as this major. 
.89 
 
   Freedom Awareness, Ontology of 
Capabilities, Independence 
s34. I believe that I can choose to do another major at 
the same time. 
.83 
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5 
 
Expectations 
 
 1.54 4.27    
 
   Causal Reasoning, Transition s20. After being accepted in this major in university, 
my state will change. 
.61 
 
   Ontology of Attribution, State-
Temporal, Future 
s30. I think due to the state that I expect to reach 
through this major. 
.69 
 
   Ontology of Attribution, Event-
Temporal, Future 
s31. Because I expect to find a good job in future. .63 
6 
 
Intangible Resources  
 
 1.31 3.64    
 
   Freedom Awareness, Psychological, 
Volition 
s1. I believe that I FREELY choose this major. .55 
 
   Impact of Commodities, Intangible 
Resources 
s13. My family situation limited my options. .78 
 
   Impact of Commodities, Intangible 
Resources 
s14. In my family, I was under negative discrimination 
and resources were not evenly distributed among us. 
.62 
 
   Ontology of Attribution, State 
Temporal, Past 
s15. I think because before making this decision, my 
other choices were limited. 
.54* 
7 
 
Effort and Ability 
 
 1.04 2.89    
 
   Goal Orientation, Freedom Awareness, 
Psychological, Connotation 
s2. I believe that I have WORKED HARD to be able to 
choose this major. 
.59 
 
   Impact of Commodities s12. My opportunities are limited because of my result 
in Concour. 
.50* 
 
   Causal Reasoning, Enabling State s21. Because my state and abilities are in line with 
this university major’s requirements. 
.60 
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   Causal Reasoning, State Change s22. I can get the required score in Concour, I apply 
for this major, and after being accepted in this major 
my state will change. 
.70 
 
   Ethical Reasoning, Impact of Third 
Party Evaluation, Taken for Granted 
36. It is obvious for me to choose this major. .44* 
8 
 
Desire Intensity 
 
 1.03 2.73    
 
   Social Identifier, Causal Reasoning, 
State 
s27. Because I have studied to pass the Concour to 
be able to choose this major. 
.50* 
 
   Goal Orientation, Correlational 
Reasoning, Time 
s10. I was always thinking about studying this major. .54* 
Note: (*) significant items with moderately low correlation that are kept in the 3rd Evaluation Instrument due to theoretical necessity.
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Study 3: Result (‘Other’ Standpoint) 
Table 36 presents the results of EFA on ‘other’ factors, including the eigenvalue, total 
loadings and variance of ‘other’ factors. As explained above only the factors with eigenvalues 
greater than one are used. So, we have extracted nine common factors at the ‘other’ standpoint. 
The second reason that these nine factors are extracted is that we seek common factors that 
cumulatively account for a large percentage of the total variance (typically at least 60%). Here, 
the first nine factors combined account for a cumulative total of 64.06% of the total variance. 
Figure 27 is the scree plot of the eigenvalues against the number of factors in the order of 
extraction that, again, nine factors seem reasonable at the ‘other’ stand point.  
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Table 36: Eigenvalues, total loadings, variance of ‘other’ factors 
Component 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 
 
6.93 
 
19.25 
 
19.25 
2 
 
5.39 
 
14.96 
 
34.21 
3 
 
2.41 
 
6.71 
 
40.91 
4 
 
1.92 
 
5.34 
 
46.25 
5 
 
1.48 
 
4.11 
 
50.36 
6 
 
1.44 
 
4.00 
 
54.36 
7 
 
1.33 
 
3.69 
 
58.05 
8 
 
1.14 
 
3.17 
 
61.22 
9 
 
1.02 
 
2.84 
 
64.06 
 
Figure 27: Scree Plot of ‘other’ factors 
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Table 37 presents the component matrix of nine ‘other’ factors and maps them onto the 
theoretical constructs in the early Evaluation Instrument. As explained above, the first column in 
this table presents the new labels of each factor that is assigned based on the theoretical 
themes of the items that are loaded to that component. The findings indicate that the first ‘other’ 
factor is value-laden as two items that are about ethical issues (i.e. o3 and o6) are highly 
correlated (! >	.7) with the first factor (.83 and .72, equivalently). Note that here ‘o’ means a 
question at the ‘other’ standpoint. The first column of Table 37 presents the new labels of each 
factor that are assigned according to the theoretical foundation. The findings indicate that the 
final none ‘other’ factors are: (1) Motivation, (2) Third Party Evaluation, (3) Intangible Resources, 
(4) Social Status, (5) Expectations, (6) Popularity, (7) Social Group, (8) Capabilities, and (9) 
Self-interest. The items loaded to these factors are marked by their question number in the 
Evaluation Instrument, indicating how the order of the previous Evaluation Instrument is revised 
as a result of EFA in this study. For example, the questions of o17, o18, o19, o27, and o28 are 
loaded to factor 5 that shows the order of ‘other’ factors in the Evaluation Instrument is going to 
be revised in the second version. As mentioned earlier, these findings help us to finalise the 
Evaluation Instrument, using the results of EFA and CFA. Further, the findings in the first row of 
Table 37 indicate that a value-laden and goal-oriented factor of Motivation has the greatest 
eigenvalue (6.92) and explains the highest variance (19.25%) in the data set among all of the 
nine ‘other’ factors. This finding is the fourth insight showing that the main agentic factor that 
distinguishes respondents, in terms of their freedom is value-laden that is mapped to Weber's 
(1993) substantive rationality. In other words, using substantive rationality distinguishes one 
from other individuals in terms of her freedom. 
Our threshold to extract the items loaded to each factor is (! ≥	.55). There are four items 
(o5, o19, o26, and o35) that are found significant but their correlation with their component is 
moderately low (.52, .50, .53, and .43 equivalently). However, we keep these four items in the 
3rd version of the Evaluation Instrument because of the theoretical necessity. This is because if 
they will be omitted then we will miss a theoretical dimension to determine agency-oriented 
factors associated with freedom. However, two items are excluded from the Evaluation 
Instrument that are o7 (measuring Teleological Reasoning, Decision Type, Sympathy) and o16 
(measuring Casual Reasoning, State). These two items are excluded because they have 
moderately low correlation with their factor, and at the same time we have two other items (o6 
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and o18) that measure the same theoretical dimensions with higher level of correlation (.72 
and .61 equivalently). 
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Table 37: ‘Other’ Component Matrix (Study3) 
Factor 
 
Label 
 
Eigen  
 
Var.% 
 
Theme, Dimension 
 
Item 
 ! 
1 
 
Motivation 
 
 6.93 19.25    
 
   Freedom Awareness, Psychological 
Freedom, Volition 
o1. He/she genuinely wants this opportunity. 
 
.76 
 
   Freedom Awareness, Psychological 
Freedom, Connotation 
o2. He/she has the drive. .76 
 
   Impact of Third Party Evaluation, 
Social Obligation 
o3. Because this choice is in line with his/her ethical 
beliefs. 
.83 
 
   Impact of First Party Evaluation, What, 
Valence 
o4. He/she is making the right choice. .57 
 
   Impact of First Party Evaluation, What, 
Valence 
o5. His/her personal evaluations largely influence 
his/her future decisions. 
.52* 
 
   Teleological Reasoning, Motivators, 
Ethical Preference 
o6. Moral and ethical concerns motivate his/her 
decision. 
.72 
2 
 
Third Party Evaluation 
 
 5.39 14.96    
 
   Third Party Evaluation, Who o20. Certain people evaluation influences this 
decision.  
.71 
 
   Third Party Evaluation, Who o21. Because he/she trusts others’ evaluation of this 
decision. 
.83 
 
   Third Party Evaluation, What 22. Because others have positive judgment. .83 
 
   Third Party Evaluation, What 23. Because others encourage him/her. .82 
 
   First Party Evaluation, How 24. Typically, people similar to him/her choose the 
same way. 
.64 
3 
 
Intangible Resources 
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 2.41 6.71    
 
   Impact of Commodities o8. Environment limited his/her choices. 
 
.81 
 
   Impact of Commodities o9. He/she has social limitations. .81 
 
   Impact of Commodities o10. Conventions and customs limited his/her choice. .81 
 
   Impact of Commodities o11. His/her family limited my opportunities. .76 
4 
 
Social Status  
 
 1.92 5.34    
 
   Ontology of Attribution, State-
Temporal, Past 
o12. Because of his/her previous state, before this 
decision. 
.76 
 
   Ontology of Attribution, State-
Temporal, Present 
o13. Because of his/her current state when she/he is 
making this decision. 
.72 
 
   Ontology of Attribution, Event 
Temporal, Past 
o14. Because of what happened before this decision. .78 
 
   Ontology of Attribution, Event 
Temporal, Present 
o15. Because of what happened just when he/she is 
making decision. 
.75 
5 
 
Expectations 
 
 1.48 4.11    
 
   Causal Reasoning, Transition o17. After making this decision, his/her state will 
change. 
.72 
 
   Causal Reasoning, Enabling State o18. His/her state, when he/she is making this 
decision enables him/her to transform into new state. 
.61 
 
   Causal Reasoning, State Change o19. Something triggered him/her, he/she will make 
this decision, and his/her state would change. 
.50* 
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   Ontology of Attribution, State-
Temporal, Future 
o27. Because of the state that he/she aims to reach 
after this decision. 
.60 
 
   Ontology of Attribution, Event-
Temporal, Future 
o28. Because of what he/she expects to happen after 
his/her decision. 
.59 
6 
 
Popularity  
 
 1.44 3.99    
 
   Correlational Reasoning (Person) o34. There are many others applying for this major. .82 
 
   Correlational Reasoning (Time) o36. This option has always applicants.  .82 
7 
 
Social Group 
 
 1.33 3.69    
 
   Impact of First Party Evaluation, How o25. He/she has many common points with those who 
choose the same major. 
.67 
 
   Impact of First Party Evaluation, How o26. He/she and those who choose the same major 
are more successful. 
.53* 
 
   Correlational Reasoning, Stimulus o35. He/she chooses this option because he/she has 
exceptional abilities. 
.43* 
8 
 
Capabilities 
 
 1.14 3.17    
 
   Freedom Awareness, Ontology of 
Capability, Number  
o29. He/she can choose a different way. .74 
 
   Freedom Awareness, Ontology of 
Capability, Equivalence  
o30. All of his/her opportunities are equally valuable to 
him/her. 
.77 
 
   Freedom Awareness, Ontology of 
Capability, Independence 
o31. This choice does not prevent him/her from 
pursuing his/her other options. 
.61 
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9 
 
Self-interest 
 
 1.02 2.84 Teleological Reasoning, Motivator o32. Maximising his/her self-interest is important when 
he/she is making this decision. 
.85 
 
   Teleological Reasoning, Decision 
Type, Selfish Action 
o33. In his/her decisions he/she tries to maximise 
his/her self-interest. 
.87 
Note: * significant items but with moderately low correlation that are kept in the 3rd Evaluation Instrument due to theoretical necessity.
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Study 3: Test of Fitness (CFA) 
To retest the discriminant validity of eight ‘self’ factor models and nine ‘other’ factor 
models, we have conducted Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) using Lisrel 8 software. As 
summarised in Table 38 both ‘self’ and ‘other’ models are found fitted to the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency. The goodness-of-fit indices for eight ‘self’ factor and nine ‘other’ factor models are 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) (.91 and .88, equivalently), Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) (.91 and .89, 
equivalently), Comparative Fit Index (CFI) (.92 and .90, equivalently), Incremental Fit Index (IFI) 
(.92 and .91, equivalently), and Relative Fit Index (RFI) (.90 and .89, equivalently), which show 
that both ‘self’ and ‘other’ models are fitted as their fitness indices are near the threshold of .9 
(Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). 
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Table 38: Fit Indices of eight ‘self’ factor and nine ‘other’ factor models (Study 3) 
 
 !"  #$ % NFI NNFI CFI IFI RFI RMSEA 
8 ‘self’-Factor Model  
 
         
 
Agentic Factors 115713.28 566 .0 .91 .91 .92 .92 .90 .07 
9 ‘other’-Factor Model 
  
         
 
Agentic Factors 35325.64 524 .0 .88 .89 .90 .91 .89 .07 
Note: Using LISREL 8 software; Cut-off criteria is .9 for excellent fit based on Normed Fit Index (NFI), Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI), 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Incremental Fit Index (IFI), and Relative Fit Index (RFI) measurements (Hu and Bentler, 1999); Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) measures close to .05 shows good fit (Levinson, 1947)
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Study 3: The Evaluation Instrument (3rd Version) 
The results of EFA and CFA have determined and confirmed eight ‘self’ factor and nine 
‘other’ factor models as the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom. Table 39 is the 
revised Evaluation Instrument (i.e. the 3rd version that is the final version) that has been 
amended in three following aspects according to the findings of study 3: (a) s23, o7 and o16 are 
excluded from the previous version (i.e. 2nd version) as their correlation with the extracted 
components is moderately low and theoretically it is not crucial to keep them in the final 
Evaluation Instrument (i.e. there are other items with higher correlation measuring the same 
theoretical construct); (b) the order and label of factors are revised based on the findings of 
Study 3, (c) the agency-oriented factors are coincided in to eight ‘self’ and nine ‘other’ factors. 
Further, in Table 39 we map the agency-oriented factors onto Weber's (1993) rationality types 
and three types of reasoning (i.e. teleological, causal and correlational), as explained in Chapter 
4 on Theory Development. For example, the first ‘self’ factor that is labelled “Motivation” is 
mapped onto Weber’s substantive rationality as all of its items are value laden. The second 
column of Table 39 shows the type of reasoning mapped to each factor. For example, the ‘self’ 
Motivation factor is mapped onto ‘teleological’ reasoning that means the agent assigns a future-
oriented reason to her decision. In addition, Figure 28 shows the agentic factors on the time line 
that its focus is on mapping factors onto temporal types of reasoning. At this stage we use 
Weber's (1993) theory and temporal types of reasoning (i.e. teleological, causal and 
correlational) to explain the results of factor analysis, we are using abduction to finalise the 
Evaluation Instrument. 
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Table 39: The Evaluation Instrument (3rd Version) 
 
View Factor 
 
Reasoning   
 
Rationality 
Type 
 
Items (theoretical themes and dimensions) 
‘Self’ 
Motivation 
 
 
 
 
Teleological 
 
 
Substantive  
 
1: I can be an influential person through choosing this major. (Impact of Third Party 
Evaluation, How) 
2: This major drives me to reach my goals. (Impact of First Party Evaluation, What) 
3: This major allows me to help others. (Teleological Reasoning, Motivator, Ethical 
Preferences)  
4: I like this major. (Teleological Reasoning, Motivator, Subjective Preferences) 
5: I will be educated and this is useful for my future. (Teleological Reasoning, 
Decision Type, Self-Centred Choice)  
6: This decision is good for me and others. (Teleological Reasoning, Decision 
Type, sympathetic Action)  
7: Through this major I can create an impact on society that is more important than 
my personal interests. (Teleological Reasoning, Decision Type, Committed Action) 
‘Self’  
Causal 
State 
 
 
 
Causal/ 
Correlational  
 
Theoretical  
 
8: I think because before this decision something happened that I could not 
achieve the result that I wanted in Concour. (Ontology of Attribution, Event-
Temporal, Past) 
9: I think because something is happening now that I am choosing this major. 
(Ontology of Attribution, Event-Temporal, Present) 
10: I think because of my family status and situation I am choosing this major. 
(Impact of First Party Evaluation, How) 
11: My specific situation makes me choose this major. (Correlational Reasoning, 
Stimulus) 
12: I have some rules for myself that prevent me from choosing other majors that 
others choose. (Impact of Third Party Evaluation, How) 
‘Self’ 
Third Party 
Evaluation 
 
Causal/ 
Correlational  
 
Formal  
 
13: My parents recommended this major to me. (Third Party Evaluation-Who) 
14: Others have positive idea about me choosing this major. (Third Party 
Evaluation-What-Valence) 
15: Other encouraged me. (Third Party Evaluation-What-Motivator) 
16: I think this is a popular major for students. (Social Identifier-Correlational 
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Reasoning-Person) 
‘Self’ 
Capabilities 
 
Causal/ 
Correlational  
 
Practical  
 
17: I believe that I have other alternatives. (Ontology of Capabilities-Number) 
18: I believe that my other alternatives are as good as this major. (Ontology of 
Capabilities-Equivalence) 
19: I think that I can choose to do another major at the same time. (Ontology of 
Capabilities-Independence) 
‘Self’ 
Expectatio
n 
 
Teleological  
 
Practical  
 
20: After being accepted in this major in university, my state will change. (Causal 
Reasoning-Transition) 
21: I think due to the state that I expect to reach through this major. (Attribution to 
Future State) 
22: Because I expect to find a good job in future. (Attribution to Future Event) 
‘Self’ 
Resource 
Limitation 
 
Causal  
 
Formal 
 
23: I believe that I freely choose this job. (Goal Orientation-Psychological 
Freedom-Volition) 
24: My family situation limited my options. (Impact of Commodities-Intangible 
Resources) 
25: In my family I was under negative discrimination and resources were not 
evenly distributed among us. (Impact of Commodities-Intangible Resources) 
26: I think because before making this decision, my other choices were limited. 
(Causal State-Past State) 
‘Self’ 
Effort and 
Ability 
 
Causal  
 
 
Practical  
 
27: I believe that I have worked hard to be able to choose this major. (Goal 
Orientation-Psychological Freedom-Connotation) 
28: My opportunities are limited because of my result in Concour. (Impact of 
Commodities-Tangible Resources) 
29: Because my state and abilities are in line with major’s requirements. (Causal 
Reasoning-Enabling State) 
30: I can get the required score in Concour, I will apply for this major, and after 
being accepted in this major my state will change. (Causal Reasoning-State 
Change) 
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‘Self’ 
Desire 
Intensity 
 
Teleological  
 
 
Substantive  
 
31: I was always thinking about studying this major. (Goal Orientation-Correlational 
Reasoning-Time) 
‘Other’ 
Motivation 
 
Teleological  
 
Substantive  
 
1: He/she genuinely wants this opportunity. (Goal Orientation-Freedom 
Awareness-Psychological Freedom-Volition) 
2: He/she has the drive. (Goal Orientation-Freedom Awareness-Psychological 
Freedom-Connotation) 
3: Because this choice is in line with her ethical beliefs. (Goal Orientation-Impact of 
Third Party Evaluation-Social Obligation) 
4: He/she is making the right choice. (Goal Orientation-Impact of First Party 
Evaluation-Valence) 
5: His/her personal evaluations largely influence his/her future decision. (Goal 
Orientation-Impact of First Party Evaluation-Valence) 
6: Moral and ethical concerns motivate his/her decision. (Goal Orientation-
Teleological Reasoning-Motivator-Ethical Preference) 
‘Other’ 
Third Party 
Evaluation 
 
Causal  
 
 
Formal  
 
7: Certain people’s evaluation influences this decision. (Third party evaluation-
who) 
8: Because he/she trusts others’ evaluation of this decision. (Third party 
evaluation-who) 
9: Because others have positive judgments. (Third party evaluation-what-valence) 
10: Because others encouraged him/her. (Third party evaluation-what-motivator) 
11: Typically, people similar to him/her choose the same way. (Social identifier-
First party evaluation-How) 
‘Other’ 
Resource 
Limitation 
 
Causal  
 
 
Formal  
 
12: Environment limited his/her choice. (Impact of Commodities-Tangible Sources) 
13: He/she has social limitations. (Impact of Commodities-Intangible Sources) 
13: Conventions and customs limit his/her choice. (Impact of Commodities-
Intangible Sources) 
14: His/her family limits his/her opportunities. (Impact of Commodities-Intangible 
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Sources) 
‘Other’ 
Causal 
State 
 
Causal/ 
Correlational  
 
Theoretical  
 
15: Because of his/her previous state, before this decision. (Causal State-Past 
state) 
16: Because of his/her current state when he/she is making this decision. (Causal 
State-Present state) 
17: Because of what happened before this decision. (Causal State-Past event) 
18: Because of what happened just when he/she is making this decision. (Causal 
State-Present Event) 
‘Other’ 
Expectatio
n 
 
Teleological  
 
 
Practical  
 
19: After making this decision, his/her state will change. (Causal State-Transition) 
20: His/her state, when he/she is making this decision, enables him/her to 
transform into new state. (Causal State-Enabling State) 
21: Because of the state that he/she aims to reach after his/her decision. 
(Attribution to Future state) 
22: Because of what he/she expects to happen after his/her decision. (Attribution 
to Future event) 
‘Other’ 
Popularity 
 
Correlational  
 
Formal  
 
23: There are many others applying for this job. (Correlational Reasoning-Person) 
24: This option always has applicants. (Correlational Reasoning-Time) 
‘Other’ 
Social 
Group 
 
Correlational  
 
Formal  
 
25: He/she has many common points with those who choose the same majors. 
(Social Identifier-First Party Evaluation-How) 
26: He/she and those who choose the same major are more successful. (Social 
Identifier-First Party Evaluation-How) 
‘Other’ 
Capabilities 
 
Correlational  
 
Practical  
 
27: He/she can choose a different way. (Ontology of Capabilities-Number) 
28: All of his/her options are equally valuable to him/her. (Ontology of Capabilities-
Equivalence) 
29: This choice does not prevent him from pursuing his/her other options. 
(Ontology of Capabilities-Independence) 
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‘Other’ 
Self-
Interest 
 
Teleological  
 
Practical  
 
30: Maximising his/her self-interest is important when he/she is making his/her 
decision.  
31: In his/her decision, he/she tries to maximise his/her decision.  
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Figure 28: Agency Oriented Factor in Time Line 
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Effort and Ability -> Practical
‘Other’ Factors - > Rationality Type:
Third Party Evaluation -> Formal
Resource Limitation -> Formal
Casual State -> Theoretical
Teleological Reasoning:
‘Self’ Factors -> Rationality Type:
Motivation -> Substantive
Capabilities -> Practical
Expectation -> Practical
Desire Intensity -> Substantive
Effort and Ability -> Practical
Other’ Factors -> Rationality Type:
Motivation -> Substantive
Expectations -> Practical
Self-interest -> Practical
Correlational Reasoning:
‘Self’ Factors -> Rationality Type:
Effort and Ability -> Practical
‘Other’ Factors - > Rationality Type:
Popularity-> Formal
Social Group-> Formal
Capability -> Formal
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Summary: Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3  
Table 40 presents an overview of Agentic Factors that are developed in the first three 
studies of this research in an attempt to answer the first research question (RQ1). We start from 
11 themes developed in Study 1, then in two surveys (Study 2 and Study 3) we concise these 
factors into to eight ‘self’ and nine ‘other’ agentic factors. Overall, Table 39 determines the 
cognitive and conative modes of agency, in an attempt to achieve the first research objective 
(i.e. determining agency-oriented factors that associated with freedom). The main result of these 
three studies is that the nine ‘other’ factor model explains higher variance in the 3rd version of 
the Evaluation Instrument, comparing with the earlier versions. Further, the number of items has 
reduced from 46 to 36 at each standpoint of ‘self’ and ‘other’.  
However, this research aims to determine the agency-freedom relationship, thus, at this 
stage three following methodological steps remain: (A) finding empirical support for the affective 
mode of agency-oriented factors; (B) collecting empirical support for rationality type and 
reconciling approach; (c) investigating empirical evidence that shows how cognitive, conative 
and affective modes of agency are related with respect to freedom as developed in the Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). It is worth mentioning here, 
however, that the final step helps to establish how freedom is expanded/contracted based on 
agency-oriented factors (i.e. the second research objective). In this regard, in the following 
section, that is Study 4, we will conduct extensive in-depth interviews, using the Evaluation 
Instrument (Table 39) in order to accomplish the remaining steps in order to finally determine 
the agency-freedom relationship. Study 4 develops empirical support for emotion, its connection 
with reason and their impact on the freedom-agency relationship. In Chapter 6 a case study 
methodology is developed to apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency based on the findings of the 
first and second objectives. Further in Chapter 6 we use the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and 
following its methodology, we will determine the agency-freedom relationship in one case study.  
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Table 21: Agentic tors, Chapter Overview 
 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Method 
 
Interview (N = 6) 
 
Survey (N = 1063) 
 
Survey (N = 4086) 
Results 
 
Themes 
 
‘Self’ Agentic Factors 
 
‘Other’ Agentic Factors 
 
‘Self’ Agentic 
Factors 
 
‘Other’ Agentic 
Factors 
Agentic 
Factors 
Cognitive Mode 
Logical Reasoning 
Teleological 
Reasoning 
Causal Reasoning 
Correlational 
Reasoning 
First Party Evaluation 
Third Party Evaluation 
Ontology of Attribution 
Conative Mode 
Freedom Awareness 
Impact of 
Commodities 
Affective Mode* 
Impact of Affective 
State 
Awareness of 
Affective State 
Cognitive Mode 
Goal Orientation 
Causal State and Triger 
Casual Reasoning 
Social Identifier 
Nature and Timing of 
Attribution 
Third Party Evaluation 
Conative Mode 
Ontology of Capabilities 
Impact of Commodities 
Phenomenological 
Institutionalism 
Ethical Limitations 
Cognitive Mode 
Goal Orientation 
Causal State and Triger 
Causal Reasoning 
Social Identifier 
Nature and Timing of 
Attributions 
Third Party Evaluation 
Correlational Reasoning 
Self-Centred Motivation 
Conative Mode 
Ontology of Capabilities 
Impact of Commodities 
Number of Capabilities 
Cognitive Mode 
Motivation 
Social Status 
Third Party 
Evaluation 
Expectations 
Effort and Ability 
Desire Intensity 
Conative Mode 
Capabilities 
Intangible 
Resources 
 
Cognitive Mode 
Motivation 
Social Status 
Third Party 
Evaluation 
Expectations 
Popularity 
Social Group 
Social Interest 
Conative Mode 
Capabilities 
Intangible 
Resources 
 
Var.% 
  
57.5% 
 
58.6% 
 
57.5% 
 
64.1% 
Note: (*) The ‘Affective Mode’ of Agency is empirically developed in qualitative rounds of data collection in Study 4. 
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Study 4: Qualitative Amendment  
This is a qualitative study to test and develop: (a) the affective mode of agency-oriented 
factors, (b) map rationality types and reconciling approaches onto the Evaluation Instrument, 
and (c) link ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ aspects of agency-outcome. In this regard, first, Study 4 
empirically tests and develops the affective mode of agency that has been identified based on 
Weiner's (2010) list of emotion and has logically been linked to an agent’s rationality types (see 
Chapter 4, Theory Development). Further, Study 4 will find that the empirical supports for the 
three modes of agency and two senses of freedom are related that is establishing freedom 
expansion/contraction based on agency-oriented factors (i.e. the second objective).  
In Chapter 4 we have shown how the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency explains the agency-
outcome of an individual who says “I have decided to become a teacher, not only because I like 
teaching but also as I believe in empowering human beings through education”, in this case she 
is using value-laden rationality type (i.e. substantive type). Further, in Chapter 4 we have 
conjectured based on theory (see Kalberg, 1980; Cockerham, 2015; Weber, 1993) that this way 
of reasoning will expand her agency and positive freedom to live the life she has reason to value, 
even though her negative freedom may be contracted. Meanwhile, if one explains her decision 
saying “I have chosen to become a teacher because this is a popular job and my family 
expected me to become a teacher, but this is not what I really like”, then she has used ‘formal’ 
rationality, which the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency says that this rationality type will contract her 
agency and positive freedom to live the life she has reason to value, even though her negative 
freedom may be expanded.  
However, the question is how the above conjectures exist in reality, i.e. how an agent’s 
freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors (i.e. the second objective). In 
other words, we need to test and developed our conjectures about the agency-freedom 
relationship that have theoretically been developed in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. In this 
regard, we need empirical support for the impact of an agent’s rationality type, emotion, 
worldview, reconciling approach and agency-oriented factors on freedom. This empirical 
endeavour is particularly important in determining the agency-freedom relationship about 
incontinent decisions, which Davidson (2014) has defined as “intentional actions contrary to 
judgment”. For example, what is the relationship between agency and the freedom of a political 
activist who decides to attend in a rally for her values (e.g. peace, freedom of speech, equality 
of human rights), although she sees the possibility of being arrested (Arlegi and Teschl, 2015); 
or a gambler who thinks of gambling as detrimental for the life she values but she cannot stop 
gambling (Davidson, 2001). These examples show the complexity of the agency-freedom 
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relationship, particularly due to the notions that Sen (1990, 1977) emphasises as ‘weakness of 
will’ (e.g. to explain the gambler’s behaviour) and ‘committed actions’ (e.g. to explain the 
political activist’s decision). Hence, we need further empirical evidence to test and develop the 
agency-freedom relationship that has been conjectured in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. 
Further, we need empirical evidence for worldview and reconciling approaches in the Tri-
Modal Theory Agency as explained in Chapter 4 on Theory Development. It is particularly 
important that this should be empirically investigated, due to what we call human tendency to 
bring contradictory reasons for her decision (i.e. “rationalisation”). Hence, Study 4 tries to find 
empirical evidence for the way an agent deals with opposing views in her mind. We have 
identified that our Evaluation Instrument can detect “rationalisation” by comparing one’s scores 
in two standpoints of the ‘self’ and ‘other’. It is conjectured that if an agent’s answers to ‘self’ and 
‘other’ standpoints are contradictory, then it is possible that she is exercising “rationalisation” 
(see Chapter 4, Theory Development). Here, we test and develop these ideas empirically.  
In this regard, Study 4 is designed in two parts. Part one includes extensive in-depth 
interviews on emotion, rationality type, and reconciling approach with the 10 students about 
their university major selection. As a result, affective modes of agency-oriented factors will be 
empirically tested and developed in relation to the cognitive and conative modes that have 
already been tested in three previous empirical studies (i.e. the first objective is being 
accomplished). The second part of Study 4 includes four extensive in-depth interviews in which 
we use agency-oriented factors to establish freedom expansion/contraction (i.e. the second 
objective is being accomplished). As a result, a case study methodology is developed to apply 
the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The next chapter uses this methodology and agency-oriented 
factors to determine the agency-freedom relationship (i.e. the research aim) in one case study 
(see Chapter 6, Case Study).  
 
Study 4: Sample 
Study 4 has two parts, i.e. it includes two samples. In Part 1 we interview 10 students 
who have already been participated in Study 3. In the survey questionnaire of Study 3, we have 
asked respondents to indicate if they are interested in participating in an interview about 
university major selection, with a focus on the same topic. 1290 students out of a cohort of 4086 
respondents have left us their ID and telephone number, showing interest in participating in an 
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interview, out of whom we have chosen 10 participants and 10 telephone interviews have been 
conducted. We have chosen these 10 individuals, because their scores in the Evaluation 
Instrument have shown that their answers to the equal factors of ‘self’ and ‘other’ are opposing. 
This indicated that these individuals were facing opposing ‘other’ worldviews, thus, using this 
sample we could have two important findings regarding: (A) ‘rationalisation’, because it is 
possible that ‘rationalisation’ has been exercised; and (B) ‘reconciling approaches’, because it is 
possible that this individual is aware of ‘other’ worldviews. Achieving these two findings is 
possible because the ‘self’ and ‘other’ worldviews of these participants are different (see 
Chapter 4, Theory Development).  
In Part 2 of Study 4, our sample includes four individuals who are not from the host 
organisation in Iran, and they have made different decisions about other issues rather than 
university major selection and career choice. These four decisions are separated for three 
reasons. First, these decisions are identified as either incontinent (i.e. the decision is 
determined contrary to ‘self’ judgement) (see Davidson's (2001) ‘weakness of will’), or 
counterintuitive (i.e. the decision is determined contrary to ‘other’ judgment) (see Sen's (2004) 
‘rational fool’). This enables us to apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and the Evaluation 
Instrument on the decisions in which determining the agency-freedom relationship is complex, 
as the agent’s decision is not easily understandable to lay observers. Second, we use the final 
version of the Evaluation Instrument and the developed version of the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency to determine the agency-freedom relationship in these four different cases, which helps 
us to develop a case study methodology to apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to any 
decision. Third, these decisions are diverse and different from our earlier focus on career choice 
and university major selection, thus, this sample enables us to test and develop the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency as a generic theory. This sample is explained in detail in Part 2 of Study 4. 
 
Study 4: Measurement 
To detect emotion, we have designed the interview questions according to Weiner's 
(2010) list of emotion (see Emotion in Chapter 4, Theory Development), and to detect rationality 
type we conduct interviews according to Weber's (1993) rationality types (see Reason in 
Chapter 4, Theory Development). Further, to detect worldviews and reconciling approach we 
design interview questions based on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism. As explained in Chapter 4, we 
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have built upon Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism and three ways of ‘dialogical’, ‘monological’ or 
‘dialectic’ approaches are identified that an agent may use to deal with opposing worldviews. 
Here, we take one step further, and we design our measurements for interview questions based 
on the definitions of dialogue, monologue and dialectic (Freedman and Ball, 2004; Marková, 
2003; Matusov, 2007; Robinson, 2011), according to which three following criteria to identify an 
agent’s reconciling approach are identified: (a) the type and quality of opposing worldviews (i.e. 
ontology of worldviews); (b) an individual’s belief in single truth or the existence of multiple 
realities (i.e. ontology of truth); and (c) the individual’s approach to keeping both opposing 
worldviews, merging them, or dismissing one of them (i.e. reconciling mechanism). Following, 
we explain three reconciling approaches based on ontology of worldviews, ontology of truth, and 
reconciling mechanism.  
 
Dialogical Approach  
Analysing Dostoyevsky’s novels, Bakhtin developed his idea of understanding human 
behaviour under authority with respect to freedom through dialogism. The characteristics of 
dialogue in Dostoyevsky’s novels are: (a) there is a double-voice discourse between characters 
(Bakhtin and Emerson, 1993); (b) the author has created ‘independent’ characters with unique 
worldviews (A worldview includes the agent’s rationality type, values, type of reasoning, and 
direct and indirect emotions regarding her decision) that are not integrated into a single 
perspective and/or the worldview of the author (Robinson, 2011). It is said that you can better 
understand your life trajectory in relationship to an opposing worldview (Grant, 2015). For 
example, imagine your political stand compared with your family’s political position. In this case, 
you can explain the trajectory of your own political stand comparing with that of your family. This 
is helpful because your perception of your family’s political stand can be perceived as more 
stable during the time, rather than yours. In this regard, Holquist (2002) further argues that “self 
can find a sufficient degree of structure in accordance with other and this allows an individual to 
present a meaningful engagement with the world”. It is worth mentioning here, however, that if 
we only have two worldviews in disagreement, it does not imply that they are in dialogue 
(Robinson, 2011). According to the review of the literature on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism we 
have identified that a dialogue has several following characteristics.  
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• Ontology of Worldview in the Dialogical Approach: In dialogue opposing worldviews must 
have completely dichotomous elements; the agent recognizes the multiplicity and 
uniqueness, validity, and narrative weight of different worldviews; the worldviews are related 
and interact with each other (Freedman and Ball, 2004). Accordingly, we identify the 
following as the characteristics of worldviews in dialogue: 
o ‘Self’ and ‘other’ worldviews have utterly different elements 
o Opposing worldviews have equal value and both worldviews are acknowledged 
• Reconciling Mechanism in the Dialogical Approach: In dialogue, all of the opposing 
worldviews must be heard and recognised. Different voices must interact in an attempt to be 
acknowledged and informed; the interaction between opposing worldviews must consistently 
continue and during this consistent process of interaction the initial worldviews may change 
(Robinson, 2011a). In dialogism, “individuals participate in a deliberate communication that 
requires the agent to evaluate opposing stands after listening, deliberating and seeking 
arguments, while at the same time this person is trying to find collective values and norms to 
somehow accommodate these opposing rationalities” (Englund, 2006). This means that the 
agent alters her understanding to allow a new input (Piaget, 1981). One who uses the 
dialogical approach resists closure or unambiguous expression and the interaction of 
opposing worldviews continues constantly (Marková, 2003). Following are the 
characteristics of using the dialogical approach to reconcile opposing worldviews of ‘self’ 
and ‘other’: 
o Opposing worldviews interact, inform and alter each other 
o The interaction between opposing worldviews never stops 
• Ontology of Truth in the Dialogical Approach: There is no single truth in dialogism, but there 
are different realities that appear to different individuals (Bakhtin, 1935); for a dialogue to 
occur all participants in the dialogue process must value all voices equally valid to the 
reasoning process (Robinson, 2011). If two worldviews are in disagreement, it does not 
mean that one worldview is wrong (Bakhtin, 1935). Following are the characteristics of ‘truth’ 
when one uses the dialogical approach to reconcile opposing worldviews: 
o There is no single ‘truth’ in Bakhtin’s understanding and different realities appear to 
different worldviews.  
o There are different realities appeared differently to ‘self’ and ‘other’. 
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Monological Approach  
Monologism is contrary to dialogism. In monologism one transcendental worldview 
constructs ‘truth’. The opposing worldviews, ideologies, values, and desires are unheard and 
unrecognised by the agent (Robinson, 2011) and the agent has single consciousness (Matusov, 
2007). Here, we identify the following characteristics to show if an agent uses a monological 
approach to reconcile opposing voices: 
• A) Ontology of Worldviews:  
o ‘Other’ is expressed through apperception (i.e. making sense of the other 
worldview). 
o The opposing worldview is presented with lesser validity and importance 
by the agent. 
• B) Ontology of Truth:  
o The agent believes in one transcendental ‘truth’. 
o Opposing values and desires are denied and perceived as worldviews by 
agent. 
• C) Reconciling Mechanism:  
o The opposing worldviews are not heard by the agent. 
o The opposing worldview is implicitly denied or explicitly refuted. 
 
Dialectical Approach  
The dialectical approach is different to both the dialogical and monological approaches. 
Here we identify it based on the Serradó and Vanegas (2015) definition of dialectic mechanism. 
We have defined the goal of a dialectic process based on Sennett's (2012) idea that “in dialectic 
point and counterpoint (thesis and antithesis) are evolved into a compromise or other state of 
agreement via conflict and tension (synthesis)”. In the dialectical approach, when there are 
opposing worldviews, the opposing parties evolve/integrate them into a transcendent worldview. 
The following characteristics show if an agent uses the dialectic approach to reconcile opposing 
voices. 
• Ontology of Worldviews: 
o ‘Self’ and ‘other’ voices are opposing 
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o Both voices are valid, recognised and heard 
• Ontology of Truth: 
o An individual believes in a transcendental ‘truth’ (It is worth mentioning 
here, however, that our approach is different from historical dialectic (see 
Hegel, 2015) and we use the notion of ‘dialectic’ just to define a way of 
reconciling worldviews that two opposing worldviews exist and can be 
integrated into a third one.) 
o A solution can be deduced from integrating opposing worldviews. 
•  Reconciling Mechanism: 
o Two opposing worldviews can evolve together in a way that a third 
worldview is consistent with previous worldviews. 
o The interaction results in a unified solution. 
 
To see if an individual is using either of the above three reconciling approaches we ask 
the questions presented in Table 40 . These questions are designed based on the mentioned 
three constructs (i.e. opposing worldviews, ontology of truth, and reconciling mechanism). 
Finally, in the last row of Table 40 we show the impact of using dialogical, monological and 
dialectic on freedom that is an agent’s ability to live the life she has reason to value. Hence, 
using ‘dialogical’ and ‘dialectic’ approaches may contract negative freedom, but one’s agency is 
more expanded than in the case when she is using ‘monological’ approaches and dismissing 
the ‘self’ worldview, while it is possible the agent is enjoying expanded negative freedom. 
Following, we explain the three reconciling approaches and their impact on the agency-freedom 
relationship in an imaginary example.  
For example, imagine Person A, who is an employee in a fashion company, finds out 
that her worldview is opposing her boss’s worldview regarding the designs of their new hat 
collection. Facing the boss’s opposing worldview, if Person A uses ‘monologue’ and dismisses 
her own worldview, then her agency is contracted, but, her negative freedom (e.g. number and 
quality of options to be promoted, to get a higher salary, to have more holidays, to be sent on 
business trips, etc.) may be expanded as she is not conflicting with her boss’s worldview. 
However, in this situation as her agency is contracted then it (Baaren et al., 2015) is shown that 
her creativity is being undermined and she may feel unsatisfied. If she uses monologue and 
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dismisses her boss’s worldview, then even though the conative mode of her agency is 
expanded and she is fully in control, the affective and cognitive modes of her agency are 
contracted, as well as her negative freedom (e.g. she may be punished or fired) as her boss 
expects her to perform according to the orders. On the other hand, if in this situation Person A 
uses dialectic, then she has managed to arrive at a single solution that is consistent with her 
own and her boss’s initial worldviews. In this case, the conative mode of her agency is a bit 
contracted, because she is not fully in control of the situation but her affective and cognitive 
modes of agency are expanded, because she is not conflicting with her boss’s worldview. In this 
case, her negative freedom is expanded (e.g. her options are expanded as she may be 
rewarded and/or promoted) as she is considering her boss’s worldview. However, using 
dialectic her positive freedom will not be expanded as much as in the case when she uses 
dialogue, when she manages to consider both her own worldview and her boss’s worldview, 
even though her worldview is being informed and may alter in discourse with the boss’s 
worldview. Using dialogue, all three modes of agency and two sides of freedom are expanded 
because both parties’ (Person A and her boss) worldviews are noticed, acknowledged and 
involved in an evolving discourse that never ends (Robinson, 2011). As a result of using 
dialogue, neither her agency nor her freedom is contracted, thus, she can create, innovate and 
enjoy doing her job. Normatively speaking, it can be conjectured that the best reconciling 
approach to have expanded agency and freedom is dialogue, then dialectic and finally 
monologue. However, it is shown that using dialogue and even dialectic to encounter the 
opposing worldview is not cognitively easy, because the agent must be able to self-distance 
from her ‘self’ rationality type and deal with the negative emotions that are generated after 
facing the ‘other’ opposing worldview. As mentioned earlier, self-distancing is a cognitively 
difficult task (White et al., 2015). In this line, Table 40 presents the measurements that we use 
in Study 4 to detect the reconciling approaches of interview participants.  
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Table 40: Measurement Scale of Monologue, Dialogue, Dialectic 
Questions of Each 
Theme 
 
Expected answers if the agent uses any of the three approaches: 
 
 
Monological Approach 
 
Dialogical Approach 
 
Dialectic Approach 
Ontology of Worldviews: 
1. Do you have the same worldview as your parents? 
2. Which worldview is more important and valuable to you? 
 
 
‘Other’ worldview is not 
recognised and acknowledged. 
Denying the difference. 
 
‘Other’ worldview is recognised and 
acknowledge.  
The differences between ‘self’ and 
‘other’ worldviews are understood. 
Differences are recognised in a 
neutral way.  
 
‘Other’ worldview is recognised 
and acknowledged.  
The differences between ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ worldviews are 
understood. 
The differences are recognised 
in relation to a single ‘true’ world 
worldview. 
Ontology of Truth: 
3. Whose worldview do you think is right? 
 
 
Belief in single transcended 
‘truth’ 
Either ‘self’ or ‘other’ worldview 
is assumed as ‘truth’. 
Either ‘self’ or ‘other’ worldview 
is assumed as a wrong 
perspective. 
 
Belief in the existence of different 
realities that appear to ‘self’ and 
‘other’. 
Both ‘self’ and ‘other’ world 
worldviews are assumed to be a 
different worldview to reality. 
 
Belief in single transcended 
‘truth’. 
If ‘self’ and ‘other’ worldviews 
are different, then one ‘true’ 
worldview is assumed to be their 
integration. 
If ‘self’ and ‘other’ worldviews 
are similar then it is the ‘truth’. 
Reconciling Mechanism: 
4. How do you make up your mind, now that your parents have a different worldview with you? 
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If ‘self’ is strong then dismissing 
the opposing worldview. 
If ‘other’ is strong then 
dismissing the ‘self’ opposing 
worldview. 
 
Keeping both worldviews. 
Continually interacting with the 
opposing worldview and being 
informed and altered. 
 
Integrating ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
world worldviews. 
At the end, keeping one single 
world worldview that is the 
integrated version of the initial 
worldviews. 
Impact on Freedom Expansion/Contraction 
 
 
If ‘self’ worldview is dismissed, 
then positive freedom is 
contracted.  
If ‘other’ worldview is dismissed 
then negative freedom is 
contracted. 
 
Positive freedom is expanded. 
Negative Freedom is expanded. 
 
Positive freedom is contracted. 
Negative freedom is expanded. 
Impact of Agency Expansion/contraction 
 
 
If ‘self’ worldview is dismissed, 
then agency is contracted.  
If ‘other’ worldview is dismissed 
then the conative mode of 
agency is expanded, but 
affective and cognitive modes 
are contracted. 
 
Agency is expanded. 
 
Affective and cognitive modes of 
agency are expanded. 
  272 
Study 4, Part 1: Result (Worldview and Reconciling Approach) 
Table 41 presents the findings. As evidence, in interview with 10 students who have had 
opposing ‘self’ and ‘other’ worldviews, we have found evidence for three types of reconciling 
approached in three cases that the agent is using a reconciling approached as we conjectured 
in Table 40. The findings indicate that F.Z. is using dialectic, N.J. is using dialogue, and M.M. 
and P.T. are using monologue.  
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Table 41: Empirical Evidence for Worldview and Reconciling Approach (Study4-Part1) 
Particip
ant 
 
Reconciling 
Approach 
 
Evidences 
F.Z. 
Case of 
Dialecti
c 
 
Participant 
 
 
F.Z. is a 19-year-old student, living in Tabriz. She was studying natural science at high school. 
This is the second year that F.Z. is taking the University Entrance Exam (Concour). Her goal is to 
study medicine in Tabriz university. However, her exam result does not allow her to choose her 
desirable option (i.e. medicine in Tabriz university). 
Opposing ‘Self’ 
and ‘other’ 
Factors 
(Self-Factor-1: Completely Agree) VS. (Other-Factor-1: Indifferent):  
(I think that I make this decision because I genuinely want it and this is based on my values.) VS. 
(Others are not sure that how genuinely I want this choice and whether I choose this based on my 
values.) 
(Self-Factor-4: Agree) VS. (Other-Factor-8: Indifferent) 
(I think that I have other alternatives with equal values.) V.S (Others are not sure whether I have 
other alternatives as valuable as this option.)  
Rationalisation Once F.Z. says that she is very eager to study medicine, but another time she contradicts herself 
and says that she is indifferent about it. In this regard, F.Z. says: 
“well my mother, father, friends and consultant know that I really like medical major, but they 
exactly do not know how much I am putting effort in it or how much I am motivated to study in this 
major.  
“If it didn't happen, well it didn’t happen. That is fine.” 
She claims that the reason that others cannot understand her is that this is the second time that 
she is taking this exam. It is not clear, why the number of attempts is related to what she claims as 
others’ misjudgement of her motives. Further, she does not feel comfortable revealing her result. 
In this regard, F.Z. says:  
“My result that became something (she does not say her result and instead uses ‘something’), my 
mother told me that I did not try hard enough. This is because this year was the second year that I 
took the university entrance exam.” 
Ontology of 
Worldview: 
This is the first sign that F.Z. is using dialectic, because she is acknowledging her mother’s 
worldview and assigns value to it but she believes in a single “true” worldview, as she says: 
“I think it is better to use each other’s ideas. There should not be only what I want or only what my 
mother tells me. I think if we talk with each other and reach a common point, it is better.” 
Ontology of 
Truth: 
This is the second sign that F.Z. is using dialectic, because she believes in an agreement stage 
that satisfies both her and her mother, as she says: 
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“Me and my mother spoke with each other and finally we arrived to an agreement. At the end we 
suggested something that both me and my mother side were agreed on it and accepted it.” 
Reconciling 
Mechanism: 
 
 
This is the third sign that F.Z. has used dialectic, because she has managed to integrate her 
worldview and her mother’s worldview in a way that is satisfying for both parties, as she says: 
My mother told me: “do not choose universities in far cities”, but I liked to choose other cities, 
because it has increased my options and the possibility of being accepted. Here, I said that “I do 
not choose very faraway cities; for example, I do not choose Ahvaz, Shiraz, etc. that are very far 
from our own city, but I choose Ardebil, Zanjan, and the cities near Tabriz”; then, my mother 
accepted that I choose other cities too.” 
Agency and 
Freedom 
 
 
Using dialectic, F.Z.’s agency and positive freedom have been expanded, as expected in Table 
21. As evidence she says: 
“When we talked like this, I was more confident about what I chose, because both my mother’s 
idea and my idea influenced it.” 
N.J. 
Case of 
Dialogu
e 
 
Participant 
 
N.J. is an 18-year-old student. She was studying natural science in high school, aiming to study 
dentistry at university, but her result in the university entrance exam was lower than the required 
grade for the major of dentistry. She is the only child and few years ago her family migrated from 
Tehran to Booshehr that is a smaller and deprived city comparing with Tehran that is the capital 
city. She pointed to this migration several times during the interview and she is so proud of her 
slang that is like what is known as “Tehrani” slang. While studying at high school, she was working 
part time as a radio presenter in Booshehr radio station, as she claims “this was because I did not 
speak like a typical Booshehri”. 
Opposing ‘Self’ 
and ‘other’ 
(Self-Factor-5: Indifferent) VS. (Other-Factor-5: Completely Agree): 
(I am not sure if this choice influences my future state.) VS. (I think that others think that this 
choice will greatly influence my future.) 
(Self-Factor-6: not agree) VS. (Other-Factor-3: agree) 
(I think that my options are not limited.) VS. (I think that others think that my options are limited.)  
Rationalization 
 
 
N.J. claims that her parents give her the authority to select her university major because she is an 
only child and they are living in rural city. It is not clear why these reasons justify her parents’ 
behaviour towards her, as she says:  
“They agree with me, because I am the only child, they let me to make my own decision. I mean 
this is because (we live in) rural cities. If I want to go to another city, I do not have the problem of 
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moving there with my family. I will not stay in a dormitory. If I choose to go to a different city, I will 
go there with my parents.” 
Ontology of 
Worldview: 
 
 
This is the first sign that N.J. is using dialogue, because she acknowledges her parents’ opposing 
worldview. Relative to the other worldview, she evaluates her ‘self’ worldview and being informed 
from that standpoint, then she considers the negative points in her ‘self’ worldview, as she says: 
“I try to react logically. This means that firstly I ask them what their reasons are. For example, to 
select a university major, my father told me not to choose private universities. This means: “Do not 
choose the majors that you like, such as dentistry and laboratory, because they are in private 
universities; instead go and study for another year and try to be accepted in public university in the 
next year, because it will reduce the cost.” Well, what I wanted was to apply for private universities 
this year. This is because, I saw my ability inside me and I saw that if I study for another year, I 
might be accepted in the same major as this year, but in public university. But I know that I cannot 
reach to dentistry in public university, even if I study for another year, based on the ability that I 
have and my energy. When I see that I have to study the same major next year, I prefer to be one 
year ahead. And the cost that I have to spend to study for another year too, but in a public 
university. I was thinking that it takes another year and passing another Concour, which I need to 
spend money for classes to take another exam. I talked with my parents and I told my thoughts. 
They became convinced and accepted that I also apply for private universities as well.” 
Ontology of 
Truth: 
 
This is the second insight that N.J. is using dialogue, because she assumes that there is an 
element of reality in different worldviews: 
“My choice has negative sides as well. For example, if I study nursing I have to take another exam 
after two years. My grades must be all A to be able to take this exam and I must have a TOFEL 
degree as well. My English is good, but the fact that my result must be all very good, is a risk.” 
Reconciling 
Mechanism: 
 
 
This is the third sign, implying that N.J. is using dialogue as for her the opposing worldviews are 
informed from each other and they continually change in this dialectic, as she says: 
“in some cases disagreement may happen. For example, I did not like nursing and I only wanted 
to choose ‘medicine’ or ‘dentistry’ majors, despite the fact that my result in exam would not match 
to these majors. I wanted to reject the other majors and I wanted to study for another year to take 
the next year university entrance exam. Well, I talked with my mother and father, and they told 
how they see those majors in the society. Then they asked me to do a research about other 
majors. Well, my mother was insisting that I choose nursing as well. Then, I went and did a 
research about nursing and I found that, yes, this is a good major and it has good prospects and 
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then I grew interest in nursing.” 
“I did my research in internet, surfing different websites, talking with nursing students at university. 
I asked them about its future in the job market and I found out that nursing and midwifery students 
can progress by taking advanced exams. I did not know this before; and I also found out that being 
accepted in this exam is very difficult (at this point she is giggling). Yes, I found this out; I also 
found out that about its income and its post degrees.” 
Agency and 
Freedom: 
 
As conjectured in Table 21, using dialogue N.J.’s freedom and agency are expanded, because 
through dialogue, she has found 150 majors that she likes and she is confident she would be 
accepted in most of them, as she says:  
Agency and freedom before and after Decision: “At first, when I came from Concour, me and my 
friends knew that our result in the exam would not let us to choose the major that we wanted. That 
is why, after less than a week after the exam I started studying for the next year’s exam. After a 
while I saw that the pressure that is on me would not let me go forward. And I did not have the 
energy that I had during the previous year for studying. So, I took one week as a gap to see if I 
can reorganise myself to study again. After a week I looked at myself and I saw that, no, I could 
not continue in this way. This means that with that spirit if I continued, after a few months 
everything would be ruined. That is why I talked with my mother and my mom told me that there 
are other majors as well. The bridge of success is not only this profession (dentistry), and of 
course through other majors I can also attain what I want. Then I talked with my aunt and relatives, 
those who have studied top majors and knew about it. I came to this conclusion to choose different 
majors, and with help of God, if the result turns into what I wanted, then I will go to university. Now, 
my options are those that I really like. This means that I like all of them, and there is no option that 
I do not like in my application list. That means that even my last option is a thing that I like. My last 
and least option is nursing that I researched about it and I found that it is good. I have completed 
150 options in my university application list. Although my result is five figure (this is very weak 
result) my first option is dentistry at Shahid Beheshi University. I start from this top choice and go 
down, until my last option that is nursing in Booshehr University.” 
M.M.: 
Case of 
M.M. 
Monolo
 
Participant 
 
M.M. is a student living in a rural city of Zanjan, that is a deprived area in Iran. She studied maths 
in high school and she achieved a very good result in the University Entrance Exam (Concour). 
She finished 83rd out of about 800,000 participants. She has decided to study electronic 
engineering in Tehran University. Her main challenge is that job market for engineering positions 
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gue 
(Dismis
s Other 
Voice) 
is abundant with many university graduates. According to the host organisation’s official website, 
in 2015, there is a widespread tendency towards medical majors that are perceived as having 
better employment prospects in Iran. M.M.'s main decision challenge is that with her good result, 
she could have studied medicine that was popular, but she was limited to her field of study at high 
school that only allowed her to choose maths-related majors.   
Opposing ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ 
(Self-Factor-5: indifferent) VS. (Other-Factor-5: completely agree): 
(I am not sure if her choice influences her future state.) VS. (I think that my parents think that this 
choice will completely change my future.) 
(Self-Factor-6: interference) VS. (Other-Factor-3: completely agree): 
(I am indifferent about the limiting impact of environment on my choice.) VS. (I think that others 
think that my options are highly limited by society.) 
Rationalisation She claims that the easy way is not exciting while she reports doubt and regret about her decision 
as she says: 
"With my choice, I have to build everything myself, and it is not like everything is provided, but I 
think if everything is there, it is not exciting at all." 
Sign of doubt: "I managed to convince my family that I can find a good job. I myself want to do 
that, but even if this will not happen, I am happy with my decision." 
Ontology of 
Worldview: 
 
This is the first sign that M.M. is using monologue and dismissing the ‘other’ opposing worldview, 
because she thinks they do not know her well and if they come to know her, they will arrive at the 
same worldview as her like her family, as she says: 
“My family gradually reached the same worldview as mine. For example, now they know that if I 
was studying biology, it was possible that I did not study hard, because I did not like that subject, 
and this might have influenced my result in Concour (university entrance exam). However, some 
people who do not know me, they ask me "why did you go to study maths, with this (good) result in 
Concour? Why did you not go to study medical majors?" But my family do not say the same thing.” 
Ontology of 
Truth: 
 
This is the second sign that M.M. is using monologue, because she says that although there are 
different worldviews, but one must stand on her own worldview to the end, as she says: 
“There are many opposing views but you should think your own way. For example, I remember a 
girl who had chosen a mathematical major like me. I asked her: "Why did you go to study maths 
and why didn't you decide to study medical majors?" She answered: "Well, doctors are sittings in 
their offices and they are playing with flies as they are bored, because there are not enough 
patients." Well, this view exists but not everyone thinks in this way.” 
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“I don't know what 'right' means here. But I think that one chooses only once and in the rest of her 
life she is following her decision. If one follows her choice and stay with it, no doubt she will 
achieve a result. The 'rightness' is what our performance will create.” 
Reconciling 
Mechanism: 
 
This is the third sign that M.M. is using monologue, because she is keeping her worldview intact 
and tries to convince others, as she says: 
 “I managed to convince them that I can find a good job. It is supposed that I find a good job, but 
even if this will not happen, I am happy with my decision.” 
Agency-
Freedom 
 
 
Using monologue and dismissing the opposing other worldview, M.M. has expanded positive 
freedom, as well as expanded affective and cognitive modes of agency, however, her conative 
mode of agency and her negative freedom are contracted and she experiences doubt and the fear 
class of emotion, as she says: 
“I had things with this problem. It turned into a challenge. But I remember when I went out of our 
school door after choosing the mathematical major, and I was going towards home, in my mind 
with each step that I was taking, I was imagining something in my mind that I don't know how to 
explain it with words. I was somehow thinking that I am going towards what I want and all of the 
doubts and regrets will remain behind me, somewhere that I do not ever look at them again.” 
 “Well, this challenge might never be solved, because sometimes one might say something that 
past will come in front of my eyes and all of those doubts that are settled down somewhere, they 
will come to the surface of my thoughts. But, anyway, when one makes a decision she must stand 
for it, as it may not be solved completely, I try not to think about it. This is because I think it has 
finished and I think that what has happened is the best thing that could have happened, and if 
someone wants to change my idea, I try not to think about it.” 
P.T.: 
Case of 
Dialecti
c 
 
Participant 
 
P.T. is an 18-year-old student of natural science. She lives in Sarab a rural city in Iran. She 
achieved a weak result in the university entrance exam that prevents her from applying for the 
popular majors in her field, such as medicine and dentistry in university. This is a special case, 
because she said that it was her father who had filled in the questionnaire on the website. This 
means that her father has access to her username and password and he used it to fill in the 
questionnaire. During the telephone interview, her father was also listening to the conversation. 
We report this case, because it represents a real other (i.e. father) worldview about the agent’s 
decision. The interesting point is that the father has filled in the questionnaire in a way that ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ worldviews are not similar. 
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Opposing ‘Self’ 
and ‘other’: 
 
(Self-Factor-5: Agree) V.S. (Other-Factor-5: Disagree) 
(Her father thinks that his daughter thinks that her choice will influence her future state.) VS. (Her 
father thinks that his daughter’s thinks that her father thinks that her choice will not influence her 
future.) 
(Self-Factor-4: Agree) V.S. (Other-Factor-8: Disagree) 
(Her father thinks that his daughter thinks that she has other valuable alternatives.) V.S. (Her 
father thinks that her daughter thinks that he thinks that she does not have other alternatives. 
Rationalization 
 
P.T. says that her weak result in Concour is due to her gender, she reports shame-related 
emotions about her decision because her exam result was not satisfactory.  
“I think about choosing nursing at university, and I think that it is good for my future. I feel that 
there is a good job market for nursing compared with other majors. If someone wants to study 
medicine, she has to try hard for seven years. But for nursing, you can achieve the job that you 
want in four years. I think, for a girl it is better that she does not invest seven years.” 
Researcher: Why? Do you think for boys it is different?  
P.T.: (She giggled and said nothing) 
Ontology of 
Worldview:  
This is the first sign that P.T. used dialectic as she assigns high priority to some kind of true 
worldview with logical characteristics, as she says: 
“I put my view in high priority and think about their view too. If their view is logical, I will count on 
their idea, if it was not logical then I will ignore their view.” 
Ontology of 
Truth: 
 
This is the first sign that P.T. uses monologue as for her there is a ‘true’ worldview that is logic but 
this logic is exactly the same as the ‘self’ worldview, as she says: 
“Logical means that I put myself in that position, the position that they want me to have in future 
and I see that I really cannot tolerate it, or if it does not match my feeling and situation, then I will 
dismiss their view.” 
Reconciling 
Mechanism:  
This is the second sign that P.T. uses monologue, because she even dismisses her own 
worldview and becomes convinced or accept the other world view and convince the other party, as 
she says: 
“I try to convince them and make them satisfied, but if they will not be convinced, then I will give 
up.” 
Agency-
Freedom 
  
P.T. uses monologue and her negative freedom is contracted, three modes of her agency are 
contracted, if she “gives up” her ‘self’ and if she dismisses the ‘other’ worldview then the affective 
mode of agency is contracted as well as her positive freedom, as she reports shame and regret 
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and she says:  
Expanded negative freedom: “I think it is good for my future. I feel that its job market is good.”  
L.J.:  
Not 
aware 
of 
‘other’ 
worldvi
ew 
 
Participant 
 
L.J. is an 18-year-old student living in Kalbor, a small village in Iran. She is studying natural 
science in high school and aims to study medicine in university. Her result in the University 
Entrance Exam does not allow her to choose the most desirable option.  
Opposing ‘Self’ 
and ‘other’ 
(Self-Factor-1: Completely Agree) VS. (Other-Factor-1: Indifferent):  
(I think that I make this decision because I genuinely want it and this is based on my values.) VS. 
(I think that others are not sure that how genuine I want this choice and whether I choose this 
based on my values.) 
Rationalisation 
 
L.J. points to money and being good for society and the fact that everyone in her family studied 
medicine as the reasons that her family has the same worldview as what she likes. At the end, she 
declined to reveal the differences between her ‘self’ and the ‘other’ opposing worldview as she 
says:  
“I am not in my parent’s position to know what they think, but they must think the same. Because 
in our family everyone is studying in medical majors, I think this influences their view. But, in 
general; No, I do not think that there is a big difference between us”  
“I think that they like medical majors, not because of its money, because our family interest is this 
and everyone has studied medical majors and they like me to study this to be able to be useful for 
society, so they must have the same idea as me. 
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Study 4, Part 1: Result (Emotion) 
Table 42 presents the findings of Part 1 of Study 4 regarding the reconciling approach, 
emotion, and agency and freedom level of the participants. These findings support three notions 
in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to determine the agency-freedom relationship. First, it is 
found that agency and freedom levels must be determined before and after the focal decision. 
Second, the agency level must be evaluated for the three modes of cognitive, conative and 
affective. Third, the freedom level must be determined for the positive and negative senses of 
freedom. Fourth, as conjectured earlier, reconciling approaches reveal certain emotions and 
influence agency-freedom, as presented in Table 24. These findings indicate that each 
construct of agency (i.e. three modes) and freedom (i.e. two sides) must be evaluated 
independently to determine the agency-freedom relationship; otherwise the 
expansion/contraction of freedom cannot be established in relation to agency. In other words, 
breaking down the complex concepts of agency and freedom into their components will help to 
clarify their relationship (see Chapter 7, Discussion for more detail). The findings reveal four 
notions about agency-freedom: (A) using dialogue the three modes of agency and two side of 
freedom are expanded; (B) using monologue and dismissing the ‘self’ worldview the three 
modes of agency and positive freedom are contracted; (C) using monologue and dismissing the 
‘other’ worldview the conative mode of agency and negative freedom are contracted; (D) using 
dialectic the conative agency and positive freedom are contracted. These findings are 
qualitatively driven from a sample of 10; thus they may have low external validity (see Chapter 9, 
Conclusion to read more about the limitations and call for future studies) but they provide 
significant ground to test the agency-freedom relationship. In the following section we study the 
‘rationality type’ aspect of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.
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Table 42: Empirical Evidence for Emotion mapped onto the Reconciling Approach 
Case 
 
Reconciling Approach 
 
Agency 
 
Freedom 
 
Emotion 
 
 Before -> After Before -> After  
F.Z. 
 
 
Dialectic 
 
Cognitive: expanded 
Affective: expanded 
Conative: contracted 
 
 
Positive: expanded 
Negative: expanded 
 
Hope 
Joy 
Confidence 
Gratitude 
N.J. 
 
 
Dialogue 
 
Cognitive: expanded 
Affective: expanded 
Conative: expanded 
 
Positive: contracted 
Negative: expanded 
 
Joy 
Hope Confidence 
M.M. 
 
 
Monologue (Dismiss other) 
 
 
Cognitive: expanded 
Affective: expanded 
Conative: contracted 
 
Positive: expanded 
Negative: contracted 
 
Doubt  
Regret 
Fear (class) 
Pride 
Envy 
P.T. 
 
 
Monologue (Dismiss the 
weaker worldview) 
 
Cognitive: contracted 
Affective: contracted 
Conative: contracted 
 
Positive: contracted 
Negative: contracted 
 
Doubt Shame 
fear 
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Study 4, Part 1: Result (Rationality Type) 
This section presents the empirical support for the rationality types that are mapped onto 
the Evaluation Instrument (see Table 39: The Evaluation Instrument (3rd Version), Study 3). In 
this regard, we focus on one case and we calculate her scores in the Evaluation Instrument and 
then test the mapping of the factors onto rationality types. For this purpose, we choose M.M.’s 
case of university major selection. M.M. is a student in Zanjan that is a small and 
underdeveloped city in Iran. We choose her case because she has the maximum level of 
negative freedom regarding her university major selection, but she is dealing with an opposing 
other worldview that makes her experience doubt and regret (see Table 42). In this regard, an 
outside observer can think that M.M. chooses her university major with positive emotions and 
with high certainty, because she has achieved a very good result in the exam and she can 
select any major she likes in her field. M.M. has high negative freedom, because she has 
achieved a very good result in university entrance exam (i.e. ranked 83rd among half a million 
exam participants in the field of physics and maths), and due to her good result she is able to 
choose any math-related major she desires in any public and/or private universities in Tehran, 
Zanjan (her hometown) and all other cities around the country. However, she experiences doubt 
and regret, particularly when she reflects on her situation from the other’s standpoint. The 
question is how M.M. is dealing with this situation, that within the scope of this study we ask 
how her freedom is expanded/contracted based on agency-oriented factors (i.e. the second 
research question). In this line, the interview findings show that M.M. says: 
“My result in the university entrance exam was 83rd. If I studied biology in high school, 
then with this result I could have chosen a medical major at university. They say that 
medicine is better than engineering, because it has a better future.”  
 
As evidence, when M.M. evaluated her university major selection from the ‘other’ 
standpoint, she was thinking about a medical major. According to the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency the reason that M.M. is experiencing regret and doubt is that the option of medical 
major is located in her unrealisable capability set as a side effect of her previous decision to 
choose a mathematical major at high school. In other words, her agency is contracted by her 
previous decision, when she uses Causal Reasoning. This is because M.M. experiences doubt 
and regret when she uses Causal Reasoning and assigns her decision to an event in the past. 
As presented in Table 43, using Causal Reasoning is mapped onto Formal Rationality, which is 
true in this incident as she is explaining her decision based on external norms and standards 
that imply medicine is a better major than engineering. These findings are in line with M.M.’s 
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scores in the Evaluation Instrument (Table 43). As evidence, M.M.’s average score for ‘other’ is 
higher than that for ‘self’ for the factor of Casual State (.47 and .61, equivalently), indicating that 
the Causal State is stronger rationality when M.M. reflects on her decision from the ‘other’ 
standpoint.
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Table 43: M.M.’s Score in the Evaluation Instrument 
Agentic Factor 
Rationality Type Standpoint Score 
Motivation 
 
 
Substantive Self .77 
 
Substantive Other .73 
Capabilities 
 
 
Theoretical Self 1.0 
 
Theoretical Other .86 
Causal Sate 
 
 
Theoretical Self .47 
 
Theoretical Other .60 
Intangible Resources 
 
 
Theoretical Self .60 
 
Theoretical Other .85 
Third Party Evaluation 
 
 
Formal Self .40 
 
Formal Other .40 
Expectation 
 
 
Practical Self .60 
 
Practical Other .85 
Effort and Ability 
 
 
Theoretical Self .70 
Desire Intensity 
 
 
Substantive Self .80 
Popularity 
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Formal Other .30 
Social Group 
  
 
Formal Other .40 
Self-interest 
  
 
Practical Other .70 
Note: The scores are calculated by summing up the score of the items for each factor 
and dividing their sum by the total score for each factor. These scores are to be used for 
presentational purposes alone, and they are not used for comparative purposes.  
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However, Causal Reasoning and Formal Rationality are not the only way of reasoning 
that M.M. is using to evaluate her decision. As evidence, M.M.’s score for Motivation factors 
from the ‘self’ and ‘other’ standpoints (.77 and .73, equivalently) are both high, implying that the 
decision to study engineering at Tehran university is also value laden and goal oriented, which 
means she also has Substantive Rationality and Teleological Reasoning. These findings are 
supported in interview as she says: 
“My decision may not be right for others, but as I believe in what I am doing I can do it 
easily and better. Since the first year in high school, I realized that I was better in 
learning logic than memorising the long names in biology. As we are living in a deprived 
area, we had no labs for biology and learning maths was easier as it just needs your 
imagination. I could have chosen the field of biology and maybe I would have grown 
interest in it, but I knew that my mind did not have the ability for learning biology as it has 
in maths. I preferred to put everything in its own place. My family gradually reached the 
same view. For example, today they know that if I had chosen biology, possibly I did not 
study as much as I studied maths, because I did not like that subject; and this might 
have negative impact in my result in Concour (University Entrance exam). However, 
some people who do not know me, they ask me "why did you go to study maths with this 
(good) result in Concour? Why did you not go to study medical majors? But my family do 
not say the same thing."  
 
 
Overall, these findings are the empirical evidence that supports the validity of the 
Evaluation Instrument, the rationality types behind its agentic factors, reconciling approach and 
emotions, in terms of establishing freedom expansion/contraction based on agency-oriented 
factors that is being developed further in the second part of Study 4.
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Figure 29: M.M.’s Scores in the Evaluation Instrument supported by Qualitative Data 
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Study 4, Part 1: Result interpretation  
Figure 30 adds the findings regarding the agency-oriented factors, emotion, reconciling 
approaches and rationality type to the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. These findings imply that 
the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency can explain the freedom expansion/contraction of an agent 
when making an important decision. However, the question is how to use the Tri-Modal Theory 
of Agency in a way that all cognitive, conative, and affective modes of agency are considered 
when we determine the agency-freedom relationship. For this purpose, we conduct Part 2 of 
Study 4 presented in the next section. At the end, a case study methodology is being developed 
that can be used to apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to determine the agency-freedom 
relationship. The next chapter uses this methodology in a full case study.
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Figure 30: Empirical Findings in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
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Study 4, Part 2: Qualitative Amendment 
This study aims to determine the agency-freedom relationship through (1st objective) 
determining the agency-oriented factors associated with one’s freedom to do/be what she 
values, and (2nd objective) establishing freedom expansion/contraction based on agency-
oriented factors. So far we have developed the Tri-Modal Modal Theory of Agency and an 
Evaluation Instrument that enables us to determine the agency-freedom relationship, but we 
need further empirical support for our second research objective. Further, we need guidelines 
for using the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in different contexts. Hence, here in Part 2 of Study 4 
we will conduct four interviews. Participants fill in an Evaluation Instrument and then we have 
conducted face-to-face interviews. These individuals are chosen for three reasons: (A) they are 
different from the participants in previous samples and this enables us to test the generic aspect 
of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency; (B) their focal decision is different from the focus of other 
empirical studies in this research; (C) these decisions have either incontinent or counterintuitive 
characteristic that means the decision is made either contrary to self/other judgement, which 
makes an interesting case to analyse the agency-freedom relationship. Here, contrary to 
judgment is identified when a decision is made contrary either to the ‘other’ or ‘self’ worldview 
and the agent is aware of it and points to this dichotomy. 
Table 44 presents the findings in terms of the participants’ scores in the Evaluation 
Instrument, reconciling approach, affective mode, as well as their agency and freedom levels 
before and after the decision. In order to combine these findings according to the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency, we have faced several key challenges. For example, the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency is a temporal theory, thus, one challenge in applying it to a decision is how far 
back/forward in one’s life trajectory we should proceed. Further, this theory analyses one’s 
capability set, thus, the question is how many capabilities must be analysed. This is regarded as 
a main operationalising challenge to apply any capability-oriented theory (Alkire, 2015, 2008), 
because in most cases agents face many potential opportunities in decision making (Kahneman, 
2012; Simon, 1978). Another challenge is how to consider the three modes of cognitive, 
conative and affective of agency in one analysis, as the amount of data and information for 
identifying all of them can exceed the scope of many research analyses. Finally, the challenge 
is how to use all of these data to determine the agency-freedom relationship using the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency, in a reliable and valid manner. In Chapter 6 we use our experience of 
conducting these four interviews (Table 44) in order to develop a case study methodology for 
the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that addresses the above challenges. Chapter 6 reports the 
case study methodology and uses it in one case study that is about M.G.’s decision. 
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Table 44: Agency-Oriented Factors and the Agency-Freedom Relationship (Study 4, Part 2) 
ID 
 
Profession 
& 
Decision 
 
 
Ag
e 
F/M 
 
Agency-Oriented Factors 
 
Agency-Freedom Relationship 
A.D. 
 
Musician 
& 
Migration 
 
31 
F 
 
Incontinent Characteristic of Decision: 
She decided to migrate, even though she knew that the side effect of her decision would force her to 
leave her family and belongings in the home country. 
‘other’ opposing worldview:  
Not migrating 
 
  Rationality Factor ‘self
’ 
‘other’ Reconcilin
g 
Approach 
Affective 
mode 
Agency Freedom 
 
  Substantiv
e 
Motivation .91 .70 Dialectic ‘other’ 
directed: 
Sadness, 
Hopelessnes
s 
 
‘self’ directed: 
hope 
 
Affective 
Mode 
Contracted
; Cognitive 
and 
Conative 
Modes 
Expanded 
 
 
Negative 
Freedom: 
Expanded 
Positive 
Freedom: 
Contracte
d 
 
 
  Theoretical Capabilitie
s 
.80 .60 
 
  Theoretical Causal 
Sate 
.46 .60 
 
  Theoretical Intangible 
Resources 
.20 .60 
 
  Formal Third Party 
Evaluation 
.80 .48 
 
  Practical Expectatio
n 
 .80 .75 
 
  Theoretical Effort and 
Ability 
.80  
 
  Substantiv
e 
Desire 
Intensity 
.80  
 
  Formal Popularity  .80 
 
  Formal Social 
Group 
 .80 
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  Practical Self-
interest 
 .70 
A.D. 
 
Interview 
Evidence 
 
Rationality Type: (Substantive)  
“I want to introduce a new image of classical music into my country, where classical music is a very alien 
thing; it is forbidden. What I want does not end and it continues or it is better to say that I will continue it; 
because, my goal is not a dead end street. I do it and continue it.” 
Reconciling Approach: (Dialectic) 
“When I was deciding to migrate, it was like I was inside a bubble, in darkness. I didn’t know about the 
outside world, about living in a different country. I asked those who had already been outside the bubble, 
those who had migrated. They all helped me to make this decision.” 
Emotion: 
“migration is like a person getting out of a pool of cold water into which you have jumped and it is very 
difficult for you, and you are tortured in that cold water. I jumped into that cold water and with more ease I 
got out of the water and I will not be tortured again.” 
Agency: 
Agency (Before and After): “Migration increased my motivation. I had motivation before, but migration 
caused me to be more motivated.” 
Freedom: 
Before (Negative Side): “My options were limited. I couldn’t apply for England because it was expensive; I 
couldn’t apply for France, because the French Embassy was shot down during that time, after some have 
attacked the British embassy in Iran. The only option that I had, and I liked was Austria.” 
Before & After (Positive Side): “my difference with the past, I mean before migration is that things were 
very difficult for me in my own country to tolerate, now they are very easy; I have more toleration for a 
difficult situation.” 
M.G
. 
 
Entrepreneu
r  
& 
Keep up a 
start-up 
business 
 
32 
M 
 
Counterintuitive Characteristic of Decision: 
Although his start-up (i.e. an online book shop) was failing, he decided to fight back and keep it up. 
He claims that he is dealing with a lack of job security and financial stability, but he prefers his 
situation to a bureaucratic job because it is his passion. M.G’s decision is analysed in Chapter 6, 
Case Study. 
‘other’ opposing worldview:  
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after failure leaving the start-up and entrepreneurship and working as an employee 
 
 
  Rationality Factor self other Reconciling 
Approach 
Affective mode Agency Freedom 
 
  Substantiv
e 
Motivation .94 .70  
monologue 
and 
dismisses 
opposing 
worldview 
 
‘other’ directed: 
fear, sadness, 
contempt 
 
‘self’ directed: 
hope and joy  
Conative 
Mode 
Contracted
; Affective 
and 
Cognitive 
Modes 
Expanded 
 
Negative 
Freedom: 
Contracte
d 
Positive 
Freedom: 
Expanded 
 
  Theoretical Capabilitie
s 
.86 .93 
 
  Theoretical Causal 
Sate 
.56 .45 
 
  Theoretical Intangible 
Resources 
.55 .20 
 
  Formal Third Party 
Evaluation 
.15 .20 
 
  Practical Expectatio
n 
.93 .90 
 
  Theoretical Effort and 
Ability 
.80  
 
  Substantiv
e 
Desire 
Intensity 
.80  
 
  Formal Popularity  .40 
 
  Formal Social 
Group 
 .60 
 
  Practical Self-
interest 
 .80 
M.G
. 
 
Interview 
Evidence 
 
Rationality Type: (Substantive) 
“My job is different to that of a normal employee. When you are an employee in the oil ministry, it is not 
important if you are doing your job or not. It doesn’t matter at all. Do you know why? Because, you say 
tomorrow I’ll do my job, simply you don’t care.” 
Reconciling Approach: (Monologue) 
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“At that time I was saying it is impossible, everyone else was telling me that it was not possible. But, from 
the other side there is a craziness that I was telling myself “I have to do this work”. 
Emotion:  
This is like ‘faith’; ‘belief’. Today no one expects me to work 16 to 20 hours a day and they tell me why you 
are wasting your time. But this “work” is joy, it is life itself and my identity.” 
Agency and Freedom: 
After: “I resisted that failure because I had commitment to my customers and employees. Commitment is a 
limitation that naturally exists in any decision that you make.” 
M.T. 
 
IT 
Professional 
& 
Migration 
 
30 
M 
 
Incontinent Characteristic of Decision: 
Even though he had good opportunities to migrate, he decided to stay in his country and grow within 
his own country and within the company where he started his career. 
‘other’ opposing worldview: 
Migrating from a developing country to live and work in a developed country 
 
  Rationality Factor self othe
r 
Reconcilin
g 
Approach 
Affective 
mode 
Agency  Freedom 
 
 
  Substantiv
e 
Motivation .71 .70 Monologue 
and 
dismiss 
other 
‘other’ 
directed: fear, 
joy 
 
‘self’ directed: 
hope, 
happiness 
All 
Modes 
Expanded 
 
Negative 
Freedom: 
Contracte
d 
Positive 
Freedom: 
Expanded 
 
  Theoretical Capabilitie
s 
.60 .60 
 
  Theoretical Causal 
Sate 
.50 .60 
 
  Theoretical Intangible 
Resources 
.46 .60 
 
  Formal Third Party 
Evaluation 
.45 .48 
 
  Practical Expectatio
n 
.93 .75 
 
  Theoretical Effort and 
Ability 
.80  
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  Substantiv
e 
Desire 
Intensity 
.80  
 
  Formal Popularity  .80 
 
  Formal Social 
Group 
 .80 
 
  Practical Self-
interest 
 .70 
M.T. 
 
Interview 
Evidence 
 
Rationality Type: (Practical)  
“However, I was thinking that by staying in Iran my social status is better. This allowed me to ignore the 
lower job opportunity here in Iran. I compromised something but I am satisfied now. It is all about cost-
benefit analysis.” 
Reconciling Approach: (Monologue Dismiss other) 
“As I remember, others were against my decision. My feeling was that others did not understand my logic. 
However, they know that I made this decision with motivation based on logic and reason.” 
“Out of experience, I arrived to this point that what I think and say is true in 80 to 90 per cent of cases.” 
Emotion: 
“Well, in some areas I might make a decision with doubt. I cannot say that I was always zero-one. 
Sometime, I didn’t know and I had uncertainty.” 
“However, fear existed there. But, together with hope. This means that that hope, that good feeling that this 
decision is right was completely overcome to stress.” 
Agency: 
After: “after I made this decision, as time passed and I became more convinced and satisfied about it. 
Since then the others’ words are completely ignored by me.” 
Freedom: 
“At that time I did not have high confidence in my decision, but now I am more confident about it.” 
K.G. 
 
Entrepreneu
r &  
Devoting his 
wealth  
 
62 
M 
 
Counter-Intuitive Characteristic of Decision: 
Although devoting his business and wealth may contradict with self-centred goals, he decided to 
devote the entire profit and main part of his business to educational equality. 
‘other’ opposing worldview: 
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Not devoting his business and wealth for other-centred cause.  
 
  Rationality Factor self other Reconciling 
Approach 
Affective 
mode 
Agency  Freedom 
 
 
  Substantiv
e 
Motivation .94 .80 Dialogue ‘other’ 
directed: 
joy, self-
esteem, 
hope 
 
‘self’ 
directed: 
hope 
All Modes 
Expanded 
Negative 
Freedom: 
Expanded 
Positive 
Freedom: 
Expanded 
 
 
  Theoretical Capabilitie
s 
.73 .60 
 
  Theoretical Causal 
Sate 
.20 .65 
 
  Theoretical Intangible 
Resources 
.46 .60 
 
  Formal Third Party 
Evaluation 
.65 .56 
 
  Practical Expectatio
n 
.60 .75 
 
  Theoretical Effort and 
Ability 
.80  
 
  Substantiv
e 
Desire 
Intensity 
1  
 
  Formal Popularity  .50 
 
  Formal Social 
Group 
 .70 
 
  Practical Self-
interest 
 .80 
K.G. 
 
Interview 
Evidence 
 
Rationality Type: (Substantive)  
“A part of it has roots in my own life that I studied with a difficult situation, I worked and studied hard and I 
always thought if I could help those who were in this situation, they could progress and became 
successful” 
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Reconciling Approach: (Dialogue) 
“I consult with many, but I did not go to speak with those who are selfish. If someone is selfish is thinking 
about himself. Well, I did not consult with those who disagreed.” 
Emotion: 
“I have done it, because if you can help others then you become happier and more satisfied and feel that 
you are influential.” 
Agency: 
Agency (Before and After): “Some might have thought that this decision was forced on me, but what was 
clear was that from 1998 I took a step on the way of donating to schools, books, and libraries.” 
Freedom: 
Before and After: I wanted that this (business) will continue in the next generation. However, it (the 
decision) has also other benefits. I saw that if I make this decision, many of the colleagues will find a better 
feeling in society. I myself am more comfortable. I do not feel that I am very different to others. This means 
that this decision had other aspects that were mostly positive. 
Note: (F) stands for Female and (M) stands for Male; (Incontinent Characteristics of Decisions) are found based on participants 
claims, implying that they determined an action contrary to judgment; (ID) to ensure anonymity we use an ID to identify the 
participants; Changes in Agency and Freedom levels are identified in transition from the before state to the after state of the decision; 
For each factor, ‘self’ and ‘other’ scores are calculated by summing up the participant’s score on its items and dividing this by the 
total score for that factor; Emotions deduced based on in Chapter 4, Theory Development. 
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Study 4, Part 2: Result Interpretation (Link to Case Study Chapter) 
Table 44 presented the result of interviews, using the Evaluation Instrument, but it also 
highlighted several challenges regarding the scope of analysis when applying the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency to determine the agency-freedom relationship. Hence, we use these findings 
to develop a case study methodology and use it in one case study in the following chapter.  
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided empirical support for the causal mechanisms behind the 
agency-freedom relationship, through developing a valid and reliable Evaluation Instrument that 
measures agency-oriented factors (using a quantitative approach), and testing the quantitative 
results and mapping them onto the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (using a qualitative approach 
and logical deduction). Further, to show a complete image of the agency-freedom relationship, 
in the following chapter we use the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and develop its case study 
methodology, then we use it to explain one complete case study. 
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Chapter 6: Case Study  
Introduction 
This thesis aims to determine the agency-freedom relationship. In this regard, the Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency has been developed that: (a) explains cognitive, conative and affective 
modes of agency with respect to freedom, (b) measures agency with respect to both positive 
and negative sides of freedom, and (c) determines how agency and freedom are related. The 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is developed to offer a reliable theory to explore an agent’s 
constraints, values, reasons and emotions behind her decisions to see when she says “I chose 
to do/be something” then how much of her agency (i.e. cognitive, affective, and conative) is 
involved in this statement. To test it, this chapter will apply the theory to one case study. In this 
chapter we use the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to show how an individual’s freedom to pursue 
the life she values can be contracted/expanded by her decision. 
In this chapter, first the case study methodology is presented and then these steps are 
passed to develop M.G.’s case study. M.G. is an Iranian entrepreneur, who has decided not to 
give up his online book shop at a time of failure of his collaboration with an Indian company. It is 
found that M.G.’s decision has been in line with his values at that time, and as a result his 
negative freedom has been contracted, even though his positive freedom and the affective and 
cognitive modes of his agency have been expanded. In general, this case study shows that: (A) 
the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is reliable; (B) the agency-freedom relationship must be 
determined for two sides of freedom (positive and negative) and three modes of agency 
(affective, negative, and conative); (C) the affective mode of agency is influenced by several 
different emotions generated from different stand points; (D) the agency-freedom relationship is 
influenced by accidental side effects of decisions; (E) the ‘cognitive’ mode of agency is shaped 
by one’s values and goals that may change over a period of time. In addition, this case study 
reveals that determining the agency-freedom relationship requires us to pass through all 
aspects of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.  
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Case Study Methodology 
The findings of the final empirical study in the previous chapter have shown several 
following challenges regarding the scope of analysis when applying the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency to determine the agency-freedom relationship: (A) start-stop point; (B) Side-Effect; (C) 
Number of Capabilities; (D) Direction of Analysis; (E) Number of Life Cycles; (F) Scope and 
Impact of Direct and Indirect Emotion. These challenges are involved in agency-freedom 
analysis, due to the generic and temporal nature of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. In this 
regard, following we develop a case study methodology that provides a guideline to apply the 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, based on the findings of empirical studies in the previous chapter 
(Chapter 5), particularly Part 2 of Study 4. The case study methodology is developed based on 
the core caveat of the agency-freedom relationship in this study that implies whatever one’s 
values are she is free to pursue them unless she makes a decision that prohibits her from living 
her according to her values. This means that we establish the agency-freedom relationship 
according to this assumption that if one makes a decision and it prevents her from living 
according to her values, then her freedom is contracted (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). 
 
Scope of Analysis: Phases and Steps 
In order to narrow the scope of analysis by the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, we identify 
three phases of (a) Capability Realisation, (b) Evaluation, and (c) Feedback Loop that includes 
11 steps as presented in Figure 31. The first phase is Capability Realisation that explains how 
an agent realises, evaluates, chooses and pursues an option from her capability set (see 
Chapter 4, Theory Development). To show all aspects of the Capability Realisation of the model, 
researchers must accomplish the following four steps of: (Step 1) decision cycles; (Step 2) Side 
Effects; (Step 3) Decision Trajectory; and (Step 4) Capability Sets. The second phase of the 
model is Evaluation that shows how an agent evaluates her state of being/doing ‘before’ and/or 
‘after’ making a significant and conscious decision. This phase has two steps of: (Step 1) the 
evaluation of the state of being/doing before the decision, and (Step 2) the evaluation of the 
state of being/doing after the decision. The third phase of the model is the Feedback Loop that 
is about the impact of agent’s evaluation of her state of being/doing on her subsequent decision. 
This phase has five steps: (Step 1) type and direction of reasoning based on the agent’s result 
in the Evaluation Instrument; (Step 2) direct and indirect emotions; (Step 3) rationality type; 
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(Step 4) reconciling approach; and (Step 5) the link between emotion, reason and decision. To 
apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, all of these three phases and their steps must be 
accomplished to determine the agency-freedom relationship. 
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Figure 31: The Three Phases and Eleven Steps of the Case Study Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase1: 
Capability Realization
• Step1: Decision Cycle
• Step2: Side Effect
• Step3: Decision 
Trajectory
• Step4: Capability Sets
Phase2: 
Evaluation
• Step1: State of 
being/doing Before the 
decision
• Step2: State of 
being/doing after the 
decision
Phase3:
Feed back-forward Loop
•Step1: Type of Reasoning
•Step2: Emotions
•Step3: Rationality Types
•Step4: Reconciling Approach
•Step5: Emotion-Reason-
Decision
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Start-Stop Point 
Analysing the decisions in Part 2 of Study 4 in Chapter 5 shows that one challenge in 
using the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in determining the agency-freedom relationship is where 
to start and stop the analysis in the model. This is a problem, because of the temporal nature of 
the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). In this regard, our 
solution to address this practical challenge is identifying three decision landmarks as presented 
in Figure 32. The first landmark is the ‘Decision’ itself, which is focal decision of analysis (i.e. 
agency outcome) (e.g. migration, choosing university major, career change, and etc.). This 
decision that is central to the temporal analysis is identified as Des1 in Figure 32. The second 
landmark is the ‘Start Point’ of analysis, which is the agent’s state of being/doing “before” 
making the focal decision, which is indicated by “start point” in Figure 32. The start point can be 
beneficial/adverse, functioning/commanding state at T1 (before making Des1). The start point is 
identified as S1 in Figure 32. The third landmark is the “stop point” of analysis, which is the 
agent’s state of being/doing after making the decision, which is evaluated as beneficial/adverse, 
functioning/commanding state at T2 (after making the decision), identified as S2 in Figure 32. 
The following are the examples of start-stop points for A.D., M.G., M.T. and K.G.: 
• A.D. case of migrating to Austria:  
o S1: A.D.’s state of being/doing before migrating to Austria when she is in Iran,  
o Des1: Decision to migrate  
o S2: A.D.’s state of being/doing after migration when she is in Austria. 
• M.G case of founding his online bookshop:  
o S1: M.G.’s state of being/doing before delivering a failed project in India when 
its failure threatened the survival of his business (online bookshop),  
o Des1: Decision to deliver the failed project and keep his online bookshop,  
o S2: M.G.’s state of being/doing after delivering the failed project. 
• M.T. case of staying in Iran instead of migrating abroad to live in a developed country 
and to work in a leading high-tech company:  
o S1: M.T.’s state of being/doing before deciding to stay in his country,  
o Des1: Decision of staying in his country  
o S2: M.T.’s state of being/doing after staying in his country. 
• K.G. case of devoting his business wealth for educational equality in Iran:  
o S1: K.G.’s state of being/doing before devoting his business wealth,  
o Des1: Decision of devoting his business wealth  
o S2: K.G.’s state of being/doing after devoting his business wealth. 
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Figure 32: The Start-Stop Point 
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Scope of the Capability Analysis 
Due to the unlimited number of an agent’s capabilities at any decision time (Britz et al., 
2013), to identify the capability set we set a rule. First, we only trace two capability complement 
sets that are directly related to the focal decision of Des1. For example, the following are the 
capability complement sets for A.D., M.T., M.G. and K.G.: 
• A.D. and M.T. cases of migration: capability sets of migrating and not-migrating. 
• M.G. case of online bookshop: capability sets of keeping up and not keeping up his 
business after failure.  
• K.G. case of devoting wealth: capability sets of devoting and not devoting wealth. 
 
Decision Trajectory: The One Cycle Rule and the 12 Nodes 
The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is dynamic and traces an agent’s decision trajectory in 
time. As a result, one important challenge in determining the agency-freedom relationship is to 
identify the evaluation of before and after the decision and how many cycles we travel 
back/forward from the start point. To establish the number of cycles we set two following 
principles. The first principle is that to use the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we analyse one 
decision cycle in each case study. Figure 33 presents the “One Cycle” rule. The second 
principle is that we have designed a time sequence presentation of decision trajectory in 12 
nodes that must be passed to conduct a case study (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). 
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Figure 33: The One Cycle Rule 
  308 
Case Study Methodology (Sum up) 
This study aims to determine the agency-freedom relationship. The Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency determines this link by analysing how an agent’s state of being/doing is being 
transformed by making an important ‘decision’, which is regarded as an agency outcome and 
the linking point between agency and freedom. Using the core model of the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency, the agency-freedom question can be expressed in this way that how an agent travels 
from her current state of being (St1) to her subsequent state of being (St2) by making an 
important decision (Des1). The state transition happens when this person makes this focal 
decision (Des1) that its analysis is the focus of this study. If Des1 conflicts with the agent’s 
values, then either her positive or her negative freedom is contracted; otherwise, if Des1 is in 
line with her values, then her positive freedom is expanded, even though in some cases her 
negative freedom may be contracted. However, if one makes a decision according to her values, 
then her agency is expanded, which is more aspirational than the cases that one has high 
negative freedom but contracted level of agency. In the following sections, we use this lens and 
based on the above-mentioned methodological steps we will conduct M.G.’s case study using 
the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. 
  309 
 
The M.G. Case Study: Introduction 
M.G. is the founder of a pioneering online bookshop in Iran (the case is kept anonymous 
due to ethical considerations, see Chapter 3, Methodology). While he was a student in Tehran 
University, he started this online book shop. His co-founder and investor was a director of a 
well-known book shop chain in Tehran. The case of the online bookshop is about a decision 
M.G. made in India in 2013. At that time his online bookshop was collaborating with an Indian 
company but their collaborative project had failed. This put the whole business on the verge of 
bankruptcy. M.G. had to decide whether to resist the failure or give up the business. As 
presented in Figure 34, M.G. decided to resist the failure and deliver the project with his own 
team, instead of giving up the whole business (Des1). This decision transformed M.G.’s state of 
being/doing from (S1) to (S2) as highlighted in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34: Decision Trajectory (Zoom out) 
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Section 1: State of Being/Doing Before Decision  
As mentioned in the case study methodology, to apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
we start from explaining why M.G. has made the focal decision of (Des1), from evaluating his 
state of being/doing before making that decision (S1) (see Figure 35).  
 
Figure 35: Section Position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency  
 
 
 
In this regard, we asked M.G. about his situation before making the decision and M.G. 
said: 
“Two years ago we were working with an Indian company. At that time, it took 
nine months from the Indian company to deliver a project that they had to finalise 
it in two months and at the end the project did not deliver. I went to south of India 
to the Indian company myself. They told me that they could not deliver the project. 
I went out of the company and I sat in the street crying.”  
 
To analyse this data, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency evaluates M.G.’s state of 
being/doing based on the two criteria of “value” and “volition” as presented in Figure 36 (see 
Chapter 3, Theory Development). In terms of “value”, M.G.’s narrative showed that his state of 
being was not desirable for him, because when he found out about the failure of the Indian 
company, he was embarrassed as he said that he sat on the street crying. Accordingly, from 
social view his state was not desirable too, as M.G. said: 
“At that moment I remembered the conflict between me and what others were 
thinking. I was telling to myself what they always told me “are you crazy? You 
were in the university and studying! Why did you start this business?”  
 
As evidence, M.G. thinks that the social view has questioned his choice and starting an 
online bookshop has not been approved and enforced by society. Regarding the “volition” 
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aspect of his decision, M.G.’s narrative showed that he did not end up at that situation from his 
own choice, and the Indian company forced him to end up with the failed project. Hence, M.G.’s 
state was “commanding”, forced by the Indian company (Figure 36). Altogether, we evaluate 
M.G.’s state of being/doing before Des1, as “Adverse Commanding”. In the following section we 
use M.G.’s result in the Evaluation Instrument to indicate why he made this decision.
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Figure 36: Value-Volition Presentation of State of Being and Doing (At T1) 
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Section 2: State of Being/Doing After Decision 
Based on the same criteria that we have used to evaluate M.G.’s state of being/doing 
before Des1, we will evaluate his state of being/doing after this decision. The findings indicate 
that M.G.’s S2 is Beneficial Functioning. S2 is functioning, because M.G has had control over 
the situation, as he claimed that he willingly asked the Indian company to give him the control 
over their IT team to deliver the failed project, as he said: 
“I asked them (the Indian company) to give me their whole team as the cost of 
not delivering my project, and I led the whole team myself for five days.”  
 
This finding implies that he volitionally has arrived at S2, thus we evaluate his state of 
being/doing after the decision as ‘functioning’. In this line, we have found that M.G. was 
experiencing joy and pride, which are the evidences for assessing his new state after the 
decision (i.e. S2) as ‘Beneficial’. In this line, M.G. says that the result of his decision has 
‘stunned’ him and others, because they have successfully delivered the failed project, as he 
said:  
“It is stunning to say that the project that could not be delivered in nine months 
was delivered in five days. I brought eight engineers from Tehran and they were 
collaborating with us on the screens and this solved the problem and we 
delivered the project.”
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Section 3: Findings of the Evaluation Instrument  
This is the first step of phase 3 of the Feed backward-forward Loop (see Figure 37). 
Here, we identify the agency-oriented factors associated with M.G.’s freedom based on his 
scores in the Evaluation Instrument (Table 45). These scores imply several findings about 
M.G.’s decision. First, the ‘self’ and ‘other’ agency-oriented factors of ‘Motivation’ and 
‘Expectation’ receive the highest scores (.94, .93, .70, and .90 respectively). As shown in Table 
45, all these factors are a future-oriented type of reasoning, implying that M.G. is more of a 
teleological thinker, attributing his decision to the future rather than the past. Having teleological 
reasoning was supported in the interview as he said: 
“One thing is very important for any entrepreneur that is ‘reputation’. If I gave up 
in India, there was no one there, but I would have lost my ‘reputation’ before my 
angle investor. I behaved in a way that my partner could ‘later’ say that “ok, he 
might be broken, but we can count on him.”  
 
This finding implies that M.G. is using teleological reasoning, referring to a reason for his 
decision in the future. The reason is that he anticipates that if he fails to deliver the project then 
in the future he will lose his reputation. This finding also shows how M.G.’s evaluation at S1 will 
feed forward to his future state, as he anticipates a threat to his reputation. This also implies that 
M.G.’s goal is to become a successful entrepreneur who has a trustworthy reputation in the 
market, which is a sign showing that he has either practical or substantive rationality. In this line, 
M.G.’s highest scores are ‘self’ Motivation (.94) and this factor is mapped onto substantive 
rationality (see Chapter 3, Theory Development). M.G.’s high score in this factor shows that he 
has substantive rationality, but all of his other highest scores are ‘Self’ Expectation (.93), ‘other’ 
Expectation (.90), and ‘other’ Capabilities imply that he has practical rationality. The question is 
what exactly M.G.’s rationality type is. This is an important question, because it shows the type 
of his values, which is required to establish if his decision has contracted his freedom.  
 
Figure 37: Section Position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
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Further, Table 45 shows that M.G.’s score for ‘self’ and ‘other’ factors of ‘third party 
evaluation’ have the lowest values (.15 and .20 respectively). These findings indicate that: (A) 
M.G. was not using formal rationality, because third party evaluation is not significant in his 
decision making, (B) M.G.’s ‘self’ worldview is stronger than the ‘other’ worldview, and (C) he 
believes that he has higher motivation than what he perceived the ‘other’ thinks about his 
decision.  
It is found that M.G.’s ‘self’ scores in the Evaluation Instrument are different to his ‘other’ 
scores. For example, his ‘self’ scores for Capabilities (.86) and Resource Limitation (.55) are 
smaller than ‘other’ scores for Capabilities (.93), and Resource Limitation (.20). These findings 
imply that: (A) M.G. was thinking about the opposing worldview when he was making the 
decision, and (B) M.G. saw more limitation on his resources to pursue what he wants, but he 
perceived that others were not aware of these constraints, and (C) he has had either 
‘substantive’ or ‘practical’ rationality, as he has had future-oriented reasoning.  
Here, the question is whether his rationality type is substantive or practical. In this regard, 
we trace M.G.’s decision cycle in time to see how loyal he remains to his values, and whether 
his goals are short-term or long-term oriented. These two sets of information will help us to 
identify his rationality type. If his values and goals are solid over time, then he has substantive 
rationality. Otherwise, if he changes his values and his objectives are short term, then he has 
‘practical’ rationality. A mechanism that helps to identify the solidity of his values is how M.G. 
encounters with the opposing worldview and whether he dismisses his own worldview (including 
his values and goals) facing the opposing worldview in the future (see Chapter 3, Theory 
Development). In the following sections we investigate M.G.’s reconciling approach.
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Table 45: M.G.’s Score in the Evaluation Instrument 
Score 
Factors Reasoning Rationality  Direction  
.94 
‘Self’ Motivation Teleological Substantive Forward 
 .56 
‘Self’ Causal State Causal/Correlational Theoretical Backward 
 .15 
‘Self’ Third Party Evaluation Causal/Correlational Formal Backward  
.86 
‘Self’ Capabilities Correlational Practical Backward 
.93 
‘Self’ Expectations Teleological Practical Forward 
.55 
‘Self’ Resource Limitation Casual Theoretical Backward 
.80 
‘Self’ Effort and Ability Casual Practical Backward 
.80 
‘Self’ Desire Intensity Teleological Substantive Forward 
.70 
‘Other’ Motivation Teleological Substantive Forward 
.20 
‘Other’ Third Party 
Evaluation 
Casual Formal Backward 
.20 
‘Other’ Resource Limitation Casual Theoretical Backward 
.45 
‘Other’ Casual State Casual/Correlational Theoretical Backward 
.90 
‘Other’ Expectation Teleological Practical Forward 
.40 
‘Other’ Popularity Correlational Formal Backward 
.60 
‘Other’ Social Group Correlational Formal Backward 
.93 
‘Other’ Capability Correlational Practical Backward 
.80 
‘Other’ Self Interest Teleological Practical Forward 
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Section 4: Rationality Type 
Here we identify M.G.’s Rationality Type that is the third step of analysing the Feed 
backward-forward loop in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (Figure 38). M.G.’s scores in the 
Evaluation Instrument qualify him for both practical and substantive rationalities. To reveal 
which one is his rationality type, here we analyse the data derived from in-depth interviews. 
Here, we try to indicate the value that led him to resist the failure of his online bookshop. It is 
found that M.G. had faith in his online bookshop that gave him “joy” and “hope”, as he said:  
“When others do not see even 1% success in your project, an entrepreneur 
never allows himself to think about failure. This is like ‘faith’; ‘belief’. Today no 
one expects me to work 16 to 20 hours a day and they tell me why you are 
wasting your time. But this work is “joy”, it is life itself and my identity.”  
 
Figure 38: Section Position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
 
 
 
It is also found that M.G. compares his values and way of thinking with an employee in a 
bureaucratic organisation (ministry of oil), as he said: 
“When you are an employee in oil ministry, it is not important if you are doing 
your job or not. It doesn’t matter at all. Do you know why? Because simply you 
don’t care.”  
 
This finding is in line with Weber's (2009) distinction between formal and substantive 
rationality. Weber says that the way a bureaucrat thinks and lives bounds his freedom within the 
standards set by formal institutions. Weber contrasts a bureaucrat with a person who has 
substantive rationality, who follows his own values and determines his own goals, who enjoys 
higher freedom (Kalberg, 1980). Similarly, in this case study M.G. contrasts his own situation 
with an employee in the ministry of oil. These findings show that M.G. does not have formal 
rationality and has teleological reasoning, which approves the findings of the Evaluation 
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Instrument about M.G.’s rationality type (see Table 45). It is found that the types of emotions 
M.G. was experiencing were related to substantive rationality (see Table 46) as he said:  
“I made this decision because I had commitment to my customers and 
employees. Commitment is a limitation that naturally exists in any decision that 
you make. In entrepreneurship ‘commitment’ is important as it is the main 
precondition for success.”  
 
In interview M.G. pointed to passion, joy, and pride, which are in Class S and Class L 
emotions as he said: 
“What I understood from entrepreneurship was that creating jobs and creation in 
general is like artists’ work, which is full of emotion, and due to this “passion” 
what happens inside you is very influential on your decisions. I cannot explain the 
feeling as it is very “enjoyable”. It is “super”. It is like a normal person standing in 
front of a mirror and thinks that he is Al Pacino. You feel that you have a different 
life from a normal life. You see, I use some words frequently in my talks. I say 
that I am “proud” that even if I die today, I am satisfied. Do you know why? 
Because the world without me is different to the world with me.” 
 
These findings show that when his values and emotions control his decisions they are in 
effect imposing demands on him, which serve to contract his negative freedom. However, M.G. 
is not bothered by this limitation because he has determined the values and goals himself, 
which if we add these findings to his high score in ‘self’ motivation (.94) we can conclude that he 
has substantive rationality and his positive freedom has been expanded by his decision.
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Table 46: Rational Indicators of Causal Dimensions  
Rationality 
Type 
 
Controllability 
 
Stability 
 
Locus 
 
Emotion 
Class 
 
Main 
Emoti
on 
 
Affordance 
Substantive 
Rationality 
 
Controllable 
 
Stable 
 
Internal 
 
Class S & L 
 
Hope 
 
Hardly 
Change 
Practical 
Rationality 
 
Controllable 
 
Stable* 
 
Internal 
 
Class S & L 
 
Hope 
 
Change 
Note: * shows the comparative stability of practical and substantive rationalities as values 
(substantive rationality) are more stable than goals (practical rationality). 
 
 
According to Table 46, if M.G. has either substantive or practical rationalities he has 
control over what values to believe and what goals to pursue, and this controllability allows him 
to experience emotions with positive hedonic characteristics. Table 46 shows that having either 
substantive or practical rationalities will enable M.G. to attribute his decision to controllable, 
stable and internal reasons. As explained in the previous chapter on emotion, when one’s 
attribution has these three loci, then it is possible that this individual experiences the Class S 
and Class L emotions (e.g. pride and particularly hope). However, the main difference between 
having substantive or practical rationality is that having the former, the values of the person 
hardly change, while one who has practical rationality has shorter-term goals. Interview data 
show that M.G. has been loyal to his values for a long time since his childhood as he said:  
“Now there are many people who are thinking about the internet-based books in 
Iran. If my online bookshop fails today, what do you think I will do tomorrow when 
I wake up? I go and start another business from its basics. Because I do these 
things since I was a kid. I have to do this because nothing else will satisfy me; I 
like this. I like creating value from nothing.”  
 
These findings trace back M.G.’s values to the past, which imply that he has ‘substantive 
rationality’ because his values have remained unchanged since his childhood. So far the 
findings indicate that M.G.’s rationality type has been substantive when he has decided to keep 
up the business (i.e. Dec 1), but to see if his rationality type will remain stable, in the following 
sections we will trace his decision cycle forward to see if his values remain unchanged in the 
future. Figure 39 maps M.G.’s scores in the questionnaire onto rationality types, showing that 
the direction of his thinking is future oriented, as his scores in both substantive and practical 
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rationalities are high. However, so far we have found more evidence supporting the notion that 
M.G. has substantive rationality. To make sure about this conclusion, we need to delve deeper 
into M.G.’s values, to see whether his decisions are about being an entrepreneur and creating 
new businesses, or whether they are about deeper causes such as socio-cultural 
preoccupations. In the following chapters we explore M.G’.s decision cycles over time and trace 
his decision to have a clear image of his values, and rationality type. 
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Figure 39: Linear Decision Trajectory Guided by ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ Models 
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Section 5: Reconciling Approach 
This is the fourth step of phase 3 of the case study methodology (Figure 40), and we 
identify three notions of: (A) the existence of an opposing worldview; (B) how M.G. deals with 
this conflict; and (C) indicating the impact of the reconciling approach on M.G.’s freedom, based 
on Bakhtin's (1935) definition of freedom according to dialogism. So far we have found evidence 
supporting the conjecture that M.G. has substantive rationality when making his decision to 
keep his business. Here, we try to indicate his reconciling approach to determine if his freedom 
to live according to his values has been expanded/contracted based on agency factors. 
 
Figure 40: Section Position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
 
 
Here, the findings show that M.G. had been facing the opposing worldview when he was 
making the decision, because his scores in the Evaluation Instrument in the ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
factors of Motivation (.94, and .70, respectively), Third Party Evaluation (.15 and .20, 
respectively), Capabilities (.86 and .93 respectively), and Resource Limitation (.55 and .20, 
respectively) were different (see Chapter 5 for a detailed explanation). M.G.’s different scores in 
the ‘self’ and ‘other’ factors of Resource Limitation and Capabilities implied that he saw more 
limitations on his choice from his ‘self’ standpoint, contrasting with the boundaries he perceived 
the ‘other’ attributed to his situation. Further, M.G. directly pointed to the existence of “dual 
worldviews” in his decision, as he said:  
“At that time everyone was telling me that it was not possible.  But, from the other 
side there is a craziness that I was telling myself “you have to do this work”. That 
is why when you speak with any entrepreneur you see this dual situation.”  
 
So far the findings have established that the opposing worldview existed when M.G. was 
making the decision, the subsequent question would be how M.G. dealt with this opposing 
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worldview when he decided to resist the failure of his online bookshop (Des1). In this regard, the 
interview data showed that M.G was using monologue dismissing the opposing worldview (or 
“satisficing dialogue”), for several following reasons. First, his view on the ontology of truth 
matched with monologue characteristics as he believes there is one ‘truth’ and it belongs to the 
person who is more convincing (see Chapter 5). In this regard, he downgraded the opposing 
worldview by attributing ‘third world citizen’ to their standpoint, claiming that they could not 
understand him, as he said:  
“There is something that people in the third world countries cannot understand it 
very well, but I have it naturally, maybe because I studied philosophy in a period 
of my life. I am happy that when the foreign investors were evaluating the price of 
my start-up, the first thing that they have written about me was that “he is a 
convincing manager.”  
 
These findings imply that M.G. believes that his worldview is more near to the single 
‘truth’ (that he perceives exists) than that of others for several reasons: (A) He points to his 
degree in philosophy to claim that this degree has enabled him to understand what others could 
not see; (b) he attributed “third world country citizens” to the opposing position that downgrades 
their worldview on the basis that they are an underdeveloped nation; (c) he pointed to “foreign” 
investors’ positive evaluation about him that shows he attributes higher ‘truth’ to the 
understanding of the foreigners, claiming that his ‘self’ view is congruent with this worldview. 
Another evidence that showed M.G. was using monologue was his reconciling mechanism 
which is more similar to the characteristics of monologue (see Chapter 5), as he dismissed the 
opposing worldviews and only considered the worldview of his partner that was in line with his 
own worldview, as he said:  
“Do you know how this conflict always reconciles in my mind? With the feeling 
that is captured in a sentence from my partner saying that “If this was an easy job, 
no doubt that someone would have done it before you.”  
 
Here, M.G. was referring to his partner’s worldview that was congruent with his own 
worldview in order to support his vision. In this way, he welcomed the other’s worldview as long 
as it was in line with his own standpoint, showing that he was using monologue, dismissing the 
opposing worldview and keeping the worldviews in agreement. According to Table 47, as a 
result of using monologue and subjugating the opposing worldview, M.G. was in control of the 
situation. As he had full control over the situation, controllability was the main dimension of the 
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cause of his decision, so he was experiencing class C emotions (see Chapter 3, Theory 
Development). We found empirical support for three emotions of Class C in interview data. One 
emotion was “shame” towards his co-founder, generated because he assumed himself 
responsible for the contract with the Indian company that had failed to deliver the project, as he 
said: 
“I could not go back to Tehran, because I was ashamed of Mr. F, because we 
had the contracts with the Indian company under his name”.  
 
Another emotion was “regret” for willingly dismissing the other options that unlike him, 
his cousins had taken those ways and they had achieved a more secure job and salary, as he 
said: 
“I was asking myself “What is at the end of it? I lost my life. I was comparing 
myself with my cousins who went to Azad University. They were employed and 
earned regular salary and they could buy good cars, but I might not be able to 
buy those cars. I was the one who studied in public university [better university] 
and I had the opportunity to be employed in ministry of oil. My mother still thinks 
that I had to do that”.  
 
The third emotion was feeling “fear” about future as he said:  
“I felt a dreadful fear. You compare yourself with the others. At the end there is 
fear, but when you digest this fear, this is like a person that behind him all the 
bridges were broken and you have no way but going forward.”  
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Table 47: Emotion Generated from Reconciling Approaches 
Reconciling Approach 
Mechanism Causal Dimension Emotion  
Monologue 
 
Dismiss ‘Other’ voice 
 
Controllability 
 
Class C & Fear  
Note: Class C emotions are: Anger, Shame, Fear, Pity, Regret, Gratitude (see Chapter 4, 
Theory Development) 
 
These findings imply that M.G. considers the other worldview (in this case his partner’s), 
as long as they align with him. In this regard, M.G. said:  
“If you come to our office, you see that there is always argument; I even argue 
with our typist and ask her “why should you type the letters in this way?” 
Sometime we set a tour in the office to show the typist what will eventually 
happen if she types like this, for the developer to design the web. So, being 
convinced is important for me”.  
 
Further, he claimed that he was considering different worldviews in order to arrive at a 
solution that is acceptable for all different parties, which is an insight to the reconciling approach 
that implies that sometimes M.G. uses the dialectic approach, as he said: 
“For me arriving to the same point of view is important. You see, in decision 
making if there were no common point of view, then there is not enough 
commitment between people to do a job. If there is no common perspective, you 
decide to make it like a ‘circle’, your team perceive it as a ‘rectangle’ and finally a 
‘hexagon’ will be created.”  
 
Here the question is what we learn from his reconciling approach and its impact on his 
freedom. The findings imply that M.G.’s reconciling approach is changing depending on the 
context of the problem. As he has pointed to some examples that he has welcomed others’ 
perspectives, respecting the solution that satisfies all parties involved. Here, it is evident that he 
has used monologue in the specific decision to keep his business after the failure in India, but 
the question is whether this reconciling approach changes in his other decisions. The answer to 
this question helps us to know more about reconciling approaches (see Chapter 3, 
Methodology). 
In this regard, despite M.G.’s claim of being welcoming towards the opposing worldviews, 
further evidence showed that M.G. was using monologue or “satisficing dialogue”, depending on 
the power of the opposing worldview and the level of conflict between the opposition and his 
values. For example, in spite of M.G.’s claim that his office was where all worldviews were 
expressed and heard, he set limits on how much the other was permitted to believe in their 
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worldview. Accordingly, M.G. said the other worldview is acceptable as long as it does not 
contradict with his values, as he said: 
“This is not like always you can convince each other. Here, I have a very good 
strategy. I say that up to the point that your partner’s decision will not threaten 
your vital interest, you agree with him, because we should prevent stupid 
arguments. We should also allow ourselves to be convinced.”  
 
More evidence showing that M.G. was using “satisficing dialogue” was that his 
reconciling approach varied according to the position of authority. For example, he pointed to an 
example that his employees are convinced by him, as he said: 
“When they disagree, I provide them with a pilot and allow them to produce the 
experimental results. People even tell me, to the CEO of the company, they say 
“shot up, lets data talk.” For example, I ask them to change something. They say 
“shot up, lets data talk.” Finally, they bring the data and then they say “ok, you 
said the truth.”  
 
In this example M.G. was trying to say that his employees were allowed to question his 
worldview, but finally they would come to a conclusion that the boss was right. Meanwhile, he 
pointed to another example where he dismissed his own voice in front of the board members, as 
he said: 
“There were many times that I was not convinced but I accepted to do what they 
want and at the end I found that it was a right way. I am doing it although I don’t 
have a good feeling about it. I think that if I have had enough evidence I could 
have convinced them.”  
 
This implied that M.G. dismissed his view before the board members, although he was 
not happy with this arrangement. This also showed that he was stepping into the area of 
monologue that was, believe your view or my view, perhaps based on empirical evidence. What 
this tells us about M.G. is that he could be flexible enough to change the reconciliation process 
depending on the nature of the problem and the other’s level of authority. In other words, he 
used dialectic as long as the other could hold their idea up to the point that it did not threaten his 
own values, i.e. he was using a form of ‘pseudo dialectics’ and/or ‘satisficing dialogism’.  
To summarise, using the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to explain M.G.’s decision has 
shown that he used a kind of “satisfying dialogic” that suffices up to a point in the absence of 
greater priorities entering the discussion. Table 48 summarises M.G.’s reconciling approach and 
his rationality type regarding his decision to keep the business. When M.G. used substantive 
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rationality, the strong standpoint in his decision was the ‘self’ particularly because he used 
monologue and subjugated the opposing worldview. As a result, M.G. was experiencing an 
emotion from the class of ‘fear’ that results in uncertainty and doubt that were involved in his 
decision cycle due to the existence of the opposing worldview that had been dismissed. Overall, 
this case has two observations for the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency: (A) using monologue 
generates class C emotions that particularly include fear, shame, and regret; and (B) the type of 
reconciling approach depends on the nature of the problem, the power of authority and the 
agent’s belief in her values.  
Regarding the impact of the ‘reconciling approach’ on ‘agency’, as we have found that 
he was using monologue, his affective and cognitive modes of agency are contracted after the 
decision, even though he is fully in control by subjugating the opposing worldview, hence his 
conative mode of agency is expanded. Further, regarding his positive and negative freedom we 
need to show whether the decision has been in conflict or conducive to his values by taking into 
account the impact of both reason (i.e. rationality types and reconciling approach) and emotion, 
which is the focus of the following sections.
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Table 48: ‘Self’ v. ‘Other’ Strength based on Rationality and Reconciling Approaches 
Rationality 
 
Reconciling Approach 
 
Result of  Reconciliation 
 
Emotion 
 
Standpoint 
Substantive 
 
Monologue 
 
Dismiss ‘Other’  
 
Fear 
 
Self 
Note: Standpoint refers to the strong standpoint in M.G.’s reconciling mechanism. 
 
Section 6: Emotion 
This section is about the ‘emotion’ step of phase 3 as presented in Figure 41. As 
explained in previous chapters, this study will capture the emotions behind decisions based on 
Weiner's (2010) Attribution Theory of Motivation. Here, we use the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
to show the emotional reasons behind M.G.’s decision and its impact on his freedom. Table 49 
shows the direct emotions that M.G. is experiencing when evaluating his state of being/doing at 
S1. The findings provide support for all Weiner’s emotions, either empirically in the interview or 
logically derived from M.G.’s rationality type and reconciling approach. In this line, M.G. said 
that he was having ‘hope’ and ‘joy’ by pointing to it as ‘crazy feeling’, as he said: 
“What I was feeling is like what Steve Jobs said in his lecture at Stanford 
University. He says “when they expelled me from the university, this was my 
feeling: ‘stay foolish, stay high!’” This is the feeling that you always have. It is a 
bit crazy. You say it is impossible, everyone else is telling you that it is not 
possible, but from the other side there is a craziness that you say “I have to do 
this work”. That is why when you speak with any entrepreneur, there is like this 
dual situation.” 
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Figure 41: Section position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
 
 
Table 49 shows the direct emotions M.G. was experiencing, their consequences on 
M.G.’s expectancy and persistency (see Chapter 3, Theory Development). For example, the 
final column shows that feeling ‘hope’ leads M.G. to look forward to the future of his decisions to 
keep his business after the failure. These findings are in line with M.G.’s high score in both ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ factors of Expectation (.93 and .90 equivalently) in the questionnaire.   
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Table 49: ‘Self’ Emotion Classes Based on Weiner’s Theory of Motivation 
Direct Emotion 
Consequence Towards who Influence Direction 
Class C 
   
 
Shame Latency Co-founder Backward 
 
Regret Persistency Mother Forward 
 
Anger Intensity Indian 
company 
Forward 
Class L 
   
 
Pride Persistency self Backward/Forward 
 
Self-Esteem Persistency self Backward/Forward 
 
Humiliation Latency self Backward/Forward 
Class S 
   
 
Hope High expectancy- 
Persistency 
self Forward 
 
Hopelessness Low expectancy-  
Latency 
self Backward 
Note: ‘Self’ emotions are direct affects.
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Table 50 presents the indirect emotions that M.G. perceived that others feel when 
evaluating his state of being/doing at S1, as a result of a rational process. The logical 
deductions in the table are empirically supported in the interview. For example, he perceived 
that his partner felt ‘pride’ towards him, as he said:  
“At that time I had a feeling that later interpreted with my partner’s sentence that 
“if founding online book shop was an easy task, someone would have done it 
before you.”  
 
In the fifth row of Table 50, we have shown that M.G. was experiencing ‘pride’ generated 
by his partner and its ‘consequence’ was ‘persistency’ in his decision to rescue his start-up 
business from failure, and M.G. was looking ‘forward’ when evaluating his decision from his 
partner’s standpoint. Meanwhile, the final row of Table 50 evaluates M.G.’s decision from his 
mother’s worldview, who according to M.G. was opposed to him starting his business and 
preferred that her son would have gone to work for the ministry of oil. As shown in the final row, 
when M.G. remembered his mother’s evaluation, he was reporting ‘hopelessness’ and its 
consequence was latency in the decision to rescue the business from failure and looking 
backward, thinking about missing his opportunity of employment at the ministry of oil. Both 
Table 49 and Table 50 show that in M.G.’s decision process several different emotions were 
involved directly and indirectly, which were generated from different standpoints. However, 
M.G.’s decision to keep his business was in line with positive Class S emotion (hope), and 
positive Class L emotions (pride). Further, to see the impact of these emotions on M.G.’s 
freedom-agency we will map the emotions onto reasons in the following sections. 
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Table 50: ‘Other’ Emotion Classes Based on Weiner’s Theory of Motivation 
 
Indirect Emotion Consequence Other Influence 
Direction 
Class C 
   
 
Regret Persistency Co-founder Forward 
 
Anger Intensity Co-founder Forward 
Class L 
   
 
Pride Persistency Partner Forward 
 
Humiliation Latency Public 
(Cousins) 
Backward 
Class S 
   
 
Hope High expectancy- 
Persistency 
Partner Forward 
 
Hopelessness Low expectancy-  
Latency 
Mother Backward 
Note: ‘Other’ emotions are indirect Emotion. 
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Section 7: Mapping Emotions onto Reason 
Table 51 presents an overall picture of both ‘direct’ (i.e. personally generated about self-
evaluation) and ‘indirect’ (i.e. rationally generated from perception about other’s evaluation) 
emotions that M.G. felt at S1 and maps them onto the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. Table 51 
shows that there are four standpoints evaluating M.G.’s decision and generating different 
emotions, which are M.G.’s self, his partner, mother, co-founder, and his cousins that generated 
indirect emotions. The first eight rows of Table 51 show the direct emotions that M.G. was 
experiencing after evaluating his initial decision to start the business and his later decision to 
contract with the Indian company.  
For example, he was experiencing ‘pride’ in his decision to start an online bookshop 
(Des-1), while we evaluated his subsequent state of being/doing as ‘Beneficial Functioning’. 
This means that ‘pride’ had a ‘good’ hedonic aspect, leading him to ‘start’ ‘to go on like that’ (i.e. 
continuing business). However, at the same time based on M.G.’s evaluation of his decision to 
contract with the Indian company (Des0), we assessed his state of being/doing after this 
decision (Dec0) as ‘Adverse Commanding’, consequently he was feeling ‘shame’ and 
‘embarrassment’, which have a ‘bad’ hedonic dimension and led him to ‘start’ to ‘go away’ from 
the state of being in contract with the Indian company. What we learn from Table 51 is the 
existence of different and sometimes opposite emotions influencing the agent. The question of 
how these emotions are generated and integrated in the agent’s mind are a part of ‘real’ domain 
in Critical Realism (see Chapter 3: Methodology) that are not observable here (see Chapter 3, 
emotion and reason black boxes in the model). Here, we identify the emotions mapped onto his 
evaluation and the subsequent decision as they are within the ‘empirical’ part of ‘real’ domain of 
ontology of being in this research (see Chapter 3, Methodology). In the following section we 
trace the overall impact of these emotions and the reasons investigated in previous sections on 
M.G.’s freedom. 
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Table 51: Mapping M.G.’s Emotions onto the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
Worldview 
State Emotion  Function Hedonic  Signal for Behavioural 
Change 
Self 
    
 
Beneficial Functioning (Starting an online bookshop) 
 
 Pride Start Good “to go on like that” 
 
 Alpha Pride Start Good “to go on the same due ability” 
 
 Beta Pride Start Good “to go on the same due effort” 
 
Adverse Commanding (Contracting with the Indian company) 
 
 Shame Start Bad “to go away” 
 
 Embaresme
nt 
Start Bad “to go away” 
Partner 
    
 
Beneficial Functioning (Starting online bookshop) 
 
 Admiration Start Good “Go towards and support” 
 
 Gratitude Start Good “Do it again” 
Co-founder 
   
 
Adverse Commanding (Contracting with the Indian company) 
 
 Anger Stop Bad “Better not to do that” 
Mother, cousins and aquentences 
  
 
Adverse Commanding (Starting the online bookshop) 
 
 Contempt Stop Bad “to change behaviour” 
 
 Humiliation Stop Bad “to change behaviour” 
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Section 8: Reason, Emotion, Decision and Freedom 
The final element of the phase of Feed backward-forward Loop in the Tri-Modal Theory 
of Agency is showing the impact of emotion and reason on an agent’s freedom (Figure 42). 
Table 52 presents the impact of emotion and reasons on M.G.’s decision values, after each of 
his three decisions of: (Des-1) starting the online bookshop, (Des0) contracting with the Indian 
company, and (Des1) resisting the failure and delivering the failed project in India. Through 
identifying the conflictive/conducive impact of decision on M.G.’s values we conclude the impact 
on his decision on his freedom. The findings indicate that the decision to start the online 
bookshop has been conducive to M.G.’s values but it has imposed limitations on his options (i.e. 
contracted his negative freedom but expanded his positive freedom), as he said: 
“When I was sitting in my office thinking about starting an online bookshop, I had 
freedom at its ultimate level. But after making the decision, you do not have that 
freedom anymore. Today that I am sitting here, I cannot close the business. Do 
you know why? Because 35 people are living from it.”  
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Figure 42: Section Position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
 
 
However, M.G.’s perception of freedom is different to our technical definition (i.e. defined 
based on Berlin’s positive-negative sides), as he claims that if he has no commitment he is 
completely free. Here, his perception may be true about his negative freedom, but it is not 
explaining his positive freedom. In this line, M.G.’s claimed that he had the ultimate level of 
freedom at the start of the business. This claim is also under scrutiny, even from the positive 
side of freedom. This is because it was not possible as he had financial limitations, and his 
scores in the questionnaire showed that from the ‘self’ standpoint his Resources and 
Capabilities were limited (.55 and .86 respectively). These findings show how important it is to 
determine three modes of agency (cognitive, conative, and affective) and two sides of freedom 
(positive and negative) in agency-freedom relationship, as individuals have different perceptions 
and definitions of freedom and there are several complex notions involved in this relationship 
(e.g. capability, achievement, motivation, values, etc.) that can be easily misunderstood by lay 
observers.  
 
  338 
Table 52: Emotion-Decision-Value-Freedom Relation with Strong ‘self’ 
Desicion 
Self (E) Self (Em)  Other (E) Other (Em) Relation to 
Value  
Des-1  
 
BF 
 
Self: Pride 
 
Conducive 
Des-1  
  
partner 
 
BF 
 
Pride-Admiration-Gratitude 
 
Conducive  
Des-1  
  
mother 
 
AC 
 
Contempt-Scorn-Disgust- 
Sympathy 
 
Conflicted 
Dec1 
 
BF 
 
Self: Pride 
 
Conducive 
Des1 
  
partner 
 
BF 
 
Pride-Admiration-Gratitude 
 
Conducive  
Des1 
  
mother 
 
AC 
 
Contempt-Scorn-Disgust- 
Sympathy 
 
Conflicted 
Des0 
 
AC 
 
Self: Shame Embaressment 
 
Conflicted 
Des0 
  
partner 
 
AF 
 
Pride-Admiration-Gratitude 
 
Conflicted 
Des0 
  
Co-founder 
 
AF 
 
Anger-Indignation-
Schaderfreude 
 
Conflicted 
Des0 
  
Mother 
 
AC 
 
Contempt-Scorn-Disgust- 
Sympathy 
 
Conflicted 
Note: E refers to Evaluation; EM refers to Emotion. BF is Beneficial Functioning; AF is Adverse 
Functioning; BC is Beneficial Commanding; AC is Adverse Commanding; Relation to Value 
shows the impact of decision on M.G.’s life from the evaluator’s standpoint. 
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Table 52 shows that the decision to contract with the Indian company is evaluated as 
Adverse Commanding by M.G., his co-founder and his mother. These evaluations have 
generated shame, anger, and contempt, and the result of this decision could have prevented 
M.G. from pursuing his values and his long-term goal of becoming a successful entrepreneur. 
Hence, from other’s standpoint this decision (Des0 in Table 52) has conflicted with M.G.’s 
values. It is found that living according to his values is conflicted by Des0 and this is supported 
in the interview, as he said:  
“When I found the project failed in India, one thing was very important for me as it 
must be for any entrepreneur and that is reputation. If I gave up the business in 
India, there was no one there, but I would have lost my reputation before my 
angle investor, Mr. F.”  
 
Here M.G. points to the commitment that comes from one’s values rather than from the 
decision itself as one can choose to be irresponsible and abandon a position without concern for 
the consequences. He shows that his values require him to be committed, which plays a heavy 
part in his decision making – his choices are based on an appreciation and acceptance of 
responsibilities and commitment. This is a very important observation that shows his negative 
freedom is contracted by his decision, but his positive freedom is expanded. These findings also 
support the notion that he has substantive rationality, because his decision prevents him from 
pursuing other capabilities if they were contrary to his values. Further, the final rows of Table 52 
show that the decision of not to give up the business after the failure in India (Des1) did not 
conflict with his values. This is supported in the interview as M.G. said:  
“I could not give up easily. At the beginning it was just me and at any moment I 
cannot say that I don’t want it any more. Do you know why? Because I have 
more than 200,000 users who give me money and they have my e-books. I 
cannot turn it off. They wake up in the morning and they want to have access to 
their books. It is a part of my responsibilities.”  
 
Here, M.G. is also rationalising by equating commitment with free choice, albeit driven 
by his personal values. It is evidence that he is bounded to his values and desires to succeed. 
These findings imply that M.G.’s perception lacks the distinction between positive and negative 
freedom, because Des1 has expanded his positive freedom (he is determining to live according 
to his values), but it has contracted his negative freedom (self-imposed constraints have limited 
his options).  
So far we have found two insights into the impact of M.G.’s decisions on his freedom. 
First, it is found that the overall effect of Des-1, Des0 and Des1 was not contracting M.G.’s 
freedom because except De0 (i.e. the decision to deal with the Indian company that contracted 
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M.G.’s positive freedom and three modes of his agency for a while), the other two decisions of 
Des -1 and Des1 were in line with his values of becoming a successful entrepreneur. In the 
following sections we trace M.G.’s life trajectory and the side effect of his decision to suggest a 
more accurate conclusion about the combined effect of M.G.’s decisions on different aspects of 
his freedom and agency.  
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Section 9: The Decision Cycle 
This section analyses the temporal aspect of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency by tracing 
M.G.’s decision cycle (Figure 43). We try to use these findings to indicate freedom-agency 
relationship.   
Figure 43: Section Position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
 
 
M.G.’s decision cycle to found the business is presented in Figure 44. So far, we have 
found that M.G. has ‘substantive’ (i.e. believe in nature of the book business and having a long-
term goal of creating new services and products in cultural and/or IT market) when has decided 
to keep up his business. However, we have found several evidences for ‘practical’ rationality (i.e. 
this business is another start-up like other businesses that M.G has started before, and having a 
short-term goal of becoming financially successful) in M.G.’s way of reasoning.  
To see if M.G.’s rationality type remains unchanged, Figure 44 shows M.G.’s life 
transition before and after (Des1). To clarify the solidity of M.G.’s values and the length of his 
goals we travel back and forth in his life trajectory. If we travel forth, Figure 44 shows that M.G.’s 
subsequent decision (Des2) is to sell half of the shares in his business and after that he decides 
to travel around Europe. At this stage, based on these two follow-up decisions of M.G. we can 
conclude that at the time of interviewing, M.G. had practical rationality with the short-term goal 
of financial satisfaction. Traveling forth in Figure 44  shows that his values (i.e. creating and 
expanding a new business in the IT sector) have not remained long in his life. However, if we 
travel back in his life trajectory the evidence shows that his rationality type has been substantive 
by the time of making Dec1, which is the focal point of this case study. This is because the 
earlier findings have established that his values that lead him to keep up his business (i.e. 
Dec1) have been with him since his childhood, indicating that his rationality type is substantive 
at this decision. Overall, in M.G.’s case study, his rationality type at the time of deciding to keep 
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the business was substantive rationality, but as time passed, his values changed and he has a 
shown tendency toward practical rationality. Thus, his rationality type has changed from 
substantive to practical in his life-trajectory. These findings show that one’s values and 
rationality types can change over time. 
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Figure 44: The Decision Cycle 
 
Note: This diagram is filled in based on the available data collected through interviews and questionnaires. Thus except for the main 
decision cycle that is about Dec1, the evaluation of the other states is not evidenced in the present study. 
Des1:
Decision of giving up or c
ontinue his business in In
dia
Des0:
Decision of contracting wi
th an Indian company 
Des3:
Decision of traveling arou
nd the Europe and manag
ing online bookshop from 
distance.
Des2:
Decision of selling 50% s
hares of
his business to a bigger 
company
S0:
Early state of staring an 
online bookshop
S3:
State of financial satisfa
ction
Before After
….
….
S2:
Beneficial Functioning, 
State of success after d
elivering project in India
S1:
Adverse Commanding, 
State of Failure in India
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Section 10: Side Effects 
Here, we investigate M.G.’s decisions over time, which leads us to focus on some of the 
side effects of his decisions when realising certain capabilities (Figure 45), and help to 
determine agency-freedom relationship.  
 
Figure 45: Section position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
 
 
M.G.’s decision to start the business has had several side effects, presented in Figure 
46. The main side effect of starting this business was that he lost his opportunity to be employed 
in the ministry of oil and according to him, leading a ‘normal’ life of receiving secure monthly 
income from a low-risk career. As evidence, M.G. said: 
“For example, those who leave their life such as “Digikala.com”, or 
‘cafébazar.com”, they could have had a wealthy life and they have had 1000 
ways that normally will end in a relative success or financial satisfaction. For 
example, I could have become employed in Iran’s ministry of oil, as my mother 
always has suggested and as she still thinks that I have to do that. That job 
would have provided me with a life at middle class level in a normal way. That is 
why you see a dual difference between the way an entrepreneur sees his work 
and the way others see his/her work.”  
 
Here, when M.G. is facing the opposite worldview of his mother, he is rationalising by 
identifying himself with other successful Iranian entrepreneurs. This can be explained based on 
Tajfel's (1978) social identity theory showing that M.G. is identifying himself as being as unique 
as other successful Iranian start-up owners, in order to deal with the uncertainty and doubt that 
are involved in the high-risk life of being an entrepreneur. This finding regarding the 
rationalisation supports the agency-oriented factor of ‘logical reasoning’ that has been identified 
in the thematic analysis of Study 3 of Chapter 5. Overall, Figure 46 shows an overview of M.G.’s 
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decisions and their side effects. Further, Figure 47 zooms in on one of his decisions with a focus 
on its side effect.  
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Figure 46: M.G.’s Side-Effects (Zoom out)  
 
Note: In the areas where the data about decisions and side effects are not sufficient this Figure is left blank. 
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Figure 47: Side Effects (Zoom in) 
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To summarise, Figure 48 shows how both of the decisions and their side effects 
influence M.G.’s capabilities. As evidence, M.G.’s decisions are influenced by consequences, 
but the overall picture shows that M.G. has also had determinism in a chaotic environment to 
decide the destiny of his business, showing that his agency has been expanded through making 
the decision to start the business and keeping it up during the failures. These findings support 
the idea that M.G. has had substantive rationality when making Dec1. In the following sections 
we present a clear view of M.G.’s capabilities and how certain capabilities are desired, realised 
and chosen. 
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Figure 48: Side Effects and Decision on Capabilities (Zoom in) 
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Section 11: The Decision Trajectory in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
This section is about M.G.’s decision trajectory (Figure 49). Here, we show how M.G.’s 
capabilities are influenced by emotion and reasons. Table 53 maps our findings regarding 
M.G.’s three modes of agency onto the phenotype and genotype of the 14 nodes of the Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency (see Chapter 3, Theory Development). 
 
Figure 49: Section Position in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
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Table 53: Genotype-Phenotype of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (M.G. Case Study) 
Element 
Genotype of Cell Phenotype of Actor 
Node A 
 
M.G.’s decision is influenced by:  
1. His substantive rationality with goal of becoming a successful 
entrepreneur, who has a good reputation and is financially 
satisfied. 
2. A strong ‘self’ worldview that is not dismissed facing an 
opposite ‘other’ worldview. 
3. ‘Self’ direct emotions of pride in his ability and previous 
successes; embarrassment for the failure in India; shame 
before the co-founder for contracting with the Indian 
company; regret before his mother and cousins; anger 
towards the Indian company. 
4.  Indirect perceived emotions of pride by his partner; anger 
and regret by his co-founder, humiliation and consent by his 
mother. 
 
M.G. classifies his desires and undesired 
capabilities when making Des1: 
• Desired: Not giving up the business 
after failure in India. 
• Un-Desired: Giving up the business. 
 
Node B1 
 
M.G.’s desired capabilities when making Des1 are influenced by the 
following constraints:  
1. Logical: threat to his reputation before his co-founder. 
2. Physical: geographical constraints and distance from Tehran. 
3. Axiological: commitment to customers, and responsibility to 
employees and business.  
4. Emotion: direct experienced pride and joy; indirectly was 
shameful before co-founder that pushed him forward. 
5. Reason: based on practical rationality he was pursuing the goal 
of becoming successful and keeping his reputation in the market. 
 
M.G’s realisable capabilities are: 
• Realisable Desired: staying in India 
and delivering the failed project  
• Un-realisable Desired: going back to 
Tehran and continuing the business. 
  
Node B2 
 
M.G.’s undesired capabilities are influenced by:  
1) Logical: threat to his reputation before his co-founder  
2) Axiological: commitment to customers and responsibility to 
employees and business. 
 
M.G. is coerced to categorises non-
desired capabilities in two sets: 
• Realisable Un-Desired: Giving up the 
business and going back to Tehran 
with failed project.  
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• Un-realisable Un-Desired: Giving up 
the business but keeping his reputation 
before the co-founder. 
Node C 
 
Accidental properties of starting the business was staying in India 
and delivering the project. 
 
 
M.G.’s capabilities were influenced by the 
side effect of his previous decision to 
choose a risky life of an entrepreneur.  
Node D1 
 
Choosing a desired and realisable capability of staying in India and 
delivering the failed project:  
1. Valuable from both personal worldview and his co-founder’s 
perspective 
2. He is not forced to make this choice. 
3. M.G is conscious  
4. Side-effects are generated that make him reluctant to explore 
future international contracts. 
 
M.G. made this choice free from the force 
of source of authority, and it has both 
personal and social value. This leads him 
to the “Beneficial Functioning” state. 
Node E1 
 
At S1, M.G. is evaluating his state of being/doing, using substantive 
rationality based on his goal to become a successful entrepreneur. 
 
M.G feels hope using teleological 
reasoning and practical rationalities.  
Node E2 
 
At S1, M.G. is evaluating his state of being/doing, encountering the 
opposite worldview of ‘others’, dismissing the discouraging worldview 
of others. 
 
 
Making the decision, M.G. evaluates his 
encounter with the discouraging and 
negative opposite worldview. He used 
monologue to integrate his own (i.e. ‘self’) 
and others’ worldviews. This situation 
shows that M.G.’s self-worldview is strong. 
Node E3 (a 
& b) 
 
At S1, evaluating state of being/doing, from the dual worldviews of 
‘self’ (E3a) and the perceived emotions of his co-founder, partner, 
mother, and cousins (E3b), attribution emotions are generated that 
influence subsequent decision (i.e. Des1). 
 
Making the decision, M.G. evaluates his 
state of being/doing from the dual 
worldviews of ‘self’ and ‘other’ (i.e. partner, 
co-founder, mother, and cousins). This 
generates self-directed and perceived-
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indirect emotions that are combined (in the 
emotion black box). The emotions 
resulting from the black box are ‘hope’ and 
‘joy’.  
Node F 
 
At S1, M.G. had substantive rationalities. However, M.G.’s future 
decisions in the Decision Cycle show that his rationality type has 
changed into practical at the time of conducting this research.  
 
M.G.’s type of rationality is: 
1.  Substantive, based on the value of 
creating digital on-line book shop and 
goal of career success.  
Node G 
 
At S1, facing an opposite worldview M.G.’s ‘self’ worldview is 
stronger in decision making. 
 
 
The way M.G. dealt with the opposite 
worldview shows:  
1) M.G. used monologue. 
2) He is rationalising, trying to pretend 
that he is welcoming other worldviews, 
but he dismisses weaker worldviews. 
3) M.G.’s rationality type is changing 
according to the nature of the problem, 
source of authority, and level of threat 
to his own values. 
Node H 
 
The self-directed emotions, the other’s perceived emotions, 
rationality-oriented emotions, worldview-oriented emotions are 
combined and create joy and hope that influence the decision. 
 
M.G. feels joy and hope after evaluating 
his decision. 
Node I 
 
Type of rationality and reconciling approach influence M.G.’s 
decision. 
 
M.G. made his decision based on his 
substantive rationality that is based on his 
goal to become a successful and 
financially satisfied entrepreneur. In this 
way he uses satisfying dialogic, which 
means he dismisses the worldviews that 
contradict his values, or the worldviews 
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that are not empirically supported. 
Node J 
 
Decision maker’s rationale and affect integrate and influence the 
decision. Here, substantive rationality overcomes the negative 
emotions to give up the business i.e. to make a decision that is in 
conflict with his values. 
 
M.G. evaluated his state of being/doing at 
S1, from ‘self’ and ‘other’ worldviews. This 
results in some emotions. Meanwhile, he 
used his values and dealt with opposite 
worldviews based on substantive 
rationality. 
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In summary of Table 53, passing three phases of the theory has shown that M.G.’s 
decision trajectory from S1 to S2 by making Des1 has influenced his agency-freedom 
relationship. Making this decision, M.G. has substantive rationality and he has coped with the 
emotions and reasons that have pushing him away from deciding to keep his business. He has 
kept his worldview and has dismissed the opposing worldview. As Node J in Table 53 shows, 
M.G.’s decision of keeping his business after failure has been conducive to his values, thus, his 
positive freedom, as well as the cognitive and affective modes of his agency, are expanded after 
the decision. However, this decision contracted his negative freedom and the conative mode of 
agency, because some of his capabilities (e.g. working in a firm, earning regular salary and 
having job security) have been removed from his capability set after this decision. In addition, 
M.G.’s case study shows that one’s capability realisation has a temporal mechanism that 
gradually changes according to the person’s values, goals and emotions. In the following 
section we present M.G.’s capability sets, around his decision of delivering the failed project in 
India. 
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Section 12: Capability Sets 
This is the final step of explaining M.G.’s decision in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. 
M.G.’s rationality type had influenced his capability sets as presented in Table 53. Here, our 
focus is on analysing Des1 that is the decision of resisting/giving up the business after the 
failure in India, thus in Table 54 we show M.G.’s capability sets, before and after this decision. 
In Table 54, each set includes all possible options having its membership criteria. 
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Table 54: Membership Criteria of Capability Sets (Before and After Des0 and Des1) 
Set of Capabilities Members: All Possible Capabilities 
Capability Set Around Dec 0 
 Set C {Will expand the business} & {Will not expand the business } 
 Set D {Will expand the business and will contract with Indian Company} 
 Set U {Will collaborate with Indian company and fail}  
 Set UR {Will collaborate with Indian company and will not fail} 
 Set AC {Will end up with a failed project in India} 
 Set SE {Consequences of failed project in India} 
Capability Set Around Dec 1 
 Set C {Will give up the business after failure} & {Will resist and keep the business } 
 Set D {Will deal with the Failed Project} 
 Set U {Will go back to Tehran with the failed project} 
 Set DR {Will stay in India and will deliver the failed project} 
 Set BF {Deliver the project in India} 
 Set SE {Consequences of successful delivery of project} 
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Section 13: Freedom-Agency 
A gestalt view of M.G.’s decision was presented in Figure 50, showing that M.G.’s 
positive freedom, as well as the affective and cognitive modes of his agency, were not 
contracted by his decision because he was using substantive rationality and his decision was in 
line with his values, although his negative freedom has been contracted. The decision not to 
give up the business after the failure in India has generated emotions of embarrassment, shame, 
and hopelessness but could not overcome his pursuit of the goal of “becoming a successful 
entrepreneur” that generated ‘pride’ and ‘joy’ in him. He wanted to become a successful 
entrepreneur. He used teleological reasoning, thinking about his reputation. However, his 
resistance is influenced by: (a) the side effect of his previous decisions that brought success, 
self-esteem and pride, the emotions that indirectly lead him particularly from his partner’s side; 
(b) using monologue and dismissing the opposing view that could discourage him from resisting 
the failure; (c) his teleological reasoning and substantive rationality that enabled him to focus on 
the future and his goal.  
To conclude, M.G.’s agency level depends on his rationality type and reconciling 
approach that are shaped by his values in substantive rationality and dismissing the opposing 
worldview in monologue. In the decision to deliver the failed project in India, he has decided in 
line with his values and substantive rationality. This specific decision is value-laden, even 
though his capability set is limited (i.e. negative freedom is contracted) due to the self-imposed 
constraints that are coming with substantive rationality. Overall, this case study has shown that 
the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is able to determine the agency-freedom relationship by 
showing whether a decision is conflictive/conducive with the agent to live according to values.  
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Figure 50: Case Study Findings 
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Section 14: Conclusion  
The M.G. case study illustrates the following points about the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency, and according to these findings in the following chapter we will compare the Tri-modal 
Theory of Agency with some of its rival theories in order to establish the strengths and 
weaknesses of our theory within the agency-oriented area.  
a) Conative Mode of Agency: 
I. The time trajectory of M.G.’s decisions shows that despite the unpredicted impact of 
side effects, M.G. could determine to live according to his values. 
b) Affective Mode of Agency: 
I. Some parts of emotions that are generated in the agent’s decision process are within 
the ‘real’ domain that is not observable, which are located in the black boxes in the 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.  
II. Multiple emotional strands are detectable by the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.  
c) Cognitive Model of Agency: 
I. M.G. feels joy and passion when he uses substantive rationality and makes 
decisions based on his values and belief. 
II. Every element of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency must be passed to distinguish 
rationality type. 
III. M.G. feels the class of “fear”, when he thinks about the opposite worldview of others. 
IV. M.G. uses different types of reconciling approaches in different situations and his 
reconciling mechanism is changing according to the nature of the problem and the 
strength of other parties. 
d) Freedom-Agency Relationship: 
I. Although M.G. is not aware that he has substantive rationality and he cannot 
articulate the impact of his decision on his freedom, but he has an intuition that his 
decision has not contracted his freedom. This shows the importance of indicating 
three modes of agency and two sides of freedom to determine their relationship. 
II. The Evaluation Instrument is a reliable research instrument. 
I. The type of rationality and reconciliation M.G. has used, the emotions he has 
experienced, the capabilities and the chain of decision he has made are changing in 
his life trajectory. Hence, the agency-freedom relationship must be studied over time.
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Chapter 7: Theory Evaluation 
Introduction  
This thesis aims to determine the agency-freedom relationship and so far a Tri-Modal 
Theory of agency has been developed and tested that: (a) explains cognitive, conative and 
affective modes of agency with respect to freedom; (b) measures agency with respect to both 
the positive and negative sides of freedom; and (c) determines how agency and freedom are 
related. This chapter compares the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with other theories on ‘agency’ 
that somehow focus on freedom. The first section reviews the existing theories on the main 
aspects of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that are emotion, rationality, capability, reconciling 
approach, and side-effect. We focus on these elements because they are found significant in 
this study (see Chapter 6, Case Study). The following section identifies our rival theories, 
particularly the ones that focus on the relationship between agency and freedom, which are 
Grid-Group Cultural Theory by Douglas (2004), Self-determination theory by Deci and Ryan 
(2012), Milgram's (2009) Agency Theory, Endogenous-Exogenous Theory of Attribution by 
Kruglanski (1975) and Bandura's (2012, 1977) Theory of Human Agency.  
Comparing Grid-Group Cultural Theory (Bruce, 2013; Douglas, 2004) with the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency shows that we have provided a comprehensive view of the factors influencing 
decisions that prevent overemphasis on single factors like culture in explaining human agency. 
In comparison with Milgram's (2009) Agency Theory, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency pays 
particular attention to the existence and distinction of different types of rationalities (see Weber, 
1993) and reconciling approaches (see Bakhtin, 1935), which strengthen our conclusions 
because we are not overgeneralising one rationality type and one way of dealing with authorities 
to every individual. Unlike Self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 2012, 2008, 1985), the Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency offers a comprehensive conceptualisation of ‘freedom’, which can 
convince policy makers and managers to be more careful and reluctant about making decisions 
for others. In comparison with the Endogenous-Exogenous theory of attribution (Kruglanski, 
1975; Lange et al., 2011), the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency was able to fill a gap in the attribution 
literature that lacked a reliable theory for understanding decision behaviour with focus on 
freedom.  
Last but not least, contrary to Bandura’s (1977) Theory of Human Agency, the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency is conceptualising ‘agency’ with focus on the impact of an agent’s ‘decision’ 
on her ‘freedom’. In comparison with Bandura’s theory that contains loose conclusions about 
agency and freedom, here, we avoid the simplified view of agency and freedom by considering 
following notions in our analysis: (A) the impact of ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ on decision; (B) the 
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role of time in the agency-freedom link; (C) the side-effects of decisions on an agent’s life 
trajectory; and (D) the multilevel impact of personal and universal constraints on positive and 
negative freedom. The loose conclusions like “if one empowers his competencies, self-
regulatory skills and belief in his efficacy, then his freedom will be expanded” (Bandura, 2012). 
Our theory shows how Bandura’s claim can be undermined by personal-universal constraints, 
the side-effects of an agent’s previous decisions, her rationality type, and the way she deals 
with the opposing worldviews. Here, we have shown how emotion, reason and constraints can 
contract/expand freedom, even though she has empowered her internal assets (see Chapters 5 
and 6).  
Comparing the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with its rivals reveals that the novelty and 
significance of the present study is determining a multilevel and value-laden relationship 
between agency and freedom, with thorough focus on both sides of freedom (i.e. positive and 
negative) and three modes of agency (i.e. cognitive, affective and conative). This is because we 
have consciously focused on decision as a link between agency and freedom, which is a well-
known concept in various disciplines and prevents us from making loose judgments. This 
chapter shows our advantage in being deeply sceptical towards the existing loose judgements 
about decrease/increase in freedom and agency levels, as some (Bandura, 2012) equate 
freedom with a ‘throwback to medieval theology”; others (Deci and Ryan, 2012) regard it as 
identical to well-being; and others (Kruglanski, 1975) use similar concepts like volunteer actions 
to stay away from providing a comprehensive definition for freedom.  
 
The Main Elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency  
M.G.’s case study has shown how the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency explains the impact 
of ‘emotion’ and ‘reason’ on his agency outcome (i.e. decision) and determines his agency-
freedom relationship (Figure 50). These findings imply the important role of five elements in the 
agency-freedom relationships that are: (A) Emotion; (B) Rationality Type; (C) Worldview; (d) 
Capability Set; and (e) Side-effect. Following, we explain how the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
has investigated each of these five elements regarding the agency-freedom relationship: 
(A) Emotion: In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, the impact of ‘Emotion’ on the agency-
freedom relationship is studied based on Weiner’s (2010) list of attribution emotion, founded 
upon the appraisal psychology idea that a person experiences certain emotions when someone 
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is evaluating her behaviour. Error! Reference source not found. shows both direct and 
indirect emotions that M.G. has experienced. These findings have five implications. First, 
Weiner’s (2010) emotions are empirically tested from the two standpoints of ‘self’ and ‘other’ in 
the case study. Second, the emotion that is generated depends on the standpoint from which 
the agent is evaluating herself. Third, rationality type and reconciling approach are two cognitive 
mechanisms that generate indirect emotions. Fourth, there are countervailing emotions that 
influence the decision-making process. 
(B) Rationality Type: The impact of ‘Rationality type’ on the agency-freedom 
relationship is studied based on Weber’s (1993) four types of rationalities based on this idea 
that an agent’s freedom in the modern era depends on her way of reasoning, values and goals. 
In this regard we have developed an Evaluation Instrument that identifies an individual’s 
rationality type based on an 8-Factor model of ‘self’ and a 9-factor model of ‘other’. This 
instrument has been tested in two surveys (see Chapter 5, Data Analysis). The results of CFA 
have confirmed that both models are fitted. Meanwhile, EFA has found both models to be valid 
with 60% explanatory power. In addition, M.G.’s case study has tested and approved the 
reliability of both ‘self’ and ‘other’ models. Case study findings reveal that the temporal aspect of 
the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is able to distinguish between ‘practical’ and ‘substantive’ 
rationalities that are both future-oriented reasoning.  
(C) Worldview: The impact of ‘Worldview’ on the agency-freedom relationship is studied 
based on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism based on this idea that if an agent dismisses her worldview 
in front of the worldview of authority then her freedom is contracted. The Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency incorporates ‘self’ and ‘other’ agentic models to identify if there is any opposing 
worldview in the decision-making process. The M.G. case study shows that he was facing an 
opposing worldview as his ‘self’ and ‘other’ scores for some factors like ‘Capabilities’ were 
different (.86 and .55 respectively). These findings indicate that: (A) the Evaluation Instrument at 
the heart of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is a valid research instrument to identify the 
existence of opposing worldviews; (B) an agent’s reconciling approach has a dynamic nature 
and it depends on the nature of the problem, (C) our approach of investigating how an agent 
encounters opposing worldviews is a cognitive way of exploring indirect emotions.  
(B) Capability Set: The impact of the ‘Capability Set’ on the agency-freedom 
relationship is studied based on Sen’s (1999) Capability Approach (CA) based on the ‘plurality’ 
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of human objectives. According to CA ‘agency’ is defined as one’s ability to choose, act, create 
change, be responsible for her actions, while her achievements are judged based on her values 
and objectives (Sen, 2007). Here, we define agency as affective, cognitive and conative abilities 
to make a decision that is conducive to live the life agent personally has reason to value. The 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency determines the relationship between three modes of agency and 
Berlin's (1969) negative freedom (i.e. the ‘space’ within which one is free to do/be what she 
wants) and positive freedom (i.e. what/who determines the action). The Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency identifies the boundaries of the ‘space’ of negative freedom based on the number, 
quality, easiness/difficulty of choosing and pursuing a capability before and after realising that 
capability. In addition, our theory shows how ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ determine a decision (i.e. 
the positive sense of freedom) (see Error! Reference source not found.). In this line, the case 
study findings have revealed how the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency: (a) identifies the factor 
influencing the capability set; (b) traces an agent’s capabilities that are transforming into a state 
of being/doing; (c) classifies capabilities based on the ‘desirability’ and ‘realisable’ criteria; (d) an 
agent follows a capability and ends up at the ‘functioning’ and/or ‘commanding’ state of 
being/doing; and (e) both ‘personal’ and ‘social’ standpoints can be considered to evaluate the 
state of being/doing. Further, the ‘Side Effect’ is another aspect of the Capability Realisation 
phase of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. In this regard, case study findings indicate how 
accidental consequences of previous decisions will influence the capability set and its transition 
to a state of being/doing (see Chapter 6, Case Study).  
To evaluate the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, we need to compare it with the existing 
theories that address the above-mentioned concepts of emotion, rationality type, worldview, 
capabilities and side-effect with respect to agency and freedom. Here, we draw a conceptual 
link between these five central elements of our theory and freedom (Figure 51), in order to 
identify its rival theories. Initially, we choose the competitor theories based on their focus on the 
agency-freedom relationship. The literature review chapter (see Chapter 2) has shown that 
there is a dearth of research on determining the agency-freedom relationship, but each concept 
has been independently studied in several theories. For example, there is a solid body of 
literature on decision (Becker, 2010, 1993; Bruce, 1999), emotion (Lerner et al., 2015), 
rationality (Kalberg, 1980), capability approach (Alkire, 2007, 2005; Jørgensen, 2015; 
Reisenzein, 2014), agency (Ajzen, 2015; Roberts, 2015) and freedom (Berlin, 1958; Sen, 1999). 
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However, the connection between these concepts has rarely been explored (MacCallum, 1967; 
Pattanaik and Xu, 1990). In the following sections we sum up the conceptual linkage and 
accordingly we identify the existing literature on each branch.
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Figure 51: The Main Elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
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Conceptual Linkages in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
 
Table 55 summarises the conceptual linkage of each part of the agency-freedom 
relationship in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency (as presented in Figure 51), as well as its link to 
the three phases of the theory. The final column of Table 55 shows the unique function of that 
part in explaining the agency-freedom relationship. For example, the second row of Table 55 
shows that we try to understand how ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ influence one’s capability to pursue 
her valuable state of being/doing in “Capability Realisation” based on Sen’s (1999) Capability 
Approach and we use our theory and questionnaire to investigate this research enquiry. Table 
55 provides a classification of the main themes of our theory that helps us to identify its main 
rivals that focus on agency and/or freedom in terms of the factors influencing decision, and the 
impact of decision on freedom.
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Table 55: Elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
Research Enquiry  
Conceptual Link Position in Theory Element Background 
Theory 
Research Instrument 
How does evaluation 
influence decision? 
 
Evaluation >Emotion > 
Decision >Freedom. 
 
 
Phase 3: Feed 
Backward-Forward 
Loop 
 
Emotion 
 
(Weiner, 2010) 
Theory of 
Motivation 
 
Model,  
Evaluation Instrument 
How do reason and 
emotion influence the 
decision object? 
 
Reason & Emotion > 
Decision (Capability) > 
Freedom. 
 
 
Phase 1: 
Capability 
Realization 
 
Capability 
 
Sen's (1999) 
Capability 
Approach 
 
Model, 
Evaluation Instrument 
 
How do values shape 
rationality that 
influences decision and 
freedom? 
 
Value > Rationality > 
Reason & Emotion > 
Decision > Freedom. 
 
Phase 3: Feed 
Backward-Forward 
Loop 
 
Rationality 
 
Weber's (1993) 
Rationality 
Types 
 
Model,  
Evaluation Instrument 
How does the opposing 
worldview influence 
decision and freedom? 
 
Worldview > Reconciling 
Approach > Decision > 
Freedom. 
 
Phase 3: Feed 
Backward-Forward 
Loop 
 
Reconcilin
g Approach 
 
Bakhtin's (1935) 
Dialogism 
 
Model,  
Evaluation Instrument, 
Case Study Guideline 
How do unintended 
side-effects influence 
decision and freedom? 
 
 
Decision > Side Effect > 
Decision > Freedom. 
 
Phase 1: 
Capability 
Realization 
 
Side Effect 
 
Sen's (1999) 
Capability 
Approach 
 
Model,  
Case Study Guideline 
Note: Case study guideline refers to the methodology that is developed in Chapter 6 to apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. Model 
refers to the core decision model of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that is developed in Chapter 4.
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Rival Theories of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
Based on Table 55, we have identified five rival theories that focus on similar conceptual 
linkages in Table 56. For example, the second row of Table 56 shows that Rational Choice 
Theory (RCT) is developed by Becker (1976) based on the economic model of Supply and 
Demand to explain non-market behaviours like discrimination and marriage. This theory is in 
this table because it focuses on the Rational-Decision linkage that we have in the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency. The final column of the second row shows that subsequent research on RCT 
have focused on the role of emotion in decision making (Lerner et al., 2015), and investigating 
decisions made in an organisational context (Scott et al., 2015). However, RCT is not qualified 
as one of the main competitors of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, because RCT aims at 
understanding the rational-decision relationship and ‘freedom’ is not its focal point. The first 
column of Table 56 shows the conceptual linkage of each theory with our theory.  For example, 
the conceptual link of the Practical Theory of Choice that is developed by Sen (1977) is 
understanding the impact of goals and ethics on decision that is presented in the table as: (Goal 
and Ethics > Decision). Here, the Practical Theory of Choice is not qualified as one of the main 
competitors of our theory, because its focal purpose is the understanding of ethical motivation 
rather than freedom. 
The theories summarised in Table 56 are emphasising some parts of the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency. As presented in Table 56 only five theories are focusing on decision with 
emphasis on ‘freedom’, and that is why in the following sections we will compare them with the 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. These theories are: (A) the self-determination theory by Deci and 
Ryan (2012, 2008); (B) the theory of endogenous-exogenous attribution by Kruglanski (1975); 
(C) Milgram's (2009) agency theory; (D) the Grid-Group Cultural theory by Douglas (2007); and 
(E) Bandura's (2012) Psychological Cognitive Theory of Human Agency. Figure 52 shows how 
these rival theories together cover all of the main elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. 
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Table 56: Potential Rival Theories of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
Research Enquiry 
Conceptual Link 
to Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency 
Author Theory/Mo
del 
Recent Research Trends 
How to explain motivation? 
Behaviours are motivated by 
satisfying the basic needs of 
competency, Relatedness and 
Autonomy. 
 
Motivation>Decisio
n >Freedom* 
 
(Deci and 
Ryan, 
2008, 
1985, 
1985) 
 
Self-
determinatio
n Theory  
 
Patient Determination Act by 
Aryee et al. (2015) 
 
 Evolution of theory by 
Buchanan (2016) 
 
Self-determination in 
organisations: Jørgensen 
(2015) 
How to explain non-market decisions 
using an economic supply and 
demand model? Non-market 
behaviours can be explained by 
market rules. 
 
Rational>Decision 
 
(Becker, 
2010, 
1993, 
1976) 
 
Rational 
Choice 
Theory 
 
Emotion and Decision by 
Lerner et al. (2015) 
 
Decision in Organizations by 
Scott et al. (2015) 
 
 
How to explain rational and irrational 
decisions? People have several 
biases and they make decision on the 
bases of potential values of loss and 
gain. 
 
Rational 
&Emotion>Decision 
 
(Kahnema
n, 2003, 
2003, 
2002) 
 
Prospect 
Theory 
 
Decision and risk by Avineri 
and Ben-Elia (2015) 
 
Focus on guilt and happiness 
by Quick et al. (2015) 
How to explain altruistic decisions? 
People may internalise others’ goals 
and be involve in commitment actions 
that are against their self-interest. 
 
Gaol 
&Ethics>Decision 
 
(Sen, 
1990) 
 
Practical 
Theory of 
Choice 
 
Focus on Democracy by 
Neverauskas and Tijūnaitienė 
(2015) 
 
Democratic network 
governance by Sørensen and 
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Torfing (2016) 
How to explain decisions made in 
social settings? People have dual 
mind (automatic and planned) and 
make decisions on the bases of 
‘reciprocity’ and ‘hypocrisy’. 
 
Affect 
&Environment>Dec
ision 
 
(Bargh, 
1997, 
1989) 
 
Dual 
Process 
Model 
 
In the field of education by 
Scaglione et al. (2015)  
 
Focus on obesity by Price et al. 
(2016) 
 
Risk Modelling by Sage and 
Haimes (2015) 
How to make Rational Choice Theory 
more realistic? Decisions are 
governed by ‘loyalty’ and ‘authority’; 
one has bounded rationality so 
chooses the ‘satisficing’ option not 
the optimum option.  
 
Rationality>Decisio
n 
 
(Simon, 
1965) 
 
Formal 
Theory of 
Employmen
t 
Relationship 
 
Focus on influence, case of US 
president by Haeder and 
Yackee (2015) 
 
Career pattern focus in civil 
servants in Germany by Veit 
and Scholz (2015) 
How to explain human agency in 
social settings? Agency has four 
properties of intentionality, 
forethought, self-reactiveness, self-
reflectiveness and one is both a 
producer and product of social 
settings. 
 
Agency>Freedom 
 
(Bandura, 
2012, 
1989, 
1977) 
 
Psychologic
al Cognitive 
Theory of 
Human 
Agency 
 
Focus on sustainability in  
consumption by Roy et al. 
(2015)  
 
Field of education (Murphy, 
2015) 
 
Focus on Career self-
management by Lent and 
Brown (2013) 
 
How is brain activity in decision 
 
Brain>Decision 
 
(Damasio, 
 
Theory of 
 
Memory load and uncertain 
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making? Cognitive decision making is 
not possible without emotion. 
2012, 
1999; 
Damasio 
et al., 
2015) 
Automatic 
Behaviour 
decision making by Cui et al. 
(2015) 
 
Emotion  and decision by 
Lerner et al. (2015) 
How to measure capabilities? 
Developing a reliable and valid index 
to measure a capability set. 
 
Constrains>Capabil
ity>Decision 
 
(Alkire, 
2008, 
2007, 
2005) 
 
Empowerm
ent 
Measure 
Index 
 
Role of Outcome in capability 
set by Kinchin et al. (2015) 
 
Role of organisation on 
capability set by Sun et al. 
(2015) 
How do groups control behaviour? 
Grid and Group dimensions explain 
four cultural biases that explain how 
groups control behaviour. 
 
Culture>Rationality
>Decision>Freedo
m* 
 
(Douglas, 
2007) 
 
Grid Group 
Cultural 
Theory 
 
Focus on supply chain by Loffi 
et al. (2015) 
 
Focus on Attitude by Robinson 
and Swedlow (2015) 
How does a rational person make a 
decision? Decisions can be 
understood in mathematical 
algorithm, where decision makers are 
players and choose an optimum 
strategy to maximise their interest. 
 
Reason>Decision 
 
Harsanyi 
et al. 
(1988) 
 
General 
Theory of 
Equilibrium 
Selection in 
Games 
 
Focus on Pragmatism by Benz 
et al. (2016) 
 
Fuzzy logic analysis by 
Esposito et al. (2015) 
How to understand attribution? To 
understand a behaviour one must see 
if it is ‘volunteer’.  
 
Freedom>Behaviou
r* 
 
(Kruglans
ki, 1975) 
 
Theory of 
Endogenou
s-
Exogenous 
Attribution 
 
Focus on early childhood 
education by Sugimoto (2015) 
 
Focus on Tuberculosis by 
Jabbari and Kheiri (2016) 
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What is attribution? Each attribution 
has three aspects of time, stimulus, 
and persons. 
 
Behaviour>Evaluati
on 
 
(Kelley et 
al., 2013) 
 
Kelly Cube 
 
Focus on attitude and decision 
by Eiser and van der Pligt 
(2015) 
How to explain behaviour under 
authority? People are either in an 
‘autonomous’ state and control their 
choice, or in an ‘agented’ state and 
follow the order and put off 
responsibility to the authority. 
 
Worldview>Decisio
n>Freedom* 
 
(Milgram, 
2009, 
1965, 
1963) 
 
Milgram’s 
Agency 
Theory 
 
Ethical decision making by 
Roberts (2015) 
 
Business ethics by Kaptein 
(2015) 
How does emotion influence 
behaviour? Moral emotion has 
functional quality based on the 
actors’ perceived controllability to 
situation. 
 
Evaluation>Emotio
n>Decision  
 
(Reisenzei
n, 2014) 
 
Appraisal 
Theory of 
Moral 
Emotion 
 
Emotion and decision by 
Kassam (2015) 
How to improve Rational Choice 
Theory? Add identity dimension to 
the theory. 
 
Identity>Decision 
 
Akerlof 
and 
Kranton 
(2010) 
 
Identity 
Economic 
 
Focus on Stratification by Davis 
(2015) 
 
Identity in social networks by 
Patacchini and Zenou (2016) 
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Figure 52: Rival Theories of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in Conceptual Linkage 
 
  375 
Comparative Analysis of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency  
This section compares the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with its rivals. To compare, first 
we explain how the other theories explain the agency-freedom linkage and then we compare 
them with the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. The comparison is based on 11 criteria: (A) research 
focus; (B) research problem; (C) research approach; (D) phenotypes; (E) aim; (F) main themes; 
(G) applications; (H) research instruments; (I) freedom measurement; (J) discipline and (K) 
research methods. In order to sum up each comparison we will apply both the Tri-Modal Theory 
of Agency and its competitor on an imaginary example.  
 
Versus the Self-Determination Theory 
Table 57 compares the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with the Self-Determination Theory 
(SDT) (Deci and Ryan, 2012). SDT focuses on the freedom aspect of agency-outcome by 
defining ‘motivation’ as an individual’s attempt to satisfy her need for ‘autonomy’. To compare 
SDT and our theory, we use them to explain a patient’s life or death choice before undergoing a 
difficult surgery. We use this hypothetical example because one area that SDT is used with 
particular focus on freedom is in the Patient Determination Act, which is a programme that 
supports patients to make their own life or death decision before they undergo vital surgery 
(Jørgensen, 2015). This programme requires medical institutions to (a) identify if a patient 
needs to be in charge of her life-death destiny, and (b) professionals need to put the 
responsibility for surgery on to the patient and let her to make the life or death decision 
(Jørgensen, 2015). The problem is that medical institutions hardly commit to Patient 
Determination Act (Angelos and Johnston, 1999a; Bahurmoz et al., 2015). As Table 57 shows, 
the justification that SDT provides for doctors and nurses is that patients have a basic 
psychological need for autonomy, so they need to leave them to make their own decision to 
satisfy this need. There are several studies showing that implementing this programme using 
the SDT approach is a challenging task, as it is difficult to convince professionals to let patients 
make the their own decision (Angelos and Johnston, 1999b). As Table 57 shows SDT is not 
founded on the ‘plurality’ of objectives and human ‘agency’ to live according to what they value. 
As a result, SDT lacks the required philosophical foundation to apply the Patient Determination 
Act and similar programmes that require professionals to allow patients to choose their destiny.  
On the other hand, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is founded upon a comprehensive 
definition of freedom by Berlin (1969), who identifies two senses of positive-negative for 
freedom (Gray, 2015). Accordingly, in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency all individuals must have 
‘agency’ to choose, act, live and being judged according to their own values (Sen, 1999). In this 
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case the challenge of implementing the Patient Determination Act can be addressed, because 
of the philosophical background of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. Another advantage of the 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency over SDT is its Evaluation Instrument that enables medical 
institutions, doctors and nurses to identify how a patient is reasoning, what her values and goals 
are. The existing SDT questionnaires focus on ‘motivation’ rather than ‘freedom’ as they have 
six measurements for motivation and only one measurement for autonomy (Aryee et al., 2015). 
Overall, Table 57 shows that ‘freedom’-oriented nature of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is its 
advantage over SDT in order to be used in the cases where ‘freedom’ of choice matters.  
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Table 57: Self-Determination Theory v. Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
Self-Determination Theory 
 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
Focus: 
 
Focus: 
 
Motivation  Freedom 
 
Authors: 
 
Authors: 
 
(Deci and Ryan, 2012, 2008, 1985)  Present study 
 
Research Problem: 
 
Research Problem: 
 
Lack of psychological well-being.   Unclear agency-freedom relationship. 
 
Research Question: 
 
Research Question: 
 
How to measure motivation to help people grow 
their psychological wellbeing?  
 How to determine the agency-freedom relationship?  
 
Research Approach: 
 
Research Approach: 
 
Explain motivation based on the basic psychological 
needs of autonomy, competency and relatedness. 
 Measure impact of constraints, ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ on 
decision, in order to avoid conflicts with one’s values (i.e. 
contracts freedom). 
 
Discipline: 
 
Discipline 
 
Psychology  Economy, philosophy, psychology 
 
Research Method: 
 
Research Method: 
 
Experiment  Survey, Interview, Case study 
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Model: 
 
Model: 
 
Dependent variable: 
Behaviour (adoption and maintenance) 
Independent variables: 
Autonomous vs. Controlled behaviour 
motivation/regulation 
Behaviour related need satisfaction of (autonomy, 
competence, relatedness) 
Need-Supportive Behaviour Settings and 
Interactions 
Behaviour Causality Orientations 
Behaviour Goals/Participation motive 
 Dependent Variable:  
Freedom (Negative and Positive) 
Agency (Cognitive, Affective, Conative) 
Independent Variables: 
Decision: (Object (Capability), Subject, Process) 
Emotion 
Direct: ‘Self’ Evaluation 
Indirect: ‘Other’ Evaluation, Rationality Type, facing 
opposing worldview 
Reason 
Rationality Type (Reasoning, Values, Goals) 
Worldview (Reconciling Approach) 
Constraints: 
Universal (Logical-Physical) 
Personal (Resources-Axiological) 
Research Aim: 
 
Research Aim: 
 
Measure the impact of basic needs on motivation.  Explain how ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ influence decision and 
trace their impact on freedom. 
Research instrument: 
 
Research instrument: 
 
Five measurements of motivation 
One measurement of sense of choice 
 
 Eight scales from the ‘self’ standpoint 
Nine scales from the ‘other’ standpoint 
All measurements focus on freedom 
Main themes: 
 
Main themes: 
 
Distinguishes internal from external motives 
Human goal is achieving psychological wellbeing 
SDT is an organismic dialectical approach that 
people are active organisms and evolve to grow and 
 Distinguishes factors in both emotional-reason, and self-
other categories 
Human goal is being able to live the life she values.  
People have agency to make choices but their decisions 
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development occurs automatically are influenced by ‘emotion’ and ‘reason’, while they try to 
live conducive to their values. 
Advantage points: 
 
Advantage point: 
 
Six sub-theories 
Applied in extensive areas 
Used experiment to set causality 
 Focus on two sides of freedom and three modes of agency 
Evaluation Instrument is developed in two surveys, 21 in-
depth interviews, and one case study 
Freedom 
 
Freedom 
 
Is defined as individual’s basic psychological need 
to satisfy autonomous needs.  
 Agent’s ability to live according to her values that is 
influenced by her agency outcome (i.e. decision) that is 
made based on the agent’s rationality type, worldview, 
direct and indirect emotions, side effect of her other 
decisions and capability set. 
 
Freedom-Oriented Application 
 
Freedom-Oriented Application 
 
The ‘Patient Determination Act’ designed to give the 
responsibility of life or death to patients. The 
practical challenge of SDT is convincing medical 
institutions to allow patients be the agent of their 
own lives (Jørgensen, 2015).  
 It can be used in the ‘Patient Determination Act’ by 
providing a freedom-based platform that can convince 
medical institutions to respect a patient’s agency. 
Note:  The elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency are presented relative to SDT. 
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Versus Grid-Group Cultural Theory 
Table 58 compares the Grid-Group Cultural Theory (Douglas, 2007) known as Cultural 
Theory (CT) and the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, for two reasons. First, CT considers ‘freedom’ 
as it shows how an individual’s behaviour is ‘controlled’ in a group. Second, to classify human 
behaviour Grid-Group theory uses Weber's (1993) rationality types that serve as the theoretical 
background of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency for identifying an agent’s reasons and values. 
Table 58 compares CT and our theory. As an example for Table 58, we use both theories to 
explain why a Muslim woman is wearing the Hijab in France.  
Table 58 shows that to explain her decision behaviour CT focuses on the ‘cultural’ 
differences of that woman with French society. According to CT, as this woman is not following 
the regulations of French society and she is behaving according to her personal values she is 
‘isolated’ in French society (Bruce, 2013). This may seem fine so far, but the problem of CT is 
when policy makers want to conduct policies based on this explanation. CT believes that the 
conflict between the opposing cultural biases is not reconcilable. In other words, it is not 
possible for French society and the Muslim woman to deal with their conflict and arrive at a 
solution in a way that both worldviews are heard and the outcome satisfies both parties’ 
interests, because they have opposing cultural biases (Douglas, 2007). As a result of this view 
we see that French authorities have banned the Hijab in public spaces, ignoring Muslim protests 
against the Hijab ban (Noaparast, 2014). As evidence, using CT policy makers may involve their 
cultural bias in their judgments.  
On the other hand, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency focuses on both positive and 
negative freedom and this prevents it from making naive judgments about freedom by narrowing 
its explanation to a single factor like culture. This is possible because our Evaluation Instrument 
measures the impact of eight agentic factors from the Muslim woman’s standpoint as well as 
nine agentic factors from what she perceives that others think about her decision to wear the 
Hijab. This provides us with her capability set, rationality type, way of reasoning, values, goals 
and emotions regarding her decision (Row 10, Table 58). For example, if her scores in this 
questionnaire show that she has a ‘causal’ type of reasoning and her she is wearing the Hijab 
because her family coerced her, then in an interview we try find out if she dismisses her own 
worldview to follow the order, retains both worldviews or integrates them into a third worldview. 
At the end these findings help us to understand what type of rationality she is using, whether 
she is using ‘monologue’ and her freedom is contracted by wearing the Hijab or whether she is 
having a dialogue between the opposing worldviews and she is simply living according to her 
values. Her scores in the Evaluation Instrument show if she has ‘teleological’ reasoning and 
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‘substantive rationality’ and wearing the Hijab is in line with her faith and long-term goals or not. 
Further, we will not rely on quantitative data and try to conduct an interview to see if she is 
wearing the Hijab for her religious ‘values’ and she experiences ‘joy’ when practicing this ritual 
or whether it is a matter of coercion. After these analyses we can conclude if the decision to 
wear the Hijab has contracted her freedom to live the life she values or not. As evidence, the 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency offers an Evaluation Instrument and interview guidelines that help 
us to understand why an individual is behaving differently from the dominant grid of the society. 
These findings help to build upon cultural studies (Bruce, 2013; Robinson and Swedlow, 2015).  
Further, as presented in row 11 of Table 58, our theory offers three ways of reconciling 
opposing worldviews (i.e. monologue, dialogue, and dialectic), which prevents us from 
accepting this simple assumption that people from different rationality types are not able to deal 
with the conflict between their worldviews. In other words, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is 
against CT’s (Douglas, 2007) claim that different worldviews are not able to tolerate each other. 
This comparison shows that the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency prevents us from making 
overgeneralisations about human behaviour that could have harmful consequences for the 
wellbeing of minorities (Noaparast, 2014); the detrimental policies (e.g. the Hijab Ban in France) 
that are justified under the umbrella of cultural classifications in which the diversity of individuals’ 
values, goals, emotions and way of reasoning is neglected. 
  382 
Table 58: Grid Group Cultural Theory v. Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
Grid Group Cultural Theory 
 
 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
Focus: 
 
Focus: 
 
Culture  Freedom 
 
Authors: 
 
Authors: 
 
(Bruce, 2013; Douglas, 2007; Loffi et al., 
2015) 
 Present study 
 
Research Problem: 
 
Research Problem: 
 
Colonial mind-sets of ‘primitive irrationality’ 
and lack of a topology of cultural biases that 
explains human behaviours in different 
societies.   
 Agency-freedom link is unclear and policy makers neglect 
individuals’ agency-freedom and they conduct some policies 
that undermine the wellbeing of affected people.  
 
Research Question: 
 
Research Question: 
 
How to explain behaviour in a group?  How to determine agency in relation to freedom?  
 
Research Approach: 
 
Research Approach: 
 
To understand the controlling role of groups 
on human behaviour, Cultural Theory 
classifies all cultures in two dimensions of 
group (boundary around community) and 
grid (regulation). 
 Measure the factors influencing agency in three forms of 
affective (emotion), cognitive (reason) and conative 
(capabilities) in order to indicate agency level according to its 
outcome (i.e. decision) and test whether the decision is against 
her ‘values’ and thus contracts her freedom. 
Discipline: 
 
Discipline 
 
Anthropology and Sociology  Economy, Philosophy, Psychology 
 
Research Method: 
 
Research Method: 
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Field study  Survey, Interview, Case study 
 
Model: 
 
Model: 
 
Two dimensions:  
Grid 
Group 
Four cultural biases:  
High grid and high group (Positional),  
Low grid and low group (isolated) 
Low grid and high group (egalitarian) 
High grid and low group (individual) 
Three types of Weber’s Rationality: 
Bureaucrat (as a positional figure) 
Holy man (as an egalitarian figure) 
Merchant (as an individualist figure) 
 
 Two dimensions:  
Agency 
Freedom 
Three modes:  
Cognitive  
Affective  
Conative 
Two sets of factors:  
Emotion 
Reason 
Four levels of agency-freedom: 
Beneficial Functioning 
Beneficial Commanding 
Adverse Functioning 
Adverse Commanding 
Four Types of Weber’s Rationality based on Kalberg's (1980) 
categories: 
Substantive 
Practical 
Theoretical 
Formal 
Four types of facing opposing worldviews: 
Monologue (Dismiss ‘self’) 
Monologue (Dismiss ‘other’) 
Dialectic 
Dialogue 
Two sets of emotion: 
Direct (Self-generated) 
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Indirect (Other-generated) 
Three Dimensions of Decision: 
Object (Capability) 
Subject 
Process 
Research Aim: 
 
Research Aim: 
 
Explain how much of an individual life is 
controlled by its group. 
 Determine the agency-freedom relationship. 
 
Research instrument: 
 
Research instrument: 
 
Theoretical Framework  
Model 
 Theory 
Model 
Evaluation Instrument 
Case study guideline 
 
Main Themes: 
 
Main themes: 
 
Being built on universalism of cultural biases 
in a deterministic view of human life. 
Tries to show distribution of a value set in 
society. 
Explains human behaviour based on two 
dimensions of ‘grid’ and ‘group’ in four 
cultural categories. 
Explains human behaviour in the abstract 
sense according to their interactions and 
interpersonal relations. 
Believes in ‘irreconcilable conflict’ between 
worldviews that are coming from opposing 
cultural biases.  
 Is built upon liberal and pluralistic view of human life. 
Tries to determine the agency-freedom relationship with 
reference to ‘value’.  
Explains decisions from the ‘self’ and ‘other’ standpoints. 
Traces the impact of decision on ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
freedom and three modes of agency. 
Explains agency-oriented factors based on ‘reason’ that are 
derived from four “rationality types” and “reconciling 
approaches” and two types of “emotions” that derived from the 
agent’s evaluation of her current state of being/doing. 
Prevents simple generalisations about how an agent deals with 
opposing worldviews and distinguishes between the dialogue, 
monologue and dialectic approach to facing opposing 
worldviews. 
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Freedom 
 
Freedom 
 
Freedom is considered only from its 
negative sense as focuses on the “Grid” as 
what limits the freedom space of a social 
being in a group. 
 Freedom is considered from: (a) the negative sense through the 
‘capability set’ as a ‘conative’ mode of agency, and (b) the 
positive senses through ‘emotion’ and ‘reason’ influencing 
decisions that are equivalently the ‘affective’ and ‘cognitive’ 
modes of agency.  
Note:  The elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency are presented relative to Cultural Theory.
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Versus Milgram’s Agency Theory 
Table 59 compares Milgram's (1965) Agency Theory and the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency for two reasons. First, Milgram (1965) focuses on the agency-freedom relationship by 
looking at freedom as ‘obedience’ before authorities. Second, to explain obedience Milgram 
explores how individuals encounter with the opposing worldview, particularly when it belongs to 
authority. In the worldview aspect of our theory we have the same focus, where we explore how 
one reconciles her ‘self’ worldview and ‘other’ opposing worldview based on Bakhtin's (1935) 
dialogism.  
To compare Milgram's (1965) Agency Theory and the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we 
use them to explain why an American citizen may vote for the state’s gun law that regulates the 
possession of firearms accessories, despite the extensive body of evidence on the substantial 
threat of gun-related violence to children and youth in that country (Xuan and Hemenway, 2015). 
This example shows Milgram's (1965) limitations in explaining why one may vote for a law that 
harms others. For Milgram's (1965) theory an American citizen who votes for the state’s gun law 
is either ‘autonomous’ and following her own will, or ‘agentic’ and following the order. The Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency shows that this is a simplistic view of human agency for two reasons. 
First, our theory can show that an American citizen, as a modern individual could possess four 
different types of rationalities (i.e. practical, substantive, formal, and substantive), among which 
the ‘formal’ rationality is the only type that matches with Milgram's (1965) explanation. In the 
other words, there are many people who vote for the gun law because they wanted to satisfy 
their socio-economic needs (i.e. having practical rationality), and/or they believed that this is the 
fundamental principle of the US codes of conduct (i.e. having substantive rationality), and not 
because they are following the authorities (i.e. having formal rationality). 
The second problem with Milgram’s explanation is simplifying how people encounter with 
the opposing worldview to one form of reconciling approach, saying that if one is following an 
order that results in harming someone else this person dismisses her own worldview in front of 
the opposing worldview (i.e. monologue reconciling approach). Based on Bakhtin's (1935) 
dialogism, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency identifies three different types of reconciling 
approaches (i.e. monologue, dialogue, and dialectic) that one may accommodate depending on 
the nature of the problem (see Chapter 6, Case Study). For example, imagine an American 
woman who votes against the state’s gun law in order to protect her children’s lives in a society 
where any maniac can possess a gun and attack public spaces (Xuan and Hemenway, 2015). 
At the same time, she can be aware of the opposing worldview of her husband who believes 
that having a gun is necessary for Americans, in order to be able to defend themselves in the 
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face of future terrorist attacks. This woman can use either dialogue (i.e. she considers her 
husband’s worldview, being informed by him while keeping her own worldview), dialectic (i.e. 
considers her husband’s worldview and integrates her own worldview with his perspective and 
arrives at a third worldview that is consistent with both of the original worldviews), and/or 
monologue (i.e. excludes either her own worldview or her husband’s worldview). One of the 
weak aspects of Milgram's (1965) Agency Theory is that Milgram assumes that all people in 
front of authority use the monologue approach.  
Comparing Milgram's (1965) Agency Theory with our theory highlights the simplistic 
generalisation about human agency in historical cases. The typical example of this fragile 
agency theory about human behaviour is on why soldiers from Nazi Germany became involved 
in the Holocaust during World War II. Milgram's (1965) Agency Theory is developed based on 
this example, where the military situation makes a soldier obey the order from higher ranked 
officers. Milgram  relies on this special sample and theorises that people will avoid responsibility 
for their actions by obeying orders just as Nazi soldiers placed the responsibility for harming 
Jews on the shoulders of higher ranked authorities, as Hitler was the legitimate power in 
Germany at that time. This is because in military forces, formal rationality is enforced and an 
alternative example (e.g. the American reaction to state gun law) encourages other forms of 
rationalities and reconciling approaches that are not captured by Milgram (2015). Our theory 
shows the limitations of Milgram's (1965) Agency Theory. In addition, we offer the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency that indicates these simplifications and suggests a more realistic explanation 
about agency and its link to freedom.  
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Table 59: Milgram’s Agency Theory v. Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
Milgram’s Agency Theory 
 
 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
Focus: 
 
Focus: 
 
Obedience  Freedom 
 
Authors: 
 
Authors: 
 
(Milgram, 2009, 1965, 1963)  Present study 
 
Research Problem: 
 
Research Problem: 
 
How individuals behave when there is a 
conflict between obedience to authority and 
their personal will. 
 How agency and freedom are related.  
 
Research Question: 
 
Research Question: 
 
Do people obey an order even if it involves 
harming another person? 
 When one says “I chose to be/do something”, how much of her 
agency is involved in terms of her freedom?  
 
Research Approach: 
 
Research Approach: 
 
Conduct an experiment in which 
participants receive orders from authority to 
harm another person and observe the 
result. 
 To understand the agency oriented factors associated with 
freedom: 
In-depth Interview on why one makes a decision.  
Design a questionnaire. 
Test it in two surveys and amend it in 11 interviews and one 
case study; asking participants to reveal the ‘reasons’ behind 
their decision from the ‘self’ and ‘other’ standpoints. 
Map the result to indicate the agent’s rationality type, and 
reconciling approach before the opposing worldview.  
Based on the theory, explore the ‘emotions’ generated from 
evaluating their state of being/doing before and after making 
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that decision.  
Trace their decision trajectory to see if it conflicts with the 
agent’s values, i.e. contracts her freedom. 
Discipline: 
 
Discipline 
 
Psychology and Philosophy  Economy, Philosophy, Psychology 
 
Research Method: 
 
Research Method: 
 
Experiment  Survey, Interview, Case study 
 
Model: 
 
Model: 
 
Two states of behaviour: 
Autonomous state (one directs her 
decisions and takes responsibility for its 
consequences) 
Agentic state (one follows the order and 
puts the responsibility for her actions onto 
the authority; legitimacy of authority 
matters) 
 Decision is influenced by: 
Emotion (generated directly from evaluating her state of 
being/doing and/or indirectly due to her rationality type and 
facing an opposing worldview) 
Reason (based on rationality type and standpoint) 
Freedom is contracted if agency outcome (i.e. decision) 
prevents one from living according to her values. 
Agency and Freedom are linked through decision 
Research Aim: 
 
Research Aim: 
 
Identify an individual’s state of behaviour.  Identify the agency-freedom relationship. 
Research instrument: 
 
Research instrument: 
 
Experiment  
(ethical problems and sampling biases). 
 Model,  
Survey (Questionnaire validated in two studies),  
Case Study (validated in one extensive case) 
Freedom 
 
Freedom 
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Obedience aspect of negative freedom.  Positive-Negative Freedom mapped onto Cognitive, Conative 
and Affective Modes of Agency 
Note:  The elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency are presented relative to the Milgram Agency Theory.
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Versus Endogenous-Exogenous Attribution Theory 
Table 60 compares the Endogenous-Exogenous Attribution Theory (Kruglanski, 1975) 
and the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency for two reasons. First, Kruglanski (1975) focuses on the 
‘volunteer’ aspect of behaviour in attribution studies that has roots in freedom, which is the focus 
of the present study. Second, the ‘volunteer’ feature of behaviour is the focal point of 
Kruglanski’s (1975) theory in an attempt to make Attribution Theories more realistic. In this line, 
the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency also has tried to improve the reliability of observer’s judgments 
about decision behaviour. To compare Kruglanski’s (1975) theory and our theory we use these 
two lenses to explain why a student chooses to study medicine at university.  
As presented in Table 60, Kruglanski (1975) focuses on the ‘attribution’ of the student’s 
university major choice, while the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency focuses on the factors influencing 
her agency, trying to establish whether her university major choice (agency outcome) has 
prevented her from living the life she has reason to value (i.e. contract her freedom). Kruglanski 
(1975) asks the student if she chooses this major voluntarily and if it is the case then this theory 
argues that this decision is an ‘action’ not an ‘occurrence’, thus attributions assigned to this 
behaviour are either endogenous (e.g. ability, effort, talent) and/or exogenous (e.g. luck, 
environment). On the other hand, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency uses its Evolution Instrument 
and asks the student to fill in this questionnaire. This provides us with the student’s rationality 
type, reasoning, opposing worldview, and values from her ‘self’ and ‘other’ standpoints. Further, 
if we find an opposing worldview in her answers to the questionnaire, we ask her how she deals 
with this conflict. We ask her about the emotions she has experienced and map them onto her 
reasons. At the end we conclude whether her freedom is contracted by her agency-outcome 
based on the above-mentioned ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’. This information enables us to test if this 
decision has been in line with her values, and in case of contradiction, we say that this decision 
has contracted her freedom. In addition, we can say that if her university major choice 
contracts/expands affective, conative, and cognitive modes of her agency. On the other hand, 
Kruglanski’s (1975) explanation only classifies this student’s decision as an ‘action’ and waits for 
naïve observers to attribute reasons to this behaviour. Contrasting our explanation with 
Kruglanski’s (1975) approach shows that the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency provides a much more 
coherent interpretation of human decision regarding freedom and agency. 
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Table 60: Endogenous-Exogenous Attribution Theory v. Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
Endogenous-Exogenous Attribution Theory 
 
 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
Focus: 
 
Focus: 
 
Attribution  Freedom 
Authors: 
 
Authors: 
 
(Jabari and Khiry, 2016; Kruglanski, 1975)  Present study 
Research Problem: 
 
Research Problem: 
 
Volunteer aspect of behaviour is ignored in 
attribution theories. 
 Freedom of the decision maker is ignored in attribution 
theories and policy maker observations.  
Research Question: 
 
Research Question: 
 
How to explain attribution with focus on volunteer 
aspect of behaviour? 
 How to explain decisions with a focus on freedom?  
 
Research Approach: 
 
Research Approach: 
 
Whether a behaviour is volunteer (i.e. action) or 
non-volunteer (i.e. occurrence) shows if 
endogenous or exogenous attributions are 
assigned to it. 
 
 If a decision is influenced by agency-oriented factors and 
it conflicts with the agent’s “values”, then it contracts her 
freedom. 
Discipline: 
 
Discipline 
 
Psychology  Economy, Philosophy, Psychology 
 
Research Method: 
 
Research Method: 
 
Experiment  Survey, Interview, Case study 
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Model: 
 
Model: 
 
Behaviour has two dimensions: 
Volunteer (action) 
Non-volunteer 
Attributions assigned to action are: 
Endogenous 
Exogenous  
 
 Agency-oriented factors have three modes: 
Affective (emotion) 
Cognitive (reason) 
Conative (Capabilities) 
Freedom is contracted by agency-outcome if the decision 
is against the agent’s “values”. 
Research Aim: 
 
Research Aim: 
 
Explains attribution based on behaviour. 
 
 Explain freedom based on agency. 
Research instrument: 
 
Research instrument: 
 
Experiment 
 
 Theory, Model, Questionnaire 
Freedom 
 
Freedom 
 
Definition is narrowed to ‘volunteer’ vs. ‘non-
volunteer’ behaviours. 
 Definition covers negative freedom through capabilities 
(conative mode of agency), and positive freedom through 
rationality type and worldview (cognitive mode of 
agency), and emotion (affective mode of agency) in time 
within life trajectory. 
Note:  The elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency are presented relative to the Exogenous-Endogenous Theory of Attribution.
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Versus Bandura’s Human Agency Theory 
Table 61 compares the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with the Human Agency Theory 
(Bandura, 2012), because this theory: (a) is on the agency-freedom relationship; (b) considers 
the temporal aspect of reasoning; (c) points to freedom by acknowledging the ‘agency-social 
structure’ duality; (d) looks at the impact of circumstances as ‘protuity’ on human agency; and 
(e) addresses ‘freedom’ with respect to goals, rights, options and means to pursue them.  
 To clarify the differences between our theory and Bandura’s (2012) theory, we apply 
both of them to a hypothetical decision. In this regard, we use these two lenses and explain an 
Englishman’s voting behaviour in the UK’s EU referendum in 2016. In this regard, Bandura’s 
(2012) theory says that having the right to vote only shows that this person has passive freedom, 
and we need to look at his active freedom, that is the extent to which his vote is influential in his 
life. His theory will distinguish between ‘passive’ and ‘active’ forms of freedom, which is an 
immature version of Berlin's (1958) ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ senses of freedom, which is 
accommodated in detail in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. Bandura (2012) explains passive 
freedom as participating in the election in the absence of constraints, which is similar to Berlin's 
(1958) negative sense of freedom. Bandura’s (2012) active freedom is about the extent to which 
this vote will enable the voter “to exercise his self-influence in the service of his selected goals 
and outcomes”, which is similar to Berlin's (1958) positive sense of freedom. In this regard, 
Bandura’s (2012) definitions of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ types of freedom are incomplete versions 
of Berlin's (1958) ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ senses of freedom, and it is not clear what are the 
added values of his new concepts compared with the original definitions. 
 Further, Bandura’s (2012) explanation has several limitations: (A) neither of the four 
aspects of his agency (i.e. forethought, intentionality, self-reflectiveness, and self-reactiveness) 
in his theory are focusing on how constraints limit one’s agency; (B) Bandura’s theory overlooks 
‘causal’ and ‘correlation’ types of reasoning as its mere focus in the ‘forethought’ aspect of 
agency is on ‘teleological’ reasoning that people reason based on forward thinking anticipating 
the future; (d) accordingly, Bandura’s (2012) theory has a narrow perspective on future-oriented 
types of rationalities (i.e. substantive and practical), and ignores ‘formal’ and ‘theoretical’ ways 
of living. For example, a member of parliament may vote for the UK to remain in the EU against 
his personal interests and goals, because her party has coerced her, i.e. she has a ‘formal’ type 
of rationality and uses the ‘correlational’ type of reasoning attributing her decision to an event 
that is happening when she is voting and not to her goals in the future.  
In contrast with Bandura’s (2012) theory, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency explains the 
voters’ agency through analysing the outcome of their agency (i.e. decision) and measuring its 
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impact on their freedom (i.e. the extent to which agency-outcome conflicts/conduces with the 
agent’s values). This is because Bandura’s focus is on ‘agency’ in regard to human 
‘development’, whereas the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency focuses on ‘agency’ in ‘decision’-
making process and its relation to ‘freedom’. In the example of voting, Bandura’s (2012) 
preoccupation is to show that the Englishman’s vote is both the product and producer of his 
circumstance, whereas the concern of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is to identify the ‘reasons’ 
and ‘emotions’ that influence the voters’ agency when they vote, and whether that vote is 
conducive to their values. 
 As Table 61 shows, Bandura’s (2012) theory believes that ‘free-will’ is a metaphysical 
concept and to understand the Englishman’s voting behaviour we need to understand his 
‘intentionality’, ‘forethought’, ‘self-reflection’ and ‘self-reactiveness’. However, the main 
disadvantage of Bandura’s theory is lack of a valid and reliable research instrument to measure 
the above-mentioned characteristics of agency. On the other hand, the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency is equipped with an Evaluation Instrument that identifies the Englishman’s rationality 
type and reasoning from both his ‘self’ and ‘other’ standpoints. For example, if an Englishman 
votes for the UK to remain in the EU, and his results in our Evaluation Instrument show that he 
has ‘substantive rationality’ and strongly believes in the purity of English national culture, aiming 
at sustaining what has remained as the English way of life, then his freedom is contracted by 
this decision, because if the UK stays in the EU the country’s borders are open to new cultures 
and ways of life (Bradley et al., 1986). On the other hand, if this person’s scores show that he 
has ‘practical rationality’, wants to have financial satisfaction, aims at exporting his products to 
the EU market, then his decision for the UK to remain in the EU will expand his freedom, as it is 
in line with him living according to his values.  
Another disadvantage of Bandura’s (2012) theory is its loose conclusions about the 
contraction/expansion of freedom. He says that human development is possible if one develops 
his competencies, self-regulatory skills and belief in his efficacies in order to increase his 
options and then his freedom. The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency questions this simple and loose 
judgment about human freedom, as we have shown that how a human being is able to make a 
decision that contracts her negative freedom, despite having mature competency, self-regularity 
skills and efficacy. Overall, the advantage of our theory over Bandura’s (2012) theory is our 
focus on the agency-freedom relationship and considering both the ‘emotion’ and ‘reason’ roots 
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of decisions that enable our theory to avoid typical misjudgement about the agency-freedom 
relationship. 
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Table 61: Theory of Human Agency v. Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
Theory of Human Agency 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
Focus: 
 
Focus: 
 
Agency-Development  Agency-Freedom 
 
Authors: 
 
Authors: 
 
(Bandura, 2012, 1989, 1977)  Present study 
 
Research Problem: 
 
Research Problem: 
 
Duality between human agency and social 
structure. 
 Vague agency-freedom relationship.  
 
Research Question: 
 
Research Question: 
 
How to explain human agency in a social 
structure? 
 How to determine the agency-freedom relationship?  
 
Research Approach: 
 
Research Approach: 
 
Agency is people acting in an environment 
through a reciprocal interplay of 
interpersonal, behavioural, and environmental 
determinants. 
 
 There are several factors influencing agency-outcome in 
terms of freedom. This result in decisions that are in 
conflict with the agent’s values, then contracting her 
freedom. 
Discipline: 
 
Discipline 
 
Psychology  Economy, Philosophy, Psychology 
 
Research Method: 
 
Research Method: 
 
Experiment  Survey, Interview, Case study 
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Model: 
 
Model: 
 
 
Agency has four core properties: 
Intentionality (action plans and strategies to 
realise goals) 
Forethought (agency has temporal extension 
in the past and future) 
Self-reactiveness (though and actions are 
linked through regulating)  
Self-reflection (self-examining actions and 
adjustment) 
Agency has three modes: 
Individual 
Proxy 
Collective 
Foundation of Agency (i.e. motivation): 
Self-efficacy belief 
 
 Freedom is expanded/contracted by agency outcome (i.e. 
decision). 
Decision has three parts: 
Object (Capabilities) 
Subject 
Process 
Agency oriented factors are in three modes: 
Cognitive (Reason) 
Rationality Type 
Reconciling Worldview 
Affective (Emotion) 
Direct 
Indirect 
Conative  
Capabilities 
Decisions Constraints are: 
Universal 
Personal 
Research Aim: 
 
Research Aim: 
 
Explain agency in relation to social structure. 
 
 Explain agency in relation to freedom. 
Research instrument: 
 
Research instrument: 
 
Experiment 
 
 Theory, Model, Evaluation Instrument 
 
Main Themes 
 
Main Themes 
 
Free will is a throwback to medieval theology, 
so we have to see human behaviour as self-
 Freedom has two sides - positive and negative - that 
encompass personal and social aspects of causal 
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influence, as a part of casual structure. 
Level of agency depends on agentic personal 
sources, type of activities, and situational 
circumstance. 
“Your freedom will expand if you develop your 
competencies, self-regulating skills, and 
belief in your self-efficacy, because your 
choices will increase.” 
“The metaphysical aspect of freedom must be 
addressed by cultivation of agentic 
capabilities.”  
 
structure. 
Level of agency depends on level of freedom that is 
identifiable based on the impact of agency oriented 
factors on decision to be in line with one’s values and 
goals. 
Freedom will expand/contract if a decision is in conflict 
with/conducive to values. 
The metaphysical aspect of freedom can be addressed 
through analysing agency-outcome (i.e. decision). 
Freedom 
 
Freedom 
 
Freedom has a proactive and passive sense. 
The passive sense is about the absence of 
constraints. The active sense is exercises of 
self-influence in the service of selected goals 
and desired outcomes. Freedom involves 
rights, options and means to pursue them. 
 Based on the philosophical worldviews of Berlin (1958) 
and Sen's (1999) CA, freedom has a positive sense (i.e. 
who/what decides) and a negative sense (freedom space 
to be free within). Both aspects are influenced by 
decision. If decision is conducive to values, then freedom 
is expanded, otherwise it is contracted. The Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency shows how agency-oriented factors 
influence decisions with a focus on freedom, which shows 
the associated between agency-oriented factors and 
freedom. 
Note:  The elements of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency are presented relative to Bandura’s Agency Theory. 
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Conclusion 
To evaluate the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we have compared it with five rival theories. 
The common point of these competitors is that all have addressed the agency and freedom from 
different perspectives. Comparing the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with Grid-Group Cultural 
theory (Douglas, 2007) shows that our study helps policy makers avoid the making of policies 
that contract the freedom of minorities. The advantage of our theory is that it shows how people 
can have dialogue with opposing worldviews, which prevents policy makers from excluding 
minorities from political discourses. Comparing our theory with Self-Determination Theory (SDT) 
(Deci and Ryan, 2012) shows that our strength is the coherent concept of freedom that has a 
philosophical foundation in ‘agency’ and ‘plurality’ of objectives, which can facilitate the 
implementation of the Patient Determination Act in hospitals.  
Comparing the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency with Milgram’s Agency Theory highlights that 
our advantage is providing a thinking platform that prevents narrow perspectives of human 
behaviour that attribute only one way of reasoning to different individuals. Further, comparing 
our theory with Endogenous-Exogenous Attribution theory (Kruglanski, 1975) shows that we are 
filling the existing gap in the attribution literature, which ignores an individual’s capability set, 
emotions, values, and constraints in explaining their behaviour. Finally, comparing our theory 
with Bandura's (2012) Theory of human agency shows that the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
offers a new definition of human agency based on the agency-freedom relationship.  
In general, our focus on agency-freedom is the novelty of the present study. In particular, 
there are following four areas in our theory that are not paralleled by any other theory, as they 
are the constituted elements that in itself are novel with respect to decision making and freedom. 
First, distinguishing all of Weber's (1993) rationality types and the three types of reasoning in 
the past, present, and future. In this regard, Bandura’s (2012) theory has somehow pointed to 
‘substantive’ and ‘practical’ rationality types in the ‘forethought’ and ‘intentionality’ aspects of his 
theory. However, he does not show how to distinguish between a value-driven behaviour (i.e. 
substantive) and a goal-driven conduct (i.e. practical) where both are future-oriented rationalities. 
In addition, Bandura (2012) ignors the type of reasonings that refer to past and present (i.e. 
causal and correlational), and the type of rationalities that are not goal oriented (i.e. formal and 
theoretical). Further, Milgram's (2009) agency theory also sees every individual with a ‘formal’ 
type of rationality as it tries to explain human behaviour under authority. Both Self-Determination 
Theory (SDT) (Deci and Ryan, 2008) and Cultural Theory (Douglas, 2007) percieve all 
individuals as having a ‘theoretical’ type of rationality, as they try to explain human behaviour 
with reference to abstract cultural rules and basic psychological needs.  
  
 
 
 
401 
The second unique element of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is its focus on the 
distinction and contradiction of ‘emotion’ and ‘reason’ in decision behaviour. Previously, Deci 
and Ryan's (2012) SDT has focused on the emotional aspect of motivation in regard to people’s 
attempt to satisfy their basic psychological need of ‘relatedness’. However, SDT’s approach 
does not capture how both ‘emotion’ and ‘reason’ influence the decision object, subject and 
process. The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency identifies the impact of ‘emotion’ and ‘reason’ on the 
decision objective (i.e. capability set), which enables us to identify am agent’s values and traces 
the decision trajectory to show if the agency-outcome contracted/expanded freedom with 
respect to values.  
The third unique element of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is its Evaluation Instrument, 
which is comprised of an 8-Factor model of ‘self’ and a 9-factor model of ‘other’ for identifying 
one’s rationality type, direction of reasoning and values. Previousely, Deci and Ryan's (2008) 
SDT offers a research instrument for measuring self-determination. In comparison, their 
questionnaires have low internal and external validity for measuring freedom, as noted in some 
reviews of SDT (Keitner, 2000; Teixeira et al., 2012; Van den Broeck et al., 2016).  
The final unique element of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is its evaluation part that 
takes both ‘self’ and ‘other’ perspectives into account from the standpoints of decision maker 
and her reflection from the position of others. Bandura (2012) has tried to capture the role of 
self-reflection in human agency in his theory, but it lacks a research instrument to capture an 
agent’s reflection on her behaviour and to show how this person reconciles opposing 
worldviews at the time of decision making. The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is able to help 
people to reflect on their decisions from the position of others, to face the opposing worldview if 
one existed, to reconcile their own worldview and the opposing worldview, and to express the 
emotion they experience during this process. This is a unique approach to study self-reflection 
in decision making that has an emotional side, founded upon Weiner's (2010) theory of 
attribution and a philosophical root in Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism. Overall, the combination of 
these four elements in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency will offer a novel worldview on human 
‘agency’ through explaining how decisions are influenced by affective, conative and cognitive 
modes of agency, and whether they expand/contract freedom, by capturing all types of 
rationalities, reasonings, emotion-reason contradictions, and ‘self’-‘other’ worldviews in the 
decision-making process.  
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
Introduction 
This thesis aims to determine the agency-freedom relationship. In this regard, a Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency is being developed that: (A) explains cognitive, conative and affective 
modes of agency with respect to freedom, (B) measures agency with respect to both positive 
and negative sides of freedom, and (C) determines how agency and freedom are related. This 
chapter reflects on the initial research questions and evaluates the findings. The outcomes of 
this study are unified in a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that has been validated in the previous 
chapter, according to which our main contribution is explaining the link between ‘agency’ and 
‘freedom’ and that is a novel area.  
The present study has established that to determine the agency-freedom relationship, it 
is appropriate to issue four caveats here. First, to study ‘agency’ without making loose 
judgments about its relationship with freedom, we need to focus on agency-outcome 
(‘decision’), as research (Lehnert et al., 2015; Roberts, 2015) has shown that ‘decision’ is a well-
established concept in different domains of social science. In this line, the agency-freedom 
relationship in terms of ‘cognitive’ and ‘affective’ modes of decision behaviour can be informed 
by neuroscience breakthroughs on ‘agency’. For example, the Caspar et al. (2016) study that 
has found that coercion changes the sense of agency in the human brain and some other 
(Ajzen, 2015; Chorlton et al., 2012) findings that imply there are many brain activities that are 
not within an individual’s control in the decision-making process. Meanwhile to study the 
‘conative’ mode of agency in the agency-freedom relationship, research can benefit from other 
disciplines such as sociology (Kalberg, 1980; Weber, 1993), philosophy (Bakhtin, 1935; Berlin, 
1958), and economic development (Sen, 1999, 1990). This is because each discipline has 
progressed in different aspects of agency-outcome (Anderson, 2001; Roberts, 2015). The 
second caveat is that to determine the agency-freedom relationship, the reference point should 
be ‘values’. In this line, we say that an agent’s freedom is contracted if her decision is in conflict 
with her ‘values’. This means that the existence of different ‘rationality types’ (see Chapter 7, 
Theory Evaluation, where rationality types are defined based on Weber’s theory.) and various 
ways of reconciling the opposing worldviews (see Chapter 7, Theory Evaluation, where 
Reconciling Mechanisms are identified based on Bakhtin’s dialogism) must be taken into 
account, in order to determine a valid link between agency and freedom. Third, the agency-
freedom relationship should be determined as a temporal link. The temporal aspect means that 
one’s agency and freedom levels must be evaluated before and after her decision, in order to 
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avoid judgmental misattribution, which research (Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014) has 
indicate as a methodological challenge of studies that focus on understanding human decisions. 
Fourth, the expansion/contraction of agency and freedom must be established 
independently but in relationship to each other. In this line we say that having freedom is 
necessary to have agency. This means that if freedom (either positive or negative) is contracted 
then at least one mode of agency (either conative, cognitive or affective) is going to be 
contracted. In other worlds, the agency-freedom relationship is multidirectional. This means that 
this link can be either inverse or direct. Sometime, the agency-freedom relationship can be 
direct when an agent evaluates her state of being/doing as desirable/non desirable (see 
Chapter 4, Theory Development, where desirability is defined as Value-Laden criterion for 
assessing capabilities that is established in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency), from both the ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ standpoints, then both her agency and freedom levels are expanded/contracted 
simultaneously. However, at other times the agency-freedom relationship can be inverse when 
an individual makes counterintuitive (see Chapter 4, Theory Development, where 
counterintuitive decisions are defined as the actions that are determined by an agent contrary to 
other’s judgement) and incontinent decisions (see Chapter 4, Theory Development, where 
incontinent decisions are defined as the actions that are determined by agent contrary to ‘self’ 
judgment like gambling) that the agent’s state of being/doing is evaluated differently from the 
‘self’ and ‘other’ standpoints. In these cases, the two sides of freedom (positive and negative) 
and the three modes of agency (affective, cognitive and conative) may expand or contract 
differently, which shows that the agency-freedom relationship can be inverse (Note that the 
relationship is either inverse/direct, which means it cannot be both direct and inverse at the 
same time). Hence, the final caveat to determine the agency-freedom relationship is to consider 
this relationship as ‘multidirectional’ that is what we have accomplished in the Tri-modal Theory 
of Agency. This study has managed to measure three modes of agency (cognitive, conative and 
affective) in relation to two sides of freedom (positive and negative) before and after making a 
decision, considering all mentioned caveats of the agency-freedom relationship. As a result, we 
have come to this understanding that process is as important as end point in the agency-
freedom relationship, which is having freedom is important but having agency to choose to have 
freedom is more aspirational.         
This chapter evaluates our findings according to the research questions in three 
sections. The first section provides an overview of the research aim, objectives, and questions. 
The second section shows how we have integrated existing theories on freedom and agency “to 
identify the agency-oriented factors associated with freedom”, which is our first research 
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objective. Here, we have two contributions to agency-freedom research: (a) Defining ‘Agency’ 
based on ‘Freedom’, and (b) providing empirical support for the agency-oriented factors that 
associated with freedom. The second section establishes “freedom expansion/contraction 
based on agency-oriented factors” that is the second research objective of this study. Here, we 
contribute to the agency-freedom literature (Bandura, 2012; Deci and Ryan, 2012; Milgram, 
2015) by measuring agency and freedom levels in relation to each other, respecting all modes 
of agency and all sides of freedom. To conclude, we show how this study opens a new path to 
study agency in relation to freedom. 
 
Research Review 
In line with ‘pluralist’ thinkers (Berlin, 1969; Sen, 1999) we believe that everybody must 
be the agent of her life. This means that everyone must be able to freely set her own value set, 
to choose her desirable (i.e. value-laden) capabilities, to pursuit the life she has reason to value, 
to be evaluated based on her decisions, and to be responsible for her agency-outcome in social 
context. However, the problem is the ambiguousness of agency with a focus on freedom in 
terms of: (A) the extent to which a decision is made internally in terms of ‘cognitive’ and 
‘affective’ states of agent (Damasio et al., 2015; Rudolph et al., 2013; Rudolph and 
Tscharaktschiew, 2014), and (B) the extent to which an agent is in control of her own decision 
(i.e. the ‘conative’ mode of agency) to make a volitional decision conducive to her own values 
(Simhony, 2014). Thanks to the field of neuroscience, today we know that when a person says 
“I chose to do/be something”, even her conscious and willing choice is influenced by some 
factors, without the agent’s awareness (Ajzen, 2015, 2011). In the other words, it seems that the 
chosen option has already been set for one to pursue (Meyer, 2008).  
The ambiguity of the agency-freedom relationship becomes more critical when it allows 
authorities to overlook people’s agency in their policies (Lehnert et al., 2015; Craft, 2013; 
Roberts, 2015). For example, in France policy makers have banned the Hijab in public spaces, 
ignoring Muslim women’s agency to choose what to wear. No doubt, this has contracted some 
of these women’s freedom, as they have willingly chosen to wear Hijab due to their values 
(Foerster, 2013). Another example is when hospitals and healthcare institutions ignore the 
‘Advance Directive’ programme to allow patients volitionally choose between life and death 
before undergoing life-threatening surgery (Seal, 2010; Gilfix, 2010). Undoubtedly, some of 
these patients’ freedom has been contracted by these hospitals. Further, there are many 
parents who ignore their children’s freedom to choose the major they desire. As a result the 
freedom of many young adults to be/do what they value has been contracted in their family at 
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the beginning of their career path (Joussemet et al., 2008). Following, even though research 
(Ashkanasy and Härtel, 2014) has shown that employees’ voice behaviour (i.e. their 
discretionary communication of their ideas about work-related issues with the intention to 
improve organisational function) will improve organisational career growth, managers fail to 
welcome employee voice behaviour (Schulte Steinberg et al., 2015). In all of these examples 
people in authority (e.g. policy makers, doctors, parents, and managers) have contracted the 
freedom of those who are under their control (i.e. Muslin women, patients, children, and 
employees). The problem is that this coercion on an individual’s capability to do/be what they 
value (i.e. freedom) is not widely acknowledged in society (Alkire, 2007), politics (Georgantzís et 
al., 2013), organisations (Meyer, 2008) and even in academia (Van den Broeck et al., 2016). 
This is partly because as Weber (1993) argues and Milgram (1965) shows in his experiments, 
modern individuals think that obeying authorities and living according to established 
bureaucratic norms are perceived as the eligible and ‘normal’ way of life, even if this path is in 
opposition to one’s personal values. Accordingly, in the literature on decision making (Craft, 
2013; Lehnert et al., 2015) and judgments about human decision behaviour (Rudolph and 
Tscharaktschiew, 2014), the link between agency and freedom is rarely questioned or clarified.  
To shed light on the agency-freedom relationship there is a gap in the literature in terms 
of explaining the extent to which decisions are produced internally and their impact on 
contraction/expansion of freedom. This gap has already been noted by some scholars in the 
area of agency studies (Craft, 2013; Lehnert et al., 2015), but it has not been addressed in a 
comprehensive way and in relation to freedom (see Chapter 2, Literature Review). Researchers 
in the field of neuroscience have studied the link between agency and action (Ajzen, 2015), but 
this field has neglected the importance of ‘values’ in the agency-freedom relationship (Hart, 
2014). On the other hand, the existing theories on the value-freedom relationship in the field of 
social science suffer from other limitations. Some are narrowed to the impact of a single factor 
like ‘culture’ on decision (Douglas, 2007); some only focus on the motivational aspect of the 
decision-freedom relationship like Deci and Ryans' (2012, 2008) Self-determination Theories; 
some like Bandura's (2012) Human Agency Theory are future oriented and ignore different 
types of reasoning that refer to the past and present; some like Milgram's (2015) Agency Theory 
are limited to a single way that the ‘self’ is shaped in society; and most of them lack a coherent 
definition of freedom like Kruglanski's (1975) Endogenous-Exogenous Theory of Attribution (see 
Chapter 7, Theory Evaluation).  
To fill this gap, the aim of this study has been “to determine the relation between agency 
and freedom”. In this regard, our first objective has been “to identify the agency-oriented 
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factors associated with freedom”. In other words, initially we have tried to identify the internal 
factors that influence the agency-outcome of an individual to live according to her values. 
Further, our second objective has been “to establish how freedom is expanded/contracted 
based on agency-oriented factors”. In other words, we have used the agency-oriented factors to 
determine whether a decision has contracted/expanded freedom. Figure 53 presents our aim 
and objectives and the conceptual links between ‘agency’, ‘decision’, ‘freedom’ and ‘value’ in 
this study, as developed earlier (see the early conceptual framework in Chapter 4, Theory 
Development). In the following sections we show how we have achieved the following aim and 
objectives in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. 
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Figure 53: Visual Presentation of the Research Aim and Objectives 
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Agency-Oriented Factors Associated with Freedom 
We believe that an individual’s agency to do/be what she has reason to value is 
influenced by several factors. In this way, agency has an outcome (i.e. a decision) that 
contracts/expands the agent’s freedom. To explain the agency-freedom relationship, our first 
research question is “What factors influence one’s agency to be/do what she values?” This is an 
important enquiry for two reasons. First, it (Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015) is shown that the 
leading theories about agency and freedom are not unified in a single theory. Second, it is not 
clear how one’s decisions contract/expand her freedom. In this regard, Sen’s (1999) Capability 
Approach (CA) is regarded by scholars (Andersson et al., 2012; Gasper, 2002) as the leading 
study that has emphasised the link between agency outcome as a decision and freedom. In CA 
“substantive freedom is defined as _the capabilities _ to choose a life one has reason to value” 
(Sen, 1999). However, the problem is that several studies (Hodges and Creese, 2013; Roberts, 
2015) have shown that CA is not explicit about how this choice (i.e. agency outcome) 
contracts/expands freedom and more importantly this theory lacks a valid practical research 
instrument.  
In this regard, the present study has developed a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that 
contributes to Capability Studies (e.g. Alkire, 2007; Andersson et al., 2012) by offering an 
agency-oriented approach towards determining freedom expansion/contraction. This is a 
significant contribution, because one of Sen's (1999) distinctive reasons to justify the 
importance of research on ‘freedom’ is the importance of having ‘agency’ that means people are 
able to: (A) act and bring about change, (B) be responsible for their actions, (C) be judged on 
their own achievements regarding their own values and objectives. Recent studies have shown 
that capability literature needs a theory that captures the agency aspect of freedom particularly 
to study individuals’ perception of entitlement (O’Leary-Kelly et al., 2016), child survival and 
agency of women (Requejo et al., 2015), as well as agency and fertility reduction (Sandström et 
al., 2015). 
Addressing this gap and to investigate our first research question “What factors influence 
one’s agency to be/do what she values?” we have conceptualised ‘freedom’ based on agency-
outcome (decision) in a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. First, we have used Sen's (1999) 
‘substantive freedom’ as our cornerstone, which has the foundation of Berlin’s (1958) two 
senses of freedom and Rawls’s (2009) view on primary goods. Here, in line with Berlin (1958) 
who says “to coerce a man is to deprive him from freedom”, we have proposed the agency-
oriented concept of freedom as “a decision will contract freedom if it is in conflict with the 
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agent’s values.” This articulation enables us to focus our definition of freedom around the notion 
of agency-outcome (decision) and consequently agency, which offers a new trend in the field of 
ethical decision making (e.g. Craft, 2013; Lehnert et al., 2015). Further, this start-point has 
enabled us to achieve our first objective based on Berlin’s (1958) two senses of ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ freedom that is regarded as an inclusive view towards liberty (Gray, 2015), as 
explained in the following two sections. 
 
Negative Freedom and Agency 
Negative freedom is described as “the ‘space’ within which a person can do what she 
wants without the interference of others” (Berlin, 1958). Here, the focal debate among the 
scholars has always been on the criteria according to which this non-interfered ‘space’ is 
regarded as appropriate (Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015; Simhony, 2014). Unlike welfarists 
like Bentham (1996), who believe that ‘utility’ must define this ‘space’ and Rawls (2009), who 
says ‘primary goods’ must identify this ’space’, our view in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is 
that “the capabilities to choose a life an individual has reason to value” must set the boundaries 
of this ‘space’. For example, ‘fasting’ and ‘starving’ are different states of being, because the 
‘space’ (i.e. the capabilities) the former person has is larger than the latter person. Having the 
capability ‘to eat’ expands the first person’s freedom in a negative sense, compared with the 
second person who lacks the capability to eat. In other words, negative freedom “depends 
simply on the power to choose between at any rate two alternatives” (Berlin, 1969). In this 
regard, the core of our enquiry to “understand the negative sense of agency-oriented factors 
associated with freedom” is established on: (a) recognising the quantity and quality of an 
agent’s options, and (b) identifying the values and perspectives of evaluating these alternatives 
in the decision-making process. In this regard, a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has been built 
upon the following notions of Sen's (1999) CA, which empowers our findings with the 
advantages of CA, which Clark (2005) has categorised as ‘theoretical depth’ and 
‘multidisciplinary relevance’: 
First, Sen (1999) says that to evaluate freedom researchers must be explicit about the 
judgments about ‘functioning’ (i.e. the things a person does/is), and ‘capabilities’ (the things a 
person is free to do/be or potential functioning). However, several reviews (Andersson et al., 
2012; Hodges and Creese, 2013) of CA literature have shown that there is inconsistency 
between how different researchers identify ‘capabilities’ and ‘functioning’ (Alkire, 2008; 
Nussbaum, 2004), and how they determine the capability set (Alkire and Foster, 2011). More 
importantly many researchers in this domain are not explicit about their evaluation criteria for 
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‘capabilities’ and ‘functioning’ (Andersson et al., 2012). In this regard, the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency has addressed these shortcomings through: (A) identifying a ‘desirability’ assessment 
criterion of capabilities that tests how ‘valuable’ and ‘volitional’ a capability is perceived by the 
agent; (B) evaluating the ‘desirability’ of each capability from both the ‘personal’ and ‘social’ 
standpoints; (C) tracing how a capability turns into functioning at the two assessment phases of 
‘desirability’ and ‘realisable’ checking; (D) identifying how ‘realisable’ a capability is based on 
logical, physical, axiological constraints and resource limitations; (E) distinguishing between the 
state of being/doing that an agent is willing to choose (i.e. functioning) and the state that an 
agent is coerced to attain (i.e. commanding); (F) differentiating between ‘beneficial’ and 
‘adverse’ states of being/doing from both the personal and social standpoints (see Chapter 6, 
Case Study). 
The significance of the present study is that the mentioned methodological steps are 
applied and empirically tested in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. This benefits the studies in 
the field of CA (e.g. Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015; Comim, 2001) that try to investigate how 
an agent transforms her capabilities into functioning. In addition, our attention to various aspects 
of capability evaluation has a result in developing the assessment criterion of ‘desirability’, 
whose important characteristic is that it is ‘value-laden’, because this focus will expand decision 
analysis beyond the rationalist view. In this line, using ‘desirability’ can address the limitations of 
rationalists’ decision analysis. It (Wismadi et al., 2013) has been shown that the rationalist view 
of understanding decisions is utility oriented and its mere focus on ‘preferences’ has neglected 
to acknowledge an agent’s values and emotions. Sen (1990) has criticised the rationalist view 
for failing to distinguish between ‘motive’, ‘choice’ and ‘welfare’ in the analysis of ‘preferences’ in 
decision making. Hence, our multidimensional and explicit attention to capability evaluation can 
help to address the limitations of rational choice theories. 
Second, Sen (1999) emphasises that to evaluate substantive freedom (i.e. the 
capabilities) all of the ‘realised’ and ‘non-realised’ options must be considered and evaluated. 
For example, comparing two states of being of fasting and starving, if an observer ignores the 
‘unrealised’ option of eating, it will be difficult to compare these two people’s negative freedom. 
However, the capability scholars’ (Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015; Comim, 2001) main 
challenge has been the absence of a valid research instrument to capture, trace and evaluate 
capabilities. This is because capabilities are countless and dynamic in relation to time and 
context (see Chapter 2, Literature Review). Our study has addressed this limitation in three 
following ways.  
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First, we have particularly focused on impact of the agents’ important decisions on their 
freedom (e.g. career choice, migration, marriage, investment, etc.). This has narrowed our 
research domain to recognising the capabilities that are related to that specific decision in the 
agent’s life trajectory. As evidence, in Chapter 6 (Case Study Methodology Section) we have 
explained how the ‘complementary capabilities’ that are related to a decision are analysed in the 
Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. For example, in the M.G. case study we have identified two sets of 
‘delivering the failed project’ and ‘not delivering the failed project’, which has helped the Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency to trace M.G.’s life trajectory according to the decision of sustaining his 
business. Our second approach to address the evaluation challenge of the capability set is 
founded upon the economic view that “the value of a set of options is in the best use one can 
make out of them” (Sen, 1999a). In this line, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has a temporal 
dimension and we have focused our evaluation on the agent’s state of being/doing before and 
after the decision (see Chapter 6, Case Study), instead of evaluating all of the alternative states 
of being/doing one could have been/done (i.e. capability set) at any time in her life.  
Third, we have distinguished among different types of obstacles on an agent’s capability 
realisation. In the Logical Core of the Tri-modal Theory of Agency, we have established that 
one’s capability set is limited by personal and universal constraints (i.e. physical, logical, 
resource based and axiological) (see Chapter 3, Theory Development). Hence, there is only one 
subset of an agent’s capability set that its members are logically reasonable, physically 
possible, allowable from an axiological sense, and achievable in terms of availability of 
resources, which in sum there is one capability set that its members are realisable. 
Distinguishing between various types of constraints on an agent’s capability set contributes to 
capability studies (e.g. Hodges and Creese, 2013) that try to identify the capability set using set 
theory. This direct approach towards evaluating capabilities will contribute to the literature that is 
trying to identify an agent’s capabilities (Abel and Frohlich, 2012; Ahlberg, 2013; Alkire, 2008; 
Alkire and Foster, 2011), agency (Hart, 2014), and wellbeing (Basu, 2013). Overall, to identify 
the negative sense of agency-oriented factors associated with freedom, we have focused on an 
agents’ capabilities. This is a novel view towards the ‘conative’ mode of agency in terms of 
freedom within the fields of psychology (Bandura, 2012) and social science (Abel and Frohlich, 
2012; Sandström et al., 2015). In the next section we show how the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
has captured the positive sense of freedom. 
 
  412 
Positive Freedom and Agency 
Investigating the first research question of ‘What factors influence one’s agency to do/be 
what she values?’, we have also captured the ‘positive’ sense of freedom that implies “what/who 
is the source of control to determine what a person is able to do/be” (Berlin, 1969). Research 
(Simhony, 2014) shows that a critical aspect of understanding the ‘positive’ sense of freedom is 
the human divided self, which psychologists (Haidt, 2006) distinguish as the ‘cognitive’ and 
‘affective’ parts of human being, motivating human actions. In this regard, Berlin (1958) believes 
that we have a ‘higher’ self that controls our reason-oriented actions and a ‘lower’ self that 
makes us behave irrationally (Simhony, 2014). Unlike Berlin (1958) and in line with recent 
findings in the field of neuroscience (Damasio et al., 2015; Damasio and LeDoux, 2012; 
Damasio, 1999), emotion literature (Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014) and moral philosophy 
of emotion (Nussbaum, 2007, 2004, 2003), we believe that ‘self’ has an ‘affective’ and a ‘rational’ 
side and both are necessary for an intelligent decision. Hence, positive freedom is captured in 
both the affective and cognitive modes of the Tri-modal Theory of Agency that both modes can 
lead an agent to live according to her values (i.e. expand freedom). 
In this line, through taking the following steps we have tried to captured what is known 
(Ajzen, 2015) as the ‘cognitive’ and ‘affective’ modes of agency, with respect to Berlin's (1958) 
positive freedom. First, we have distinguished between ‘emotion’- and ‘reason’-oriented factors 
that influence decisions. In addition, we have used Weiner's (2010) method of investigating 
emotions to empirically test the impact of emotion on decision. In line with the Rudolph and 
Tscharaktschiew (2014) findings, our findings have indicated that an agent is dealing with 
different countervailing emotions simultaneously at the decision time (see Chapter 6, Case 
Study, Feed Backward-Forward Loop). These findings are significant because Weiner's (2010) 
attribution emotions are tested in the field of agency-freedom (Jin et al., 2014; Lehnert et al., 
2015), that is for the first time, to the best knowledge of the author.  
Our second novelty in identifying agency-oriented factors associated with freedom is that 
unlike Berlin (1958) and in line with cognitive psychologists like Bandura (2012), British Idealists 
like Simhony (2014), and normative behavioural theories like (Ajzen, 2015; Cialdini and Trost, 
1998; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005), the present study is sceptical about the idea that 
“positive freedom is merely a matter of inner conditions of the true self” (Berlin, 1969). This 
study has empirically shown that agency will take shape in the environment. Accordingly, we 
have developed an agent’s interaction with social institutions based on two theories of Weber's 
(1993) Rationality Types and Bakhtin's (1935) Dialogism on reasoning and freedom. 
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Weber (1993) says that a modern individual’s freedom is declining in modern 
bureaucratic societies that dictate a common set of values and goals to everyone. In this line, to 
show how societies shape the type and direction of reasoning we have mapped our agency-
oriented factors onto Weber's (1993) types of rationalities. In addition, we have mapped these 
factors onto three types of reasoning in the past, present, and future (i.e. causal, correlational, 
and teleological equivalently) (see Chapter 4, Theory Development). This builds on studies 
(Kelley et al., 2013) that focus on the causal aspect of understanding human behaviour, and 
researchers (Olesen, 2011) that try to simulate human behaviour. In this line, our findings have 
indicated the agency-oriented factors in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency as following: (A) factors 
of ‘Causal State’, and ‘Resource Limitation’, representing Weber's (1993) theoretical rationality 
that an agent reasons based on external abstract principles that is mapped onto casual and/or 
correlational reasoning; (b) factors of  ‘Expectation’, ‘Capabilities’, ‘Effort and Ability’ and ‘Self-
interest’, representing Weber's (1993) practical rationality that an agent reasons based on her 
goals that is mapped onto teleological reasoning; (c) factors of ‘Motivation’ and ‘Desire intensity’, 
representing Weber's (1993) substantive rationality that an agent reasons based on her values 
and beliefs that is mapped onto teleological reasoning; and (d) factors of ‘Third-party evaluation’, 
‘Popularity’ and ‘Social Group’, representing Weber's (1993) formal rationality that an agent 
reasons based on external norms that are mapped onto causal and/or correlational reasoning 
(see Chapter 5, Data Collection, Findings and Analysis).  
Our findings have established that Weber's (1993) rationality types and directions of 
reasoning are relevant for the purpose of identifying an agent’s values and goals. According to  
recent reviews on decisions and agency outcome (Lehnert et al., 2015; Roberts, 2015), and to 
the best knowledge of the authors, this is a unique accomplishment in the field of agency and 
freedom. This finding implies that the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency can identify an agent’s 
rationality type in terms of her values and objectives and this contributes to the understanding of 
freedom expansion/contraction relative to agency-outcome. Further, comparing the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency with its rivals has shown that the present study is unique as it takes all types 
of Weber's (1993) rationality types into account (see Chapter 7, Theory Evaluation). For 
example, both Douglas (2007) and Milgram (2015) perceive all individuals as having a formal 
rationality type and this is a significant shortcoming in their theories. Overall, the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency builds on studies that try to apply Weber's (1993) rationality types in the area 
of human agency (Bandura, 2012), reasoning (Kalberg, 1980) and institutional phenomenology 
(Meyer and Land, 2013; Meyer, 2008). 
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The other theory that we have used to show how external factors influence agency from 
the ‘positive’ freedom perspective is Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism that implies one’s freedom is 
limited when this person is subjugating her worldview in front of authorities. In this line, to show 
the impact of opposing worldviews on the agency-freedom relationship, the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency has measured the impact of each agency-oriented factor from ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
standpoints (see Chapter 5, Data Collection, Analysis, and Findings). The state of the art on 
dialogism and freedom (e.g. Robinson, 2011) has not shown similar studies like the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency that has the following advantages over the existing literature in this area. First, 
the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency helps an agent to reflect on her decision from the other’s 
perspective. This is a significant approach because self-reflection is regarded by scholars 
(Ajzen, 2011; Hoy, 2013) as a complex and sometimes impossible task to occur naturally. 
Second, our theory enables researchers to identify ‘rationalisation’ (i.e. when an agent offers a 
comfortable instead of sound reason for her decision) by comparing ‘self’ and ‘other’ worldviews. 
We have found that if the ‘self’ and ‘other’ worldviews are different, then it is possible that the 
agent is substituting a convenient explanation for the actual reason (e.g. emotion), which results 
in unsound reasoning (see the ‘rationalisation’ sections in Chapters 3, 5 and 6). This is a novel 
contribution to the field of attribution theory, because it will improve the validity of self-report 
data collection methods, which are identified as misattribution (Allen, 2012; Tipper and Bach, 
2008) and judgmental biases (Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Tipper and Bach, 2008). 
Further, through detecting rationalisation we identify the role of ‘logical reasoning’ as an agency-
oriented factor on the agent’s freedom (see Chapter 5, Study 1, Thematic Analysis). 
Third, we have shown that if agent is facing an opposing worldview then she may use 
either of the three reconciling approaches of ‘dialogue’, ‘dialectic’ and ‘monologue’ (see 
Reconciling Mechanisms in Chapters 5 and 6). We have built these reconciliation approaches 
upon Bakhtin's (1935) theory of dialogism. As a result, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has 
adapted Bakhtin's (1935) dialogical view as an agency-oriented perspective toward freedom, 
which to the best knowledge of the author is among the first attempts in this area. Further, our 
theory offers a unique method to identify the axiological constraint of subjugating personal 
worldview in front of authority in the literature on ethical decision making (e.g. Craft, 2013; 
Roberts, 2015). This helps to enhance the studies on interpersonal interactions in decision 
making (e.g. Bakhtin and Emerson, 1993; Robinson, 2011) and different behavioural theories 
(e.g. Ajzen, 2015; Cialdini and Trost, 1998; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005).  
Overall, our attempt to identify the positive sense of agency-oriented factors associated 
with freedom has covered three aspects of the ‘self’ in decision making for the first time: (a) the 
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duality of the rationality-affect based on Weiner's (2010) attributional emotions; (b) the social 
impact of institutions on shaping a person’s values and goals based on Weber's (1993) 
rationality types; (c) the invisible impact of authorities in coercing an agent to subjugate her 
personal worldview based on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism. Further, the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency has shifted freedom-oriented research on the ‘self’ (e.g. Martins, 2015; Simhony, 2014) 
towards the focus on ‘agency’ that is backed up by scientific findings like the breakthroughs of  
Damasio et al. (2015). In this line, the present study helps to: (a) distinguish between the 
‘affective’ and ‘cognitive’ factors influencing an agent with respect to freedom, (b) identify the 
effect of ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ on decision objectives (i.e. capabilities), (c) evaluating agency 
outcome (i.e. decision) with respect to ‘values’ (see Feed backward-forward Loop in Chapters 3, 
5 and 6).  
So far, we have shown how the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has integrated the ‘cognitive’ 
mode of agency in the fields of psychology (Ajzen, 2015) and neuroscience (Damasio et al., 
2015) with the notion of the ‘self’ in social science (Weber, 1993), philosophy (Bakhtin, 1935), 
and economy (Sen, 2007) under the umbrella of Berlin’s (1969) positive freedom. The next 
section presents the empirical contributions of this present study and how the ‘affective’ mode of 
agency is captured in relation to freedom.  
 
Methodological Advantages   
We believe that determining the agency-freedom relationship through agency outcome 
(decision) enables us to empirically develop a set of factors to measure agency-level with 
respect to freedom-level. In this regard, our attempt to address the first question that “What 
factors influence one’s agency to do/be what she values” has led us towards the empirical 
assessment of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. In this regard, our main rival that offers an 
empirical theory to explain the behaviour-authority relationship is Deci and Ryans' (2012, 2008) 
Self-Determination Theory (SDT) (see Chapter 7, Theory Evaluation). A recent review (Van den 
Broeck et al., 2016) has shown that Deci and Ryan have managed to offer a six-scale theory to 
empirically measure ‘authority’ as a dimension of ‘motivation’. As evidence, authority-motivation 
only focuses on the psychological aspect of the agency-freedom relationship (Hui et al., 2013). 
Addressing this shortcoming, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has managed to develop 8-factor 
model of ‘self’ and 9-factor model of ‘other’ that measures agency-oriented factors with respect 
to freedom (see Evaluation Instrument, Chapter 5, Data Collection, Findings and Analysis).  
The above models have the following advantages. First, the result of CFA has 
established that both the ‘self’ and ‘other’ models are fitted to the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. 
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Second, the results of EFA have shown that both models can distinguish more than 65% of 
differences among individuals’ in terms of their decision motives, limitations, reasoning, 
rationality, goals and values. Third, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is applicable in other 
contexts because it has been developed in two surveys on ‘career choice’ of 1063 employees, 
and on university major choice of 4086 students. Fourth, the empirical factors are validated in 
20 interviews and one case study. Fifth, our theory helps participants to reflect on their opposing 
worldview, which research (Hoy, 2013) has shown that the self-reflection approach helps to 
improve the reliability of self-report data collection. Further, to the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first published study that empirically apply Weber's (1993) types of rationalities in the context 
of Iran. 
In addition to these methodological advantages that identify ‘reasons’ behind the 
agency-outcome, we have developed a mechanism to empirically measure the impact of direct 
and indirect ‘emotions’ on the agency-freedom relationship. Our approach is developed based 
on Weiner's (2010) emotion list in his attribution theory of motivation (see Chapter 3, Theory 
Development). Using Weiner’s method, we have collected empirical evidence that is in line with 
Weiner's (2010) list of emotions. To the best knowledge of the author, and relying on recent 
studies on Weiner’s study (e.g. Reisenzein, 2014; Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014), the Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency is the first study that has adapted Weiner's (2010) emotions in the field 
of agency-freedom. In this line, recent empirical studies on emotion have mainly been on 
decision, which they (Clark, 2005, 2002; Craft, 2013) either neglect to acknowledge freedom, or 
they (Jin et al., 2014; Damasio et al., 2015; Damasio and LeDoux, 2012) are narrowed to the 
field of psychology and neuroscience.  
So far we have shown how the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency captures an agent’s three 
modes of ‘cognitive’, ‘affective’, and ‘conative’ with respect to freedom. The next section shows 
how these agency-oriented factors are used to explain an agent’s freedom 
expansion/contraction. 
 
 The Agency-Freedom Relationship in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
We have determined the agency-freedom relationship through identifying whether an 
agent’s decisions are in line with her values. In this line, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is built 
based on this idea that ‘a decision contracts an agent’s freedom if it is in conflict with her values’. 
Accordingly, our second research question is “What is the implication of agency-oriented factors 
for the expansion/contraction of the agent’s freedom?” To answer this question, we have used 
agency-oriented factors to explain how a decision can contract freedom relying on Berlin's 
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(1969) concept of ‘coercion’. Berlin (1969) says that “any kind of inability is not coercion; 
coercion is when other people consciously/unconsciously intervene with your actions and put 
obstacles on the way of achieving your goals.” In other words, this sense of freedom is the 
space within which your actions are not intervened by external and non-agentic factors. For 
example, if you cannot understand a difficult text then you are not coerced. You are coerced 
when others interfere with your education that enables you to realise the capability of reading 
(Martins, 2015). On the same basis, we have been careful in our agency-based 
conceptualisation of freedom that “any kind of decision that limits your capability set is not 
contracting your freedom. Your freedom is contracted when you make a decision that is in 
conflict with your values.” In addition we say that a decision may contract an agent’s negative 
freedom and her conative mode of agency, but it is in line with her values and expands her 
positive freedom, as well as her affective and cognitive modes of agency (see Chapter 6, Case 
Study conclusion). Meanwhile, a decision can expand both sides of freedom and all modes of 
agency (see Chapter 5, K.G.’s Decision). A decision can contract an agent’s negative freedom 
and the conative mode of agency, but expands her positive freedom as well as her affective and 
cognitive modes of agency (see Chapter 5, M.T.’s Decision). As evidence, our findings have 
established that the agency-freedom relationship is multidirectional, thus, all aspects of freedom 
and agency must be determined independently and thoroughly in relation to each other. This is 
a contribution to agency studies like (Bandura, 1977; Milgram, 2015), as well as Berlin's (1969) 
and Sen's (1999) definition of freedom.  
The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has established that not all of the decisions that are 
contracting negative freedom and conative mode of agency are contracting positive freedom 
and affective-cognitive modes of agency. In other words, the agency-freedom relationship is 
monotonic and multidirectional. Monotonic means that at any time the relationship moves in one 
direction. Multidirectional means that this relationship could be either direct or inverse. Our 
findings have indicated that the direct link between freedom and agency can be either positive 
or negative. The positive-direct way relationship is when an agent chooses her own desirable 
option that is commensurate with her own values and others evaluate her decision as desirable 
too (i.e. Beneficial-Functioning). In a positive-direct relationship both agency and freedom levels 
are expanded. The negative-direct way relationship is when an agent chooses an option that is 
not desirable from both the self and other standpoints, which means the choice is not 
commensurate with her own and social values (i.e. Adverse-Commanding). In the negative-
direct relationship both agency and freedom levels are contracted.  
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However, the findings have indicated that agency and freedom are not always directly 
related and in counterintuitive and incontinent decisions this relationship is inverse (see Chapter 
5, Study 4, Part 2). The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has established two types of inverse 
relationships. The first type of inverse relationship between agency and freedom is when an 
agent chooses her desirable option commensurate with her own values, but it is contrary to 
others’ values (i.e. counterintuitive decision). Here, agency-outcome will have contracted 
negative freedom and the conative mode of agency, but positive freedom and affective-cognitive 
modes of agency may be expanded (i.e. Adverse-Functioning) (see Chapter 6, Case Study). 
The second type of inverse relationship of agency and freedom is when agent attains a 
capability that is not commensurate with her own values but others (i.e. external norms) 
evaluate it as desirable. Here, her positive freedom, as well as cognitive and affective modes of 
her agency are contracted, but her negative freedom and conative mode of agency may be 
expanded (i.e. Beneficial-Commanding state of being/doing) (see Chapter 5, Study 4, Part 1 
and Part 2).  
In the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency the relationship between agency and freedom is 
determined in one’s journey from her before state to the after state of the focal decision, for 
three modes of agency (cognitive, conative and affective) and two sides of freedom (positive 
and negative), in order to clarify the above-mentioned complexities involved in this link, 
particularly when agency and freedom are inversely related. The advantage of the present study 
is that we have developed a case study methodology and we have applied the Tri-Modal Theory 
of Agency to one case study that shows how these complexities in the agency-freedom 
relationship can be addressed (see Chapter 6, Case Study). Our findings have shown that the 
main contribution of determining the agency-freedom relationship as monotonic, multidirectional 
and temporal in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is to Sen's (1977) idea of “committed actions” 
and Davidson's (2014) studies on “incontinent actions”, because the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency is able to show ‘why’ and ‘how’ some decisions are made contrary to personal and 
social judgments. This is because our findings have established ‘values’ as the cornerstone of 
the agency-freedom relationship. In this regard, we say having freedom is important, but having 
agency to choose to have freedom is more aspirational (i.e. value laden). As evidence, in 
Chapter 6, M.G.’s case study is a manifestation of this idea, as M.G.’s substantive rationality 
and his hope have resulted in the decision to save his business. This decision has contracted 
M.G.’s negative freedom to live a financially secure life, but that precise decision has expanded 
his positive freedom, as well as his affective and cognitive modes of agency to live an 
aspirational life. A life that creates change in the way people have access to book through 
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online tools in his country. These findings can be used in future studies to test whether the 
affective and conative modes of agency are more related to the positive side of ‘freedom’, and 
the conative mode of agency is more related to the negative side of freedom. Figure 54 
summarises our findings regarding the agency-freedom relationship in the following four 
domains of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency:  
• Beneficial Functioning (BF): If one’s state of being/doing is evaluated as BF, then three 
modes of agency (cognitive, conative and affective) and two sides of freedom (positive 
and negative) have a positive-direct relationship. Hence, both her agency and freedom 
levels are expanded after decision. In this case the chosen option is both internally and 
externally desirable that is value laden according to both ‘self’ and ‘other’ evaluation. As 
an example see K.G.’s agency-freedom after the decision to give away his business 
wealth in Chapter 5, Study 4, Part 2.  
• Adverse Commanding (AC): If one’s state of being/doing is evaluated as AC, then three 
modes of her agency (cognitive, conative and affective) and two sides of freedom 
(positive and negative) have a negative-direct relationship. Hence, agency and freedom 
levels are both contracted after her decision. This means that her chosen capability is in 
conflict with both her own values and external norms. For example, the state of 
being/doing of Jean Valjean, the protagonist of Victor Hugo’s 1862 novel Les Miserables, 
who was arrested for committing a crime (stealing a bread) after breaking the law was 
Adverse Commanding. 
• Adverse Functioning (AF): If one’s state of being/doing is evaluated as AF, then her 
agency and freedom have a reverse relationship of type one (Figure 54). Hence, at least 
one mode of her agency (possibly the cognitive mode) and her positive freedom is 
contracted while her negative freedom is expanded after decision. Here the agency level 
after the decision needs to be determined by collecting evidence according to (A) 
agentic factors using the Evaluation Instrument, (B) considering reflection problem that 
how self and other’s viewpoint can influence each other (see Minskey’s (1975) theory of 
mind), and (C) considering the neighbourhood effect on the agent’s evaluation of her 
state of being and doing as suggested in several studies (Goux and Maurin, 2007; 
Freeland, and Keister, 2016). In this case the agent’s chosen option is internally 
desirable (i.e. conducive to her values) but externally non-desirable (i.e. in conflict with 
some norms). As an example, see Chapter 5, M.M.’s decision.    
• Beneficial Commanding (BC): If one’s state of being/doing is evaluated as BC, then her 
agency and freedom have a reverse relationship of type two (Figure 54). Hence, at least 
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one mode of her agency (possibly the affective mode or cognitive mode) is contracted 
after the decision, but her negative freedom is expanded. This means that her chosen 
capability is in conflict with her own values, but is conducive to external norms. To clarify 
what mode of agency is expanded and how positive/negative freedom changes we need 
to consider the reflection problem by collecting data about the agentic factors, as well as 
the neighbourhood effect on agent’s evaluation. For example, a social smoker who has 
to refrain from smoking in public spaces in the UK is at the Beneficial Commanding state 
of being/doing, because internally she wants to smoke but she refrains from doing so 
due to the smoking ban regulation, which is beneficial to her own health and that of 
others.   
 
It is important to clarify how AF and BC rank in terms of agency and freedom with each 
other. In this regard, we believe that the process of living according to an agent’s values is more 
important than the end point that may be achieved by making decisions that are in conflict with 
personal values but expands one’s available options (Clark, 2005; Gasper, 2002; Nussbaum, 
2004). In this line, we call for further studies to use the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency and our 
Evaluation Instrument to investigate the relative ranking of BA and AF in terms of agency before 
and after the decision, as presented in Figure 54. In this line, to understand agency-freedom link 
one of the issues that need to be considered about the relationship between agency and 
freedom is that in this thesis we investigate the correlation of these two concept and we have 
not tried to establish causality. Here, we say that agency and freedom are correlated in 
monotonic and multidirectional way, and we have established that to understand this 
relationship the changes in three modes of agency (affective, cognitive and conative) and two 
sides of freedom (positive and negative) need to be studied in isolation. However, if a research 
will try to explain causal relationship between agency and freedom then the issue of 
endogeneity needs to be considered. The endogeneity issue is that agency and freedom can 
have two-way relationship, which means that expansion of agency increases freedom level, 
while at the same time one can argue that the expansion of freedom can increase agency. If 
future research tries to explain the causal relationship between agency and freedom, an 
instrumental variable must be found that is correlated with one side of this causal relationship, 
while it is not correlated with the other side. For example, it can be argued that agent’s 
educational level is correlated with her cognitive and affective modes of agency, but it is not 
correlated with her negative sides of freedom. Hence, educational level can be used as an 
instrumental variable to explain the casual relationship between cognitive and affective modes 
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of agency and negative freedom. It must be emphasised that the present thesis is not 
concerned with explaining the causal relationship between agency and freedom, but if future 
studies are looking for causal link then they need to find relevant instrumental variables, like 
educational level. 
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Figure 54: The Freedom-Agency Relationship in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency 
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In this line, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is novel as most of the freedom-oriented 
studies are narrowed to the decision object (i.e. capabilities) by building upon Sen's (1999) CA 
and hardly offer a new perspective to study freedom (Bellanca et al., 2011; Cameron and 
Eyeson, 2012). Some studies have indirectly explained the impact of environment on the 
freedom of individuals but they are narrowed to single factors like culture (Douglas, 2007), 
authority (Milgram, 1965), identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010) and market (Becker, 2010). 
Some decision researchers focus on the psychological aspects of a decision and indirectly point 
to freedom through other concepts, such as agency (Bandura, 2012) and motivation (Deci and 
Ryan, 2012). In addition, most of the freedom-oriented studies have a normative perspective 
(Bandura, 2012; Sen, 2007) and their problem is that they are mainly theoretical and developed 
in the field of philosophy (Bakhtin, 1935; Berlin, 1958), and/or ignore the philosophical 
foundations and rely purely on empirical findings in the field of psychology (Bandura, 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, this study builds upon agency-freedom studies by linking these two 
concepts. Our novelty is to establish a monotonic, multidirectional and temporal relation 
between agency and freedom through developing a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. This theory is 
coherent and unique because it measures both the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ senses of freedom 
in relation to three modes of agency that are cognitive, conative and affective. 
In terms of negative freedom, this study has three contributions to the area of agency-
freedom. First, we follow Sen's (1999) view on negative freedom. The Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency identifies the impact of both ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ on agent’s capabilities. Second, 
capabilities are assessed based on a value-laden criterion (i.e. ‘desirability’) as well as the 
‘realisable’ characteristic that is about personal and universal constraints on the agency-
freedom relationship. Overall, this study contributes to the understanding of negative freedom 
by identifying the boundaries of the space within which one is free to decide based on her: (a) 
values and (b) capability set. 
 In terms of positive freedom, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has three contributions to 
research on what/who is the ‘self’ that controls agency-outcome with respect to freedom. First, 
we have empirically shown that both the ‘rational’ and ‘affective’ sides of ‘self’ are in charge of 
planned and intellectual agency-outcome that are conducive to an agent’s values and expand 
freedom. Second, we have empirically tested the impact of Weiner's (2010) attribution emotions 
on agency-outcome in relation to freedom. Finally, we have identified how the ‘self’ is shaped in 
‘society’ from two perspectives. Our first approach is based on Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism that 
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sheds light on the reconciliation approaches that people use to subjugate their ‘self’/’other’ 
worldview when they face authorities. Second, based on different types of Weber's (1993) 
rationalities we have established self-society interaction by showing how the ‘self’ reacts to the 
values and goals of societies. Overall, both the ‘cognitive’ and ‘affective’ modes of agency are 
captured in positive sense of freedom. The novelty of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is 
gathering ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ senses of freedom in three modes of agency (i.e. cognitive, 
affective and conative) within a unified theory.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Introduction 
This thesis aims to determine the agency-freedom relationship. As a result, a Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency was developed that: (a) explains cognitive, conative and affective modes of 
agency with respect to freedom, (b) measures agency with respect to both the positive and 
negative sides of freedom, and (c) determines how agency and freedom are related. This 
chapter presents the link between the research gap and the novelty of our enquiry. In this 
regard, it starts by presenting the theoretical contributions of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to 
Berlin's (1958) view on freedom in philosophy, Sen's (1999) Capability Approach in human 
development, Weiner's (2010) emotions in the Attribution Theory of Motivation, Weber's (1993) 
rationality types and Bakhtin's (1935) dialogical theory. Following, this chapter presents three 
practical contributions of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency that are: (a) it is a valid theory 
because it has been tested and approved in one complete case study (see the M.G. Case 
Study); (b) it is accompanied by a reliable Evaluation Instrument because it has been tested and 
amended in two surveys (N1 = 1063 and N2 = 4086) (see Chapter 5); and (c) this theory offers 
eight Self and nine Other scales to measure agency levels based on an agent’s freedom. 
Further, this chapter presents the methodological contributions of the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency as it is among the pioneering multidisciplinary theories on the agency-freedom 
relationship that determines the agency-freedom relationship by linking Berlin's (1958) definition 
of freedom with Sen's (1999) focus on an agent’s capabilities and Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism as 
the conative mode of agency; linking them to Weber's (1993) rationality types as the cognitive 
mode of agency, and finally mapping these two modes of agency onto Weiner's (2010) 
attribution emotions as the affective mode of agency. In this line, this study has managed to 
develop an Evaluation Instrument that has improved self-report data collection tools by 
measuring each agentic factor associated with freedom from the ‘self’ and ‘other’ stand points.  
However, in the limitations section we show that the Tri-modal Theory of Agency 
requires further development in the following areas: (A) analysing the number and quality of 
capabilities (e.g. using Fuzzy Analysis techniques as suggested by Martinko and Martinez, 
2012) in time (see Chiappero-Martinetti et al., 2015); (B) measuring the impact of emotion on 
the agency-freedom relationship (e.g. using longitudinal data, experimental intervention, and 
research methods that test emotions within person and day-to-day variation as suggested by 
Ashkanasy, 2015); (C) identifying the impact of side-effects and impact of chance and/or luck on 
agency-outcome with respect to freedom; (D) detecting an agent’s exercise of rationalisation 
from the standpoint of real third-party observers; (E) measuring the reason-emotion association 
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and its impact on agency outcome; and (F) conducting cross-cultural studies to broaden the 
generalisability of the outcome. 
This chapter will end by recommending several areas for future studies and relevant 
research questions that are: (A) analysing decision side effects on the agency-freedom link; (B) 
ranking agency and freedom levels in the inverse agency-freedom relationships of Adverse 
Functioning and Beneficial Commanding (see Chapter 8, Discussion); (C) collecting more 
empirical evidence for impact of emotion, reason and their combination on the agency-freedom 
link; (D) applying the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to freedom-oriented questions about decisions 
in different contexts; (E) using the Evaluation Instrument to detect rationalisation in agency-
freedom oriented research topics; (F) grouping people based on their rationality type with 
respect to their agency and freedom level; and (G) using the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to test 
the agency-freedom relationship of individuals for improving their mental health in different 
social settings (e.g. organisations). Overall, this chapter shows how this research has started a 
new path to study the agency-freedom relationship. 
  
Novelty and Gap 
The findings indicate that this research has been the first multidisciplinary (i.e. 
philosophy, psychology, sociology, economy) study that has successfully addressed the gap in 
freedom-agency research by defining agency and freedom in relation to each other and 
developing a Tri-Modal Theory of Agency to measure the agency-freedom relationship. The gap 
is that the relationship between agency and freedom is contested and unclear (see Chapter 2, 
Literature Review). In other words, it has been unclear how internally a decision is produced 
and how one’s freedom is expanded/contracted as a result of that decision, when one says “I 
chose to do/be something”, particularly when this decision is made contrary to external 
judgment (i.e. counterintuitive) and/or internal judgment (i.e. incontinent actions) (see Chapter 3, 
Methodology). The Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has clarified the answers of the above-
mentioned two research questions by achieving two objectives: (A) identifying the agency-
oriented factors associated with freedom, and (B) establishing freedom expansion/contraction 
based on those agency-oriented factors. Addressing these two objectives, the Tri-Modal Theory 
of Agency contributes to the area of agency-freedom in the following theoretical, practical and 
methodological strands. 
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Theoretical Contribution 
Our attempt to show what factors influence one’s agency to do/be what she values (i.e. 
the first research question) has several theoretical contributions to freedom and agency studies. 
First, it builds on Berlin's (1958) definition of freedom by questioning his view about the role of 
the divided self on decision making. Berlin believes that intellectual and rational decisions are 
reason oriented and emotion distracts one’s intellectual choices (Martins, 2015). In this line, we 
have used Weiner's (2010) Attribution Theory of Motivation and we have shown the important 
role of emotion on life-changing and intellectual decisions. The novelty of our approach is that 
we have used Weiner's (2010) list of emotions and his method of investigating emotions with 
focus on agency and freedom. The reason that we have combined Weiner's (2010) emotional 
approach in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is to analyse the emotions that influence an agent’s 
subsequent decision. The findings of the M.G. case study have shown that when M.G. was 
reflecting on others’ (i.e. his partner, mother, angle investor, and his cousins) evaluations of his 
situation, he was experiencing different emotions (i.e. pride, sadness, fear, and envy) 
simultaneously. It is not yet clear how emotion and reason are integrated in the mind (Damasio 
et al., 2015), but our findings have shown that ‘hope’ and ‘substantive rationality’ has been the 
main drivers of M.G.’s agency outcome (see Chapter 6, Case Study). The emotions that are 
detected in the present study are similar to Weiner's (2010) list of emotions, but our novelty is 
that we have used them to understand how these emotions influence agency outcome with a 
focus on freedom.  
Second, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has advanced Sen's (2007, 1999, 1977, 1973, 
1997) Capability Approach in the area of the agency-freedom relationship by: (A) tracing how a 
capability turns into state of being/doing, which builds upon Alkire's (2008, 2007, 2005, 2002) 
approach of identifying a capability set; (B) evaluating capabilities and state of being/doing form 
personal and social views based on their volition and desirability in a unified model; (C) 
measuring the role of emotion on capability realisation that is a reply to Nussbaum's (2007, 
2003) call in the field of philosophy and human development; (D) acknowledging the impact of 
decision consequences on capability realisation; (E) developing eight self and nine other 
measurement scales to evaluate states of being/doing with a focus on freedom and agency that 
is consistent with the Deci and Ryan (2012, 2008, 1985) attempt to identify motivation; and (F) 
for the first time establishing how personal and environmental factors influence capability 
realisation based on both Weber's (1993) sociological theory and Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism. 
Third, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency contributes to existing agency theories (e.g. 
Bandura, 2012, 1989, 1977; Milgram, 2009, 1965, 1963), normative theories of behaviour 
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(Cialdini et al., 1990), exchange theories of behaviour (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005), and 
attitude theories of behaviour (Ajzen, 2011) by identifying a fresh perspective on how 
environment and agents interact. This is the first study that has combined Weber's (1993) view 
on how modern individuals’ internalise bureaucratic social norms and Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism 
on how an agent subjugates her worldview in front of others. In this line, the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency contributes to freedom-agency studies by: (A) mapping the factors that influence one’s 
evaluation of her state of being/doing onto Weber's (1993) different types of rationalities in order 
to show how societies impact individuals’ agencies, and what values shape an individual’s 
reasons for her decisions; (B) following Bakhtin's (1935) dialogism, developing our agentic 
Evaluation Instrument as a self-report method that helps individuals to self-reflection on their 
decisions, and enables researchers to detect if an agent is subjugating her worldview in front of 
the opposing worldview.  
Overall, the two theoretical contributions above advance our understanding of the 
person-environment interaction in the agency-freedom link with respect to Berlin's (1958) 
positive and negative freedom. This is because our attempt to answer the first research 
question is based on who/what is the source of control (i.e. positive freedom), while it also helps 
to identify the space within which an agent is free to do/be what she values (i.e. negative 
freedom). Further, our attempt to show freedom expansion/contraction based on agency-
oriented factors (i.e. the second research question) has resulted in several theoretical 
contributions to freedom studies. First, it builds on Berlin's (1958) definition of coercion (see 
Chapter 8, Discussion) by (a) defining agency and freedom in relationship, (b) focusing on one’s 
values in order to show if a decision is conducive to those values (i.e. expands freedom), or is in 
conflict with those values (i.e. contracts freedom). No doubt, psychological, social, and 
philosophical theories of agency will benefit from the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency, because for 
the first time freedom and agency are linked in an analytical theory of agency outcome (i.e. 
decision), which is a well-known concept in all of these disconnected disciplines. Finally, our 
advancements to the agency-freedom link have been tested in one comprehensive case study 
(see Chapter 6, Case Study). 
 
Practical Contribution 
The findings indicate that the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has five practical contributions 
to the field of the agency-freedom link. Researchers can apply this theory to any conscious and 
significant decision (e.g. employee selection, appraisal, retention, promotion, investment, career 
choice, migration) to answer the four following important questions about the agency-freedom 
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link: (A) what are the agency-freedom levels of the agent according to her evaluation of her 
state of being/doing before and after that decision; (B) what is the agent’s decision trajectory in 
time; (C) what are the possible unintended consequences of agency-outcome; and (D) whether 
the participant is exercising ‘rationalisation’. In particularly, detecting ‘rationalisation’ is a 
practical contribution to attribution studies (Ababneh et al., 2013; Carless and Waterworth, 
2012; Sugimoto, 2015), because the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency can identify if an individual is 
providing unsound reasons for her decisions, which shows lay individuals may have unsound 
logical reasoning when they try to explain their decisions (see Chapter 5, Study 1).  
In addition, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is accompanied by an Evaluation Instrument 
to identify agency-oriented factors. This instrument is valid (approved in one complete case 
study) and reliable (tested and amended in two surveys). This instrument is a significant 
practical contribution to the field of Self-Determination (Aryee et al., 2015; Deci and Ryan, 2012). 
Finally, this study contributes to the studies that focus on the role of emotion in an individual’s 
social behaviour in organisations (Ashkanasy and Daus, 2016, 2013), particularly the studies on 
employees’ voluntary participation (Ashkanasy, 2013), their affective commitment and the 
relationship between these issues and career growth (Ashkanasy, 2015, 2014).  
 
Methodological Contribution 
Developing the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency we have two methodological contributions to 
the field of agency-freedom. First, this is the first study that applies a multi-disciplinary theory to 
agency-freedom studies from several disconnected areas in the humanities, selects the most 
relevant theory on agency-freedom from each discipline, and finally combines them in the Tri-
Modal Theory of Agency. In this line, the theories that are selected and combined are by 
Bakhtin (1935) and Berlin (1969) on philosophy of freedom; by Sen (2007, 1990) on economy of 
decision making; by Weber (1993) on sociology of individual decision-makers in bureaucratic 
societies; and by Weiner (2010) on psychology of emotions that are generated in the decision-
making process. Second, this research builds upon the studies (Tao, 2016, 2013) that use the 
mixed-method approach towards social enquiry based on critical realist research philosophy to 
determine an agency-freedom relationship. In this regard, both the individuals’ interpretations as 
well as the existing trends of agency-outcome regarding freedom are investigated, using both 
qualitative and quantitative methods. In particular, we have several unique methodological 
advantages. First, our quantitative method is conducted on two large samples (n=1063, and 
n=4086) in two different studies on career choice and university major selection. Second, the 
survey questionnaires are designed in a way that each participant is required to self-reflect on 
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her decision from the two worldviews of ‘self’ and ‘other’. Third, based on the result of the factor 
analysis the agency-oriented factors are tested and amended in two studies. Finally, our case 
study is particularly novel because it has been accompanied by a coherent methodology for 
applying the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency.    
 
Limitations of the Study 
It must be acknowledged that the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency has some limitations. First, 
the impact of decision side-effects is not explained in detail on the agent’s life trajectory. Hence, 
the role of chance and/or luck on the agency-freedom relationship is not determined in this 
version of the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. This restriction is because the combinatorics of a 
decision’s side-effects are huge and so it is impractical to deal with through conventional 
methods within the time boundaries of a PhD thesis. In this line, we have narrowed our analysis 
to only one decision cycle in an agent’s life (as shown in case study methodology, we have 
traced decisions one cycle before and after the focal decision). Second, capability analysis 
needs further enquiry in the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency. At the moment, we have only analysed 
two complementary capabilities related to one focal decision. This is because focusing on a 
greater number of capabilities has required us to use Fuzzy Analysis on how the capability set 
will evolve in time. Using this approach would also exceed the time available for a PhD project. 
Third, investigating the impact of emotion on the agency-freedom link needs further empirical 
support and application of additional techniques from neuroscience and psychology. In this 
regard, the Tri-Modal of Theory of Agency has only opened the path to study the impact of 
emotion on the agency-freedom linkage. Here, we have found some empirical support only for 
the emotions in Weiner's (2010) list. In this vein, our theory does not explain how countervailing 
emotions like pride, shame, sadness, joy and etc. combine in a way that an agent decides to 
choose an alternative that contradicts some of these drives.  
Fourth, an agent’s choice lays in etymology of a cognition-affect counterbalance in detail 
with the Tri-Modal theory of Agency. We have acknowledged this limitation in the Emotion and 
Rationale Black Boxes, but further studies in the field of neuroscience may help to satisfy this 
inadequacy. However, recent studies on rational-affect association (Damasio et al., 2015; 
Holmstrom et al., 2014) are not providing comprehensive answers to these questions and it 
seems that emotional scientists are taking the first steps in this line of enquiry.  
Fifth, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency needs further consideration to detect the role of 
the theme of ‘logical reasoning’ (see thematic analysis, Chapter 5, Study 1), through the 
exercising of ‘rationalisation’ (i.e. when one replaces the sound - in the logical sense - reason 
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for a convenient one). Instead, the present study has collected data only from the agent’s point 
of view. Hence, we need to expand the evaluation part of our theory by collecting data from 
third-party observers as well. Further, our proposition regarding the type of reconciling approach 
that an agent uses to integrated her ‘self’ with the ‘other’ worldview is a novel idea and with 
extra findings it can be presented as an original sub-theory. Finally, a limitation of the present 
study is its contextual limitation in that it is narrowed to Iran. Due to accessibility issues, the Tri-
Modal Theory of agency has been developed and applied in two surveys, several interviews and 
one case study in Iran. However, these limitations do not prevent the Tri-Modal Theory of 
Agency from establishing a novel view of the agency-freedom relationship. On the other hand, 
these restraints call for the following areas for future research on the freedom-agency link.     
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
To improve the Tri-Modal of Theory of Agency, we call for future research on the 
following areas. First, consistent with researchers that have focused on impact of chance on 
freedom, like Alfred (2015), Garcia Gracia et al. (2015), and Hedgecoe (2015), we call for 
further research on the impact of decision consequences/side-effects on the agency-freedom 
relationship. In this line, researchers can investigate the following questions “How to capture the 
impact of more than one decision cycle on agent’s freedom”; “How chance and/or luck influence 
one’s agency level”, and “How an agent’s emotional-rational states change in time and what 
impact it has on the agent’s freedom”. 
Second, in line with emotion-decision scientists in the field of neuroscience (Damasio et 
al., 2015), psychology (Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew, 2014), robotics (Roberts, 2015) and 
philosophy (Nussbaum, 2007), we recommend researchers to conduct further empirical studies 
on the impact of emotion on the agency-freedom relationship. In this regard, researchers can 
investigate “What are the more reliable data collection tools to explore affectively and cognitively 
driven emotions generated in the past”; “How comprehensive is Weiner's (2010) list of emotions 
to explain the agency-freedom relationship”; and “How opposing emotions combine to drive an 
agent towards one certain path”. Here, we are repeating what studies with a focus on emotion 
have acknowledged in the humanities (Holmstrom et al., 2014) and robotic (Roberts, 2015).  
Third, in line with research on understanding decisions (e.g. Xie et al., 2015), particularly 
the studies on counterintuitive decisions (e.g. Tuthill, 2015), we call for further studies on 
comparing agency levels of the state of being/doing that are an inverse relationship between 
agency and freedom (i.e. Adverse Functioning (AF), and Beneficial Commanding (BC)). In this 
line, researchers can address the questions such as “How to rank agency and freedom levels of 
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AF or BC in relation to each other”. These are new areas that are established by the Tri-Modal 
Theory of Agency and researchers with interest in the areas of person-environment interaction 
(e.g. Amiot et al., 2012; Bandura, 2015; Ajzen, 2015; Cialdini and Trost, 1998; Cropanzano and 
Mitchell, 2005) can benefit from these lines of enquiry. 
Fourth, as an study that has developed an Evaluation Instrument to detect the exercising 
of ‘rationalisation’ by comparing ‘self’ and ‘other’ evaluations in a self-report questionnaire we 
call for further investigations on the following research questions: “How to recognise if an agent 
is deceitful about her freedom level in a self-report questionnaire”; “Is there any correlation 
between one’s tendency to exercise rationalisation and her agency level with a focus on 
freedom”; “Is there any link between rationalisation, rationality types, reconciling approach and 
values”. These research enquiries offer important insights for researchers in the areas of 
agency and freedom by using our Evaluation Instrument. 
Fifth, future studies can use the agentic factor to cluster individuals according to their 
agency level. This line can include such research questions as: “Are people with certain 
Weberian (1993) rationality types (i.e. substantive, practical, formal, and theoretical) classifiable 
in distinguishable agency levels?”; “Do people with substantive rationality enjoy higher level of 
agency than individuals that have the formal type of rationality?” These enquiries particularly 
build upon the studies that focus on Weber's (1993) rationality types (e.g. Adler, 2012; 
Cockerham, 2015; Kalberg, 1980). 
Further, future studies can apply the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency in different contexts in 
order to understand the impact of culture and society on the agency-freedom relationship. 
Accordingly, researchers can investigate “Are agentic factors valid in different cultures?”; “The 
extent to which the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency is able to explain agency-freedom link in 
different societies”; and “what is the role of culture in an individual’s tendency to make 
counterintuitive decisions”. Finally, the Tri-Modal Theory of Agency can be used in the area of 
psychological wellbeing (e.g. Moscone et al., 2016) to understand the role of agency and 
freedom on mental health of an individual in a social setting (e.g. work setting). This line can 
include such research questions as “What is the impact of having expanded agency in all three 
modes of cognitive, conative and affective on the mental health of workers?”, or “Is there any 
meaningful relationship between having certain rationality types and psychological wellbeing at 
work setting?”  
To conclude, this study has started a new path to clarify the agency-freedom relationship 
and it ends this research with a call for more research on this area. At the end, we have come to 
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this understanding of the agency-freedom relationship that although freedom matters, having 
agency to give up freedom in pursuit of one’s values ought to be the primary aspiration. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Coding (Study 1) 
 
 Key themes               Sub-themes 
1 
 
Logical 
Reasoning  
 
Actual Sentence Use: 
This choice is not my priority, but it is still my priority; 
I cannot leave my belongings and my family, … I can forget my 
family and leave the country; 
I did not want to choose my other options, so I chose this job with 
full freedom;  
its wage was very low, no one knows this as a job … I like this job;  
 
Actual Word Use: 
Choices;  
And 
So 
Or 
if 
Forced me;  
My Priority;  
Freely;  
Cost & Benefit Analysis;  
Better Decision;  
Right Word;  
Because;  
Situation;  
Completely Free;  
Low Wage;  
Satisfied;  
Need;  
I was only 19 years old;  
Age;  
Free time to study;  
Earn money; 
2 
 
Freedom 
Awareness  
 
Actual Sentence Use: 
My other better alternatives;  
My first priority was to become a professor;  
I made this decision freely;  
The situation pushed me to make this decision, but I made a free 
choice;  
I cannot fight with all of the things around me;  
I could have made other choices, but I decide freely;  
My main alternative was studying for a PhD;  
My main alternative was becoming a professor in a university 
abroad;  
My main alternative was working in my university major;  
Being a personal tutor is an option, which may not be the first 
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option but keeps us in contact with society;  
I had freedom of choice among a limited number of similar options;  
I did not face a closed door among the options I had but there were 
not many alternatives;  
If I had more options to choose then the gender difference might 
become important;  
Being a man or woman does not limit your options in this job as a 
personal tutor;  
In the public sector the priority is with men, but to become a 
personal tutor there is no difference;  
 
Actual Word Use:  
My First Option;  
Other Better Alternatives;  
Stanford University;  
Good Universities;  
Universities Abroad;  
University Professor;  
Low Ranked Universities;  
Better Options;  
Leave Other Choices;  
Higher Level;  
Continue;  
First Priority;  
Countries’ Situation;  
Difficult;  
Cannot Become;  
Situation;  
Things around me;  
Cannot;  
Let me;  
I am pushed;  
Freely;  
Limitation;  
Studying for PhD;  
Main alternative;  
Situation;  
Opportunity;  
Organisation provides an opportunity;  
Forced opportunity;  
Available options;  
Freedom to choose among limited options;  
Not many options;  
Contact with society;  
Facing a closed door;  
Not many alternatives;  
Gender difference; 
Priority with men; 
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3 
 
Teleological 
Reasoning 
 
Actual Sentence Use: 
This job had a proper future;  
To start show your brother ship then you will be promoted;  
When I was student, I imagining myself in the position of my own 
personal tutor;  
I became a personal tutor because I felt job security in this 
organisation;  
I became a personal tutor because this institution has a learning 
environment;  
This job gave me good job experience;  
I could not reach my financial goals as a personal tutor;  
I did not want to stay in this role but I expect to be promoted after 
six years;  
Since I was a student I like to be a personal tutor;  
I liked to give consultancy to students since I was a student myself;  
When becoming a personal tutor, I was not thinking about its 
future; 
It was a job that I liked;  
I became a personal tutor in order to be in touch with students and 
give them consultancy;  
I could teach them (the students) at home if I was lucky;  
Because the other options were not interesting for me at all;  
Because I like this job,  
I do this with a minimum wage;  
I like personal tutorship over other part-time jobs because I like the 
educational atmosphere;  
I think I like the role of Personal Tutor rather than teacher;  
If I took Kanoon exams as a student, I could choose a better major 
and then find a better job; 
If I were in my Personal Tutor shoes;  
I was thinking about in the past; 
 
Actual Word Use: 
Role of personal tutor; 
Teaching ability;  
Improve myself;  
Lead me;  
Future;  
Dream;  
Wish;  
Establishing;  
Meritocracy in Kanoon;   
Environment for my improvement;  
Development in my career;  
Job security;  
General goal;  
Preparing myself for something;  
Required experience;  
Too young;  
When I was student;  
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Value;  
Consultancy;  
Think about future; 
Like;  
Financial Source;  
Educational Field;  
Teaching;  
Students;  
Class;  
Teach at Home;  
Consultancy;  
Minimum wage;  
Role;  
I think;  
Teacher;  
Impact of previous decisions;  
Kanoon Exams;  
Better major;  
Student; 
4 
 
First Party 
Evaluation 
 
Actual Sentence Use: 
A job that ensures you receive a regular salary;  
I do not pay attention to what others say;  
I try to prove to others that I made a right choice by improving in 
my job;  
I had the required background as my family is working in Kanoon;  
I do not accept many people, only my family;  
I believe only in my family;  
My concerns are my family’s concerns;  
I have consulted an expert and he prevented me from starting my 
business as a woman;  
The female age of entrepreneurship is higher;  
My mother had a great role;  
My mother forced me to choose an option that leads me towards 
stability;  
My family directed my university major;  
My parents’ influence is positive and I accept it;  
I can moderate my family’s influence but it is a good force;  
My family’s force leads me towards a good end;  
We live in a small city and everyone is curious about your actions 
and decisions;  
In our small city we have to do things that are required by people in 
power;  
In other jobs people have better social status;  
My interests and freedom to choose are more important than my 
social status;  
 
Actual Word Use: 
Father;  
Mother;  
Close Friends;  
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Public Sector;  
Salary;  
Insure;  
Security;  
Prove them;  
Different View;  
What Others Say;  
Required Back Ground;  
Family;  
Accept people;  
Concern;  
Problem;  
Wisdom;  
Influence;  
Female;  
Age;  
Entrepreneurship;  
Sharif University;  
Leads toward stability;  
Family;  
Direct;  
University major;  
Belief;  
Since childhood;  
Good end;  
Positive force;  
Push me;  
Towards good end;  
Social status;  
Interest; 
 
5 
 
Third Party 
Evaluation  
 
Actual Sentence Use: 
Others could not understand me;  
Discouraging signals coming from other sources around me;  
My father and mother knew me;  
My parents always look at me in a good way;  
After becoming a personal tutor, others’ perceptions of me had 
changed;  
It seemed that they were saying I made a mistake;  
No one knows my interest; 
I know myself;  
Seeing me from outside they cannot have a correct judgment;  
When I entered this role I found out that it was a bit different than I 
had imagined it;  
After a while I found out that my previous perception was wrong;  
All my colleagues are trying to get money from people’s children;  
This job has difficulties of its own;  
The manager above us is not an interesting and kind man at all;  
They ask us lots of tasks while the money we got in return is not 
enough at all;  
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I prefer teaching in a good high school rather than a university;  
I am forced not to show my different religious beliefs because they 
attribute different things to my behaviour; 
Compared with other jobs I learn managerial rules as a personal 
tutor;  
I laugh at those who criticise my decision, because I know better;  
They say I made a mistake;  
My father was not agreeing;  
My family could not stop me from pursuing my interest;  
I compare my job with my students’ parents’ jobs and I see other 
jobs are better judged in Iran;  
I wish I had chosen a major that suites better the country’s social 
and economic situation;  
When I go for job interviews in the public sector they look at me as 
if I was an unemployed person;  
When I say what is my major and university, they look at me like I 
have done nothing important;  
My father and partner have no objection to working as a personal 
tutor;  
I was lazy and becoming a personal tutor helped me because I had 
to work on weekends;  
In future decisions I pay more attention to the environment and 
how to treat others at work;  
I consult with others but I always take the final decision;  
My family knew me;  
After the environment my personality is important in my decisions;  
I do not choose the jobs that my friends always choose; 
They knew me;  
I am a picky person;  
I have special interests; 
I prefer to be a good teacher in a high school, rather than being a 
professor in a bad university;  
In Iran if they have different religious beliefs, it is for themselves 
and they do not show it;  
In Iran people are forced to adapt the religious beliefs authorised in 
the country;  
Going to university gives you something that puts you higher than 
other students;  
I had no other option as I was studying and worked as a personal 
tutor;  
I do not say luck, but I say God will;  
I behaved as it is said in Islam which is true;  
No one treats personal tutoring like a proper job;  
The public sector does not employ my major easily;  
To start a business, you need lots of investment;  
Iran’s educational system look at my major traditionally; 
 
Actual Word Use:  
Discouraging Signal;  
Other Sources Around;  
Father & Mother;  
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Parents;  
Look at Me;  
Perception Toward me;  
They were Saying;  
Prevent;  
General View;  
Judgment;  
Negatively Evaluated;  
Students’ Educational Development;  
Colleagues;  
Getting Money from Peoples’ Children;  
My Mind;  
Priority;  
Job;  
Difficulties;  
Manager;  
Kind;  
Lots of Tasks;  
Corruption;  
Lower Degree;  
Formalized;  
Academic Job;  
Iran;  
Prefer;  
Different Religious Beliefs;  
They may Attribute;  
My behaviour;  
My brother;  
Example;  
Successful;  
Managerial rule;  
Criticise my choice;  
Others;  
Laugh at them;  
Agree;  
My students’ parents’ jobs;  
Accepted;  
Suites;  
Social and economic situation;  
Valued here;  
Unemployed person;  
Bad feeling;  
Treat;  
Husband;  
Objection;  
I was lazy;  
Environment;  
Treat others;  
Final decision;  
Consult with others;  
Good Teacher;  
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Good University;  
Bad University;  
Sharif University;  
Amir Kabir University;  
Tehran University;  
Top Ranked University;  
Strange Factor;  
Religious Beliefs;  
Here in Iran;  
Society;  
Thing;  
Forced to Adapt;  
Authorized in Country;  
Wait to go to university;  
I had no other option;  
God Will;  
Luck;  
Islam;  
Behave;  
True;  
Public Sector;  
Investment;  
Educational System;  
Traditional Way; 
 
 
6 
 
Ontology of 
Attribution 
 
Actual Sentence Use: 
To be hired I did not put in any effort but as a Personal Tutor I 
worked hard;  
I had the factors that the organisation was looking for; 
Wisdom is more important that effort to enter Kanoon;  
I became a Personal Tutor because I needed a part-time job as a 
university student but they did not promote me; 
Personal Tutorship is not my career prospect;  
I want to continue in my university major;  
A lack of luck, family, friends, effort and ability were the reasons 
that I decided to become a Personal Tutor;  
Others were not important in my decision and I have special 
interests different to those of my friends; 
It was not luck, but by accident I found the role of Personal Tutor, 
because I was looking for a job;  
Actual Word Use: 
Hire;  
Easily;  
Effort;  
Interview;  
Organisational Positive View;  
Work hard;  
Ability;  
Wisdom;  
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Part-time job;  
Friend;  
Family;  
Effort;  
Luck;  
Ability; 
 
7 
 
Causal 
Reasoning 
 
Actual Sentence Use: 
I have some belongings that I cannot leave;  
Because my university lessons were more intense and I could not 
do a part-time job;  
They have passed a law that only those with a PhD degree can 
become a professor in university;  
My belonging to my family did not allow me to leave and go to 
another country to study;  
As I could not find a job related to my major I became a Personal 
Tutor;  
Comparing bad feelings I received from interviews in other 
organisations, working in Kanoon gave me good feeling;  
My previous job was not satisfying and by accident I saw an ad for 
Personal Tutorship;  
I was lazy to start a difficult job;  
I had to try harder for other alternatives; 
 
Actual Word Use: 
Belonging;  
Cannot Leave;  
External Force;  
Busy Schedule;  
Part Time Job;  
During That Time;  
It was a Good Time;  
After Two Years;  
When;  
More Free Time;  
Start Working;  
AT the End Of;  
Gradually Graduating;  
Pass a Law;  
PhD;  
Master;  
Lower Ranked University;  
Compare;  
My major;  
Interesting;  
Advertisement;  
By accident;  
Previous job;  
Lazy;  
Try harder; 
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8 
 
Impact of 
Commodity 
 
 
Actual Sentence Use: 
The influential factors in my decision definitely are within me. 
I chose it because of interest and ability that I felt from within. 
I was the best student in our school.  
I was hard working with good results at school. 
There are so many other better candidates with PhDs from other 
countries. 
To start working in Kanoon you must first become a Personal Tutor 
and show your abilities. 
I think this is a free choice. 
They interviewed me for this job, so it could be effort. 
That means that my interests are also important that I became a 
Personal Tutor in Kanoon. 
Because of my personality I may not continue the task that I have 
started in a perfect way. 
I have to work in Kanoon to build up my personality.  
One or two days of hopelessness is enough, not more. 
To be hired I did not put in any effort.  
After the interview I was easily accepted as a Personal Tutor.  
The organisation has had a very positive view towards me, 
because I had the things that they were looking for.  
I did not put in so much effort, but during my job in Kanoon, I was 
always working hard.  
I was trying hard to stay in Kanoon, when I faced difficulty and was 
desperate. 
Ability and wisdom are more important that effort. Without thinking 
this person cannot enter Kanoon. 
 
Actual Word Use: 
Within Me; 
Interest; 
Ability; 
Best Student; 
Hard Working; 
Talented; 
IQ; 
Better Candidates; 
Hopelessness; 
Easily; 
Try Hard; 
Things They Look for; 
Working Hard; 
Trying Hard; 
Wisdom; 
Effort; 
Thinking; 
 
9  
 
Correlational 
 
Actual Sentence Used: 
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Reasoning 
 
At that time, I was 19 years old. 
Simultaneously I could choose to work as an engineer. 
At that time, I had no experience. 
Other people like me decided the same. 
I became a Personal Tutor, because I was looking for this job. 
I did not have the required job experience to choose another job. 
I could not find a job related to my major. 
It was because of my major that I end up being a Personal Tutor. 
I had no other job opportunity. 
Actual Word used: 
Simultaneously 
At that time 
Then 
At that age 
During that period 
 
10 
 
Impact of 
Affective State 
 
 
 
Actual Sentence Use:  
Because, I am funded by my family and like Iran;  
I had a sense of gratitude towards Kanoon;  
If it was not for Kanoon, I could not succeed in Concour;  
Kanoon helped me and I felt gratitude towards it;  
I had to return Kanoon’s favour;  
I like to;  
Helping students satisfies some feeling in me that I like to do this 
job; 
It was important work in Kanoon, not other places;  
I like working in Kanoon;  
I want to talk about myself;  
I am seeing myself indebted to Kanoon;  
Main feeling;  
I was hopeful when deciding to become a Personal Tutor;  
I made a right choice because I wanted to build up my character;  
After some defeats I became helpless;  
Working with students in Kanoon is energising; 
 
Actual Word Use:  
My Family;  
Funded 
Iran;  
Country;  
Belongings;  
Feel;  
Obliged;  
Sense;  
Reciprocity;  
Feeling;  
Gratitude;  
Helped me;  
Favour;  
Help;  
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Like;  
Connected;  
Main Feeling;  
Hope;  
Important;  
Build up character;  
Hopeless;  
Defeat;  
Continue;  
Personality;  
Energizing; 
 
11 
 
Awareness of 
Affective State 
 
 
 
Actual Sentence Use:  
This job helps me to build my character;  
I forced myself to stay in this job;  
My personality is like when something contradicts with my study, I 
get rid of it;  
I decided to stay in this job to build up (my character);  
I wanted to sit and do a secure job and be relaxed;  
I found stability and serenity in Kanoon;  
I chose what I liked which was not a right decision;  
Others reacted unpleasantly when they found out that I am a 
Personal Tutor;  
I had to prove them wrong; 
 
Actual Word Use:  
Build;  
Character;  
Help;  
Force herself;  
Characteristics;  
Personality;  
Contradict;  
Feel;  
Stay;  
Build up;  
Relaxed;  
Secure job;  
Serenity;  
Stability;  
Like;  
Right;  
Choose;  
Unpleasant reaction;  
Prove them wrong;  
Successful; 
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Appendix 2: Participant Advertisement (Study1) 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Thanks for participating in this research, which is a part of my (Parastoo Ghalamchi) doctoral 
thesis in Brunel Business School. Brunel University and I assure you about the confidentiality of 
the information you provide for this research, i.e. no natural and legal third party can have 
access to your information without your permission. The next six questions are about your 
decision to become a Personal Tutor in this organisation. In particular, these questions try to 
reveal how volitional and valuable you think your decision to become a Personal Tutor is. 
Please read them carefully and answer the questions. If any of these questions seems vague, 
please mention it in the available box. Finally, please send us your contact information, if you 
are interested in participating in an interview about the same topic. In this interview we will ask 
you more questions in detail about the factors influencing you to choose to become a Personal 
Tutor. We will also send you the interview questions in advance. 
 
Question1 
Did you choose to be a Personal Tutor in Kanoon as your number one preference?  
 
 
Question2 
If you had an alternative, why did you not choose it? Please explain. 
 
 
Question3 
Did you feel any pressure from any party, when you were deciding to work as a Personal Tutor 
in Kanoon? 
 
 
Question4 
Do you think being a Personal Tutor in Kanoon is beneficial to your career life? 
 
 
 
Question5 
Do you think being a Personal Tutor in Kanoon is beneficial to your personal life? 
 
 
 
Question6 
Do you think being a Personal Tutor in Kanoon will help you achieve your life ambitions? 
 
 
 
If you are interested in participating in this research and attending an interview related to your 
  470 
decision to become a Personal Tutor, please fill in the attached questions and include the 
following contact information and send them to this email: Parastoo.ghalamchi@brunel.ac.uk 
Name:                                                      Email Address: 
Telephone:                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
